Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On 20 Nov 2001, at 22:54, Greg Broiles wrote: > Very early in its lifetime, the Autonomous Zones/Mojo Nation people said > that maybe Mojo would someday be exchangable with real cash, though the > assumption was that during the early stages of software development, people > were playing with worthless currency for proof-of-concept, and that at some > point the old Mojo would be useless or disabled, and people would start > using New Mojo instead, where New Mojo might have real value. > Here's my recollection as to how this was supposed to work: 1) people who participated in the beta got free mojo as a reward for participating (they'd keep their mojo when the beta period was over) 2) In the non-beta, people would have to pay (or something) to get a starting stash of mojo 3) I don't think the "Evil Geniuses" ever expected to act as mojo-cash brokers; rather, anyone who had a supply of cash and mojo could act as a cash-mojo broker, and mojo would find its own price. > > And that problem seems to be at the center of Nomen Nescio's sotto voce > suggestion that some unnamed cypherpunks work up a currency which can be > used to "pay" people for providing information which is of value - I get > the impression that s/he is imagining some magic fairy would mint up piles > of the currency, and assign it equally to every subscriber, who would then > be empowered to pay it to the content providers they liked best. > > That's very warm and fuzzy and hippy-like, but if these tokens are handed > out for free, then what, exactly, is their value? > Right. If the tokens are EVER going to be worth anything, there can't be a way to accumulate then for free. If people have this psychological block against paying "real money" for tokens, maybe it's a good idea to make them trade CPU time for them in one of the seti-like projects. Somebody mentioned something about one involving protein-folding that sounded like it might actually be useful. George > I think the Extropians did something like that, which ended in some sort of > fiasco which some cypherpunks were involved in, though I don't know the > details and was never a participant in that list/social circle. > > > -- > Greg Broiles -- [EMAIL PROTECTED] -- PGP 0x26E4488c or 0x94245961 > 5000 dead in NYC? National tragedy. > 1000 detained incommunicado without trial, expanded surveillance? National > disgrace.
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Sunday, November 25, 2001, at 07:05 PM, Lucky Green wrote: > Greg wrote: >> That's very warm and fuzzy and hippy-like, but if these >> tokens are handed >> out for free, then what, exactly, is their value? >> >> I think the Extropians did something like that, which ended >> in some sort of >> fiasco which some cypherpunks were involved in, though I >> don't know the >> details and was never a participant in that list/social circle. > > I am unfamiliar with the Extropian electronic token experiment, but I as > the first person on the planet to have conducted an Ecash-to-fiat > currency transaction, I can assure you that somebody out there may well > be willing to pay real cash for freely minted tokens. (I was on the > Ecash selling side. The USD 35 for which I sold my Ecash beta tokens are > still in my filing cabinet). I believe Greg may have been referring to a "reputation market" experiment, circa 1993. Each list subscriber was given some number of tokens and then a market in reputations was "declared." People could buy and sell shares in the reputations of anyone, including themselves. The thought was that prices would go up on those reputations people thought the price would go up on. Issues of the "real" reputation were secondary issues (i.e., if people thought someone was a turkey, they probably wouldn't expect his rep to go up, despite the artificial nature of the market). I think the guy who wrote the market software was living in Salt Lake City at the time, but I could be misremembering. I don't remember his name, and my archives from back then are in a jumble. One thing that was interesting was the opportunity to manipulate the market. I offered to buy tokens from others, for cash. One person sold me all of his tokens for the agreed-upon price of $20. I sent him the money and he mailed his tokens to me. I then proceeded to use my extra "wealth" to bid up the value of my own reputation. The tokens were not cryptographically-strong forms of digital cash, but they worked for the intended purpose. (That is, no one tried to forge them, at least not successfully.) --Tim May "The great object is that every man be armed and everyone who is able may have a gun." --Patrick Henry "The best we can hope for concerning the people at large is that they be properly armed." --Alexander Hamilton
RE: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
Greg wrote: > That's very warm and fuzzy and hippy-like, but if these > tokens are handed > out for free, then what, exactly, is their value? > > I think the Extropians did something like that, which ended > in some sort of > fiasco which some cypherpunks were involved in, though I > don't know the > details and was never a participant in that list/social circle. I am unfamiliar with the Extropian electronic token experiment, but I as the first person on the planet to have conducted an Ecash-to-fiat currency transaction, I can assure you that somebody out there may well be willing to pay real cash for freely minted tokens. (I was on the Ecash selling side. The USD 35 for which I sold my Ecash beta tokens are still in my filing cabinet). --Lucky
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
-- On 20 Nov 2001, at 17:04, Anonymous wrote: > Third, this leaves the use of digital cash to purchase > information goods and services online. The problem is, few > companies have succeeded so far in selling information > goods online As you mention below, pornography is the big exception. Of course, control over assets is also an informational good, though not one that has been successfully put online yet. The cypherpunk dream will be close to realization when liability is limited not by the decree of the state but by the difficulty of discovering who the owners of a business are. --digsig James A. Donald 6YeGpsZR+nOTh/cGwvITnSR3TdzclVpR0+pr3YYQdkG omb+0fl57agPOUEzge7hMd8nVf7S5Qhuhj8H1YWY 4y+BQDxfgXp2UJcabXRe61UEv+6AWGmQpItvkZ9ym
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Wed, Nov 21, 2001 at 04:22:36PM -0800, Sandy Sandfort wrote: > US postal regs end at the US border. The rest of the world is full of mail > drops, accommodation addresses and mail forwarding services. Or, even inside the U.S., you could run an anon mail-receiving locker (insert $20 bill for two days, much like train station lockers) service if you only accepted FedEx/UPS/etc. letters and packages. Obviously it would cost more for users, but for sufficiently valuable cargo... -Declan
RE: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
Someone wrote: > Unfortunately U.S. postal regulations > require identification when you rent a > mail box, public or private > > It won't do much good to chain them if > each one in the chain has your ID on file. > Granted you can use fake ID but that would > be breaking the law, raising the costs > considerably. US postal regs end at the US border. The rest of the world is full of mail drops, accommodation addresses and mail forwarding services. S a n d y
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
David Molnar wrote: > On Tue, 20 Nov 2001, Anonymous wrote: > > > than using your Visa card because only the seller learns your address > > rather than a centralized agency that knows all of your purchases. > > But it's hardly worth it. > > A friend of mine was considering a business plan for physical remailer+ > "infomediary" for a class project a year or two ago. Precisely to get > around this problem. Sell learns the remailer's address. More than a few > remailers and you can chain them, etc. etc. Unfortunately U.S. postal regulations require identification when you rent a mail box, public or private. See http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/conline/audio/private_mail_box.htm: Recent amendments to postal regulations will make it harder for criminals to victimize innocent consumers by using mail drops. Anyone renting a box from a commercial mail-receiving agency such as Mail Boxers, Etc., Parcel Post, and Postnet will be required to provide two forms of ID, one being a photo ID. It won't do much good to chain them if each one in the chain has your ID on file. Granted you can use fake ID but that would be breaking the law, raising the costs considerably.
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
At 01:00 AM 11/21/2001 -0500, dmolnar wrote: >On Tue, 20 Nov 2001, dmolnar wrote: > > > > > Isn't this a description of Hawala? > > > > Maybe. I regret I'm not familiar with Hawala. I'll go google it. > >Gee, it's even in the cypherpunks archives. Sorry, everyone. > >Yes, as described sure sounds similar. The point of doing it over PayPal >would just be to make it easy for people on this list to pay Nomen. Even >though hawala works in the real world, I'm not so sure we could just start >it and expect it to work here. PayPal is a poor choice due to fraud and repudiation issues. From a transactor's viewpoint one should only exchange harder for softer money http://www.google.com/search?q=cache:srzsJTHS-xE:www.coconutgold.com/mayscale.html+mayscale&hl=en However, eGold would be excellent: no repudiations. First you must identify and reach your potential customers. Does anyone know where I could get a relatively list of hushmail addresses? >One thing that came to mind while reading about it -- does it buy us >anything in a MIX-net to separate control messages from payload messages? >This came to mind because one of the descriptions of the hawala network >seemed to imply that payment would come in from one source and then the >name of the recipient would come in from another. > >The analogy in a MIX-net for e-mail would be having a message delivered to >a MIX, and then later forwarding instructions for that message delivered >by someone else. (said instructions identifying message by hash or >something). Another way to look at this is putting delay in the hands of >the client. Not clear to me that it helps; maybe make an adversary think a >certain node is the final destination? I can't think of a MIX design off >the top of my head which does this. Anyone else? something like this >discussed way back when? Does using eGold change the MIX characteristics or feasibility? Possible downsides http://www.goldbankone.com/article.php?sid=77 steve
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
At 05:04 PM 11/20/2001 -0700, Anonymous wrote: >Some thoughts on digital cash. > >First, using anonymous cash to purchase physical goods online means giving >up much of the benefit from the anonymity. If you have to give a delivery >address, they obviously know who you are. It's still slightly better >than using your Visa card because only the seller learns your address >rather than a centralized agency that knows all of your purchases. >But it's hardly worth it. Coin (or better yet eGold) operated rental, non-USPS, parcel delivery locker business. >Second, using digital cash for purchases in the real world (grocery stores >etc) is pretty much impossible today and relatively pointless anyway since >physical cash exists. There might be some slight advantages in terms of >not having to carry cash, resistance to theft, etc., but from the privacy >perspective, things are about as good as they are going to get in the >physical world. It's only going to go downhill from here. It may not >be as bad as Scott "Get Over It" McNealy claims but realistically the use >of surveillance cameras and face recognition systems is going to increase. ATMs dispensing currency for ecash >Fourth, the significant exception is of course pornography, and >we've had debates about whether it would make sense to create a >privacy-protecting electronic payment system that catered to the porn >market. It's profitable, it's information, and there are significant >privacy considerations for some customers. > >Unfortunately the greatest sensitivity to privacy comes with illegal >products like child pornography. And the Reedy case has to be a >significant cautionary tale. Thomas Reedy was proprietor of an age >verification service which had a couple of overseas child pornographers >among its customers; he ended up with life imprisonment for what was >essentially a payment collection service. Any digital cash system >for the porn market would therefore have to screen its clients (the >sellers) very closely. It's the buyers to whom you are selling privacy, >not the sellers, so this is not inconsistent with the business model. >But it could be expensive. And by eliminating illegal porn you would >be turning away much of your potential business, leading to a constant >temptation to cross the line as Reedy did. Offshore operation from less prudish countries. >Can we identify other markets, other applications where cash or cash-like >technology can be useful? MojoNation is a good example. Their mojo is >intended to be a cash substitute to optimize load balancing and data >distribution. Unfortunately the MN network lacks compelling content >and the economy is still crude. use Automated publication from file names and meta-data. Removal of limitations of file size enabling publication of high quality video content. >Imagine if all these systems could be served by a single virtual currency, >where resources and work donated in one forum earned points which would >entitle you to privileges in another. Eric Hughes proposed something >similar back in the days of the text-based MUD and MOO online games, so >that you could transfer quota from one system to another. Or consider the >example recently where several people expressed interest in having someone >go back to the early cypherpunk archives and select interesting threads. >What if each of us had some virtual cash we could transfer to whomever >did the work. eGold is already available. >The point is that there is a possibility today for an online market in >informal, peer to peer style information services. There is work to be >done, services to provide which remain entirely in the virtual world. >If you could be rewarded for work you do online with "cash" that would >allow you to request similar services from others, the monetary system >can get off the ground. This might be a more promising start for a >virtual currency than attempts to tie it immediately to dollars. eGold has shown a substantial and profitable, though still not mainstream market, exists for an unregulated electronic currency. A similar system tied to dollars, pounds or marks, is greatly desired. steve
Re: CDR: Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Tue, 20 Nov 2001, dmolnar wrote: > > Isn't this a description of Hawala? > > Maybe. I regret I'm not familiar with Hawala. I'll go google it. Gee, it's even in the cypherpunks archives. Sorry, everyone. Yes, as described sure sounds similar. The point of doing it over PayPal would just be to make it easy for people on this list to pay Nomen. Even though hawala works in the real world, I'm not so sure we could just start it and expect it to work here. One thing that came to mind while reading about it -- does it buy us anything in a MIX-net to separate control messages from payload messages? This came to mind because one of the descriptions of the hawala network seemed to imply that payment would come in from one source and then the name of the recipient would come in from another. The analogy in a MIX-net for e-mail would be having a message delivered to a MIX, and then later forwarding instructions for that message delivered by someone else. (said instructions identifying message by hash or something). Another way to look at this is putting delay in the hands of the client. Not clear to me that it helps; maybe make an adversary think a certain node is the final destination? I can't think of a MIX design off the top of my head which does this. Anyone else? something like this discussed way back when? -David
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Wed, Nov 21, 2001 at 02:57:23AM -, Anonymous wrote: > Supposing you and others were willing to pay Nomen a modest sum for this > service, how could you do so using Paypal or Amazon, and allow him to > retain his anonymity? Ah, but I never said I'd pay for it -- I said it might be a better use Nomen's time than pointless flaming or somesuch. But going with your hypothetical, Nomen could find a trusted party with sufficient reputation capital and allow them to run the Amazon service for him/her in exchange for a small fee. Amazon requires a credit card number, billing address, and checking account number for a "merchant account." Heck, I'd do it, for a sufficient expected fee, assuming legal content, and I suspect other folks would too, for different definitions of "expected fee." How I would give a check or money order to Nomen is another problem. Perhaps he/she would like a copy of something I could download for a fee, encrypt, and send via a remailer or place in a Usenet newsgroup? Etc. I never claimed that Amazon/Paypal are sufficient for all cypherpunkly purposes; that is trivially untrue. But they may be sufficient for some tasks. -Declan
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Tue, Nov 20, 2001 at 11:45:57PM -0500, dmolnar wrote: > BBSes seem special in that the resources available are so *drastically* > limited. A BBS with one phone line could serve one user at a time. When > one person is on, nobody else has a shot. So a BBS without upload/download > ratios runs the risk of collapsing pretty quick under the weight of [...] > (On the other hand, I also gave everyone a 90 minute time quota; way more > than most people ever used. So perhaps this "quotas or die" doesn't hold > true universally. Anyone else have anecdotal evidence from BBSing? ) Hmm. In the 1980s, I ran a BBS using GBBS on an Apple IIe and later an Apple IIgs with first a Sider ][ 20 MB and then some SCSI 40 MB HDs. GBBS just supported one user at a time, of course (I recall the DiversiDial or somesuch software on the Apple II allowed as many users as you had Super Serial cards or AppleCats), so I had the leech problem. Another way around it was to limit access to the download area to pre-approved users or folks who came with recommendations or folks, as you say, who contributed something first. Some BBSs took this to a bit of an extreme and asked pretty pointed questions, like "what are your latest/best warez?" before assigning an account. -Declan
Re: CDR: Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Tue, 20 Nov 2001 [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: > > Isn't this a description of Hawala? Maybe. I regret I'm not familiar with Hawala. I'll go google it. -David
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Tue, 20 Nov 2001, Anonymous wrote: > than using your Visa card because only the seller learns your address > rather than a centralized agency that knows all of your purchases. > But it's hardly worth it. A friend of mine was considering a business plan for physical remailer+ "infomediary" for a class project a year or two ago. Precisely to get around this problem. Sell learns the remailer's address. More than a few remailers and you can chain them, etc. etc. He was thinking about it in terms of the single proxy model, but if the idea ever took off enough to have multiple competitors, you could try a MIX-net. I don't think I ever pointed this out to him. I'll have to ask him whatever came of the project. > technology can be useful? MojoNation is a good example. Their mojo is > intended to be a cash substitute to optimize load balancing and data > distribution. Unfortunately the MN network lacks compelling content Right - it's for optimizing load balancing and data distribution. Roughly stated, it seems to me to be a DoS prevention mechanism. It's not at all clear that Mojo will ever be meaningfully convertible to "real" money, at least not to me. but then again, I'm often unclear. > and the economy is still crude. But the idea is sound; P2P networks > which reward providers of information should flourish. The slashdot > quota system is another example. Also, various "warez" sites work on > an exchange basis, where people get credit for uploading files which > gives them authorization to download. and that in turn is a holdover from the old BBS days. BBSes seem special in that the resources available are so *drastically* limited. A BBS with one phone line could serve one user at a time. When one person is on, nobody else has a shot. So a BBS without upload/download ratios runs the risk of collapsing pretty quick under the weight of leeches and m0es. When I ran a BBS, I ended up removing the files section altogether; I thought messages were the most important part (and in any case, didn't have a large enough HD to hold files...plus didn't want to deal with the tension bewteen running a "free speech" BBS and screening for pirate warez so as to not get arrested.) I think this accounted in part for the obsession with "access level" which seemed common to many BBS users. (On the other hand, I also gave everyone a 90 minute time quota; way more than most people ever used. So perhaps this "quotas or die" doesn't hold true universally. Anyone else have anecdotal evidence from BBSing? ) Anyway, the point is that in such a resource-limited environment, quotas and ratios are basic rationing tools. Use them or die(mostly). When you move to an environment which has more resources, things seem to change. You can get away for longer with less in the way of resource control. So the principle that "networks which reward providers of information should flourish" may be tempered by less which selects for those networks over others. another question -- is Slashdot popular because of its moderation system? > If you could be rewarded for work you do online with "cash" that would > allow you to request similar services from others, the monetary system > can get off the ground. This might be a more promising start for a > virtual currency than attempts to tie it immediately to dollars. OK, I should *know* this, but -- what about "flooz" and "beenz" ? weren't they something along these lines before they folded? -David
Re: CDR: Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
Isn't this a description of Hawala? On Tue, 20 Nov 2001, dmolnar wrote: > On 21 Nov 2001, Anonymous wrote: > > > Supposing you and others were willing to pay Nomen a modest sum for this > > service, how could you do so using Paypal or Amazon, and allow him to > > retain his anonymity? > > On the off chance that this isn't rhetorical, because at least one way of > doing this seems straightforward... > > Some guy with a true name good enough to sign up for PayPal gets an > account, publishes a public key, and acts as a human "cash remailer." > Well, several people do, actually, and then we run a "payment MIX." Some > anonymous poster brought up the idea about a year ago IIRC and attributed > it to Ron Rivest. It sparked a short discussion which went into questions > of whether such an operation might run afoul of money laundering laws and > then sort of petered out. Or maybe I just stopped reading. > > To spell it out, Nomen offers to do the service and picks an incoming > payment MIX plus a chain of MIXes. (N.B.: will use MIX to refer to a > member of the chain). Publishes a "payment reply block" which has the > incoming payment MIX PayPal address in clear, plus a block encrypted with > the payment MIX's public key. The encrypted portion has the PayPal address > of the next MIX in the chain, plus an encrypted portion for that next MIX. > Eventually it decrypts to reveal Nomen's real PayPal account info. > Assuming everyone plays along, the money flows down the chain and ends up > in Nomen's PayPal account. I expect that's not such a great assumption > when dealing with "real" money. > > You still have the BlackNet problem, though - Nomen1 and Nomen2 can both > publish public payment blocks. Which one do you pay? In this particular > case, though, you can address that (and the fair exchange problem) by > doing what Stephen King did -- Nomen does a little bit of the work first > for free, then continues iff enough people ante up for more. You use the > payment block signed by the same key which signed the current work. > > Now that I think about it, you could probably take this down the route > Eric Hughes suggested in his "Universal Piracy Network" presentation at > DEF CON IV. That is, people pay Nomen and in return Nomen sends them the > new work first; they get 0-day access to the warezzz. Hughes had something > about "completion bonds" in his presentation as well, but I don't remember > at all what the particulars were, just that there was a rough analogy to > the movie industry. Anyone remember more details? > > I have half a mind to sign up for PayPal just to try this. (Assuming I > won't be thrown in jail for money laundering, anyway). Anyone with me? > > Nomen? :) > > Although I feel compelled to point out that with only one MIX, it's not > going to be particularly secure for Nomen. Not to mention with no > provision for detecting MIXes who shave off the payment or eat it > entirely, this might just be me trying to make a few quick $$$. Of course > if this were large-scale, you could use reputations -- a MIX which eats > the entire $$$ now loses out on the possibility of shaving small fractions > of $$$ later. > > Also, with provision for detecting MIXes who give good payments, there's > nothing to stop Nomen from alleging that I'm screwing him and ruining my > reputation. As a potential MIX, that bothers me. So there are issues here. > > > > > An alternative solution is barter. Nomen could agree to search certain > > years of archives, or certain topics, in exchange for other people working > > on other parts of the project, for example. Information barter can be > > performed while retaining anonymity. Maybe systems to facilitate barter > > could be developed if anonymous cash remains out of reach. > > right, like the barter a Nomen is trying to do with Marc right now...and > which doesn't seem to be working too well so far. Although in that case it > seems like the problem was just that this Nomen set up the terms of the > barter without bothering to ask if the other party actually wanted to > trade. That's like this guy at Coney Island I met a few months back. > > "You wanna throw a dart?? Here! Here! Free!" > > "Now you owe me five dollar!" > > (I paid. Yes, I'm a wuss. I got a cute fan out of it. I'm never doing > business like that at Coney Island ever again.) > > -David > > -- Yours, J.A. Terranson [EMAIL PROTECTED] If Governments really want us to behave like civilized human beings, they should give serious consideration towards setting a better example: Ruling by force, rather than consensus; the unrestrained application of unjust laws (which the victim-populations were never allowed input on in the first place); the State policy of justice only for the rich and elected; the intentional abuse and occassionally destruction of entire populations merely to distract an already apathetic and numb electorate... This type of demogoguery must surely wipe out the fasci
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On 21 Nov 2001, Anonymous wrote: > Supposing you and others were willing to pay Nomen a modest sum for this > service, how could you do so using Paypal or Amazon, and allow him to > retain his anonymity? On the off chance that this isn't rhetorical, because at least one way of doing this seems straightforward... Some guy with a true name good enough to sign up for PayPal gets an account, publishes a public key, and acts as a human "cash remailer." Well, several people do, actually, and then we run a "payment MIX." Some anonymous poster brought up the idea about a year ago IIRC and attributed it to Ron Rivest. It sparked a short discussion which went into questions of whether such an operation might run afoul of money laundering laws and then sort of petered out. Or maybe I just stopped reading. To spell it out, Nomen offers to do the service and picks an incoming payment MIX plus a chain of MIXes. (N.B.: will use MIX to refer to a member of the chain). Publishes a "payment reply block" which has the incoming payment MIX PayPal address in clear, plus a block encrypted with the payment MIX's public key. The encrypted portion has the PayPal address of the next MIX in the chain, plus an encrypted portion for that next MIX. Eventually it decrypts to reveal Nomen's real PayPal account info. Assuming everyone plays along, the money flows down the chain and ends up in Nomen's PayPal account. I expect that's not such a great assumption when dealing with "real" money. You still have the BlackNet problem, though - Nomen1 and Nomen2 can both publish public payment blocks. Which one do you pay? In this particular case, though, you can address that (and the fair exchange problem) by doing what Stephen King did -- Nomen does a little bit of the work first for free, then continues iff enough people ante up for more. You use the payment block signed by the same key which signed the current work. Now that I think about it, you could probably take this down the route Eric Hughes suggested in his "Universal Piracy Network" presentation at DEF CON IV. That is, people pay Nomen and in return Nomen sends them the new work first; they get 0-day access to the warezzz. Hughes had something about "completion bonds" in his presentation as well, but I don't remember at all what the particulars were, just that there was a rough analogy to the movie industry. Anyone remember more details? I have half a mind to sign up for PayPal just to try this. (Assuming I won't be thrown in jail for money laundering, anyway). Anyone with me? Nomen? :) Although I feel compelled to point out that with only one MIX, it's not going to be particularly secure for Nomen. Not to mention with no provision for detecting MIXes who shave off the payment or eat it entirely, this might just be me trying to make a few quick $$$. Of course if this were large-scale, you could use reputations -- a MIX which eats the entire $$$ now loses out on the possibility of shaving small fractions of $$$ later. Also, with provision for detecting MIXes who give good payments, there's nothing to stop Nomen from alleging that I'm screwing him and ruining my reputation. As a potential MIX, that bothers me. So there are issues here. > > An alternative solution is barter. Nomen could agree to search certain > years of archives, or certain topics, in exchange for other people working > on other parts of the project, for example. Information barter can be > performed while retaining anonymity. Maybe systems to facilitate barter > could be developed if anonymous cash remains out of reach. right, like the barter a Nomen is trying to do with Marc right now...and which doesn't seem to be working too well so far. Although in that case it seems like the problem was just that this Nomen set up the terms of the barter without bothering to ask if the other party actually wanted to trade. That's like this guy at Coney Island I met a few months back. "You wanna throw a dart?? Here! Here! Free!" "Now you owe me five dollar!" (I paid. Yes, I'm a wuss. I got a cute fan out of it. I'm never doing business like that at Coney Island ever again.) -David
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
Declan McCullagh writes: > I don't mean to take issue with much of what Anonymous writes, but > some of the examples mentioned can be taken care of adequately by > existing payment systems. > > Using Amazon's payment system (they have two types, voluntary and > pay-for-content), a webmaster can charge as low as $1, I believe, for > content, and Paypal is another option. > > Naturally, they don't do micropayments, and they don't offer the type > of anonymity that other systems do, but the early-cypherpunk-archive- > editing project, for instance, wouldn't require anon payments in > ha'pennies either. On November 13, you wrote to anon poster Nomen Nescio: > (If you really wanted to do something that might be useful, you'd > pick the more interesting threads from the dawn of the list, insert > them into a good search utility, and make that available for searching > and .tar.gz downloading.') Supposing you and others were willing to pay Nomen a modest sum for this service, how could you do so using Paypal or Amazon, and allow him to retain his anonymity? An alternative solution is barter. Nomen could agree to search certain years of archives, or certain topics, in exchange for other people working on other parts of the project, for example. Information barter can be performed while retaining anonymity. Maybe systems to facilitate barter could be developed if anonymous cash remains out of reach.
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
I don't mean to take issue with much of what Anonymous writes, but some of the examples mentioned can be taken care of adequately by existing payment systems. Using Amazon's payment system (they have two types, voluntary and pay-for-content), a webmaster can charge as low as $1, I believe, for content, and Paypal is another option. Naturally, they don't do micropayments, and they don't offer the type of anonymity that other systems do, but the early-cypherpunk-archive- editing project, for instance, wouldn't require anon payments in ha'pennies either. -Declan On Tue, Nov 20, 2001 at 05:04:03PM -0700, Anonymous wrote: > Imagine if all these systems could be served by a single virtual currency, > where resources and work donated in one forum earned points which would > entitle you to privileges in another. Eric Hughes proposed something > similar back in the days of the text-based MUD and MOO online games, so > that you could transfer quota from one system to another. Or consider the > example recently where several people expressed interest in having someone > go back to the early cypherpunk archives and select interesting threads. > What if each of us had some virtual cash we could transfer to whomever > did the work. > > The point is that there is a possibility today for an online market in > informal, peer to peer style information services. There is work to be > done, services to provide which remain entirely in the virtual world. > If you could be rewarded for work you do online with "cash" that would > allow you to request similar services from others, the monetary system > can get off the ground. This might be a more promising start for a > virtual currency than attempts to tie it immediately to dollars.
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
Some thoughts on digital cash. First, using anonymous cash to purchase physical goods online means giving up much of the benefit from the anonymity. If you have to give a delivery address, they obviously know who you are. It's still slightly better than using your Visa card because only the seller learns your address rather than a centralized agency that knows all of your purchases. But it's hardly worth it. Second, using digital cash for purchases in the real world (grocery stores etc) is pretty much impossible today and relatively pointless anyway since physical cash exists. There might be some slight advantages in terms of not having to carry cash, resistance to theft, etc., but from the privacy perspective, things are about as good as they are going to get in the physical world. It's only going to go downhill from here. It may not be as bad as Scott "Get Over It" McNealy claims but realistically the use of surveillance cameras and face recognition systems is going to increase. Third, this leaves the use of digital cash to purchase information goods and services online. The problem is, few companies have succeeded so far in selling information goods online, and the problems have nothing to do with the payment system or privacy issues. With self-contained products like music and software, piracy is rampant. There are some service businesses which are producing and selling information successfully, but usually they are in the B2B market where privacy is less of an issue. Fourth, the significant exception is of course pornography, and we've had debates about whether it would make sense to create a privacy-protecting electronic payment system that catered to the porn market. It's profitable, it's information, and there are significant privacy considerations for some customers. Unfortunately the greatest sensitivity to privacy comes with illegal products like child pornography. And the Reedy case has to be a significant cautionary tale. Thomas Reedy was proprietor of an age verification service which had a couple of overseas child pornographers among its customers; he ended up with life imprisonment for what was essentially a payment collection service. Any digital cash system for the porn market would therefore have to screen its clients (the sellers) very closely. It's the buyers to whom you are selling privacy, not the sellers, so this is not inconsistent with the business model. But it could be expensive. And by eliminating illegal porn you would be turning away much of your potential business, leading to a constant temptation to cross the line as Reedy did. Can we identify other markets, other applications where cash or cash-like technology can be useful? MojoNation is a good example. Their mojo is intended to be a cash substitute to optimize load balancing and data distribution. Unfortunately the MN network lacks compelling content and the economy is still crude. But the idea is sound; P2P networks which reward providers of information should flourish. The slashdot quota system is another example. Also, various "warez" sites work on an exchange basis, where people get credit for uploading files which gives them authorization to download. Imagine if all these systems could be served by a single virtual currency, where resources and work donated in one forum earned points which would entitle you to privileges in another. Eric Hughes proposed something similar back in the days of the text-based MUD and MOO online games, so that you could transfer quota from one system to another. Or consider the example recently where several people expressed interest in having someone go back to the early cypherpunk archives and select interesting threads. What if each of us had some virtual cash we could transfer to whomever did the work. The point is that there is a possibility today for an online market in informal, peer to peer style information services. There is work to be done, services to provide which remain entirely in the virtual world. If you could be rewarded for work you do online with "cash" that would allow you to request similar services from others, the monetary system can get off the ground. This might be a more promising start for a virtual currency than attempts to tie it immediately to dollars.
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
At 6:00 PM -0500 11/20/01, dmolnar wrote: >Does anyone happen to know of real-world current examples like this, in >which some aggregator buys and sells a commodity on an exchange, then >turns around and offers it at a flat rate to end users? I think my electric company does this each month with my power and gas.
Re: Pricing Mojo, Integrating PGP, TAZ, and D.C. Cypherpunks
On Sun, 18 Nov 2001, Tim May wrote:
> Any system involving units of Mojo, or understanding of auction models,
> etc. is hampered. And any system that has only a tiny fraction of what
> Napster had at its peak is hit with the "So what?" factor. And the Fax
> Effect kicks in--few users, not as many options, stagnation.
Mojo Nation doesn't have to "sell" directly to consumers. In fact, as you
point out, it's not realistic to expect consumers to manage their own
pricing. On the other hand, this might be an opportunity for people to
build services on top of Mojo Nation. Such a "middle" service could
provide a consumer with a turnkey, flat fee, no hassle service, while
using Mojo Nation to obtain the most efficient prics possible for
resources. The difference between the flat fee and the "most efficient"
price provided by Mojo becomes the profit for the middle service.
I don't even know if this works in theory, however. Presumably I could set
up a model to investigate the relationship between "best possible" Mojo
prices and the characteristics of the network - things like how many
users, how much trading, liqudity, which pricing algorithms people use,
and so on. Then we could ask questions like "how many people need to be
offering which kinds of services before a service built on top of Mojo can
be profitable?"
The ideal situation would be one in which the middle service can undercut
"traditional" providers -- and still make money. Except that doesn't look
like it's going to happen in the real world. You've mentioned the fact
that not enough people are running Mojo clients ("thin
market"/"illiquid"). It's not clear what it would take to get more people
in the Mojo marketplace; even if the theory works out beyond my wildest
dreams and I could somehow "prove" that Mojo will make everyone money **if
only ten million people sign up tomorrow**, I suspect no one would pay
attention.
There are other problems as well. For one thing, who are the "traditional
providers" in the previous paragraph against whom a Mojo service would
compete? in markets for which resources? In the case of disk space, it
seems to be the people who make and sell hard drives; both entrenched and
selling physical goods which any middle service would be hard pressed to
emulate perfectly. Plus, as one of the anonymous posters noted, the disk
market is quite non-volatile (maybe "boring" is the right word) with a
pronounced trend downward; what is the incentive to use a Mojo-based
service there if the customer can just wait a week and then buy a bigger HD?
So are there markets for which a "middle service" could work?
I apologize for going on at length about this, but if you want Mojo to
correspond at all to real money instead of being a DoS protection
feature, I don't see many other ways than "middle services" to make it
work on a wide scale. Then again, I may just be lacking imagination.
Does anyone happen to know of real-world current examples like this, in
which some aggregator buys and sells a commodity on an exchange, then
turns around and offers it at a flat rate to end users?
> (Hint: Faustine, especially, should read "TAZ." And "True Names." And
> "Ender's Game." And the archives. And the Cyphernomicon. Get beyond the
> fog of the mundane and see where the degrees of freedom of the Web will
> take us.)
Have you seen the SemioText(e) anthology? "TAZ" is in it, along with stuff
from J.G. Ballard, the Church of the Subgenius, stories vaguely inspired
by gnosticism, and other usual suspects. Reading it reminded me of reading
Douglas Rushkoff's _Cyberia_ for the first time -- another book which
gives new meaning to your "see where the degrees of freedom of the Web
will take us." Heady stuff, all of it, and now seems to be out of fashion,
but that's a tangent...
-David Molnar
