Re: another reason to avoid airbus: surveillance
On Friday 10 May 2002 07:32 pm, Steve Schear wrote: > A less observable jamming means is to just bring a key chain penlight > aboard and aim it at the light. If the light has a suction cup mount it > can be mounted to the arm of the chair. For more clandestine use a two > position switch on the light could activate an IR laser/led, shining > through the same lens, for light/dark cabin situations. > > steve You mean a couple of these? http://www.photonlight.com/index2.html (They even make an infrared one too!) Damn! Should have kept my mouth shut. Now I guess I'll have to leave them at home with my Leatherman Micra and my nail clippers :) -- Neil Johnson, N0SFH http://www.iowatelecom.net/~njohnsn http://www.njohnsn.com/ PGP key available on request.
Re: another reason to avoid airbus: surveillance
At 06:59 PM 5/10/2002 -0700, you wrote: >On Friday, May 10, 2002, at 05:32 PM, Steve Schear wrote: > >>At 05:06 PM 5/10/2002 -0400, you wrote: >> >>> > Black-and-white images captured by the cameras will be fed to screens in >>> > the cockpit via the cables used to distribute pictures to seat-back >>> > video screens. Although only some lights will have cameras, potential >>> > terrorists will not know which ones. >>> >>>Huh. Easily defeated. The images won't be watched, >>>as the cabin crew have better things to do. By the >>>time the plane has been taken, the best they will >>>know is that it is going on. >>> >>>Then, out comes the big roll of duck tape and slap >>>slap slap, all lights are out. Special points for >>>opaque tape. >> >>A less observable jamming means is to just bring a key chain penlight >>aboard and aim it at the light. If the light has a suction cup mount it >>can be mounted to the arm of the chair. For more clandestine use a two >>position switch on the light could activate an IR laser/led, shining >>through the same lens, for light/dark cabin situations. > >Jamming the camera or overloading it is itself a tell. Depends on the overload failure mode. Many SS camera will simply appear to be full white/black on overload. Same as a malfunction. >Knowing the exact location and geometry of a camera lens makes it feasible >to spoof the scene by placing a fixed image below the camera. Unless the >camera has a zoom, which is unlikely, a simple affine transformation of a >real "lap" is enough. Make it of a lap covered with a blanket and then >even the lack of movement will not be a tell. I can the MI music playing in the background already. steve
Re: another reason to avoid airbus: surveillance
On Friday, May 10, 2002, at 05:32 PM, Steve Schear wrote: > At 05:06 PM 5/10/2002 -0400, you wrote: > >> > Black-and-white images captured by the cameras will be fed to >> screens in >> > the cockpit via the cables used to distribute pictures to seat-back >> > video screens. Although only some lights will have cameras, potential >> > terrorists will not know which ones. >> >> Huh. Easily defeated. The images won't be watched, >> as the cabin crew have better things to do. By the >> time the plane has been taken, the best they will >> know is that it is going on. >> >> Then, out comes the big roll of duck tape and slap >> slap slap, all lights are out. Special points for >> opaque tape. > > A less observable jamming means is to just bring a key chain penlight > aboard and aim it at the light. If the light has a suction cup mount > it can be mounted to the arm of the chair. For more clandestine use a > two position switch on the light could activate an IR laser/led, > shining through the same lens, for light/dark cabin situations. > Jamming the camera or overloading it is itself a tell. Knowing the exact location and geometry of a camera lens makes it feasible to spoof the scene by placing a fixed image below the camera. Unless the camera has a zoom, which is unlikely, a simple affine transformation of a real "lap" is enough. Make it of a lap covered with a blanket and then even the lack of movement will not be a tell. --Tim May "They played all kinds of games, kept the House in session all night, and it was a very complicated bill. Maybe a handful of staffers actually read it, but the bill definitely was not available to members before the vote." --Rep. Ron Paul, TX, on how few Congresscritters saw the USA-PATRIOT Bill before voting overwhelmingly to impose a police state
Re: another reason to avoid airbus: surveillance
At 05:06 PM 5/10/2002 -0400, you wrote: > > Black-and-white images captured by the cameras will be fed to screens in > > the cockpit via the cables used to distribute pictures to seat-back > > video screens. Although only some lights will have cameras, potential > > terrorists will not know which ones. > >Huh. Easily defeated. The images won't be watched, >as the cabin crew have better things to do. By the >time the plane has been taken, the best they will >know is that it is going on. > >Then, out comes the big roll of duck tape and slap >slap slap, all lights are out. Special points for >opaque tape. A less observable jamming means is to just bring a key chain penlight aboard and aim it at the light. If the light has a suction cup mount it can be mounted to the arm of the chair. For more clandestine use a two position switch on the light could activate an IR laser/led, shining through the same lens, for light/dark cabin situations. steve
RE: another reason to avoid airbus: surveillance
> Major Variola (ret)[SMTP:[EMAIL PROTECTED]] > > http://www.newscientist.com/news/news.jsp?id=ns2256 > > Airbus, the European jet manufacturer, is planning to build concealed > cameras into the light fittings above the seats in its aircraft. The > idea is to let the crew monitor passengers and spot hijackers before > they strike. The cameras also work in the dark. > [...] > One plan Airbus is considering, says the firm's cabin security expert > Rolf Gvdecke, involves hiding a tiny camera inside the light fittings > above each passenger seat, surrounded by a ring of infrared LEDs. The > cameras will normally work with ambient light, but switch to infrared > when the cabin is dark. > I would suspect that the engineering for this has been well developed for years - it seems a natural extension of the habit of some national carriers (Air France is the one usually pointed out, but one suspects they are not alone) of wiring first class seats for sound, for purposes of industrial espionage. Extending the capabilities to all classes, and to video (need to read those negotiating postions on lap top screens, after all) seems a natural step. Once again, terrorism is used as the justification for the further removal of the right of privacy. Peter Trei
