An Analysis of Compromised Remailers

2003-12-16 Thread John Young
This came in response to Cryptome's posting of Len Sassman's
comments on remailers.

-

From: S
Subject: Re: remailers-tla.htm Compromised Remailers, December 15, 2003
Date: Mon, 15 Dec 2003 16:16:17 -0700
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Thank you for posting the Compromised Remailers article:


http://cryptome.org/remailers-tla.htm

Over the past year, many remailer users have noticed that the reliability of 
the Mixmaster type II network has steadily degraded. Although it may well be 
the result of TLA interference, the remailer community's statistical methods 
of selecting a reliable remailer chain contribute significantly to the 
network's degradation.

As a former employee of the United States Army Communications Command [USACC] 
Headquarters, I was amazed to stumble upon the existence of a publicly 
available communications medium permitting truly anonymous communication by 
hampering the government's ability at traffic analysis, or tracking an 
email message from its source to its destination. One would have to be 
foolish to believe that TLAs are not hard at work trying to pierce the veil 
of anonymity afforded by the Mixmaster type II, and, the yet to be released, 
type III remailers.

I ran tests in September, October  November, and provided the Mixmaster 
developers  remail operators with the same results I've included below. My 
testing was extremely simple: send a bunch of messages, and note which 

messages arrived. [The same procedure an accountant would use in tracking a 
financial transaction from its origin to its destination.]

What I found was that a handful of remailers accounted for virtually all of 
the un-delivered email messages. Yet, these same remailers, that never 
delivered my email messages to the alt.anonymous.messages news group, where 
also listed as among the most reliable remailers in mixmaster stats used to 
select remailer chains.

I've included my recommendations to improve the network's reliability in the 
test results below.

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Mixmaster II Reliability Issues  Test Results
-

The major issue currently plaguing the Mixmaster remailer network is the true 
reliability of the LAST remailer in a chain. A considerable number of these 
remailers habitually act like Black Holes for email messages destined for 
alt.anonymous.messages and other news groups. 

Unfortunately, most of these Black Hole remailers also happen to be listed 
as among the most reliable remailers in mixmaster stats, with ratings ranging 
from the upper 90's to 100; consequently, it's highly probable that messages 
sent to newsgroups will frequently hit one of these demon remailers, never to 
reach their intended recipient.

Over the past 2 months, I've sent  tracked over 5,124 email messages 
consisting of either 4 or 6 copies of 1,220 unique messages, each routed 
through 11 Mixmaster type II remailers, to the alt.anonymous.messages news 
group.

---
Last Remailer   Lost Msgs  Delivered Msgs% Reliability
---
antani 63  0 0
cripto 65  0 0
hastio 41  0 0
george 31  718
paranoia   41 1020
futurew33  921
edo27  925
starwars   54 2935
itys7  956
italy   7 1059
bog 3 1482
freedom 3 4594
tonga   510695
liberty 2 5196
panta   3 6996
bigapple310497
metacolo3 9997

bogg1 5298
dizum   210698
jmbcv   1 5998
frell   0 34   100
randseed0  3   100
---
Sub-totals39582568
---
Total   1,220
---


Surprisingly - at first - I found that sending messages through chains of 
remailers rated, in mixmaster stats, at 98% or greater was FAR LESS reliable 

Re: An Analysis of Compromised Remailers

2003-12-16 Thread Len Sassaman
On Mon, 15 Dec 2003, John Young wrote:

 This came in response to Cryptome's posting of Len Sassman's
 comments on remailers.

(BTW, John -- while the threat originally started out as being about
compromised remailers, my comments had little to do with that title.
Perhaps remailer security would be a better index term for cryptome?)

 Over the past year, many remailer users have noticed that the reliability of
 the Mixmaster type II network has steadily degraded. Although it may well be
 the result of TLA interference, the remailer community's statistical methods
 of selecting a reliable remailer chain contribute significantly to the
 network's degradation.

There are conflicting opinions on that statement. For instance, have a
look at this threat on alt.privacy.anon-server:

http://groups.google.com/groups?selm=8eb77bbdadfd2a6d1b21efabc1e1e090%40firenze.linux.itoe=UTF-8output=gplain

So, on one hand we have the claim that remailer reliability is degrading
because of how we select reliable remailer chains, and on the other hand
there is the claim that the reliability is increasing, because TLAs are
the only entities competent to run reliable remailers. (Apparently, if you
believe this theory, you also believe I work for the FBI.)

The facts are that the remailer network's reliability has increased over
the past few years, largely due to the renewed development attention that
Mixmaster has received.


 I ran tests in September, October  November, and provided the Mixmaster
 developers  remail operators with the same results I've included below. My
 testing was extremely simple: send a bunch of messages, and note which

The tests below unfortunately do not provide any really useful data. What
is really being tested isn't the remailer reliability, but the mail to
news gateway reliability. It would be much more useful for the tester to
isolate which remailer/mail2news combinations are resulting in lost news,
and post that data instead.


--Len.