A-Yup:
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Got the above off this blog:
http://www.boingboing.net/2004/08/31/diebold_voting_machi.html
related links:
http://www.technorati.com/cosmos/search.html?rank=&sub=mtcosmos&url=http://www.boingboing.net/2004/08/31/diebold_voting_machi.html
Here's the text of part 1:
Consumer Report Part 1: Look at this -- the Diebold GEMS central tabulator
contains a stunning security hole
Submitted by Bev Harris on Thu, 08/26/2004 - 11:43. Investigations
Issue: Manipulation technique found in the Diebold central tabulator --
1,000 of these systems are in place, and they count up to two million
votes at a time.
By entering a 2-digit code in a hidden location, a second set of votes is
created. This set of votes can be changed, so that it no longer matches
the correct votes. The voting system will then read the totals from the
bogus vote set. It takes only seconds to change the votes, and to date not
a single location in the U.S. has implemented security measures to fully
mitigate the risks.
This program is not "stupidity" or sloppiness. It was designed and tested
over a series of a dozen version adjustments.
Public officials: If you are in a county that uses GEMS 1.18.18, GEMS
1.18.19, or GEMS 1.18.23, your secretary or state may not have told you
about this. You're the one who'll be blamed if your election is tampered
with. Find out for yourself if you have this problem: Black Box Voting
will be happy to walk you through a diagnostic procedure over the phone.
E-mail Bev Harris or Andy Stephenson to set up a time to do this.
For the media: Harris and Stephenson will be in New York City on Aug. 30,
31, Sep.1, to demonstrate this built-in election tampering technique.
Members of congress and Washington correspondents: Harris and Stephenson
will be in Washington D.C. on Sept. 22 to demonstrate this problem for
you.
Whether you vote absentee, on touch-screens, or on paper ballot (fill in
the bubble) optical scan machines, all votes are ultimately brought to the
"mother ship," the central tabulator at the county which adds them all up
and creates the results report.
These systems are used in over 30 states and each counts up to two million
votes at once.
(Click "read more" for the rest of this section)
The central tabulator is far more vulnerable than the touch screen
terminals. Think about it: If you were going to tamper with an election,
would you rather tamper with 4,500 individual voting machines, or with
just one machine, the central tabulator which receives votes from all the
machines? Of course, the central tabulator is the most desirable target.
Findings: The GEMS central tabulator program is incorrectly designed and
highly vulnerable to fraud. Election results can be changed in a matter of
seconds. Part of the program we examined appears to be designed with
election tampering in mind. We have also learned that election officials
maintain inadequate controls over access to the central tabulator. We need
to beef up procedures to mitigate risks.
Much of this information, originally published on July 8, 2003, has since
been corroborated by formal studies (RABA) and by Diebold's own internal
memos written by its programmers.
Not a single location has yet implemented the security measures needed to
mitigate the risk. Yet, it is not too late. We need to tackle this one,
folks, roll up our sleeves, and implement corrective measures.
In Nov. 2003, Black Box Voting founder Bev Harris, and director Jim March,
filed a Qui Tam lawsuit in California citing fraudulent claims by Diebold,
seeking restitution for the taxpayer. Diebold claimed its voting system
was secure. It is, in fact, highly vulnerable to and appears to be
designed for fraud.
The California Attorney General was made aware of this problem nearly a
year ago. Harris and Black Box Voting Associate Director Andy Stephenson
visited the Washington Attorney General's office in Feb. 2004 to inform
them of the problem. Yet, nothing has been done to inform election
officials who are using the system, nor have appropriate security
safeguards been implemented. In fact, Gov. Arnold Swarzenegger recently
froze the funds, allocated by Secretary of State Kevin Shelley, which
would have paid for increased scrutiny of the voting system in California.
On April 21, 2004, Harris appeared before the California Voting Systems
Panel, and presented the smoking gun document showing that Diebold had not
corrected the GEMS flaws, even though it had updated and upgraded the GEMS
program.
On Aug. 8, 2004, Harris demonstrated to Howard Dean how easy it is to
change votes in GEMS, on CNBC TV.
On Aug. 11, 2004, Jim March formally requested that the Calfornia Voting
Systems Panel watch the demonstration of the double set of books in GEMS.
They were already convened, and the time for Harris was alre
