[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
- Forwarded message from cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: cyphrpunk <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 16:44:37 -0700 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]] Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] One of the problems with the idea of a pseudonym service distinguishing between "good" and 'bad" users is that it has no way on its own of telling the difference. The service manages pseudonyms, which are intended to be used out on the web in some way. But the service can't tell if people are playing nicely or not. The only way this could happen is if the service receives *complaints*. This is the only feedback mechanism possible. I gather that Tor does in fact send out complaints about people who misbehave. Perhaps blog services do so as well. One problem is that these complaints generally don't arrive in real time. It takes time for a human being to notice that some vandalism has occured and register a complaint. If the pseudonym service is going to be able to respond, it has to know which pseudonym was active at the time the bad actions occured. Jimmy Wales very accurately describes the problem with pseudonyms at the web-server level. If Wikipedia or blog comments require the use of pseudonyms, these can be linked after the fact. I am very sensitive to this problem myself. The implied solution is that the pseudonym service would maintain the pseudonyms, but would not reveal them to the web service. Rather, it would only provide a certificate that the pseudonym is currently in good standing, i.e. it has not received (too many) complaints. This implies that the pseudonym service must maintain a record of recently used pseudonyms, and have some way of mapping them to what the web services (which issue the complaints, services like Wikipedia) would have seen. This mapping might be by IP address, or if Wikipedia and other services are willing to do more, it could perhaps be an opaque identifier which the pseudonym service provided at the time the web service (Wikipedia) asked whether this pseudonym was a "good guy" or not. As a specific example, the pseudonym service might have replied, to a query from Wikipedia, "Yes, this user is a good guy, and the sequence number of this reply is #1493002." Then later if abuse occured, Wikipedia (or the blog service, or other victim of vandalism) comes back and said "we had a problem with the user who was certified with sequence number #1493002". The pseudonym server would map this back to the pseudonym in use at that time, and invalidate the pseudonym (or at least give it a bad mark, with enough such marks killing the nym). The main problems with this solution are first, it requires considerable manual work on the part of the pseudonym server, similar to the work necessary at an ISP to resolve complaints about users. It could be a full time job. And second, it requires custom software at Wikipedia and other web services that might be willing to work to implement such a solution. The second problem could be alleviated by the use of a related service, a web proxy that is only for "good" pseudonyms. The web proxy would provide transparent pass-through similar to anonymizer.com, but only for users who were able to provide the kind of certification described above, from the pseudonym server. In this way, the outgoing IP addresses belonging to the web proxy would be "good" from the POV of Wikipedia and other web services. Those services could continue to use IP blocking as one of their main tools for handling misuse, treating the web proxy service as being like an ISP. The web proxy service could be bundled with the pseudonym service, or they could exist independently. CP - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
- Forwarded message from Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -
From: Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 07:40:41 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]
User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Macintosh/20050317)
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Nick Mathewson wrote:
> But these aren't your goals, if I understand correctly. Wikipedia
> doesn't ultimately care how Tor is implemented, or what it contains,
> so long as it is significantly less effective as a tool for Wikipedia
> abuse. Yes?
That's right. I'm not an expert in Tor-ish matters, and so despite my
strident manner at times, I am very happy to learn more and understand
why some initial suggestion I might have has already been considered and
rejected with good cause.
And as an ongoing gesture of goodwill, let me explain _why_ I want Tor
to be significantly less effective as a tool for Wikipedia abuse. It
isn't because Tor is a threat to our work. One of the nice things about
how Tor is implemented is that we can easily get a list of the exit
servers and block them. Problem solved.
No, the reason I am interested in exploring possibilities for reducing
the abuse is not to protect wikipedia, but to make it possible for Tor's
goals to be achieved more effectively.
> {1} To be clear, I think that it's more accurate to talk about changes
> to the User/Tor/Wikipedia interaction, and to suggest a need for
> action by the Tor project and its supporters, than to talk about a
> need for changes in Tor's architecture, and a need for action by
> Tor.
Yes. The one thing I should caution against, though, is assuming that
the right solution to the problem should involve anything complicated on
the part of Wikipedia. We're willing to do whatever, but I'm also
interested in how this problem can be solved more generally. In this
way, tor servers can be allowed to post anonymously and in a hit-and-run
fashion to blogs, for example.
--Jimbo
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
- Forwarded message from David Benfell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -
From: David Benfell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 02:59:44 -0700
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.7i
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
On Thu, 29 Sep 2005 00:17:07 -0400, Nick Mathewson wrote:
>
> I assume that you're not just ignoring everybody else and replying
> only to what Jimmy says, right? There have been other posts here
> explaining why pseudonymity and Tor are not at odds, so long as
> pseudonymity is user selected.
Pseudonyms are a separate problem from Tor. As someone posted, Tor
does not prevent people from using pseudonyms. If pseudonyms will
solve Wikipedia's problem, then fine; a good portion of this argument
has been about Wikipedia's need for authentication. See my comments
following your footnote.
> Wikipedia has user accounts and IP-based blocking. That's a kind of
> authentication. Wikipedia does not require you to use a user account
> to edit pages, and does not do much to ensure that user accounts
> belong to real people. That's a lack of authentication.
>
Now why couldn't *he* say that? The man's involved with an
encyclopedia project; he should be able to write.
The way this particular aspect of our disagreement arose is that I
accused him of wanting Tor to do his authentication for him. He
claimed that Wikipedia does do its own authentication. Now you
explain that Wikipedia does not *require* authentication. Which
undermines the usefulness of offering authentication.
> It's like how Tor blocks some highly-abusable services, like SMTP on
> port 25, but doesn't do content filtering to try to hunt for abusive
> behavior on exiting streams. We filter out some abuse, but we can't
> filter out all abuse without turning off the network. An anti-Tor
> rhetorician could say, "You filter abuse, but you don't filter abuse!"
> But what would that prove?
You are attempting to compare Tor's security policy to Wikipedia's
security policy.
Tor has a security policy. Tor's security policy is to protect
originating IP addresses which might be connected to persons. We
hope, in combination with Privoxy, it protects anonymity
reasonably well. On the reasonable (I think) premise that other
sites are primarily responsible for their own security, it only
limits some abuse.
Now, what is Wikipedia's security policy? With no authentication
requirement, and a policy that allows anyone to edit (unless they're
connecting from a blacklisted IP address), I might as well ask, "What
is truth?"
> {1} This case is more commonly known, in the literature, as
> pseudonymous communication than anonymous communication. Then
> again, if you're going to invoke dictionaries in a technical
> discussion, anonymity becomes a very broad term.
But Tor is about anonymity. Not about pseudonymity. Not about other
forms of authentication. As it should be.
>From a communication perspective, anonymity has a very specific
meaning. It means we cannot identify a person. Note that the failure
to identify a person makes no reference to kind of identification.
There need be no preference for "real life" names versus pseudonyms
versus IP addresses versus whatever else you can think of. Anything
that identifies a person contradicts the concept that this person is
anonymous.
This has practical implications. For instance, as someone pointed
out, when the Chinese police raid a dissident's apartment, and search
his hard drive, they are able to tie the pseudonym to a "real life"
identity. If the police can also connect the pseudonym to what they
consider "crime," the distinction between a pseudonym and a "real
life" name loses much of its value; hopefully, the pseudonym permitted
the dissident to continue his activities for longer.
Now, I will certainly agree, as someone else pointed out, that Tor
should permit the use of pseudonyms or other forms of authentication.
But the fact remains that any identification--as implied by
authentication--contradicts anonymity; it is therefore something which
Tor should not involve itself with.
Simply put, it is not and cannot be Tor's problem.
--
David Benfell, LCP
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
---
Resume available at http://www.parts-unknown.org/
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
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ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
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[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
- Forwarded message from Nick Mathewson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -
From: Nick Mathewson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2005 00:38:01 -0400
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]
User-Agent: Mutt/1.4.2.1i
Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Hi again, Jimmy!
On Wed, Sep 28, 2005 at 06:57:37AM -0400, Jimmy Wales wrote:
[...]
> I said no such thing. Tor servers exist for the sole purpose of aiding
> people who have a genuine need for privacy. Tor operators by and large
> are unhappy that Tor users can't edit Wikipedia, and are genuinely
> interested in exploring solutions, especially solutions which involve
> changes or enhancements to the Tor architecture which help solve the
> problem not just for Wikipedia but for _all_ internet services which
> desire to carefully balance a desire for privacy and openness against abuse.
I think I've identified one of the reasons some people here are disturbed
about your suggestions. When you talk about changing the Tor
architecture, they think you mean changes to Tor that would require
all users to have pseudonyms, or ostracize the users who didn't. When
you say "Tor should do X," they think you mean "the Tor software
should do X".{1}
If that were what you meant, they would be right to be concerned.
Pseudonymity is wrong for many users. Complicating the core Tor
implementation would be bad.
But these aren't your goals, if I understand correctly. Wikipedia
doesn't ultimately care how Tor is implemented, or what it contains,
so long as it is significantly less effective as a tool for Wikipedia
abuse. Yes?
This could be achieved, as some people fear, through modifying the
core of Tor. But that isn't the only way to change matters. As
discussed, introducing a separate pseudonymous authentication service
(perhaps even an anonymous credential service, if we can find a way to
do this without patent infringement) would serve just as well, and
require no modifications to the Tor code. Users who didn't want to
use such a service would be no worse off than they are today. Users
who wanted to use Tor and edit Wikipedia at the same time could decide
whether the implications of such a service were acceptable to them.
{1} To be clear, I think that it's more accurate to talk about changes
to the User/Tor/Wikipedia interaction, and to suggest a need for
action by the Tor project and its supporters, than to talk about a
need for changes in Tor's architecture, and a need for action by
Tor.
yrs,
--
Nick Mathewson
- End forwarded message -
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Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl
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ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org
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Description: Digital signature
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]]]
- Forwarded message from Geoffrey Goodell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: Geoffrey Goodell <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2005 09:55:41 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6+20040907i Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] On Wed, Sep 28, 2005 at 09:27:12AM -0400, Jimmy Wales wrote: > But now we're back to the question: how can Tor be improved to deal with > this very serious and important problem? What are the steps that might > be taken, however imperfect, to reduce the amount of abuse coming from > Tor nodes? I think that we can agree that there are short-term and long-term solutions to this problem. In the short-term, we can block Tor nodes by routing address and develop special mechanisms to allow Tor users to edit Wikipedia content anyway. We can do this either via some sort of indirection or via some sort of special change to Wikipedia itself, working around the limitations in Mediawiki. We can focus on the short-term for now. However, I think that most proponents of Tor believe that in the long-term, Wikipedia should support location-independent users. So we need a plan going forward, and this plan should be sufficiently general to apply to any location-independent users, not just users of Tor. I think that many of us hope that some day the Internet will be flat and routing information will be useless in tracking identity or reputation. This will be difficult to achieve, but it is certainly my hope. As such, I am loath to encourage the design of systems that require any form of access control at the network layer, and I believe that the right thing to do is avoid such temptation, even if software tools like Mediawiki appear to be designed with network-layer access control in mind. Geoff - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
Quoting Alan Barrett <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>: > > - Forwarded message from Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - > > We are not looking for a perfect solution. Yes, Wikis will be > > vandalized. We're prepared to deal with that, we do deal with that. > > But what I am seeking is some efforts to think usefully about how to > > helpfully reconcile our dual goals of openness and privacy. > > Wikipedia should allow Tor users to register Wikipedia nyms. > Then they could block: > Tor users trying to edit without a nym; > Tor users trying to edit with a nym that has a bad reputation; > and they could rate-limit > Tor users trying to edit with a nym that has insufficient history > to be classified as good or bad; > while not blocking > Tor users trying to edit with a nym that has a good reputation. s/Tor/all/g This is an excellent summation, except that there is no compelling reason to treat Tor-carried traffic differently than any other traffic. Credentialing and reputation tracking are good ideas, and should be applied universally. -- Roy M. Silvernail is [EMAIL PROTECTED], and you're not "It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss http://www.rant-central.com
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]]]
- Forwarded message from Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Wed, 28 Sep 2005 09:27:12 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Macintosh/20050317) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Eugen Leitl wrote: >>What is it that we don't get? > > That Tor is working as designed, and that the problem with bad actors using > its > cloak is a problem with the actors themselves. "Finally, we note that exit abuse must not be dismissed as a peripheral issue: when a system's public image suffers, it can reduce the number and diversity of that system's users, and thereby reduce the anonymity of the system itself." I'm pleased to report that the original design documents rightly agree with me that the it is in the interest of the longterm success of the Tor project that an attitude of throwing up our hands in defeat is not enough. > Those people are not sticking their heads in the sand. They're correctly > noting > that nothing is broken except the bad actors. That *is* sticking their heads in the sand. Yes, we can lay moral blame on the bad actors. That's fine. Let's all stop typing for a minute or two and just _hate_ them for it. Ok, now we all feel better. :-) But now we're back to the question: how can Tor be improved to deal with this very serious and important problem? What are the steps that might be taken, however imperfect, to reduce the amount of abuse coming from Tor nodes? --Jimbo - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
> - Forwarded message from Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - > > From: Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> > Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 19:50:52 -0400 > To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]] > User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Macintosh/20050317) > Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] > > > So Wikipedia understands that the transport layer isn't to blame, yet they > > persist in asking for changes in the Tor transport to address the problem > > of malicious users? *groan* > > Actually, the transport layer *is* to blame. I don't know how much more > clear I can be about it. Because Tor users are almost universally bad, > because almost no good edits come out of the Tor network, we block them. This is getting close to the 'agree to disagree' point, but I'll go one more round. No, the transport layer is not to blame. The malicious users are to blame. The subset of Tor users abusing Wikipedia may be "almost universally bad", but that is still a subset, and doesn't indight Tor itself. > If what you're saying is "I think it is fine for Wikipedia to block > Tor," then you really aren't contributing productively to this > conversation. There are some facts we know: we can usefully reduce the > amount of anonymous grief we get by blocking Tor exit servers. So, this > is what we are currently doing. I consider this unfortunate, but there > you go. What I'm saying is that Tor is designed to provide anonymity, and does this fairly well. That anonymity is at odds with the social contract where it provides an avenue for malicious action without responsibility, but that fact is not the fault of the anonymity or its enablers; it is the fault of the bad actors. > We are not looking for a perfect solution. Yes, Wikis will be > vandalized. We're prepared to deal with that, we do deal with that. > But what I am seeking is some efforts to think usefully about how to > helpfully reconcile our dual goals of openness and privacy. > > I don't say "privacy is wrong, so Tor should change their philosophy". > I make no apologies for simply ignoring you if you say that "openness is > wrong, so Wikipedia should change their philosophy." I'm not saying openness is wrong. I'm saying it has its costs, which you obviously already recognize, and reducing those costs may require embracing a less-than-fully-open philosophy. That modification may include blocking Tor exit nodes, based on the behavior of bad actors. That's unfortunate, but expedient. But trying to force-fit pseudonymity on the Tor anonymity model is an attempt to shift your costs onto Tor. > > Roger gets it. The Wikipedians don't. > > What is it that we don't get? That Tor is working as designed, and that the problem with bad actors using its cloak is a problem with the actors themselves. As Bob Hettinga noted elsewhere, "perfect pseudonymity *is* perfect anonymity". Arguably, perfect pseudonymity is a more useful construct, but it is a much harder problem than anonymity. And given that perfect pseudonyms are perfectly disposable, that still won't address the bad actor problem completely. Openness requires responsibility, and responsibility implies accountability, so the only "perfect" solution is 100% meatspace correlation to enable enforcement of the social contract. That might solve your vandalism problem, but it introduces other issues. > This thread started off because a Tor > server complained to me about the blocking, and part of my response is > that one beef I have is that some people in the Tor community seem very > happy to simply stick their heads in the sand and pretend that > "Wikipedians don't get it". > > That's not helpful. Those people are not sticking their heads in the sand. They're correctly noting that nothing is broken except the bad actors. -- Roy M. Silvernail is [EMAIL PROTECTED], and you're not "It's just this little chromium switch, here." - TFT SpamAssassin->procmail->/dev/null->bliss http://www.rant-central.com
Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
> - Forwarded message from Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - > We are not looking for a perfect solution. Yes, Wikis will be > vandalized. We're prepared to deal with that, we do deal with that. > But what I am seeking is some efforts to think usefully about how to > helpfully reconcile our dual goals of openness and privacy. Wikipedia should allow Tor users to register Wikipedia nyms. Then they could block: Tor users trying to edit without a nym; Tor users trying to edit with a nym that has a bad reputation; and they could rate-limit Tor users trying to edit with a nym that has insufficient history to be classified as good or bad; while not blocking Tor users trying to edit with a nym that has a good reputation. This will require some changes to the MediaWiki software that Wikipedia uses. AFAIK, there's currently no way to rate-limit nyms that have insufficient history, and blocks on IP addresses are currently all or nothing. --apb (Alan Barrett)
[EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]]]
- Forwarded message from Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> - From: Jimmy Wales <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> Date: Tue, 27 Sep 2005 19:50:52 -0400 To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: [EMAIL PROTECTED]: Re: Wikipedia & Tor]] User-Agent: Mozilla Thunderbird 1.0.2 (Macintosh/20050317) Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Eugen Leitl wrote: >>Wikipedia already needs this sort of thing because of AOL IPs -- they >>have similar characteristics to Tor, in that a single IP produces lots >>of behavior, some good some bad. > > > So Wikipedia understands that the transport layer isn't to blame, yet they > persist in asking for changes in the Tor transport to address the problem of > malicious users? *groan* Actually, the transport layer *is* to blame. I don't know how much more clear I can be about it. Because Tor users are almost universally bad, because almost no good edits come out of the Tor network, we block them. Why is it that Tor users are so bad? The main reason is that the anonymity provides them with cover. AOL users are sort of bad, but not universally bad. Why is that? It is in part because of the way their transport layer is designed. > That's not the perception they need to change. They need to realize that if > an > avenue for action without responsibility exists, someone will use it. We *do* realize that. That's exactly what I'm talking about. Tor provides an avenue for action without responsibility, and people do use it. > Wikis get defaced all the time *without* AOL or Tor, because the philosophy > allows > anyone to edit. It is that philosophy that is in error, not the transport > layers used by the vandals. If what you're saying is "I think it is fine for Wikipedia to block Tor," then you really aren't contributing productively to this conversation. There are some facts we know: we can usefully reduce the amount of anonymous grief we get by blocking Tor exit servers. So, this is what we are currently doing. I consider this unfortunate, but there you go. We are not looking for a perfect solution. Yes, Wikis will be vandalized. We're prepared to deal with that, we do deal with that. But what I am seeking is some efforts to think usefully about how to helpfully reconcile our dual goals of openness and privacy. I don't say "privacy is wrong, so Tor should change their philosophy". I make no apologies for simply ignoring you if you say that "openness is wrong, so Wikipedia should change their philosophy." > Roger gets it. The Wikipedians don't. What is it that we don't get? This thread started off because a Tor server complained to me about the blocking, and part of my response is that one beef I have is that some people in the Tor community seem very happy to simply stick their heads in the sand and pretend that "Wikipedians don't get it". That's not helpful. --Jimbo - End forwarded message - -- Eugen* Leitl http://leitl.org";>leitl __ ICBM: 48.07100, 11.36820http://www.leitl.org 8B29F6BE: 099D 78BA 2FD3 B014 B08A 7779 75B0 2443 8B29 F6BE signature.asc Description: Digital signature
