Christopher Bellamy: How the resistance movement caught Allies in a trap
25 March 2003
As the Battle for Baghdad gets under way, the Iraqi defensive strategy is
looking increasingly sound. In his speech yesterday, Saddam Hussein said
the invaders were "trapped" by heroic Iraqi resistance. In a way, he may
just be right.
The pace of the US 3rd Mechanised Infantry Division's race up the Euphrates
and towards Baghdad has been almost unprecedented in the history of war.
But as this mighty armoured force heads for the capital, its main supply
route looks increasingly vulnerable. The Iraqis have let the Americans,
and, to a lesser extent, the British, roll over them and then appeared
behind the invaders in small groups to harry them from the rear.
The US and British formations pressing towards Baghdad and held on the
Euphrates and Tigris have had to "reconsolidate", and go into all-round
defensive positions to guard against opposition coalescing behind them. In
that sense they are, as President Saddam put it, "trapped".
The left flank of the Allied thrust has gone extremely fast; the right, far
more slowly. The Iraqis have therefore achieved exactly what they need:
they have identified the main enemy thrust. The Iraqi generals, including
quite a few trained at Sandhurst, know what to do next. Counter-attack the
isolated spearhead with a massive armoured reserve. Of the Republican Guard
Force's six divisions – the only Iraqi divisions to be at full strength –
three are in the area around Baghdad. A full-scale armoured battle is
probably what the US planners want, because they would win it. The Iraqi
generals know full well what happens when T-72s and BMPs come up against M1
Abrams and Bradleys, Apaches and A-10 Thunderbolts. That is why, so far,
the Iraqi strategy of avoiding large-scale battle has been so successful.
But the appearance of the Americans, tired and at the end of their supply
lines, outside Baghdad might be too great a temptation. The resulting
contest could be symbolic, with shades of the Battle of Kursk in 1943.
The Allied attack, indeed, has much in common strategically with the German
assault on Soviet Russia in 1941 and, from an operational viewpoint, with
the invasion of France in 1940. In the former, the Germans, neglecting
their flanks, tore across Belgium and northern France to the sea in a few
days. Guderian's crossing of the Meuse at Sedan is considered to be the
master-stroke which made this possible, and it is no coincidence that,
before the present war broke out, US armoured divisions were instructed to
study it. By a strange coincidence, the crossing over the Euphrates at
Nasiriyah is much the same distance from Baghdad as Sedan is from Paris. In
1940, the British and French attempted to cut the advancing German
spearhead off with a counter-attack from north and south. In fact, only the
British attack, at Arras, had any chance of success. It failed, partly
because they lacked air support, but gave the Germans, including Rommel, a
real shock. The US commanders are no doubt confident that their
overwhelming air superiority and the complete "transparency of the
battlespace" will mean they can identify and destroy any Iraqi
counter-attacks.
The comparisons with 1940 are ultimately comforting to the American and
British forces. Those with 1941 are less so. As they fanned out into the
vast spaces of the western Soviet Union, the Germans encircled vast numbers
of Soviet troops. But many of the troops were able to work their way out,
and others, left behind by the swift German advance, joined local people to
form partisan units. That is exactly what seems to be happening in southern
Iraq at the moment.
The Allied commanders must be worried at this continued resistance around
and behind their advanced forces. They could deal with it, if they were
more brutal in their use of the available weaponry or if they had more
troops. If such resistance continues it will be necessary to deploy more
troops, either regulars or reservists, or to use Iraqi units which have
come over to the Allies for rear-area security.
At the moment, the latter looks a very risky option. The forward formation
– the 3rd Infantry Division – also faces problems. The troops are all very
tired. It seems inconceivable that they will be committed to assaulting
Baghdad itself. Baghdad is a city with a million more people than Rome. The
idea of Allied troops getting involved in street fighting is terrible to
contemplate. It is most likely that, having reached the edge of Baghdad, it
will have to halt for resupply and for other formations to catch up. This
may be the significance of the capture of the H2 and H3 airfields west of
Baghdad, which could be used as jumping-off points for airborne and
air-landed forces.
Sunday night saw the heaviest bombing of Baghdad so far, although the media
concentrated, understandably, on the capture of US troops. Reporters in the
city told of the biggest explosions they had heard so far, suggesting the
Americans may have started using the formidable Massive Ordnance Air Burst
(MOAB) weapon, which is as powerful as 20 to 30 tons of Second World War
RDX and makes a cloud looking like a nuclear weapon. The new military
jargon is "Effects-based warfare" – the use of military power for political
effect. There has been continued and stiffening Iraqi resistance. The US
has been humiliated. Not only have the Iraqis been putting up a decent
fight, but they have taken American prisoners. Still heavier assaults on
Baghdad can therefore be expected.
Christopher Bellamy is professor of military science and doctrine at
Cranfield University.