Re: Anyone Remember Zero Knowledge Systems?

[Adam Shostack]

On Wed, Sep 10, 2003 at 11:32:29AM -0400, R. A. Hettinga wrote:
| 
| 
| Cryptonomicon.Net - 
| 
| Anyone Remember Zero Knowledge Systems? 
| Date: Wednesday, September 10 @ 11:15:00 EDT 
| Topic: Commercial Operations / Services 


| Unfortunately, they never quite made a compelling enough argument
| for mass adoption of their system and eventually morphed the company
| into a manufacturer or more conventional privacy tools. Freedom still
| exists as a product, thought it is aimed at web users, only runs on
| Windows clients, and routes requests through proxy servers owned by
| Zero Knowledge Systems.   


Freedom Websecure is a different protocol set from Freedom.net.

Websecure runs on linux, see http://websecure4linux.sourceforge.net/

The Freedom.net code is available for non-commercial use, see
http://slashdot.org/articles/02/02/16/0320238.shtml?tid=158 or the
shmoo group cvs server,
http://cvs.shmoo.com/view/projects/freedom-server/

The problem with running Napster over Freedom was bandwidth costs.
Users may be more willing to pay today, given the clear risk of paying
$10,000 or more in fines.  I'm sure that ZKS would be happy to sell
someone a commercial use license.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
   -Hume

Re: unintended consequences: Davis recall leads to US internal passports

[Bill Stewart]

Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
Licenses as IDs at airports questioned

WASHINGTON  Federal officials and lawmakers raised serious concerns
Tuesday about the continued use of driver's licenses at airports and
U.S. borders in light of California's new law allowing illegal
immigrants to obtain the widely accepted means of identification.
California's law against Driving While Speaking Spanish is only
about 10 years old, and was a Pete Wilson thing.
It happened about when I moved here - did other states start
doing similar things in the mean time?
The Feds started bullying states into collecting SSNs
when issuing drivers' licenses in the mid 80s,
ostensibly as a way of preventing duplicate registrations,
but I hadn't heard they'd been doing this.
Davis had refused to sign such a law before, citing homeland security
concerns. His about-face was questioned by some as a move to garner
support in the Latino community. 
"Homeland Security"?  Back when Pete Wilson was State Reptile,
he was at least only claiming it was to make it hard for illegal immigrants
to come here and compete for jobs and get welfare,
but wasn't pretending they were a threat.
excerpts from
http://www2.ocregister.com/ocrweb/ocr/article.do?id=56388§ion=NEWS&subsection=NEWS&year=2003&month=9&day=10

Re: unintended consequences: Davis recall leads to US internal passports

[Tim May]

On Wednesday, September 10, 2003, at 09:38  AM, Major Variola (ret.) 
wrote:

Licenses as IDs at airports questioned

WASHINGTON  Federal officials and lawmakers raised serious concerns
Tuesday about the continued use of driver's licenses at airports and
U.S. borders in light of California's new law allowing illegal
immigrants to obtain the widely accepted means of identification.
"If driver's licenses are given to people who are illegally in the
country, then that puts extra burdens and difficulties on our 
inspectors
at the border," Hutchinson said. "If you don't have integrity in the
driver's licenses that are issued, then it really undermines the whole
premise of allowing U.S. citizens to travel abroad and come back with
limited proof of U.S. citizenship, without a passport."
There has never been any "integrity" (in OS/capabilities/verification 
terms) in the driver's license issuance. Not in any of the three states 
I have requested and gotten DLs in has there ever been the slightest 
attempt to verify who I say I am (lacking is-a-person credentials, this 
would be difficult anyway).

The wisdom of using driver's licenses for identification was also
questioned Tuesday in a congressional watchdog report that found that
fraudulent licenses are passing muster at airports, border crossings 
and
motor-vehicle offices. The full report by the General Accounting Office
has been classified for security reasons. But in public testimony
prepared for the Senate Finance Committee, Robert Cramer, director of
GAO's office of special investigations, warned about relying on 
driver's
licenses for identification.

Davis had refused to sign such a law before, citing homeland security
concerns. His about-face was questioned by some as a move to garner
support in the Latino community.
Our first Mexican governor expects to add an estimated 525,000 former 
illegal aliens to the Democrap voter base in California.

BTW, having briefly volunteered at a "register to vote" table a while 
back, I can assure you all that we never asked for any ID whatsoever 
upon taking the completed forms, that many of those who registered were 
obviously too recent in arrival in the U.S. to be legally qualifed to 
be citizens, let alone voters, and that many of those I "registered" 
(*) had essentially no knowledge of anything political.

(* I did not actually "register" them...that happens somewhere back 
when the form I collected from them is processed by the DP center and 
entered into the big computer. Do the staffers in Sacramento make 
efforts to verify addresses or to cross-check with Immigration and 
Naturalization? Do you want to buy a bridge? Once the forms are sent 
in, registration is a foregone conclusion.)

--Tim May

Re: [cdr] CAPPS-II: Green/Yellow or Red for freight?

[Tyler Durden]

So I guess his CAPS profile was green?

-TD


From: "J.A. Terranson" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [cdr] CAPPS-II: Green/Yellow or Red for freight?
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2003 21:42:18 -0500 (CDT)
http://www.cnn.com/2003/US/Southwest/09/09/plane.stowaway/index.html

Man shipped from New York to Texas in crate
Tuesday, September 9, 2003 Posted: 10:31 PM EDT (0231 GMT)
WASHINGTON (CNN) -- Federal officials are investigating how a man managed 
to
hide inside a crate that was flown by a major cargo carrier from New York 
to
Dallas, Texas.

Charles McKinley wanted to go to his father's house in Dallas and decided 
to
"ship himself rather than pay for a ticket," said Transportation Security
Administration spokeswoman Suzanne Luber.

McKinley secured himself in the crate, apparently with some help, along 
with
his computer and some clothes.

The incident highlighted a potential hole in aviation security.

Luber shipped himself through cargo carrier Kitty Hawk Inc., which said it
was told by the shipping firm, Pilot Air Freight, that the crate was loaded
with computer monitors.
The crate, marked as containing computer equipment, was picked up at a
company called Metrotech in the Bronx, New York, and driven to John
F. Kennedy International Airport, and then to Newark, New Jersey, where it
was placed on a Kitty Hawk cargo plane, she said.
"The plane actually went to Buffalo. From Buffalo it went to Fort Wayne,
Indiana. There was a change of planes onto another Kitty Hawk cargo plane,
and he ended up at DFW [Dallas/Fort Worth International Airport]," Luber
said.
He was then driven to the intended address, which was his father's house in
De Soto, a suburb 14 miles south of Dallas.
Carl Smith, assistant chief of the De Soto Police Department, said that 
when
the deliveryman went to remove the box from the truck he noticed a person
inside.

Authorities believe Smith had moved something he had been using to cover
himself, so the driver was able to see him through a slit in the crate.
"At that time, the young man kicked one side of the crate out, crawled out,
got his box, and walked around to the back of the house," Smith said.
The driver contacted police.

McKinley is being held at the Dallas County Sheriff's Department, Smith
said. Authorities have not released his age, but news reports said he is 
25.

Luber said authorities detained McKinley on outstanding warrants for theft 
of
a check and a traffic violation. The TSA is working with the FBI and the
U.S. attorney's office to investigate and determine if there are any 
federal
charges for this incident.

"We've made significant improvements in cargo security, but we do have 
more,
more to go," Luber said. TSA teams have examined cargo carriers and the
airport facilities they use to load packages "to determine strengths and
weaknesses in cargo security," she said.

The TSA has a cargo security advisory committee that is expected to provide
recommendations for additional security as early as October 1, she said.
"The bottom line is just like passenger security there's not just one 
single
silver bullet," Luber said. "We're taking a layered approach.

"Should Congress ask us, we are ready to train cargo pilots as federal 
flight
deck officers." Federal flight deck officers are armed with guns in the
cockpit.

Richard Phillips, chairman and chief executive officer of Pilot Air 
Freight,
said his company rigidly adhered to TSA procedures, keeping the crate off a
passenger plane and placing no travelers at risk.

"It is unfortunate that one individual would choose to flaunt air
regulations," he said.
A spokesman for Kitty Hawk Cargo added, "This is a very unusual incident."

CNN correspondent Patti Davis contributed to this report.
_
Get a FREE computer virus scan online from McAfee. 
http://clinic.mcafee.com/clinic/ibuy/campaign.asp?cid=3963

Re: unintended consequences: Davis recall leads to US internal passports

[Major Variola (ret)]

At 11:53 AM 9/10/03 -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
>California's law against Driving While Speaking Spanish is only
>about 10 years old, and was a Pete Wilson thing.
>It happened about when I moved here - did other states start
>doing similar things in the mean time?
>The Feds started bullying states into collecting SSNs
>when issuing drivers' licenses in the mid 80s,
>ostensibly as a way of preventing duplicate registrations,
>but I hadn't heard they'd been doing this.

Interesting.  I didn't know the history.

What is morbidly fascinating is how the driver's license is/has become
the internal passport.  And now, when it is being brought back to
a certification that one "knows how to drive", the scum who manipulated
it into an internal passport are shiiting bricks.

As a Ca driver, I'm in favor of it ---we have to pay for uninsured
drivers insurace or risk collisions with them.  As someone who
won't be going to Mexico, I don't care if they require real passports
(instead of a Ca driver's license) to re-enter the country.
If the US wants to get real borders, that's fine with me.  If they
want to deport illegals, that's fine too, so long as they don't violate
civil rights doing it.  (Hint: stopping people on the street because
they look foreign is not acceptable.  The INS was doing that
in Orange or San Diego county recently.  I wrote to some mexican
activist reminding them that no one in this country needs
to speak to pigs, if you're not driving.)

\begin{rant}
Illegals (and unlicensed pharmacists) also drive an anonymity industry:
credit-card-like debit cards that don't require proof of income, just
cash;
prepaid phones that don't require a billing address, etc.

I've read that to enter a Fed building you need "ID".  I'm curious
what happens if you haven't got it.  Adrian Lamo had his card.
I'm currently ignoring the conscription notices I get from the
local jury droids; if I *volunteer* someday (after reviewing
fija.org) I'll be sure to be without ID.

Also heard on the tube that 60K fake IDs are caught at the border
annually.  Wonder how many aren't caught.

NIB magnets are probably overkill, but it was the first and last
useful swipe my license's magstrip will see...

Re: [cdr] Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform

[Joseph Ashwood]

- Original Message - 
From: "Tim May" <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: [cdr] Re: Digital cash and campaign finance reform


> There are too many loopholes to close.

I think that's the smartest thing any one of us has said on this topic. 
Joe

[p2p-hackers] Project Announcement: P2P Sockets (fwd from bradneuberg@yahoo.com)

[Eugen Leitl]

- Forwarded message from Brad Neuberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> -

From: Brad Neuberg <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Date: Tue, 9 Sep 2003 20:43:04 -0700 (PDT)
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: [p2p-hackers] Project Announcement: P2P Sockets

Hi everyone.  I just posted the web site, source code,
and two tutorials for the Peer-to-Peer Sockets Project
at http://p2psockets.jxta.org.  The source code
represents a
working, 1.0 beta 1 release, with several pieces of
software, such as Jetty and XML-RPC Client and Server
libraries, already ported onto this new API.  I have
spent the last month and a half working full time on
this.  Here are some more details on the project:



Are you interested in:

* returning the end-to-end principle to the
Internet?
* an alternative peer-to-peer domain name system
that bypasses ICANN and Verisign, is completely
decentralized, and responds to updates much quicker
than standard DNS?
* an Internet where everyone can create and
consume network services, even if they have a dynamic
IP address or no IP address, are behind a Network
Address Translation (NAT) device, or blocked by an
ISP's firewall?
* a web where every peer can automatically start a
web server, host an XML-RPC service, and more and
quickly make these available to other peers?
* easily adding peer-to-peer functionality to your
Java socket and server socket applications?
* having your servlets and Java Server Pages work
on a peer-to-peer network for increased reliability,
easier maintenence, and exciting new end-user
functionality?
* playing with a cool technology?

If you answered yes to any of the above, then welcome
to the Peer-to-Peer Sockets project! The Peer-to-Peer
Sockets Project reimplements Java's standard Socket,
ServerSocket, and InetAddress classes to work on a
peer-to-peer network rather than on the standard
TCP/IP network. "Aren't standard TCP/IP sockets and
server sockets already peer-to-peer?" some might ask.
Standard TCP/IP sockets and server sockets are
theoretically peer-to-peer but in practice are not due
to firewalls, Network Address Translation (NAT)
devices, and political and technical issues with the
Domain Name System (DNS).

The P2P Sockets project deals with these issues by
re-implementing the standard java.net classes on top
of the Jxta peer-to-peer network. Jxta is an
open-source project that creates a peer-to-peer
overlay network that sits on top of TCP/IP. Ever peer
on the network is given an IP-address like number,
even if they are behind a firewall or don't have a
stable IP address. Super-peers on the Jxta network run
application-level routers which store special
information such as how to reach peers, how to join
sub-groups of peers, and what content peers are making
available. Jxta application-level relays can proxy
requests between peers that would not normally be able
to communicate due to firewalls or NAT devices. Peers
organize themselves into Peer Groups, which scope all
search requests and act as natural security
containers. Any peer can publish and create a peer
group in a decentralized way, and other peers can
search for and discover these peer groups using other
super-peers. Peers communicate using Pipes, which are
very similar to Unix pipes. Pipes abstract the exact
way in which two peers communicate, allowing peers to
communicate using other peers as intermediaries if
they normally would not be able to communicate due to
network partitioning.

Jxta is an extremely powerful framework. However, it
is not an easy framework to learn, and porting
existing software to work on Jxta is not for the
faint-of-heart. P2P Sockets effectively hides Jxta by
creating a thin illusion that the peer-to-peer network
is actually a standard TCP/IP network. If a peer
wishes to become a server they simply create a P2P
server socket with the domain name they want and the
port other peers should use to contact them. P2P
clients open socket connections to hosts that are
running services on given ports. Hosts can be resolved
either by domain name, such as "www.nike.laborpolicy",
or by IP address, such as "44.22.33.22". Behind the
scenes these resolve to JXTA primitives rather than
being resolved through DNS or TCP/IP. For example, the
host name "www.nike.laborpolicy" is actually the NAME
field of a Jxta Peer Group Advertisement. P2P sockets
and server sockets work exactly the same as normal
TCP/IP sockets and server sockets.

The benefits of taking this approach are many-fold.
First, programmers can easily leverage their knowledge
of standard TCP/IP sockets and server sockets to work
on the Jxta peer-to-peer network without having to
learn about Jxta. Second, all of the P2P Sockets code
subclasses standard java.net objects, such as
java.net.Socket, so existing network applications can
quickly be ported to work on a peer-to-peer network.
The P2P Sockets project already includes a large
amount of software ported to use the peer-to-peer
network, including a web se

GSM Crack Paper

[John Young]

"Instant Ciphertext-Only Cryptanalysis of GSM Encrypted
Communications," by Elad Barkan, Eli Biham, Nathan Keller

  http://cryptome.org/gsm-crack-bbk.pdf  (18 Pages, 234KB)

Abstract. In this paper we present a very practical cipher-text only
cryptanalysis of GSM encrypted communications, and various active
attacks on the GSM protocols. These attacks can even break into
GSM networks that use "unbreakable" ciphers. We describe a
ciphertext-only attack on A5/2 that requires a few dozen milliseconds
of encrypted off-the-air cellular conversation and finds the correct
key in less than a second on a personal computer. We then extend
this attack to a (more complex) ciphertext-only attack on A5/1. We
describe new attacks on the protocols of networks that use A5/1, A5/3,
or even GPRS. These attacks are based on security flaws of the GSM
protocols, and work whenever the mobile phone supports A5/2. We
emphasize that these attacks are on the protocols, and are thus
applicable whenever the cellular phone supports a weak cipher, for
instance they are also applicable using the cryptanalysis of A5/1.
Unlike previous attacks on GSM that require unrealistic information,
like long known plaintext periods, our attacks are very practical and
do not require any knowledge of the content of the conversation.
These attacks allow attackers to tap conversations and decrypt
them either in real-time, or at any later time. We also show active
attacks, such as call hijacking, altering data messages and call
theft.

[cdr] An IRC server is available...

[Jim Choate]

Hi,

Open Forge, LLC is making a IRC server available on kraken.open-forge.com
on port 6667 available for use. The current channels include a
#cypherpunks.

For more information please visit the SSZ & Open Forge homepages.


 -- --
  [EMAIL PROTECTED][EMAIL PROTECTED]
  www.ssz.com   www.open-forge.com

Re: GPG Sig test

[Bill Frantz]

At 7:31 PM -0700 9/9/03, Mark Renouf wrote:
>Can someone verify this message? Someone told me that my signatures were
>coming up invalide for some reason. I just created a new key recently
>(old one expired months ago). I just uploaded it to keyserver.pgp.net
>
>Thanks!
>
>--
>Mark Renouf <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
>
>[demime 0.97c removed an attachment of type application/pgp-signature
>which had a name of signature.asc]

For some reason this mail tickled my sense of humor.

Try sending the message without MIME.

Cheers - Bill


-
Bill Frantz   | "A Jobless Recovery is | Periwinkle -- Consulting
(408)356-8506 | like a Breadless Sand- | 16345 Englewood Ave.
[EMAIL PROTECTED] | wich." -- Steve Schear | Los Gatos, CA 95032, USA

Anyone Remember Zero Knowledge Systems?

[R. A. Hettinga]

Cryptonomicon.Net - 

Anyone Remember Zero Knowledge Systems? 
Date: Wednesday, September 10 @ 11:15:00 EDT 
Topic: Commercial Operations / Services 


It seems that a day doesn't go by that there's new news about the RIAA suing another 
file swapper. First it's college students, then it's 12-year old honor students, and 
we hear that they're going after senior citizens next. With ISPs either volunteering 
or being forced to divulge subscriber information, it's a wonder that there isn't a 
technology to help shield user's online privacy with respect to their file swapping 
activities. 

Well... actually there is, and it's been around for a couple of years. 



We don't normally do commercial endorsements here, but when we see so much chatter 
from people on newsgroups talking about privacy protecting technology, we figured we 
should probably chime in. Way back in the late 90's a company called Zero Knowledge 
Systems was formed to develop privacy enhancing technology for the Internet. Their 
flagship product Freedom.Net was a giant onion-skin routing cloud with encrypted 
links. The idea was that someone desiring privacy would open an encrypted link with a 
Freedom.Net node and send it's internet requests through that node. That node in turn 
would encrypt the request and route it through another semi-randomly selected node 
using a different encryption key. This process would repeat until the request exited 
the cloud of encrypted packet routers and hits the target of it's destination. The 
response to the request would return via a similar convoluted, encrypted path. 

At the time, Freedom.Net was being pitched as a tool for human rights workers, 
whistleblowers, or even parents who don't want identifying information about their 
children being collected by heartless corporations intent on selling their kids the 
latest Anime action figures. 

Unfortunately, they never quite made a compelling enough argument for mass adoption of 
their system and eventually morphed the company into a manufacturer or more 
conventional privacy tools. Freedom still exists as a product, thought it is aimed at 
web users, only runs on Windows clients, and routes requests through proxy servers 
owned by Zero Knowledge Systems. 

It is interesting to ponder what would happen if the Freedom network were widely 
deployed and routing file swapping packets. One key feature of the original Freedom 
network was that routing nodes could (and would) be placed in different legal 
jurisdictions. Assuming that node operators actually logged packet traffic, 
organizations like the RIAA would be forced to subpoena node operators in multiple 
countries; a process humorously referred to as "Jurisdictional Arbitrage." 

Imagine a world where your file swapping software also included a Freedom-like client 
that routed your request through a maze of encrypting routers. The routers themselves 
could be placed in different countries. This could make for big headaches when the 
RIAA moves to subpoena logs of file swapper's activities. They couldn't get the logs 
from the ISPs because there's no way the ISP could peek in the traffic stream to 
identify offending content. They could try to put a sniffer on a US-based encrypting 
network node, but there's likely little information that could be gathered from this; 
the "payload" of a packet is encrypted with a key that the intermediate routers don't 
know. 

About the only place the RIAA could attack would be the servers. After all, all the 
encryption in the world won't help you if you publicize the IP address of your file 
store. I'm sure what keeps the record industry executives up at night is the worry 
that somewhere in the middle of the backwoods of Colombia or in the occupied 
territories of Israel / Palestine there are extra-territorial jurisdictions that can't 
be served with papers. Honestly, do you really want to be the process server that goes 
in to serve papers on FARC guerillas? 

The future is unclear, but while we start thinking about critical infrastructure, 
maybe we could think about a way to protect the record companies from financial ruin 
at the hands of FARC or HAMAS. Yes, I know there are several out there who would like 
to help destroy the RIAA and all they stand for. Yes, they are behaving in a manner 
indistinguishable from bastards. But they're our bastards, and if they are to be 
"taken down," there's a legal process for doing so. 

It's well known that Hollywood has much better political representation than Silicon 
Valley. What would happen if KaZaa or Gnutella or Sharmin Networks started operating 
an encrypted network? Would the RIAA move to outlaw encryption? Maybe the 
entertainment companies would buy the ISPs and block encrypted content from traversing 
their network. In any event, we see a whole new chapter in the privacy wars brewing. 
Don't say you weren't warned. 






This article co

Re: [p2p-hackers] Project Announcement: P2P Sockets (fwd from bradneuberg@yahoo.com)

[Morlock Elloi]

> stable IP address. Super-peers on the Jxta network run
> application-level routers which store special
> information such as how to reach peers, how to join

So these super peers are reliable, non-vulnerable, although everyone knows
where they are, because  ?



=
end
(of original message)

Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows:

__
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software
http://sitebuilder.yahoo.com

Re: cats

[Harmon Seaver]

On Tue, Sep 09, 2003 at 12:40:57PM -0700, Major Variola (ret) wrote:
> At 08:12 AM 9/9/03 -0500, Harmon Seaver wrote:
> >On Mon, Sep 08, 2003 at 11:15:31AM -0700, Tim May wrote:
> >> "Dogs can't conceive of a group of cats without an alpha cat."
> --David
> >> Honig, on the Cypherpunks list, 2001-11
> >
> >
> >   Cats always have an alpha cat. And they often have pissing contests
> to
> >determine the pecking order. This is just as true of house cats as it
> is of
> >lions.
> 
> First, many cats (e.g., mountain lions) do not form social groups beyond
> 
> the mother raising the cubs.  Female African lions reportedly do hang
> out together.
> 
> Second, if you examine the context of the original post, the statement
> was a metaphor about leaderless ("anarchic") assemblies such
> as this list.  In particular, the Feds (dogs) haven't historically
> understood
> that this list is the equivalent of a grad lounge or spontaneous beach
> party:
> there are multiple conversations, no one is moderating or otherwise
> choreographing
> squat.

   Yes, I'm well aware of what it's trying to say, but it's really a very poor
analogy based on a faulty premise. 

>  When cats encounter each other by chance, they may assert
> dominance,

   Not "may" -- they always do, just as dogs do. And not just in first meetings,
it continues virtually forever, including sometimes all-out fighting, but
sometimes too subtle for most humans to even be aware of. 

> (linguistic pissing contests are not unheard of here :-)
> but their lives are not structured around following, or smelling the
> higher-up's ass.
> 

We have three or four distinct groups of cats living here that we feed. Two
in the house, two in the garage/greenhouse who once lived in the house but could
not resolve the dominance issue between one male in the house and one alpha
female now in the greenhouse. Then there are the more or less permanent two
females that live on and under the front porch, who also have serious unresolved
issues with the Mama Fritz of the greenhouse (who does get outside during the
day). Dominance also goes down the line, watching the 3 young offspring of one
of the porch ladies makes that pretty clear, one of those bosses the other two,
but all are subservient to the two older females, and their mother, Shy, clearly
bosses Bobbette, the other older female. Neither of them take crap from Mama
Fritzi, in fact one day I watched Bobbette whup Mama's butt, but that hasn't
deterred Mama one iota.
And then we have the feral toms who come to the permanent bin feeder on the
porch as well, who have their own inter-relationships. 
If you read any texts on cat behavior, you'll find dominance a well studied
attribute. Most say there is *always* an alpha cat, even if it isn't apparent to
the casual observer.


-- 
Harmon Seaver   
CyberShamanix
http://www.cybershamanix.com

Re: cats

[Morlock Elloi]

Well, cats *do* have a quite strict hierarchy which is far from ad-hoc
establishment of the pecking order. So the analogy dosn't hold with cat
behavioral experts.

However, if cats could perform anonymized hissing, biting and scratching, then
I'm sure that cypherpunk maillist would be a good analogy for cat behavior.



> Second, if you examine the context of the original post, the statement
> was a metaphor about leaderless ("anarchic") assemblies such
> as this list.  In particular, the Feds (dogs) haven't historically
> understood that this list is the equivalent of a grad lounge or spontaneous
> beach party:
> there are multiple conversations, no one is moderating or otherwise
> choreographing
> squat.  When cats encounter each other by chance, they may assert
> dominance,
> (linguistic pissing contests are not unheard of here :-)
> but their lives are not structured around following, or smelling the
> higher-up's ass.




=
end
(of original message)

Y-a*h*o-o (yes, they scan for this) spam follows:

__
Do you Yahoo!?
Yahoo! SiteBuilder - Free, easy-to-use web site design software
http://sitebuilder.yahoo.com

GPG Sig test

[Mark Renouf]

Can someone verify this message? Someone told me that my signatures were
coming up invalide for some reason. I just created a new key recently
(old one expired months ago). I just uploaded it to keyserver.pgp.net

Thanks!

-- 
Mark Renouf <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>


signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part

Re: Your papers please [what color is John Gilmore?]

[Adam Shostack]

First answer: He's in red, no green, argggh!

Second answer: We've changed the name of the program to ITAR so his
lawsuit goes back to square 1! That's the plan!

Third answer: CAPPS was just a clever distraction, the real program
remains classified.  Please step over here.

Adam



On Tue, Sep 09, 2003 at 02:27:23PM -0700, Bill Stewart wrote:
| What color is John?  He's Tie-Dyed, of course...
| 
| You were expecting a single category they knew what to do with?
| 
| Major Variola (ret.) wrote:
| >Most people will be coded green and sail through. But up to 8
| >percent of passengers who board the nation's 26,000 daily flights will
| >be coded "yellow" and will undergo additional screening at the
| >checkpoint, according to people familiar with the program. An estimated
| >1 to 2 percent will be labeled "red" and will be prohibited from
| >boarding. These passengers also will face police questioning and may be
| >arrested.
| >
| >http://www.washingtonpost.com/ac2/wp-dyn/A45434-2003Sep8?language=printer

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
   -Hume