part III: Game theory, psychobio, demographics: Genesis of Suicide Terrorism
Priorities for Homeland Security
The last line of defense against suicide terrorism--preventing bombers
from reaching targets--may be the most expensive and least likely to
succeed.
Random bag or body searches cannot be very effective against people
willing to die, although this may provide some semblance of security and
hence
psychological defense against suicide terrorism's psychological
warfare. A middle line of defense, penetrating and destroying recruiting
organizations
and isolating their leaders, may be successful in the near term, but
even more resistant organizations could emerge instead. The first line
of defense is
to drastically reduce receptivity of potential recruits to recruiting
organizations. But how?
It is important to know what probably will not work. Raising literacy
rates may have no effect and could be counterproductive should greater
literacy
translate into greater exposure to terrorist propaganda (in Pakistan,
literacy and dislike for the United States increased as the number of
religious
madrasa schools increased from 3000 to 39,000 since 1978) (27, 38).
Lessening poverty may have no effect, and could be counterproductive if
poverty reduction for the entire population amounted to a downward
redistribution of wealth that left those initially better off with fewer
opportunities
than before. Ending occupation or reducing perceived humiliation may
help, but not if the population believes this to be a victory inspired
by terror
(e.g., Israel's apparently forced withdrawal from Lebanon).
If suicide-bombing is crucially (though not exclusively) an
institution-level phenomenon, it may require finding the right mix of
pressure and
inducements to get the communities themselves to abandon support for
institutions that recruit suicide attackers. One way is to so damage the
community's social and political fabric that any support by the local
population or authorities for sponsors of suicide attacks collapses, as
happened
regarding the kamikaze as a by-product of the nuclear destruction of
Hiroshima and Nagasaki. In the present world, however, such a strategy
would
neither be morally justifiable nor practical to implement, given the
dispersed and distributed organization of terrorist institutions among
distantly
separated populations that collectively number in the hundreds of
millions. Likewise, retaliation in kind ("tit-for-tat") is not morally
acceptable if allies
are sought (41). Even in more localized settings, such as the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, coercive policies alone may not achieve
lasting relief from
attack and can exacerbate the problem over time. On the inducement
side, social psychology research indicates that people who identify with
antagonistic groups use conflicting information from the other group to
reinforce antagonism (19). Thus, simply trying to persuade others from
without
by bombarding them with more self-serving information may only increase
hostility.
Other research suggests that most people have more moderate views than
what they consider their group norm to be. Inciting and empowering
moderates from within to confront inadequacies and inconsistencies in
their own knowledge (of others as evil), values (respect for life), and
behavior
(support for killing), and other members of their group (42), can
produce emotional dissatisfaction leading to lasting change and
influence on the part
of these individuals (43). Funding for civic education and debate may
help, also interfaith confidence-building through intercommunity
interaction
initiatives (as Singapore's government proposes) (35). Ethnic
profiling, isolation, and preemptive attack on potential (but not yet
actual) supporters of
terrorism probably will not help. Another strategy is for the United
States and its allies to change behavior by directly addressing and
lessening
sentiments of grievance and humiliation, especially in Palestine (where
images of daily violence have made it the global focus of Moslem
attention)
(44) (Fig. 4). For no evidence (historical or otherwise) indicates that
support for suicide terrorism will evaporate without complicity in
achieving at
least some fundamental goals that suicide bombers and supporting
communities share.
Fig. 4. Moslem youth with Quran dressed as
a Palestinian suicide bomber demonstrating outside the United
Nations office in Jakarta, Indonesia (April
2002). (Indonesia is the most populous Moslem nation.)
[Reuters/Darren Whiteside] [View Larger
Version of this Image (95K GIF file)]
Of course, this does not mean negotiating over all goals, such as
Al-Qaida's quest to replace the Western-inspired system of nation-states
with a
global caliphate, first in Moslem lands and then everywhere (see
supporting online text for history and agenda of suicide-sponsoring
groups). Unlike
other groups, Al-Qaida publicizes no specific demands after ma
part II: Game theory, psychobio, demographics: Genesis of Suicide Terrorism
Dubious Public Perceptions Recent treatments of Homeland Security research concentrate on how to spend billions to protect sensitive installations from attack (14, 15). But this last line of defense is probably easiest to breach because of the multitude of vulnerable and likely targets (including discotheques, restaurants, and malls), the abundance of would-be attackers (needing little supervision once embarked on a mission), the relatively low costs of attack (hardware store ingredients, no escape needs), the difficulty of detection (little use of electronics), and the unlikelihood that attackers would divulge sensitive information (being unaware of connections beyond their operational cells). Exhortations to put duct tape on windows may assuage (or incite) fear, but will not prevent massive loss of life, and public realization of such paltry defense can undermine trust. Security agencies also attend to prior lines of defense, such as penetrating agent-handling networks of terrorist groups, with only intermittent success. A first line of defense is to prevent people from becoming terrorists. Here, success appears doubtful should current government and media opinions about why people become human bombs translate into policy (see also supporting online text on contrary academic explanations). Suicide terrorists often are labeled crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in the midst of poverty and ignorance. The obvious course becomes to hunt down terrorists while simultaneously transforming their supporting cultural and economic environment from despair to hope. What research there is, however, indicates that suicide terrorists have no appreciable psychopathology and are at least as educated and economically well off as their surrounding populations. Psychopathology: A Fundamental Attribution Error U.S. President George W. Bush initially branded 9/11 hijackers "evil cowards." For U.S. Senator John Warner, preemptive assaults on terrorists and those supporting terrorism are justified because: "Those who would commit suicide in their assaults on the free world are not rational and are not deterred by rational concepts" (16). In attempting to counter anti-Moslem sentiment, some groups advised their members to respond that "terrorists are extremist maniacs who don't represent Islam at all" (17). Social psychologists have investigated the "fundamental attribution error," a tendency for people to explain behavior in terms of individual personality traits, even when significant situational factors in the larger society are at work. U.S. government and media characterizations of Middle East suicide bombers as craven homicidal lunatics may suffer from a fundamental attribution error: No instances of religious or political suicide terrorism stem from lone actions of cowering or unstable bombers. Psychologist Stanley Milgram found that ordinary Americans also readily obey destructive orders under the right circumstances (18). When told by a "teacher" to administer potentially life-threatening electric shocks to "learners" who fail to memorize word pairs, most comply. Even when subjects stressfully protest as victims plead and scream, use of extreme violence continues--not because of murderous tendencies but from a sense of obligation in situations of authority, no matter how trite. A legitimate hypothesis is that apparently extreme behaviors may be elicited and rendered commonplace by particular historical, political, social, and ideological contexts. With suicide terrorism, the attributional problem is to understand why nonpathological individuals respond to novel situational factors in numbers sufficient for recruiting organizations to implement policies. In the Middle East, perceived contexts in which suicide bombers and supporters express themselves include a collective sense of historical injustice, political subservience, and social humiliation vis-`-vis global powers and allies, as well as countervailing religious hope (supporting online text on radical Islam's historical novelty). Addressing such perceptions does not entail accepting them as simple reality; however, ignoring the causes of these perceptions risks misidentifying causes and solutions for suicide bombing. There is also evidence that people tend to believe that their behavior speaks for itself, that they see the world objectively, and that only other people are biased and misconstrue events (19). Moreover, individuals tend to misperceive differences between group norms as more extreme than they really are. Resulting misunderstandings--encouraged by religious and ideological propaganda--lead antagonistic groups to interpret each other's views of events, such as terrorism/freedom-fighting, as wrong, radical, and/or irrational. Mutual demonization and warfare readily ensue. The problem is to stop this spiral from escalating in opposing camps (Fig. 3).
Game theory, psychobio, demographics: Genesis of Suicide Terrorism
Here's a bit of meat for Tim... Genesis of Suicide Terrorism Scott Atran Contemporary suicide terrorists from the Middle East are publicly deemed crazed cowards bent on senseless destruction who thrive in poverty and ignorance. Recent research indicates they have no appreciable psychopathology and are as educated and economically well-off as surrounding populations. A first line of defense is to get the communities from which suicide attackers stem to stop the attacks by learning how to minimize the receptivity of mostly ordinary people to recruiting organizations. CNRS-Institut Jean Nicod, 1 bis Avenue Lowendal, 75007 Paris, France, and Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI 48106-1248, USA. E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED] ... Gotta love this excerpt: Such sentiments characterize institutional manipulation of emotionally driven commitments that may have emerged under natural selection's influence to refine or override short-term rational calculations that would otherwise preclude achieving goals against long odds. Most typically, such emotionally driven commitments serve as survival mechanisms to inspire action in otherwise paralyzing circumstances, as when a weaker person convincingly menaces a stronger person into thinking twice before attempting to take advantage. In religiously inspired suicide terrorism, however, these emotions are purposely manipulated by organizational leaders, recruiters, and trainers to benefit the organization rather than the individual (supporting online text on religion) (36). 36. In much the same way, the pornography, fast food, or soft drink industries manipulate innate desires for naturally scarce commodities like sexual mates, fatty foods, and sugar to ends that reduce personal fitness but benefit the manipulating institution. [S. Atran, In Gods We Trust (Oxford Univ. Press, New York, 2002)]. Whole article: According to the U.S. Department of State report Patterns of Global Terrorism 2001 (1), no single definition of terrorism is universally accepted; however, for purposes of statistical analysis and policy-making: "The term `terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience." Of course, one side's "terrorists" may well be another side's "freedom fighters" (Fig. 1). For example, in this definition's sense, the Nazi occupiers of France rightly denounced the "subnational" and "clandestine" French Resistance fighters as terrorists. During the 1980s, the International Court of Justice used the U.S. Administration's own definition of terrorism to call for an end to U.S. support for "terrorism" on the part of Nicaraguan Contras opposing peace talks. Fig. 1. Chanting demonstrators in Pakistan-held Kashmir defending Osama bin Laden's actions and ambitions as freedom-fighting (November 2001). [AP Photo/Roshan Mugal] [View Larger Version of this Image (96K GIF file)] For the U.S. Congress, "`act of terrorism' means an activity that--(A) involves a violent act or an act dangerous to human life that is a violation of the criminal laws of the United States or any State, or that would be a criminal violation if committed within the jurisdiction of the United States or of any State; and (B) appears to be intended (i) to intimidate or coerce a civilian population; (ii) to influence the policy of a government by intimidation or coercion; or (iii) to affect the conduct of a government by assassination or kidnapping." (2). When suitable, the definition can be broadened to include states hostile to U.S. policy. Apparently, two official definitions of terrorism have existed since the early 1980s: that used by the Department of State "for statistical and analytical purposes" and that used by Congress for criminal proceedings. Together, the definitions allow great flexibility in selective application of the concept of terrorism to fluctuating U.S. priorities. The special category of "State-sponsored terrorism" could be invoked to handle some issues (3), but the highly selective and politically tendentious use of the label terrorism would continue all the same. Indeed, there appears to be no principled distinction between "terror" as defined by the U.S. Congress and "counterinsurgency" as allowed in U.S. armed forces manuals (4). Rather than attempt to produce a stipulative and all-encompassing definition of terrorism, this article restricts its focus to "suicide terrorism" characterized as follows: the targeted use of self-destructing humans against noncombatant--typically civilian--populations to effect political change. Although a suicide attack aims to physically destroy an initial target, its primary use is typically as a weapon of psychological warfare intended to affect a la
