RE:Confiscation of Anti-War Video
The problem might be the resultant emf signature, much more of a giveaway than the brief activity of a digital camera. What really might be useful is steganographically placing it on the back of some bulshit cellphone call (not likely to arouse much suspicion these days) j - Original Text - In antoher context I've wondered about the possibility of wireless, near-real-time video upload. We videoed and photoed the demo, but tape and chip were confiscated Sunday by the guards at Warrenton Training Center, Site D, near Brandy Station, VA, Site D is the global comm center for State and DoD, and reportedly the CIA: http://cryptome.org/wtcd-eyeball.htm I asked if the shoulder of the road was federal property. Their answer: yes. Choose an Internet access plan right for you -- try MSN! http://resourcecenter.msn.com/access/plans/default.asp
Re: Fw: RE:Confiscation of Anti-War Video
On Mon, Oct 28, 2002 at 02:56:29PM -0800, Richard Crisp wrote: hmm, it seems to me that video riding in a stegano fashion on a cell phone call would exceed the bandwidth capability of the channel. It's one thing to send a single image steganographically on a cell call, but it is another to send a live video feed. rdc There are many issues here... in general should this kind of thing happen often, there will be either CALEA access at the switch to lists of all traffic from a cellsite or geographical area (remember E911 location capability) or local off air gear deployed to monitor traffic. Clearly the spooks have developed some modern off-air digital traffic monitoring stuff - they need it it places without CALEA - and there is little doubt that it only costs money to hire some programmers to make it work with US carrier unique variations of protocols. And needless to say, most of this stuff consists of tuners coupled to DSPs coupled to high power high end laptops so most all of the heavy lifting is in code for the DSPs and laptops that sort through the bits and signals - and upgrading for the domestic environment is just loading some new code... And as for using 802.11 stuff, sure it will work the first time or two it is tried, but soon enough portable 802.11 stuff will appear on the other side, including both capture and jamming equipment. And most of the code for capture and analysis can be had from the public domain from hacker sources right now - not much expense in adapting it. And locating 802.11b stuff by using appropriate direction finding sniffer hardware with DF antennas is a pretty obvious thing to do - presumably finding the points talking to each other should be easy, making finding the remote relay site and pouncing on it pretty easy. Also, you are very right about the bandwidth issues, and another point not made is that the network is a sealed box with analog voice in and analog voice out rather than a general purpose TCP/IP bit pipe - one cannot just pervert a voice call into carrying hidden data on digital cellphones, at least at much bandwidth as the voice is vocoded into 4800 baud or thereabouts (modern phones use variable rate stuff) and it would take some truly hairy DSP code to synthesize a bizarre stream of voice like audio that allowed access to even a small fraction of that 4800 baud. I suppose it is theoretically possible, but much harder than the V90 stuff and heavily dependent on very precise knowledge of the vocoders and error correction used. One might get 1200 baud or so, but even that would take a lot of tricks at both ends and sure would not be stenography in any normal sense in that it would sound like something from mars and nothing like normal speech in any known language. And probably in order to get reasonable band with the talk spurt statistics would have to be very wrong which would make it stick out like a sore thumb anyway. And what use is 1200 baud when dealing with video ? And of course data as opposed to voice calls would be targeted by the CALEA stuff from the git-go since they would actually be the logical pipe to ex filtrate the video and one with reasonable bandwidth...
Re: Fw: RE:Confiscation of Anti-War Video
On Mon, Oct 28, 2002 at 09:32:48PM -0500, Tyler Durden wrote: Any chance this is the same Dave Emery who does the radio broadcasts? (I listen from WFMU). If so, man! If a tiny fraction of the stuff you have said over the years is true, well...brrr. A good example is Los Amigos de Bush...doesn't have to be true/right...the fact that those theories so easily fit the facts is very uncomfortable. If nothing else, it has challenged my complacency. If you're NOT that Dave Emery, well, please purge the brain cells that this little message has eaten up! TD Sorry, a completely unrelated east coast David Emery. Never met the west coast radio personality, though it is possible we share some opinions... -- Dave Emery N1PRE, [EMAIL PROTECTED] DIE Consulting, Weston, Mass. PGP fingerprint = 2047/4D7B08D1 DE 6E E1 CC 1F 1D 96 E2 5D 27 BD B0 24 88 C3 18
Re: Fw: RE:Confiscation of Anti-War Video
Any chance this is the same Dave Emery who does the radio broadcasts? (I listen from WFMU). If so, man! If a tiny fraction of the stuff you have said over the years is true, well...brrr. A good example is Los Amigos de Bush...doesn't have to be true/right...the fact that those theories so easily fit the facts is very uncomfortable. If nothing else, it has challenged my complacency. If you're NOT that Dave Emery, well, please purge the brain cells that this little message has eaten up! TD From: Dave Emery [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Richard Crisp [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: Fw: RE:Confiscation of Anti-War Video Date: Mon, 28 Oct 2002 18:29:13 -0500 On Mon, Oct 28, 2002 at 02:56:29PM -0800, Richard Crisp wrote: hmm, it seems to me that video riding in a stegano fashion on a cell phone call would exceed the bandwidth capability of the channel. It's one thing to send a single image steganographically on a cell call, but it is another to send a live video feed. rdc There are many issues here... in general should this kind of thing happen often, there will be either CALEA access at the switch to lists of all traffic from a cellsite or geographical area (remember E911 location capability) or local off air gear deployed to monitor traffic. Clearly the spooks have developed some modern off-air digital traffic monitoring stuff - they need it it places without CALEA - and there is little doubt that it only costs money to hire some programmers to make it work with US carrier unique variations of protocols. And needless to say, most of this stuff consists of tuners coupled to DSPs coupled to high power high end laptops so most all of the heavy lifting is in code for the DSPs and laptops that sort through the bits and signals - and upgrading for the domestic environment is just loading some new code... And as for using 802.11 stuff, sure it will work the first time or two it is tried, but soon enough portable 802.11 stuff will appear on the other side, including both capture and jamming equipment. And most of the code for capture and analysis can be had from the public domain from hacker sources right now - not much expense in adapting it. And locating 802.11b stuff by using appropriate direction finding sniffer hardware with DF antennas is a pretty obvious thing to do - presumably finding the points talking to each other should be easy, making finding the remote relay site and pouncing on it pretty easy. Also, you are very right about the bandwidth issues, and another point not made is that the network is a sealed box with analog voice in and analog voice out rather than a general purpose TCP/IP bit pipe - one cannot just pervert a voice call into carrying hidden data on digital cellphones, at least at much bandwidth as the voice is vocoded into 4800 baud or thereabouts (modern phones use variable rate stuff) and it would take some truly hairy DSP code to synthesize a bizarre stream of voice like audio that allowed access to even a small fraction of that 4800 baud. I suppose it is theoretically possible, but much harder than the V90 stuff and heavily dependent on very precise knowledge of the vocoders and error correction used. One might get 1200 baud or so, but even that would take a lot of tricks at both ends and sure would not be stenography in any normal sense in that it would sound like something from mars and nothing like normal speech in any known language. And probably in order to get reasonable band with the talk spurt statistics would have to be very wrong which would make it stick out like a sore thumb anyway. And what use is 1200 baud when dealing with video ? And of course data as opposed to voice calls would be targeted by the CALEA stuff from the git-go since they would actually be the logical pipe to ex filtrate the video and one with reasonable bandwidth... _ Get faster connections -- switch to MSN Internet Access! http://resourcecenter.msn.com/access/plans/default.asp
