Why asymmetrical warefare practitioners have nothing to fear

2002-05-31 Thread keyser-soze

[An edited copy of Who Let the Terrorists Succeed? 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/758330.asp]

The now-famous memo Minneapolis agent Coleen Rowley sent to Robert Mueller, director 
of the FBI, now widely known as the Federal Bureau of Incompetence. The May 21, 2002 
memo, obtained by Time, is one scary document. It suggests [SURPRISE!] that we have a 
bunch of time-servers protecting our security, which no one is in charge of anything. 
If any of this changed after September 11, Rowley, a highly regarded veteran of the 
bureau, does not say so.

Without mentioning names, Rowley basically fingers a mid-level FBI supervisory 
agent in the Hoover Building (in Washington) named Dave Frasca, who was supposed to be 
running the task force on religious fanatics. After the Minneapolis office took 
flight-student and hijacker-wannabe Zacarias Moussaoui into custody and obtained 
intelligence from the French indicating that he had terrorist ties, alert Minnesota 
agents didnt just passively push the case up the chain of command. They became, in 
Rowleys words, desperate to search his computer laptop. So desperate that they 
risked the wrath of higher ups by committing a real pre-9-11 no-no: contacting the CIA.

Headquarters personnel didnt just deny the request to probe Moussaoui 
further. Even though they were privy to many more sources of intelligence information 
than field agents, as Rowley plaintively put it, they continued to, almost 
inexplicably, throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis by-now desperate attempts 
to obtain a search warrant.

Because Frascas not commenting publicly, we havent heard the other side of 
the story. But as anyone who has ever worked in an office knows, HQ always has its own 
take on events, and sometimes its even right. In this case a federal judge in 
Washington, Royce C. Lambreth, grew annoyed at the poor documentation involved in 
requests from federal prosecutors for search warrants and wiretaps. One prosecutor so 
angered Lambreth that he was actually barred from seeking any more approvals from 
judges, a move that sent a chilling career message down through the ranks of the 
Justice Department. So Frasca, knowing which way the wind was blowing in Washington, 
wasnt just going to rubber stamp the Minneapolis request.

[Does this mean the complaints by civil libertarians that FESA were being heard?]

Moreover, the very fact that HQ is, in Rowleys words, privy to many more 
sources of intelligence is actually a hindrance, not necessarily a sign of 
negligence. The more intelligence chaff that comes in, the harder it is to find the 
wheat. Frasca should have the chance to explain that, and Judge Lambreth should 
explain why he thought the warrant process was being abused.  
 
 But Rowleys certainly correct when she tells Mueller that the problem with 
chalking this all up to the 20/20 hindsight is perfect problem  is that this is not 
a case of everyone in the FBI failing to appreciate the potential consequences. It is 
obvious that the agents in Minneapolis who were closest to the action and in the best 
position to gauge the situation locally did fully appreciate the terrorist risk/danger 
posed by Moussaoui.
 
Doesnt that sound familiar in your company? The branch offices never think 
headquarters knows whats really going on, while the home office VPs think the branch 
guys are a bunch of whiners without the chops to make it in the big time at HQ. 

But in this evergreen of bureaucratic in-fighting, one of HQs best arguments 
is usually that unlike the branch offices, it sees the big picture. This time, as 
Rowley notes, Frasca and company not only failed to see the big picture, they worked 
actively to keep others from trying to see it. Thats quite an indictment.

And thats only part of her bombshell. Rowley, who is, fortunately for her, 
close to retirement, also goes after Mueller himself. I have deep concerns that a 
delicate and subtle shading/skewering of facts by you and others at the highest levels 
of the FBI has occurred and is occurring. She argues that Muellers reorganization, 
which would further empower the FBIs Washington headquarters, is exactly the wrong 
approach to preventing terrorism.
 
As if to confirm Rowleys harsh judgment, Mueller last week classified her 
memo, though we learned after it was leaked that there is nothing even vaguely 
compromising about FBI sources and methods contained in it. He classified it for the 
same reason Bush and Cheney dont want an independent commission to investigate what 
happened: Its embarrassing.

Now its up to the rest of us to decide. 

[Unfortunately its not.  If it were the problem would have been addresses decades ago.]

Is embarrassment a proper standard for classifying documents and sweeping poor 
performance under the carpet? Or is it perhaps more patrioticand better for 
preventing a 

Why asymmetrical warefare practitioners have nothing to fear from the FBI (and probably the rest of U.S. intelligence/law enforcement)

2002-05-29 Thread keyser-soze

[An edited copy of Who Let the Terrorists Succeed? 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/758330.asp]

The now-famous memo Minneapolis agent Coleen Rowley sent to Robert Mueller, director 
of the FBI, now widely known as the Federal Bureau of Incompetence. The May 21, 2002 
memo, obtained by Time, is one scary document. It suggests [SURPRISE!] that we have a 
bunch of time-servers protecting our security, which no one is in charge of anything. 
If any of this changed after September 11, Rowley, a highly regarded veteran of the 
bureau, does not say so.

Without mentioning names, Rowley basically fingers a mid-level FBI supervisory 
agent in the Hoover Building (in Washington) named Dave Frasca, who was supposed to be 
running the task force on religious fanatics. After the Minneapolis office took 
flight-student and hijacker-wannabe Zacarias Moussaoui into custody and obtained 
intelligence from the French indicating that he had terrorist ties, alert Minnesota 
agents didnt just passively push the case up the chain of command. They became, in 
Rowleys words, desperate to search his computer laptop. So desperate that they 
risked the wrath of higher ups by committing a real pre-9-11 no-no: contacting the CIA.

Headquarters personnel didnt just deny the request to probe Moussaoui 
further. Even though they were privy to many more sources of intelligence information 
than field agents, as Rowley plaintively put it, they continued to, almost 
inexplicably, throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis by-now desperate attempts 
to obtain a search warrant.

Because Frascas not commenting publicly, we havent heard the other side of 
the story. But as anyone who has ever worked in an office knows, HQ always has its own 
take on events, and sometimes its even right. In this case a federal judge in 
Washington, Royce C. Lambreth, grew annoyed at the poor documentation involved in 
requests from federal prosecutors for search warrants and wiretaps. One prosecutor so 
angered Lambreth that he was actually barred from seeking any more approvals from 
judges, a move that sent a chilling career message down through the ranks of the 
Justice Department. So Frasca, knowing which way the wind was blowing in Washington, 
wasnt just going to rubber stamp the Minneapolis request.

[Does this mean the complaints by civil libertarians that FESA were being heard?]

Moreover, the very fact that HQ is, in Rowleys words, privy to many more 
sources of intelligence is actually a hindrance, not necessarily a sign of 
negligence. The more intelligence chaff that comes in, the harder it is to find the 
wheat. Frasca should have the chance to explain that, and Judge Lambreth should 
explain why he thought the warrant process was being abused.  
 
 But Rowleys certainly correct when she tells Mueller that the problem with 
chalking this all up to the 20/20 hindsight is perfect problem  is that this is not 
a case of everyone in the FBI failing to appreciate the potential consequences. It is 
obvious that the agents in Minneapolis who were closest to the action and in the best 
position to gauge the situation locally did fully appreciate the terrorist risk/danger 
posed by Moussaoui.
 
Doesnt that sound familiar in your company? The branch offices never think 
headquarters knows whats really going on, while the home office VPs think the branch 
guys are a bunch of whiners without the chops to make it in the big time at HQ. 

But in this evergreen of bureaucratic in-fighting, one of HQs best arguments 
is usually that unlike the branch offices, it sees the big picture. This time, as 
Rowley notes, Frasca and company not only failed to see the big picture, they worked 
actively to keep others from trying to see it. Thats quite an indictment.

And thats only part of her bombshell. Rowley, who is, fortunately for her, 
close to retirement, also goes after Mueller himself. I have deep concerns that a 
delicate and subtle shading/skewering of facts by you and others at the highest levels 
of the FBI has occurred and is occurring. She argues that Muellers reorganization, 
which would further empower the FBIs Washington headquarters, is exactly the wrong 
approach to preventing terrorism.
 
As if to confirm Rowleys harsh judgment, Mueller last week classified her 
memo, though we learned after it was leaked that there is nothing even vaguely 
compromising about FBI sources and methods contained in it. He classified it for the 
same reason Bush and Cheney dont want an independent commission to investigate what 
happened: Its embarrassing.

Now its up to the rest of us to decide. 

[Unfortunately its not.  If it were the problem would have been addresses decades ago.]

Is embarrassment a proper standard for classifying documents and sweeping poor 
performance under the carpet? Or is it perhaps more patrioticand better for 
preventing a 

Why asymmetrical warefare practitioners have nothing to fear from the FBI (and probably the rest of U.S. intelligence/law enforcement)

2002-05-29 Thread keyser-soze

[An edited copy of Who Let the Terrorists Succeed? 
http://www.msnbc.com/news/758330.asp]

The now-famous memo Minneapolis agent Coleen Rowley sent to Robert Mueller, director 
of the FBI, now widely known as the Federal Bureau of Incompetence. The May 21, 2002 
memo, obtained by Time, is one scary document. It suggests [SURPRISE!] that we have a 
bunch of time-servers protecting our security, which no one is in charge of anything. 
If any of this changed after September 11, Rowley, a highly regarded veteran of the 
bureau, does not say so.

Without mentioning names, Rowley basically fingers a mid-level FBI supervisory 
agent in the Hoover Building (in Washington) named Dave Frasca, who was supposed to be 
running the task force on religious fanatics. After the Minneapolis office took 
flight-student and hijacker-wannabe Zacarias Moussaoui into custody and obtained 
intelligence from the French indicating that he had terrorist ties, alert Minnesota 
agents didnt just passively push the case up the chain of command. They became, in 
Rowleys words, desperate to search his computer laptop. So desperate that they 
risked the wrath of higher ups by committing a real pre-9-11 no-no: contacting the CIA.

Headquarters personnel didnt just deny the request to probe Moussaoui 
further. Even though they were privy to many more sources of intelligence information 
than field agents, as Rowley plaintively put it, they continued to, almost 
inexplicably, throw up roadblocks and undermine Minneapolis by-now desperate attempts 
to obtain a search warrant.

Because Frascas not commenting publicly, we havent heard the other side of 
the story. But as anyone who has ever worked in an office knows, HQ always has its own 
take on events, and sometimes its even right. In this case a federal judge in 
Washington, Royce C. Lambreth, grew annoyed at the poor documentation involved in 
requests from federal prosecutors for search warrants and wiretaps. One prosecutor so 
angered Lambreth that he was actually barred from seeking any more approvals from 
judges, a move that sent a chilling career message down through the ranks of the 
Justice Department. So Frasca, knowing which way the wind was blowing in Washington, 
wasnt just going to rubber stamp the Minneapolis request.

[Does this mean the complaints by civil libertarians that FESA were being heard?]

Moreover, the very fact that HQ is, in Rowleys words, privy to many more 
sources of intelligence is actually a hindrance, not necessarily a sign of 
negligence. The more intelligence chaff that comes in, the harder it is to find the 
wheat. Frasca should have the chance to explain that, and Judge Lambreth should 
explain why he thought the warrant process was being abused.  
 
 But Rowleys certainly correct when she tells Mueller that the problem with 
chalking this all up to the 20/20 hindsight is perfect problem  is that this is not 
a case of everyone in the FBI failing to appreciate the potential consequences. It is 
obvious that the agents in Minneapolis who were closest to the action and in the best 
position to gauge the situation locally did fully appreciate the terrorist risk/danger 
posed by Moussaoui.
 
Doesnt that sound familiar in your company? The branch offices never think 
headquarters knows whats really going on, while the home office VPs think the branch 
guys are a bunch of whiners without the chops to make it in the big time at HQ. 

But in this evergreen of bureaucratic in-fighting, one of HQs best arguments 
is usually that unlike the branch offices, it sees the big picture. This time, as 
Rowley notes, Frasca and company not only failed to see the big picture, they worked 
actively to keep others from trying to see it. Thats quite an indictment.

And thats only part of her bombshell. Rowley, who is, fortunately for her, 
close to retirement, also goes after Mueller himself. I have deep concerns that a 
delicate and subtle shading/skewering of facts by you and others at the highest levels 
of the FBI has occurred and is occurring. She argues that Muellers reorganization, 
which would further empower the FBIs Washington headquarters, is exactly the wrong 
approach to preventing terrorism.
 
As if to confirm Rowleys harsh judgment, Mueller last week classified her 
memo, though we learned after it was leaked that there is nothing even vaguely 
compromising about FBI sources and methods contained in it. He classified it for the 
same reason Bush and Cheney dont want an independent commission to investigate what 
happened: Its embarrassing.

Now its up to the rest of us to decide. 

[Unfortunately its not.  If it were the problem would have been addresses decades ago.]

Is embarrassment a proper standard for classifying documents and sweeping poor 
performance under the carpet? Or is it perhaps more patrioticand better for 
preventing a