Re: CDR: Re: FBI moves to route internet through central servers: Another dagger in the Heart of Freedom in America

[Samuli Suonpaa]

Mark Henderson <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> On Sat, Oct 27, 2001 at 11:06:51AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> wrote:
>> - re-awaken FidoNet
> FidoNet, ugh. Would the software even work under most current 
> operating systems?

Yes it would. At least some of the software, that is. Anyone
interested in bbs-software with all Fidonet-components built in,
capability to act as an SMTP-MTA, ftpd, httpd (I think), handles
usenet also, can be used with http also...

It does work at least on Linux/Intel, Linux/Sparc, Linux/Alpha,
FreeBSD/Intel, Amiga, Windows NT, PC-DOS, OS/2...

And no, it is not Open Source. More information at
, if memory serves.

Suonpää...

Re: FBI moves to route internet through central servers: Another dagger in the Heart of Freedom in America

[Morlock Elloi]

> > rsh over a modem). There is no particular reason why one couldn't
> > encrypt before sending and decrypt upon receipt. Mostly just a
> > modification to sendmail.cf and a modification to rmail. Of course
> > this really just solves the problem for a single hop uucp link.

There is a package that encrypts e-mail, it is called something like Pretty
Good Privacy. Use the fucking PGP for e-mail at the end-user point. No need to
trust anyone. Crypto concentration points are bad as any other concentration
points.

> 
> Believe it or not, I still have one mail route that travels over UUCP 
> for the last link.  For the past 4 or 5 years, I've done UUCP over 
> TCP/IP.  I'd think that one could tunnel that through SSL, though 
> I've never tried to do it.

Or use 802.11b with a small dish ... does wonders to 20 miles and it's rather
hard to intercept *every* path.

> Heh... 19,200 was blazingly fast in those days, and the Telebit was 
> set up for UUCP spoofing (the local modem faked the ACK packets 
> to save turnaround time) to get better throughput.  Still, I think a 
> 56K modem could outpull a Telebit.

You mean the $2500 9600 baud telebit is inferior today ?

:-)


=
end
(of original message)

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Re: FBI moves to route internet through central servers: Another dagger in the Heart of Freedom in America

[Roy M. Silvernail]

On 27 Oct 2001, at 13:24, Mark Henderson wrote:

> uucp still lives in pretty much every UNIX and UNIX-like operating
> system and it moves email well. 
> 
> It would be a simple matter to get uucp going for a mail link with
> some sort of over the wire encryption. It has been about ten years
> since I've dealt with this, but as I recall each email message went
> via a uux of rmail (uux was remote command execution - sort of like
> rsh over a modem). There is no particular reason why one couldn't
> encrypt before sending and decrypt upon receipt. Mostly just a
> modification to sendmail.cf and a modification to rmail. Of course
> this really just solves the problem for a single hop uucp link.

Believe it or not, I still have one mail route that travels over UUCP 
for the last link.  For the past 4 or 5 years, I've done UUCP over 
TCP/IP.  I'd think that one could tunnel that through SSL, though 
I've never tried to do it.

> I wonder if my old Telebit modem still works. It is in a box
> somewhere...

Heh... 19,200 was blazingly fast in those days, and the Telebit was 
set up for UUCP spoofing (the local modem faked the ACK packets 
to save turnaround time) to get better throughput.  Still, I think a 
56K modem could outpull a Telebit.
--
   Roy M. Silvernail [ ] [EMAIL PROTECTED]
DNRC Minister Plenipotentiary of All Things Confusing, Software Division
PGP Key 0x1AF39331 :  71D5 2EA2 4C27 D569  D96B BD40 D926 C05E
 Key available from [EMAIL PROTECTED]
I charge to process unsolicited commercial email

Re: FBI moves to route internet through central servers: Another dagger in the Heart of Freedom in America

[Mark Henderson]

On Sat, Oct 27, 2001 at 11:06:51AM -0700, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:
> - re-awaken FidoNet

FidoNet, ugh. Would the software even work under most current 
operating systems?

uucp still lives in pretty much every UNIX and UNIX-like operating 
system and it moves email well. 

It would be a simple matter to get uucp going for a mail link with
some sort of over the wire encryption. It has been about ten years 
since I've dealt with this, but as I recall each email message went
via a uux of rmail (uux was remote command execution - sort of like
rsh over a modem). There is no particular reason why one couldn't
encrypt before sending and decrypt upon receipt. Mostly just a
modification to sendmail.cf and a modification to rmail. Of course
this really just solves the problem for a single hop uucp link.

People did a lot of multi-hop uucp. I remember trying to work out the 
right "bang path" to get mail across the country to people I was 
corresponding with quickly. Of course, you end up with the same 
problems. Traffic can be monitored. multi-hop uucp means there are 
lots of very easy interception points. This doesn't really get around 
the whole problem, uucp is just something different to monitor, still 
subject to traffic analysis, and you'd need real end to end 
encryption of email messages via something like pgp/gpg anyway. 

The only thing a large multi-hop uucp network would give us is that 
it would allow us to do is decentralise and control our own mail 
paths, so monitoring would be harder, in that sense. In a large 
enough network, one could even use a different path for each message. 

I wonder if my old Telebit modem still works. It is in a box somewhere...

---
Mark Henderson, [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
 "Heilir fsir. Heilar asynjur. Heil sja in fjvln}ta fold." - Sigrdrmfumal
OpenPGP/GnuPG keys available at http://www.squirrel.com/pgpkeys.asc

Re: FBI moves to route internet through central servers: Another dagger in the Heart of Freedom in America

[Jim Choate]

On Sat, 27 Oct 2001, Matt Beland wrote:

> > - Purchase and offer 802.11 public access points
> 
> Which does absolutely nothing to help the situation. Traffic from access 
> point to access point is still through landlines, still controlled by ISPs, 
> and still subject to monitoring. The source might be obfuscated, but that's 
> not security or privacy - that's just making LEA's work a little harder and 
> spend a little more money which they'll take from us, anyway.

That's not entirely correct. In fact there are examples of dedicated lines
being used for wireless interconnectivity to bypass the traditional
network. The 802.11b are worthless for anything but playing around with,
but the 802.11a that just came out has sufficient bandwidth and range to
become a real contender with respect to spontaneous urban network layers.


 --


 The people never give up their liberties but under some delusion.

 Edmund Burke (1784)

   The Armadillo Group   ,::;::-.  James Choate
   Austin, Tx   /:'/ ``::>/|/  [EMAIL PROTECTED]
   www.ssz.com.',  `/( e\  512-451-7087
   -~~mm-'`-```-mm --'-

Re: FBI moves to route internet through central servers: Another dagger in the Heart of Freedom in America

[Matt Beland]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On Saturday 27 October 2001 11:06 am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> A few of the alternatives are:
> - to support the smaller ISPs doing local peering and who cannot afford to
> use the major peering points 

They still have to purchase their bandwidth from the major players, 
especially if the government subsidizes or otherwise rewards those ISPs who 
use the public peering points

> - re-awaken FidoNet

FidoNet died because it's slow, cumbersome, and technically inferior - and 
most traffic still flows through the Internet, anyway, particularly for 
things like email. 

> - Purchase and offer 802.11 public access points

Which does absolutely nothing to help the situation. Traffic from access 
point to access point is still through landlines, still controlled by ISPs, 
and still subject to monitoring. The source might be obfuscated, but that's 
not security or privacy - that's just making LEA's work a little harder and 
spend a little more money which they'll take from us, anyway.

> - write letters and emails to the major ISP CEOs warning of the dire
> technical and personal consequences should their networks surcome to this
> fed pressure

Um, what consequences? If they don't cooperate, they get shut down. If they 
do cooperate, they probably get subsidies ("reimbursement"), preference for 
government contracts, etc. The majority of the people on the internet are, 
sadly, no longer mainly geeks; they're sheeple who do as they're told as long 
as they can still watch "Friends" and "Survivor". 

If you want to fix the problem, spread the word on encryption. Hushmail won't 
do it, Mr. Soze; it's a central location and a profit-making business, and if 
you think they won't cooperate with court orders you're dreaming. How would 
you know if it was secure or not? You don't, you have to rely on what they 
tell you.

Use PGP or, better yet, GPG. Teach other people how to do the same. Get 
enough people doing it that it becomes an inconvenience to NOT use 
encryption, then let inertia take over. 

Join a militia, work to keep the militia from being marginalized or turned 
into a "fringe" group. Work the militia in your community by forming legal 
neighborhood watches, taking on the responsibilities of volunteer fire 
departments in rural areas, form search and rescue teams for emergencies. Be 
the first on the scene for every sandbagging effort in flood areas. You're 
doing your job right if the national guard is never needed in your area - 
replace them, co-opt their members if you can. March in parades with clean 
uniforms, happy smiles and big American flags. Do everything you can to keep 
recruitment up and complaints low. Find the local, state, and federal 
politicians you like the most or hate the least and work to help them 
campaign in your area - it never hurts to have official friends. Keep 
educating the people, bless their dear little hearts, on what it means to be 
free - and use local examples. Don't just say "the government might take away 
your right to send encrypted email" - they don't care. Say "you know, the 
government wants to take us away from you. They want to label us the same as 
they labelled those idiots in Waco and Montana. Who would protect you then?" 
It's all about PR. 

- -- 
Matt Beland
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.rearviewmirror.org
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Re: CDR: Re: FBI moves to route internet through central servers: Another dagger in the Heart of Freedom in America

[Matt Beland]

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

On Saturday 27 October 2001 11:06 am, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote:

> A few of the alternatives are:
> - to support the smaller ISPs doing local peering and who cannot afford to
> use the major peering points 

They still have to purchase their bandwidth from the major players, 
especially if the government subsidizes or otherwise rewards those ISPs who 
use the public peering points

> - re-awaken FidoNet

FidoNet died because it's slow, cumbersome, and technically inferior - and 
most traffic still flows through the Internet, anyway, particularly for 
things like email. 

> - Purchase and offer 802.11 public access points

Which does absolutely nothing to help the situation. Traffic from access 
point to access point is still through landlines, still controlled by ISPs, 
and still subject to monitoring. The source might be obfuscated, but that's 
not security or privacy - that's just making LEA's work a little harder and 
spend a little more money which they'll take from us, anyway.

> - write letters and emails to the major ISP CEOs warning of the dire
> technical and personal consequences should their networks surcome to this
> fed pressure

Um, what consequences? If they don't cooperate, they get shut down. If they 
do cooperate, they probably get subsidies ("reimbursement"), preference for 
government contracts, etc. The majority of the people on the internet are, 
sadly, no longer mainly geeks; they're sheeple who do as they're told as long 
as they can still watch "Friends" and "Survivor". 

If you want to fix the problem, spread the word on encryption. Hushmail won't 
do it, Mr. Soze; it's a central location and a profit-making business, and if 
you think they won't cooperate with court orders you're dreaming. How would 
you know if it was secure or not? You don't, you have to rely on what they 
tell you.

Use PGP or, better yet, GPG. Teach other people how to do the same. Get 
enough people doing it that it becomes an inconvenience to NOT use 
encryption, then let inertia take over. 

Join a militia, work to keep the militia from being marginalized or turned 
into a "fringe" group. Work the militia in your community by forming legal 
neighborhood watches, taking on the responsibilities of volunteer fire 
departments in rural areas, form search and rescue teams for emergencies. Be 
the first on the scene for every sandbagging effort in flood areas. You're 
doing your job right if the national guard is never needed in your area - 
replace them, co-opt their members if you can. March in parades with clean 
uniforms, happy smiles and big American flags. Do everything you can to keep 
recruitment up and complaints low. Find the local, state, and federal 
politicians you like the most or hate the least and work to help them 
campaign in your area - it never hurts to have official friends. Keep 
educating the people, bless their dear little hearts, on what it means to be 
free - and use local examples. Don't just say "the government might take away 
your right to send encrypted email" - they don't care. Say "you know, the 
government wants to take us away from you. They want to label us the same as 
they labelled those idiots in Waco and Montana. Who would protect you then?" 
It's all about PR. 

- -- 
Matt Beland
[EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.rearviewmirror.org
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