RE: When encryption is also authentication...
Mike wrote: > Thanks, that was very enlightening. The URL is good too - > they mention that "An electronic signature is defined as being: > >an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or >logically associated with a contract or other record and >executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign >the record. " > > I would never have thought of making a sound as part of a > signature! but for voice prints, it might be a good idea. IIRC, one of the reasons why sounds were included in the bill was to include the pressing of a telephone touch-tone key in the list of acts that can create a valid contract. --Lucky, "Press '1' to agree to transfer all your present liquid assets to me".
RE: When encryption is also authentication...
Curt wrote: > I concur. The problem is that the most prevalent e-mail > program (Outlook) requires no user intervention as a default > when signing and/or encrypting a message with S/MIME. One > can override the default to "High Security" (requiring > password) only while the X.509 certificate is being installed. A locking screen saver has been part of Windows since I believe Windows 3.0, but certainly since Windows 95. Proximity cards that you keep in your pocket that automatically lock your Windows workstation when you step away from it are readily available in the marketplace. And yes, it generally is a bad idea to walk away from your workstation in a shared space while leaving yourself logged in as root. --Lucky
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know > anything about how it works does not have to destroy the > effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a > document they don't know all the ramifications because few bother to > read all of any document they sign - most of it won't apply as long > as you keep your part of the bargin, so why bother? Partially agreed - a user doesn't have to know *how* it works, but must have to take a positive step (eg, type in a password, answer "yes" to a "are you really sure you want to do this" message, that sort of thing) for it to be binding under most e-sig legislation. However, the law of contract assumes every dotted i and crossed t is read and fully understood to the full measure of the law. Enough people get caught out this way each year (they find the contract they signed isn't what they negotiated but (eg) binds them to a full term of service (say, two years) when they wanted a three month trial... There is a balance to be had here. it should be impossible for a random user to walk up to their powered off pc, power it on, then sign a document. It should be extremely difficult for a random user to walk up to a pc that has been left logged on (but which hasn't been used to sign documents for five minutes or so) and sign a document; it should be easy for the user to sign a large number of documents in rapid succession, without having to type in a complex password every single time. If this involves remembering the password for a specified "idle" time, or using a smartcard to auth (rather than a manual password or in addition) that the user can remove when he takes a coffee break then fine - but whatever you do must almost certainly use no other hardware than is already fitted to the machine, so a usb dongle could be ok for a home user but a credit-card style smartcard almost certainly won't be (although if anyone knows a decent floppy-adaptor for smartcards, I would love to know about it)
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
Ian Grigg wrote: [...] >> SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days. > > Costs are still way too high. This won't change until > browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being > valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in > cert-ware for a variety of non-security reasons. [...] Self signed certs defeat the purpose of the certificate chain mechanism, which is not just there to make Veri$ign rich. Mallory can self-sign a cert for bob.com, and hack Alice's DNS to point bob.com at her own site. But it's (theoretically, anyway) much more difficult for her to convince Verisign that she owns bob.com. If we trust Verisign to do that, then we know we're really talking to Bob when we visit bob.com. Now, the ability to add other CAs which we trust would be a nice feature, and if there were more trustworthy CAs which were added to the browsers by default, we could get the costs down closer to the actual overhead of verifying that the supplicant (er, applicant) actually owns the domain he's trying to get a cert for. But anyone can certify themselves as owning amazon.com, and it's critical that my browser tell me when some stranger makes such an assertion on their own. -J
RE: Re: When encryption is also authentication...
I ain't got that much schooling in these here matters, but it seems to me that in terms of the agreements, online agreements are pretty slacking when it comes to verifying that the end user actually read the document. Most agreements online take advantage of the fact that a user is going to skip reading the document and jump straight to the "Agree" button. If the end user insists on e-signing a document without having read it it is there perogative, but I think there should be a better system in place to insure that they either read it or that they did not read it but agree anyway. Something along the lines of timers (set to an average number of minutes it takes to read the average contract), a keyword in the document itself that forces the user to peruse the document to find the keyword, or at least force the user to type "Agree" rather than just click a button. But hey, realistically speaking, I doubt there is much enforcement going on regarding these online contracts. Do we want the Federale involved in how these contracts are designed or is the industry going to self police? CW -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Curt Smith Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 12:21 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: CDR: Re: When encryption is also authentication... I agree that the signer does not need to understand the mathematics or underlying technology for digital signatures to be viable. However, what good is an agreement when the parties do not know what the terms of the agreement are? A signature (digital or otherwise) generally indicates that the signer not only made an agreement, but also understood the agreement. A digital signatures must involve a conscious decision by the signer to keep their part of an agreement. I maintain that this requires user intervention to verify that the signer knew that they making an agreement - a "click of understanding" or pass phrase. Curt --- Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... > Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know > anything about how it works does not have to destroy the > effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people > sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because > few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it > won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, > so why bother? > > The same thing should be true of digital signatures. The > user shouldn't have to know a thing, other than they've made > a promise they better keep or all the bad clauses really do > apply, and the proof of their signature will come to haunt > them. The way the digital signature works does not > matter to them, and it shouldn't need to. > > If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into > mass appeal, then their operations will be "magic" to the > majority. And it all has to work, to 1 part in 10^8th or > better, without user comprehension. > > It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, > but they shouldn't have to know what they are doing. > > Patience, persistence, truth, > Dr. mike = end Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
On Thu, 30 May 2002, Steve Furlong wrote: > Summary: Recent laws have attempted to make electronic contracting > binding, but they have not addressed some of the fundamental principles > of contract law. These fundamental principles are often stretched or > broken in electronic contracting. There is no case law on electronic > contracts. I suspect that a contested electronic contract would be > easily voided. Thanks, that was very enlightening. The URL is good too - they mention that "An electronic signature is defined as being: an electronic sound, symbol or process attached to or logically associated with a contract or other record and executed or adopted by a person with the intent to sign the record. " I would never have thought of making a sound as part of a signature! but for voice prints, it might be a good idea. > OK, that's the way I think it is, currently in the US. The way I think > it _should_ be is much more caveat emptor, as Dr Mike and others have > said, but the legislators and judges have neglected to ask for my input. Yes, and even if we tried to give input nobody would listen to me :-) Most of the issues here are human interface, what is reasonable to expect for a valid contract. The only thing I've ever "signed" online is an order for parts via credit card, and so far it's never been a legal problem. But I see where there could be major problems if people aren't really damn careful, so I'll probably be a lot more careful than I thought I was before! Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
Hi > > However, I'd be interested to know just how many users out there > > would enter their card details on an unprotected site, despite the > > unclosed padlocks and the alert boxes. ( 02.05.30 08:34 -0400 ) Ian Grigg: > Huge numbers of them. You won't see it in security > lists, but most of your average people out there do > not understand the significance of the padlock, and > when merchants request credit card numbers, they > quietly forget to tell them. And even if they tried, network security is too arcane of a subject matter for them to care about. They just want that big dildo [or whatever it is that they're ordering]. One online merchant I know put big padlock .gifs on the site to reassure users that their transactions were secure. The padlocks on the browsers were there, but they weren't as reassuring to the customers as the images. -- \js "evolve real-time metrics"
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
Mike Rosing wrote: > > On Thu, 30 May 2002, cypherpunk_reader wrote: > > > If the end user insists on e-signing a document without having read it it is > > there perogative, > > but I think there should be a better system in place to insure that they > > either read it or that > > they did not read it but agree anyway. > > I don't think so. If they are fool enough to sign a document without > reading it, it's the same as using a pen to sign a contract without > reading it. ... > An e-signature can have the same weight in law as an ink one, and the > same rules apply. A fool and their money are soon parted. Here's my analysis of the current situation regarding electronic signatures in the United States. The following few paragraphs are the way things are as I see them, not necessarily how they should be. An e-signature in this situation would indicate assent to a contract. One of the key points to forming a valid contract is a meeting of minds between the parties. Another is authentication that the alleged contracting party was actually the person who agreed to the contract. Meeting of minds includes knowing, understanding, and agreeing to the terms of the putative contract. With paper contracts, even lengthy ones, knowledge and understanding are assumed if certain conventions are met, such as font size and emphasis of important terms, as well as opportunity to read the contract thoroughly. And the contracting party is assumed to be able to take the contract to a lawyer if he's uncertain about any part of it. Many electronic agreements fail on one or more of these points. These contracts are often very lengthy, the equivalent of several pages of printout, and are often viewed only through a very small window, and often have small or otherwise illegible fonts. In paper, this would be similar to a five-page contract being written out on post-its, with only one visible at a time. Many of the agreements cannot be printed out, which interferes with both reading and obtaining expert advice. The situation is made even worse by the mingling of technical jargon with the legal jargon; many software-related contracts are even less intellegible than other contracts. Meeting of minds is questionable under these circumstances. Authentication is similarly problematic. Ordinary contracts are commonly agreed to in person or with signatures. Electronic contracts are commonly agreed to with one or two mouse clicks. There is nothing to indicate that the "signer" was the person he alleged to be. Some laws (see below) attempt to make this irrelevant, essentially saying that if your computer agreed, you agreed, but this is unlikely to stand up in court on basic principles. I was unable to find any US case law (court cases which went to trial and verdict, and which were written up for publication) on this subject. Bear in mind that I no longer have access to Lexis or Westlaw, but google and such can usually find relevent cases. I suspect that there are no reported cases hinging on electronic signatures. This isn't surprising, because the oldest electronic signature law is less than six years old, and that's probably not enough time for a problem to have arisen, been litigated, been appealed, and been written up. The "e-sign" law of 2000 doesn't provide much help. It states simply that a contract may not be denied solely because it was electronically signed. Furthermore, it applies only to interstate and international contracts. (Though most electronic contracts for, eg, downloaded software will be interstate or international.) It doesn't provide standards or guidance for what makes a valid electronic contract. The Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (UETA) is a model law which about half of the states have enacted. Some, maybe most, of these states have modified UETA before passing it. It's not clear how this affects contracts in which only one party is in a UETA state. UETA says that an electronic record fulfills any requirements for a written contract document and that an electronic signature fulfills any requirement for a signature on the contract, and it outlines what constitutes an electronic record and an electronic signature. Interestingly, UETA states that an "agent", meaning a program, can fulfill the requirements for a signature, even without human participation. See http://www.ladas.com/BULLETINS/2002/0202Bulletin/USElectronicSignature.html for a decent summary, and http://www.uetaonline.com/ for more detail. Summary: Recent laws have attempted to make electronic contracting binding, but they have not addressed some of the fundamental principles of contract law. These fundamental principles are often stretched or broken in electronic contracting. There is no case law on electronic contracts. I suspect that a contested electronic contract would be easily voided. OK, that's the way I think it is, currently in the US. The way I think it _should_ be is much more caveat emptor, as Dr Mike and others have sa
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
Ian Grigg wrote: [...] >> SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days. > > Costs are still way too high. This won't change until > browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being > valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in > cert-ware for a variety of non-security reasons. [...] Self signed certs defeat the purpose of the certificate chain mechanism, which is not just there to make Veri$ign rich. Mallory can self-sign a cert for bob.com, and hack Alice's DNS to point bob.com at her own site. But it's (theoretically, anyway) much more difficult for her to convince Verisign that she owns bob.com. If we trust Verisign to do that, then we know we're really talking to Bob when we visit bob.com. Now, the ability to add other CAs which we trust would be a nice feature, and if there were more trustworthy CAs which were added to the browsers by default, we could get the costs down closer to the actual overhead of verifying that the supplicant (er, applicant) actually owns the domain he's trying to get a cert for. But anyone can certify themselves as owning amazon.com, and it's critical that my browser tell me when some stranger makes such an assertion on their own. -J
RE: Re: When encryption is also authentication...
On Thu, 30 May 2002, cypherpunk_reader wrote: > If the end user insists on e-signing a document without having read it it is > there perogative, > but I think there should be a better system in place to insure that they > either read it or that > they did not read it but agree anyway. I don't think so. If they are fool enough to sign a document without reading it, it's the same as using a pen to sign a contract without reading it. A fool is a fool, why try to protect them? It's pretty hopeless to try because fools are so clever! I don't have a problem with a signing system that requires the user to do something (like maybe even use a pda stylus and actually sign with their own handwriting), but *forcing* them to read a contract is just plain silly. When enough fools have been burned by a scam, the word will get out and the rest of the fools who don't read contracts might think about not signing. An e-signature can have the same weight in law as an ink one, and the same rules apply. A fool and their money are soon parted. Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
RE: Re: When encryption is also authentication...
I ain't got that much schooling in these here matters, but it seems to me that in terms of the agreements, online agreements are pretty slacking when it comes to verifying that the end user actually read the document. Most agreements online take advantage of the fact that a user is going to skip reading the document and jump straight to the "Agree" button. If the end user insists on e-signing a document without having read it it is there perogative, but I think there should be a better system in place to insure that they either read it or that they did not read it but agree anyway. Something along the lines of timers (set to an average number of minutes it takes to read the average contract), a keyword in the document itself that forces the user to peruse the document to find the keyword, or at least force the user to type "Agree" rather than just click a button. But hey, realistically speaking, I doubt there is much enforcement going on regarding these online contracts. Do we want the Federale involved in how these contracts are designed or is the industry going to self police? CW -Original Message- From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED]]On Behalf Of Curt Smith Sent: Wednesday, May 29, 2002 12:21 PM To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: CDR: Re: When encryption is also authentication... I agree that the signer does not need to understand the mathematics or underlying technology for digital signatures to be viable. However, what good is an agreement when the parties do not know what the terms of the agreement are? A signature (digital or otherwise) generally indicates that the signer not only made an agreement, but also understood the agreement. A digital signatures must involve a conscious decision by the signer to keep their part of an agreement. I maintain that this requires user intervention to verify that the signer knew that they making an agreement - a "click of understanding" or pass phrase. Curt --- Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... > Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know > anything about how it works does not have to destroy the > effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people > sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because > few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it > won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, > so why bother? > > The same thing should be true of digital signatures. The > user shouldn't have to know a thing, other than they've made > a promise they better keep or all the bad clauses really do > apply, and the proof of their signature will come to haunt > them. The way the digital signature works does not > matter to them, and it shouldn't need to. > > If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into > mass appeal, then their operations will be "magic" to the > majority. And it all has to work, to 1 part in 10^8th or > better, without user comprehension. > > It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, > but they shouldn't have to know what they are doing. > > Patience, persistence, truth, > Dr. mike = end Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know > anything about how it works does not have to destroy the > effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a > document they don't know all the ramifications because few bother to > read all of any document they sign - most of it won't apply as long > as you keep your part of the bargin, so why bother? Partially agreed - a user doesn't have to know *how* it works, but must have to take a positive step (eg, type in a password, answer "yes" to a "are you really sure you want to do this" message, that sort of thing) for it to be binding under most e-sig legislation. However, the law of contract assumes every dotted i and crossed t is read and fully understood to the full measure of the law. Enough people get caught out this way each year (they find the contract they signed isn't what they negotiated but (eg) binds them to a full term of service (say, two years) when they wanted a three month trial... There is a balance to be had here. it should be impossible for a random user to walk up to their powered off pc, power it on, then sign a document. It should be extremely difficult for a random user to walk up to a pc that has been left logged on (but which hasn't been used to sign documents for five minutes or so) and sign a document; it should be easy for the user to sign a large number of documents in rapid succession, without having to type in a complex password every single time. If this involves remembering the password for a specified "idle" time, or using a smartcard to auth (rather than a manual password or in addition) that the user can remove when he takes a coffee break then fine - but whatever you do must almost certainly use no other hardware than is already fitted to the machine, so a usb dongle could be ok for a home user but a credit-card style smartcard almost certainly won't be (although if anyone knows a decent floppy-adaptor for smartcards, I would love to know about it)
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
> SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days. Costs are still way too high. This won't change until browsers are shipped that treat self-signed certs as being valid. Unfortunately, browser manufacturers believe in cert-ware for a variety of non-security reasons. Hopefully, one day the independant browser manufacturers will ship browsers that show a different icon for self- certs, rather than annoy the user with mindless security warnings. Then, we can expect a massive increase in secure browsing as sites start defaulting to self-signed certs, and a consequent massive increase in security, as well as a follow-on massive increase in the sale of certs. Unfortunately, we probably won't see an enhanced market for CA certs until Verisign goes broke. > However, I'd be interested to know just how many users out there would enter > their card details on an unprotected site, despite the unclosed padlocks > and the > alert boxes. Huge numbers of them. You won't see it in security lists, but most of your average people out there do not understand the significance of the padlock, and when merchants request credit card numbers, they quietly forget to tell them. And, in a lot of cases, credit card details are shipped over cleartext email rather than browsers. Many of these merchants have card-holder-present agreements, the restrictions of which, they just ignore. Commerce being what commerce is, it is more important to get the sale than deal with some obscure security nonsense that doesn't make sense. > Have security fears and paranoia been abated by widespread crypto > to the point whereby users will happily transmit private data, whether > encrypted > or nay, just because they *perceive* the threat to now be minimal? Now that the > media has grown tired of yet-another-credit-card-hack story? Much of today's body of (OECD) net users don't read the news about the net and don't understand the debate, nor can they make sense of how to protect themselves from a site that is hacked... Three or four years back, much of the body of the net was still technically advanced and capable of understanding the fallacious security arguments. These days, perversely, the users are better able to evaluate the security risks, because they don't understand the arguments, so they look to the actual experience, which provides no warnings. > Pointers to any evidence/research into this much appreciated... ta. Unfortunately, real data is being kept back by the credit card majors. It is my contention that there has never been a case of sniffed-credit-card-abuse, and nobody I've ever talked to in the credit card world has ever been able to change that. On the whole, all net-related credit card fraud is to do with other factors: mass thefts from hacked databases, fraudulent merchant gatherings, fear-of- wife revocations, etc. Nothing, ever, to do with on-the-wire security. -- iang
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
I concur. The problem is that the most prevalent e-mail program (Outlook) requires no user intervention as a default when signing and/or encrypting a message with S/MIME. One can override the default to "High Security" (requiring password) only while the X.509 certificate is being installed. I also agree that alternative authorization mechanisms (or combination thereof) are entirely appropriate: smartcards, flashcards, biometric readers, magnetic strips, bar codes, etc. Different schemes will work provided the hardware is available and adequate authentication can be assured. Curt --- David Howe <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: > Partially agreed - a user doesn't have to know *how* it > works, but must have to take a positive step (eg, type in a > password, answer "yes" to a "are you really sure you want to > do this" message, that sort of thing) for it to be binding > under most e-sig legislation. However, the law of contract > assumes every dotted i and crossed t is read and fully > understood to the full measure of the law. Enough people get > caught out this way each year (they find the contract they > signed isn't what they negotiated but (eg) binds them to a > full term of service (say, two years) when they wanted a > three month trial... > There is a balance to be had here. it should be impossible > for a random user to walk up to their powered off pc, power > it on, then sign a document. It should be extremely difficult > for a random user to walk up to a pc that has been left > logged on (but which hasn't been used to sign documents for > five minutes or so) and sign a document; it should be easy > for the user to sign a large number of documents in rapid > succession, without having to type in a complex password > every single time. If this involves remembering the password > for a specified "idle" time, or using a smartcard to auth > (rather than a manual password or in addition) that the user > can remove when he takes a coffee break then fine - but > whatever you do must almost certainly use no other hardware > than is already fitted to the machine, so a usb dongle could > be ok for a home user but a credit-card style smartcard > almost certainly won't be (although if anyone knows a decent > floppy-adaptor for smartcards, I would love to know about it) = Curt end eof
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
On Wed, 29 May 2002, Curt Smith wrote: > I agree that under-the-hood encryption is becoming more and > more prevalent, and that it generally improves security. Also, > the widespread use of encryption technology helps protect > cryptorights in general as important to the public good. This is kinda the opposite of... > Both legally-binding and authentication technology should not > be completely transparent. Even "EULA's" require > user-intervention. Digitally signed messages should require > user-intervention. this. Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know anything about how it works does not have to destroy the effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, so why bother? The same thing should be true of digital signatures. The user shouldn't have to know a thing, other than they've made a promise they better keep or all the bad clauses really do apply, and the proof of their signature will come to haunt them. The way the digital signature works does not matter to them, and it shouldn't need to. If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into mass appeal, then their operations will be "magic" to the majority. And it all has to work, to 1 part in 10^8th or better, without user comprehension. It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, but they shouldn't have to know what they are doing. Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
Mike Rosing wrote: > If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into mass appeal, > then their operations will be "magic" to the majority. And it all has to > work, to 1 part in 10^8th or better, without user comprehension. > > It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, but they > shouldn't have to know what they are doing. Agreed, the mechanics of a system are unimportant from a user's point of view, so long as it works and they can work it. What magic crypto should strive for, though, is an understanding in users of the effects its presence promotes, and the ramifications involved when it is lacking. SSL for commerce is readily in place without batting an eyelid these days. However, I'd be interested to know just how many users out there would enter their card details on an unprotected site, despite the unclosed padlocks and the alert boxes. Have security fears and paranoia been abated by widespread crypto to the point whereby users will happily transmit private data, whether encrypted or nay, just because they *perceive* the threat to now be minimal? Now that the media has grown tired of yet-another-credit-card-hack story? Pointers to any evidence/research into this much appreciated... ta. .g
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
On Wed, 29 May 2002, Curt Smith wrote: > A digital signatures must involve a conscious decision by the > signer to keep their part of an agreement. I maintain that > this requires user intervention to verify that the signer knew > that they making an agreement - a "click of understanding" or > pass phrase. Yes of course - the point of signing something is a promise. The act of signing by pen is just being transformed into a different kind of act. I think typing a pass phrase is better than a click, but we'll see what the market develops. Graham, there are many university profs interested in security on the net, and the medical field is just starting to get into this in a big way. I'm not sure they are following consumers, but a web search on "medical crypto" may find you a lot of interesting tidbits. Patience, persistence, truth, Dr. mike
Re: When encryption is also authentication...
I agree that the signer does not need to understand the mathematics or underlying technology for digital signatures to be viable. However, what good is an agreement when the parties do not know what the terms of the agreement are? A signature (digital or otherwise) generally indicates that the signer not only made an agreement, but also understood the agreement. A digital signatures must involve a conscious decision by the signer to keep their part of an agreement. I maintain that this requires user intervention to verify that the signer knew that they making an agreement - a "click of understanding" or pass phrase. Curt --- Mike Rosing <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... > Having it be "transparent" where the user doesn't need to know > anything about how it works does not have to destroy the > effectiveness of digital signatures or crypto. When people > sign a document they don't know all the ramifications because > few bother to read all of any document they sign - most of it > won't apply as long as you keep your part of the bargin, > so why bother? > > The same thing should be true of digital signatures. The > user shouldn't have to know a thing, other than they've made > a promise they better keep or all the bad clauses really do > apply, and the proof of their signature will come to haunt > them. The way the digital signature works does not > matter to them, and it shouldn't need to. > > If digital crypto, signatures or e-cash are going to get into > mass appeal, then their operations will be "magic" to the > majority. And it all has to work, to 1 part in 10^8th or > better, without user comprehension. > > It may well take "user intervention" to create a signature, > but they shouldn't have to know what they are doing. > > Patience, persistence, truth, > Dr. mike = end Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com
When encryption is also authentication...
I agree that under-the-hood encryption is becoming more and more prevalent, and that it generally improves security. Also, the widespread use of encryption technology helps protect cryptorights in general as important to the public good. The fundamental problem with "under-the-hood" is that the user is not required to have any understanding of the process. Furthermore encryption technology is often also authentication technology. This includes transparently sending S/MIME documents (encrypted and/or signed) as a default without requiring additional user intervention. In many places this results in legally binding documents. Furthermore, anyone with access to a system can send legally binding e-mail documents on the user's behalf. Both legally-binding and authentication technology should not be completely transparent. Even "EULA's" require user-intervention. Digitally signed messages should require user-intervention. --- Lucky Green <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote: ... > I indeed consider passive encryption methods alone to be > typically insufficient for some of my personal security needs > and am continuing to utilize encryption that requires me as > the user to make that trust decision. But that does not mean > that no security benefits are to be had from opportunistic > encryption of Internet traffic. ... > How does the increased use of strong crypto under-the-hood > help Cypherpunks? The answer reminds me of the response > another Cypherpunk gave to my posting statistics about the > nature of the USENET traffic seen by a major node. I > expressed surprise at these rather revealing statistics, > musing that there had to be a lesson to be learned from the > fact that the bulk of the data is generated in newsgroups > that one would not initially consider mainstream. His > response was illuminating: "Yes, the lesson is: just look at > all that cover traffic". > > --Lucky = end Yahoo! - Official partner of 2002 FIFA World Cup http://fifaworldcup.yahoo.com
