Bug#271933: marked as done (CAN-2004-0786: apr_uri_parse() buffer overflow)

2004-09-16 Thread Debian Bug Tracking System
Your message dated Thu, 16 Sep 2004 12:02:29 +0100
with message-id [EMAIL PROTECTED]
and subject line Fixed in incoming
has caused the attached Bug report to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what I am
talking about this indicates a serious mail system misconfiguration
somewhere.  Please contact me immediately.)

Debian bug tracking system administrator
(administrator, Debian Bugs database)

--
Received: (at submit) by bugs.debian.org; 16 Sep 2004 08:02:59 +
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu Sep 16 01:02:59 2004
Return-path: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Received: from mail.enyo.de [212.9.189.167] 
by spohr.debian.org with esmtp (Exim 3.35 1 (Debian))
id 1C7rEJ-0006ao-00; Thu, 16 Sep 2004 01:02:59 -0700
Received: (debugging) helo=deneb.enyo.de ip=212.9.189.171 name=deneb.enyo.de
Received: from deneb.enyo.de ([212.9.189.171])
by mail.enyo.de with esmtp id 1C7rEH-0004yt-7O
for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Thu, 16 Sep 2004 10:02:57 +0200
Received: from fw by deneb.enyo.de with local (Exim 4.34)
id 1C7rEG-0001Ob-Pf; Thu, 16 Sep 2004 10:02:56 +0200
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 7bit
From: Florian Weimer [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: Debian Bug Tracking System [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: CAN-2004-0786: apr_uri_parse() buffer overflow
X-Mailer: reportbug 2.64
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2004 10:02:56 +0200
Message-Id: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.60-bugs.debian.org_2004_03_25 
(1.212-2003-09-23-exp) on spohr.debian.org
X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-8.0 required=4.0 tests=BAYES_00,HAS_PACKAGE 
autolearn=no version=2.60-bugs.debian.org_2004_03_25
X-Spam-Level: 

Package: libapr0
Version: 2.0.50-12
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole

Uniras has reported a vulnerability in apr-util:

http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/403518/index.htm

The identified vulnerability is in the apr-util library; the
apr_uri_parse function in the apr-util library lacks input validation on
IPv6 literal addresses, which can result in a negative length parameter
being passed to memcpy.

It's likely that this bug affects Subversion.

---
Received: (at 271933-done) by bugs.debian.org; 16 Sep 2004 11:02:36 +
From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Thu Sep 16 04:02:36 2004
Return-path: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Received: from dev.bitch-whore.com (localhost.localdomain) [213.208.111.147] 
by spohr.debian.org with esmtp (Exim 3.35 1 (Debian))
id 1C7u28-000744-00; Thu, 16 Sep 2004 04:02:36 -0700
Received: by localhost.localdomain (Postfix, from userid 1000)
id AE8D51BAB0; Thu, 16 Sep 2004 12:02:29 +0100 (BST)
Date: Thu, 16 Sep 2004 12:02:29 +0100
From: Thom May [EMAIL PROTECTED]
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Fixed in incoming
Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=iso-8859-1
Content-Disposition: inline
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.6+20040818i
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.60-bugs.debian.org_2004_03_25 
(1.212-2003-09-23-exp) on spohr.debian.org
X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-2.0 required=4.0 tests=BAYES_01 autolearn=no 
version=2.60-bugs.debian.org_2004_03_25
X-Spam-Level: 

apache2 2.0.51-1 is in incoming currently which fixes this and the other two
recent CAN announcements.
-Thom

-- 
That sounds like a lot of work... Can we out source?
The Revolution will not be outsourced!
(Slick/Monique - Sinfest)




Bug#271945: apache in woody is missing security patches/updates

2004-09-16 Thread Mark Bryars
Package: apache
Version: 1.3.26-0woody5
Tags: woody, security
In 1.3.28 there is a patch that prevents file descriptors leaking to
child processes, this is not present. This causes processes spawned
by php (in this case 4.1.2-6woody3, not tested 4.1.2-7.0.1 yet) to have
full access to the apache logs, sockets etc.
I suggest this patch could be backported.



Bug#271945: apache in woody is missing security patches/updates

2004-09-16 Thread Matt Zimmerman
Maintainers, please raise the severity of this bug and contact the security
team if this is an urgent issue.

-- 
 - mdz




Bug#271933: CAN-2004-0786: apr_uri_parse() buffer overflow

2004-09-16 Thread Florian Weimer
Package: libapr0
Version: 2.0.50-12
Severity: grave
Tags: security
Justification: user security hole

Uniras has reported a vulnerability in apr-util:

http://www.uniras.gov.uk/vuls/2004/403518/index.htm

The identified vulnerability is in the apr-util library; the
apr_uri_parse function in the apr-util library lacks input validation on
IPv6 literal addresses, which can result in a negative length parameter
being passed to memcpy.

It's likely that this bug affects Subversion.




Re: Bug#271945: apache in woody is missing security patches/updates

2004-09-16 Thread Fabio Massimo Di Nitto
On Thu, 16 Sep 2004, Matt Zimmerman wrote:

 Maintainers, please raise the severity of this bug and contact the security
 team if this is an urgent issue.

Please can we have at least the CAN number and reference? Joey has been
keeping track of this iirc.

Fabio

-- 
user fajita: step one
fajita Whatever the problem, step one is always to look in the error log.
user fajita: step two
fajita When in danger or in doubt, step two is to scream and shout.




Bug#271945: apache in woody is missing security patches/updates

2004-09-16 Thread Matt Zimmerman
On Thu, Sep 16, 2004 at 10:09:19PM +0200, Fabio Massimo Di Nitto wrote:

 On Thu, 16 Sep 2004, Matt Zimmerman wrote:
 
  Maintainers, please raise the severity of this bug and contact the security
  team if this is an urgent issue.
 
 Please can we have at least the CAN number and reference? Joey has been
 keeping track of this iirc.

I thisk this refers to the follow upstream changelog entry:

  *) Certain 3rd party modules would bypass the Apache API and not
 invoke ap_cleanup_for_exec() before creating sub-processes.
 To such a child process, Apache's file descriptors (lock
 fd's, log files, sockets) were accessible, allowing them
 direct access to Apache log file etc.  Where the OS allows,
 we now add proactive close functions to prevent these file
 descriptors from leaking to the child processes.
 [Jim Jagielski, Martin Kraemer]

This is a workaround for security bugs in third-party mobules (which ones?),
and not a security fix in itself.

-- 
 - mdz