Bug#860268: [Fwd: Re: Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus]

[Jeremy Bicha]

On Wed, Oct 11, 2017 at 2:34 PM, Phil Wyett  wrote:
> I have looked at both 'jessie' and 'wheezy'. Both are not affected by this
> specific issue and have mechanism(s) like stretch (with update) and newer
> versions of nautilus that display and require input when confronted with 
> certain
> file types.

nautilus 3.22 introduced integrated (almost silent) tarball
decompression support which makes the test case for this vulnerability
a lot simpler.

Thanks,
Jeremy Bicha

Bug#860268: [Fwd: Re: Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus]

[Phil Wyett]

On Sat, 2017-10-07 at 21:06 +0200, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On Thu, 2017-10-05 at 21:42 +0200, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> > On Sat, 2017-09-23 at 01:38 +0100, Phil Wyett wrote:
> > > Hi Security Team,
> > > > 
> > > > Please accept the attached 'nautilus' debdiff for stretch-security.
> > > > 
> > > > Info:
> > > > 
> > > > The debdiff is a backport of the fix from upstream[1] and includes
> > > > translations
> > > > for the UI changes.
> > > > 
> > > > [1]: https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e997
> > > > 9236d3
> > > > 1a
> > > > 8d3bb0
> > 
> > Hi Phil,
> > 
> > the debdiff looks good, but please use +deb9u1 as suffix for the version
> > number. You may then proceed with the upload to security-master.
> > 
> > Note that since it's the first nautilus security upload to stretch it needs
> > to
> > be build with -sa.
> > 
> > You can safely upload a source-only upload, but you need to remove the
> > .buildinfo from the changes file before uploading.
> 
> I'll take care of the upload. Do you intend to backport the patches to Jessie?
> 
> Regards,

Hi,

I will look at it. But, I just know it will be a nightmare if possible at all. I
shall add info to the bug report probably mod next week.

Regards

Phil
 
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Bug#860268: [Fwd: Re: Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus]

[Yves-Alexis Perez]

On Thu, 2017-10-05 at 21:42 +0200, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> On Sat, 2017-09-23 at 01:38 +0100, Phil Wyett wrote:
> > Hi Security Team,
> > > 
> > > Please accept the attached 'nautilus' debdiff for stretch-security.
> > > 
> > > Info:
> > > 
> > > The debdiff is a backport of the fix from upstream[1] and includes
> > > translations
> > > for the UI changes.
> > > 
> > > [1]: https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e997
> > > 9236d3
> > > 1a
> > > 8d3bb0
> 
> Hi Phil,
> 
> the debdiff looks good, but please use +deb9u1 as suffix for the version
> number. You may then proceed with the upload to security-master.
> 
> Note that since it's the first nautilus security upload to stretch it needs
> to
> be build with -sa.
> 
> You can safely upload a source-only upload, but you need to remove the
> .buildinfo from the changes file before uploading.

I'll take care of the upload. Do you intend to backport the patches to Jessie?

Regards,
-- 
Yves-Alexis

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Bug#860268: [Fwd: Re: Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus]

[Yves-Alexis Perez]

On Sat, 2017-09-23 at 01:38 +0100, Phil Wyett wrote:
> Hi Security Team,
> > 
> > Please accept the attached 'nautilus' debdiff for stretch-security.
> > 
> > Info:
> > 
> > The debdiff is a backport of the fix from upstream[1] and includes
> > translations
> > for the UI changes.
> > 
> > [1]: 
> > https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d3
> > 1a
> > 8d3bb0

Hi Phil,

the debdiff looks good, but please use +deb9u1 as suffix for the version
number. You may then proceed with the upload to security-master.

Note that since it's the first nautilus security upload to stretch it needs to
be build with -sa.

You can safely upload a source-only upload, but you need to remove the
.buildinfo from the changes file before uploading.

Regards,
-- 
Yves-Alexis

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Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Sat, 2017-09-23 at 01:37 +0100, Phil Wyett wrote:
> On Sat, 2017-09-23 at 01:36 +0100, Phil Wyett wrote:
> > On Fri, 2017-09-22 at 17:19 -0400, Jeremy Bicha wrote:
> > > I asked on IRC about this so feel free to send the email, Phil or Donncha:
> > > 
> > > jbicha | carnil: are you going to sponsor #860268 as a security update?
> > > jmm_ | jbicha: yeah, we can fix that via security.debian.org, please
> > > send a mail to t...@security.debian.org, only a few of us are on IRC
> > > 
> > > 
> > > Thanks,
> > > Jeremy Bicha
> > 
> > Hi Security Team,
> > 
> > Please accept the attached 'nautilus' debdiff for stretch-security.
> > 
> > Info:
> > 
> > The debdiff is a backport of the fix from upstream[1] and includes
> > translations
> > for the UI changes.
> > 
> > [1]: https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236
> > d3
> > 1a
> > 8d3bb0
> > 
> > Related debian bug:
> > 
> > https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
> > 
> > Related upstream bug:
> > 
> > https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
> > 
> > Related CVE:
> > 
> > https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14604
> > 
> > Debian security tracker:
> > 
> > https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-14604
> > 
> > Regards
> > 
> > Phil
> > 
> 
> 


Oops... Massive sleep derived error. debdiff has been forwarded to security team
on another email that did not have a massive recipient list and had them on it.

Apologies for the error.

Regards

Phil
 
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Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Sat, 2017-09-23 at 01:36 +0100, Phil Wyett wrote:
> On Fri, 2017-09-22 at 17:19 -0400, Jeremy Bicha wrote:
> > I asked on IRC about this so feel free to send the email, Phil or Donncha:
> > 
> > jbicha | carnil: are you going to sponsor #860268 as a security update?
> > jmm_ | jbicha: yeah, we can fix that via security.debian.org, please
> > send a mail to t...@security.debian.org, only a few of us are on IRC
> > 
> > 
> > Thanks,
> > Jeremy Bicha
> 
> Hi Security Team,
> 
> Please accept the attached 'nautilus' debdiff for stretch-security.
> 
> Info:
> 
> The debdiff is a backport of the fix from upstream[1] and includes
> translations
> for the UI changes.
> 
> [1]: https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d3
> 1a
> 8d3bb0
> 
> Related debian bug:
> 
> https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
> 
> Related upstream bug:
> 
> https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
> 
> Related CVE:
> 
> https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14604
> 
> Debian security tracker:
> 
> https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-14604
> 
> Regards
> 
> Phil
> 

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Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Fri, 2017-09-22 at 17:19 -0400, Jeremy Bicha wrote:
> I asked on IRC about this so feel free to send the email, Phil or Donncha:
> 
> jbicha | carnil: are you going to sponsor #860268 as a security update?
> jmm_ | jbicha: yeah, we can fix that via security.debian.org, please
> send a mail to t...@security.debian.org, only a few of us are on IRC
> 
> 
> Thanks,
> Jeremy Bicha

Hi Security Team,

Please accept the attached 'nautilus' debdiff for stretch-security.

Info:

The debdiff is a backport of the fix from upstream[1] and includes translations
for the UI changes.

[1]: https://github.com/GNOME/nautilus/commit/1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a
8d3bb0

Related debian bug:

https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268

Related upstream bug:

https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991

Related CVE:

https://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14604

Debian security tracker:

https://security-tracker.debian.org/tracker/CVE-2017-14604

Regards

Phil

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GPG: 1B97 6556 913F 73F3 9C9B 25C4 2961 D9B6 2017 A57Adiff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-09-13 22:22:40.0 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+nautilus (3.22.3-1+deb9u1) stretch-security; urgency=high
+
+  * CVE-2017-14604: desktop_file_trust.patch
++ Spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated
+  by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but
+  this file's Exec field launches a malicious "sh -c" command.
+  (Closes: #860268).
+  - Initial patch by Phil Wyett 
+  - Translations additions by Donncha O'Cearbhaill 
+
+ -- Phil Wyett   Fri, 01 Sep 2017 23:43:51 +0100
+
 nautilus (3.22.3-1) unstable; urgency=medium

   * New upstream release.
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control	2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control	2017-09-20 17:58:00.0 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in	2016-12-10 02:59:53.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in	2017-09-20 14:52:48.0 +0200
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	1970-01-01 01:00:00.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	2017-09-14 15:26:27.0 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,946 @@
+From 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlos Soriano 
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:47:54 +0100
+Subject: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
+
+Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
+set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
+it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
+desktop file.
+
+However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
+comes from a compressed file.
+
+To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
+user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
+which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
+
+Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
+desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
+with the file itself.
+
+https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
+
+https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
+ .
+ nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+ .
+  * CVE-2017-14604: desktop_file_trust.patch
++ 

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Jeremy Bicha]

I asked on IRC about this so feel free to send the email, Phil or Donncha:

jbicha | carnil: are you going to sponsor #860268 as a security update?
jmm_ | jbicha: yeah, we can fix that via security.debian.org, please
send a mail to t...@security.debian.org, only a few of us are on IRC


Thanks,
Jeremy Bicha

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

Hi,

Now that the CVE (CVE-2017-14604) has been issued and this would (well, if it
ever does) pass into debian as a security update. I have updated the debdiff
accordingly. See attached.

Link to CVE: http://cve.mitre.org/cgi-bin/cvename.cgi?name=CVE-2017-14604

If any tweaks need to be made. Please let me know via this bug report.

If anyone has issues running with this patch applied. Please be sure to add
information to this bug report.

Regards

Phil

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GPG: 1B97 6556 913F 73F3 9C9B 25C4 2961 D9B6 2017 A57Adiff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-09-13 22:22:40.0 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,15 @@
+nautilus (3.22.3-1+deb9u1) stretch-security; urgency=high
+
+  * CVE-2017-14604: desktop_file_trust.patch
++ Spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated
+  by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but
+  this file's Exec field launches a malicious "sh -c" command.
+  (Closes: #860268).
+  - Initial patch by Phil Wyett 
+  - Translations additions by Donncha O'Cearbhaill 
+
+ -- Phil Wyett   Fri, 01 Sep 2017 23:43:51 +0100
+
 nautilus (3.22.3-1) unstable; urgency=medium

   * New upstream release.
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control	2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control	2017-09-20 17:58:00.0 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in	2016-12-10 02:59:53.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in	2017-09-20 14:52:48.0 +0200
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	1970-01-01 01:00:00.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	2017-09-14 15:26:27.0 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,946 @@
+From 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlos Soriano 
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:47:54 +0100
+Subject: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
+
+Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
+set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
+it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
+desktop file.
+
+However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
+comes from a compressed file.
+
+To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
+user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
+which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
+
+Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
+desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
+with the file itself.
+
+https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
+
+https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
+ .
+ nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+ .
+  * CVE-2017-14604: desktop_file_trust.patch
++ Spoof a file type by using the .desktop file extension, as demonstrated
+  by an attack in which a .desktop file's Name field ends in .pdf but
+  this file's Exec field launches a malicious "sh -c" command.
+  (Closes: #860268).
+  - Initial patch by Phil Wyett 
+  - Translations additions by Donncha O'Cearbhaill 
+Author: Phil Wyett 
+---
+
+--- a/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
 b/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include 

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Wed, 2017-09-20 at 17:30 +, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote:
> Phil Wyett:
> > On Wed, 2017-09-13 at 15:32 +, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote:
> > > Phil Wyett:
> > > > > 
> > > > > Hi,
> > > > > 
> > > > > Please note that the debdiff I provided was essentially a raw backport
> > > > > for
> > > > > testing and I thought it may have issues. It was never meant as a
> > > > > 'here it
> > > > > is,
> > > > > all done' patch ready for submission as a stable update.
> > > > > 
> > > > > I am a little busy at the moment, but if I can help here, I will.
> > > > > 
> 
> I have created a backport patch targeting Nautilus 3.22.3 which contains
> the cherry-picked translations for the new UI string.
> 
> It adds a line to the debian/control file to remove the pre-built .mo
> translation files which were included in the upstream source release. I
> also needed to add gettext as a build dependency. With this patch the
> .mo/.gmo files should be rebuilt with the new strings during the Debian
> package build.
> 
> I have tested the backported Nautlius package with Tails 3.1 which is
> based on Debian stable. The English and localised interface is displayed
> correctly.
> 
> Ideally this backport would be ready for Tails 3.2 which is schedule to
> be released early next week.
> 
> Please let me know if I need to make any further changes.
> 
> Regards,
> Donncha

Hi,

Sorry, been busy, so not had chance to get back to this.

Tested on English, German and French and all Ok.

Attached is updated debdiff, adding credit.

Regards

Phil

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GPG: 1B97 6556 913F 73F3 9C9B 25C4 2961 D9B6 2017 A57Adiff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-09-13 22:22:40.0 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,12 @@
+nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268).
+- Initial patch by Phil Wyett 
+- Translations additions by Donncha O'Cearbhaill 
+
+ -- Phil Wyett   Fri, 01 Sep 2017 23:43:51 +0100
+
 nautilus (3.22.3-1) unstable; urgency=medium

   * New upstream release.
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control	2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control	2017-09-20 17:58:00.0 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in	2016-12-10 02:59:53.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in	2017-09-20 14:52:48.0 +0200
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	1970-01-01 01:00:00.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	2017-09-14 15:26:27.0 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,943 @@
+From 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlos Soriano 
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:47:54 +0100
+Subject: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
+
+Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
+set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
+it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
+desktop file.
+
+However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
+comes from a compressed file.
+
+To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
+user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
+which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
+
+Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were 

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

Phil Wyett:
> On Wed, 2017-09-13 at 15:32 +, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote:
>> Phil Wyett:

 Hi,

 Please note that the debdiff I provided was essentially a raw backport for
 testing and I thought it may have issues. It was never meant as a 'here it
 is,
 all done' patch ready for submission as a stable update.

 I am a little busy at the moment, but if I can help here, I will.


I have created a backport patch targeting Nautilus 3.22.3 which contains
the cherry-picked translations for the new UI string.

It adds a line to the debian/control file to remove the pre-built .mo
translation files which were included in the upstream source release. I
also needed to add gettext as a build dependency. With this patch the
.mo/.gmo files should be rebuilt with the new strings during the Debian
package build.

I have tested the backported Nautlius package with Tails 3.1 which is
based on Debian stable. The English and localised interface is displayed
correctly.

Ideally this backport would be ready for Tails 3.2 which is schedule to
be released early next week.

Please let me know if I need to make any further changes.

Regards,
Donncha
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog2017-09-13 22:22:40.0 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268).
+
+ -- Phil Wyett   Fri, 01 Sep 2017 23:43:51 +0100
+
 nautilus (3.22.3-1) unstable; urgency=medium

   * New upstream release.
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control  2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control  2017-09-20 17:58:00.0 +0200
@@ -31,7 +31,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: 
https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in   2016-12-10 02:59:53.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/control.in   2017-09-20 14:52:48.0 +0200
@@ -27,7 +27,8 @@
gobject-introspection (>= 0.9.12-4~),
libgirepository1.0-dev (>= 0.10.7-1~),
libglib2.0-doc,
-   libgtk-3-doc
+   libgtk-3-doc,
+   gettext
 Homepage: https://wiki.gnome.org/action/show/Apps/Nautilus
 Vcs-Browser: 
https://anonscm.debian.org/viewvc/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
 Vcs-Svn: svn://anonscm.debian.org/pkg-gnome/desktop/unstable/nautilus/
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch 
nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch 1970-01-01 
01:00:00.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch 2017-09-14 
15:26:27.0 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+From 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlos Soriano 
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:47:54 +0100
+Subject: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
+
+Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
+set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
+it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
+desktop file.
+
+However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
+comes from a compressed file.
+
+To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
+user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
+which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
+
+Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
+desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
+with the file itself.
+
+https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
+
+https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
+ .
+ nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+ .
+   * Non-maintainer upload.
+   * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268)
+Author: Phil Wyett 
+---
+
+--- a/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
 b/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include "nautilus-global-preferences.h"
+ #include "nautilus-link.h"
+ #include "nautilus-profile.h"
++#include "nautilus-metadata.h"
+ #include 
+ #include 
+ #include 
+@@ -3580,13 +3581,17 @@
+ {
+ 

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

CVE-2017-14604 has been issued for this vulnerability.

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

It looks like I attached the wrong debdiff to my previous email. I have
attached the correct version now.
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog2017-03-09 02:39:58.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog2017-09-13 22:22:40.0 +0200
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268).
+
+ -- Phil Wyett   Fri, 01 Sep 2017 23:43:51 +0100
+
 nautilus (3.22.3-1) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   * New upstream release.
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch 
nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch 1970-01-01 
01:00:00.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch 2017-09-14 
15:26:27.0 +0200
@@ -0,0 +1,941 @@
+From 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlos Soriano 
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:47:54 +0100
+Subject: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
+
+Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
+set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
+it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
+desktop file.
+
+However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
+comes from a compressed file.
+
+To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
+user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
+which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
+
+Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
+desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
+with the file itself.
+
+https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
+
+https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
+ .
+ nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+ .
+   * Non-maintainer upload.
+   * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268)
+Author: Phil Wyett 
+---
+
+--- a/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
 b/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include "nautilus-global-preferences.h"
+ #include "nautilus-link.h"
+ #include "nautilus-profile.h"
++#include "nautilus-metadata.h"
+ #include 
+ #include 
+ #include 
+@@ -3580,13 +3581,17 @@
+ {
+ GFile *location;
+ gboolean res;
++g_autofree gchar* trusted = NULL;
+
+ if (!is_launcher)
+ {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+
+-if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file))
++trusted = nautilus_file_get_metadata (file,
++  
NAUTILUS_METADATA_KEY_DESKTOP_FILE_TRUSTED,
++  NULL);
++if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file) && trusted != NULL)
+ {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+--- a/src/nautilus-file-operations.c
 b/src/nautilus-file-operations.c
+@@ -235,10 +235,10 @@
+ #define COPY_FORCE _("Copy _Anyway")
+
+ static void
+-mark_desktop_file_trusted (CommonJob*common,
+-   GCancellable *cancellable,
+-   GFile*file,
+-   gboolean  interactive);
++mark_desktop_file_executable (CommonJob*common,
++  GCancellable *cancellable,
++  GFile*file,
++  gboolean  interactive);
+
+ static gboolean
+ is_all_button_text (const char *button_text)
+@@ -5290,10 +5290,10 @@
+ g_file_equal (copy_job->desktop_location, dest_dir) &&
+ is_trusted_desktop_file (src, job->cancellable))
+ {
+-mark_desktop_file_trusted (job,
+-   job->cancellable,
+-   dest,
+-   FALSE);
++mark_desktop_file_executable (job,
++  job->cancellable,
++  dest,
++  FALSE);
+ }
+
+ if (job->undo_info != NULL)
+@@ -7887,9 +7887,9 @@
+ }
+
+ static void
+-mark_trusted_task_done (GObject  *source_object,
+-GAsyncResult *res,
+-gpointer  user_data)
++mark_desktop_file_executable_task_done (GObject  *source_object,
++GAsyncResult *res,
++gpointer  user_data)
+ {
+ MarkTrustedJob *job = user_data;
+
+@@ -7907,13 +7907,11 @@
+ #define TRUSTED_SHEBANG "#!/usr/bin/env xdg-open\n"
+
+ static void
+-mark_desktop_file_trusted (CommonJob*common,
+-   GCancellable *cancellable,
+-   GFile   

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

Phil Wyett:
> Please note that the debdiff I provided was essentially a raw backport for
> testing and I thought it may have issues. It was never meant as a 'here it is,
> all done' patch ready for submission as a stable update.
> 
> I am a little busy at the moment, but if I can help here, I will.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Phil
> 

Hi,

I have cherry-picked the translations for the string "Trust and _Launch"
and created an updated patch and debdiff containing those strings in the
respective .po files.

Unfortunately it looks like the Debian package does not rebuild the
.gmo/.mo files from the .po files during the build. Instead it uses the
pre-built .gmo files which have be include in the upstream release. As a
result the added translation are not included with the built package.

I'm not sure what is the best way to resolve this:

1. Add gettext build dependency and rebuild the .mo files
3. Ask upstream maintainer to make a 3.22 release contain the patch and
translation
3. Create release without translation for that one string

Phil, I have tested your patch on Tail 3.1 (based on Debian Jessie) and
it is functioning as expected.
From 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Carlos Soriano 
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:47:54 +0100
Subject: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files

Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
desktop file.

However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
comes from a compressed file.

To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.

Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
with the file itself.

https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991

https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
 .
 nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
 .
   * Non-maintainer upload.
   * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268)
Author: Phil Wyett 
---

--- nautilus-3.22.3.orig/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
 #include "nautilus-global-preferences.h"
 #include "nautilus-link.h"
 #include "nautilus-profile.h"
+#include "nautilus-metadata.h"
 #include 
 #include 
 #include 
@@ -3580,13 +3581,17 @@ is_link_trusted (NautilusFile *file,
 {
 GFile *location;
 gboolean res;
+g_autofree gchar* trusted = NULL;

 if (!is_launcher)
 {
 return TRUE;
 }

-if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file))
+trusted = nautilus_file_get_metadata (file,
+  
NAUTILUS_METADATA_KEY_DESKTOP_FILE_TRUSTED,
+  NULL);
+if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file) && trusted != NULL)
 {
 return TRUE;
 }
--- nautilus-3.22.3.orig/src/nautilus-file-operations.c
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/src/nautilus-file-operations.c
@@ -235,10 +235,10 @@ typedef struct
 #define COPY_FORCE _("Copy _Anyway")

 static void
-mark_desktop_file_trusted (CommonJob*common,
-   GCancellable *cancellable,
-   GFile*file,
-   gboolean  interactive);
+mark_desktop_file_executable (CommonJob*common,
+  GCancellable *cancellable,
+  GFile*file,
+  gboolean  interactive);

 static gboolean
 is_all_button_text (const char *button_text)
@@ -5290,10 +5290,10 @@ retry:
 g_file_equal (copy_job->desktop_location, dest_dir) &&
 is_trusted_desktop_file (src, job->cancellable))
 {
-mark_desktop_file_trusted (job,
-   job->cancellable,
-   dest,
-   FALSE);
+mark_desktop_file_executable (job,
+  job->cancellable,
+  dest,
+  FALSE);
 }

 if (job->undo_info != NULL)
@@ -7887,9 +7887,9 @@ nautilus_file_operations_empty_trash (Gt
 }

 static void
-mark_trusted_task_done (GObject  *source_object,
-GAsyncResult *res,
-gpointer  user_data)
+mark_desktop_file_executable_task_done (GObject  *source_object,
+GAsyncResult *res,
+gpointer  user_data)
 {
 MarkTrustedJob *job = user_data;

@@ -7907,13 +7907,11 @@ 

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Wed, 2017-09-13 at 15:32 +, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote:
> Phil Wyett:
> > > 
> > > Hi,
> > > 
> > > Please note that the debdiff I provided was essentially a raw backport for
> > > testing and I thought it may have issues. It was never meant as a 'here it
> > > is,
> > > all done' patch ready for submission as a stable update.
> > > 
> > > I am a little busy at the moment, but if I can help here, I will.
> > > 
> > > Regards
> > > 
> > > Phil
> > > 
> > 
> > Hi,
> > 
> > Has anyone looked at how Red Hat are approaching this issue? RHEL 7.4 is
> > gnome
> > 3.22 and using nautilus 3.22.3 I believe.
> > 
> > Regards
> > 
> > Phil
> > 
> 
> The corresponding Red Hat bug is at
> https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1442231. Unfortunately there
> has not been any progress with fixing this issue in RHEL or Fedora 25
> either.
> 
> Thanks for creating the original patch. I'm not experienced with Debian
> packing, but I will try to test your patch later today.

Hi,

Being that this is tagged against Fedora 27 in Red Hats bugzilla. I have cloned
the bug and assigned it to RHEL 7.4.

https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1491425

Regards

Phil

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Web: https://kathenas.org

Github: https://github.com/kathenas

Twitter: kathenasorg

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Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

Phil Wyett:
>>
>> Hi,
>>
>> Please note that the debdiff I provided was essentially a raw backport for
>> testing and I thought it may have issues. It was never meant as a 'here it 
>> is,
>> all done' patch ready for submission as a stable update.
>>
>> I am a little busy at the moment, but if I can help here, I will.
>>
>> Regards
>>
>> Phil
>>
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Has anyone looked at how Red Hat are approaching this issue? RHEL 7.4 is gnome
> 3.22 and using nautilus 3.22.3 I believe.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Phil
> 

The corresponding Red Hat bug is at
https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1442231. Unfortunately there
has not been any progress with fixing this issue in RHEL or Fedora 25
either.

Thanks for creating the original patch. I'm not experienced with Debian
packing, but I will try to test your patch later today.

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Wed, 2017-09-13 at 15:30 +0100, Phil Wyett wrote:
> On Wed, 2017-09-13 at 13:36 +, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote:
> > Jeremy Bicha:
> > > 
> > > It's not just a UI change but a translatable string change. The new
> > > dialog that users will have to use to mark .desktop's as trusted will
> > > be untranslated.
> > > 
> > > Therefore, if you want this feature, you will need to use Nautilus >=
> > > 3.24 which means you will need to upgrade to buster.
> > > 
> > 
> > I understand backporting is more difficult when there are user facing UI
> > and localisation changes. AFAIK the only new translatable string in the
> > patch is "Trust and _Launch". Would it be possible to include the
> > translations for that string with this backport patch?
> > 
> > Personally I don't consider this change a *feature*, it is a fix for a
> > serious security issue affecting Debian stable users (and Tails). The
> > issue is trivially exploitable against the default configuration.
> > 
> > Video demonstrating the issue:
> > https://twitter.com/bleidl/status/851969179980845056
> > More information and an example:
> > https://github.com/DonnchaC/desktop-file-social-engineering
> 
> Hi,
> 
> Please note that the debdiff I provided was essentially a raw backport for
> testing and I thought it may have issues. It was never meant as a 'here it is,
> all done' patch ready for submission as a stable update.
> 
> I am a little busy at the moment, but if I can help here, I will.
> 
> Regards
> 
> Phil
> 

Hi,

Has anyone looked at how Red Hat are approaching this issue? RHEL 7.4 is gnome
3.22 and using nautilus 3.22.3 I believe.

Regards

Phil

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Web: https://kathenas.org

Github: https://github.com/kathenas

Twitter: kathenasorg

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Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Wed, 2017-09-13 at 13:36 +, Donncha O'Cearbhaill wrote:
> Jeremy Bicha:
> > 
> > It's not just a UI change but a translatable string change. The new
> > dialog that users will have to use to mark .desktop's as trusted will
> > be untranslated.
> > 
> > Therefore, if you want this feature, you will need to use Nautilus >=
> > 3.24 which means you will need to upgrade to buster.
> > 
> 
> I understand backporting is more difficult when there are user facing UI
> and localisation changes. AFAIK the only new translatable string in the
> patch is "Trust and _Launch". Would it be possible to include the
> translations for that string with this backport patch?
> 
> Personally I don't consider this change a *feature*, it is a fix for a
> serious security issue affecting Debian stable users (and Tails). The
> issue is trivially exploitable against the default configuration.
> 
> Video demonstrating the issue:
> https://twitter.com/bleidl/status/851969179980845056
> More information and an example:
> https://github.com/DonnchaC/desktop-file-social-engineering

Hi,

Please note that the debdiff I provided was essentially a raw backport for
testing and I thought it may have issues. It was never meant as a 'here it is,
all done' patch ready for submission as a stable update.

I am a little busy at the moment, but if I can help here, I will.

Regards

Phil

-- 
*** If this is a mailing list, I am subscribed, no need to CC me.***

Playing the game for the games sake.

Web: https://kathenas.org

Github: https://github.com/kathenas

Twitter: kathenasorg

Instagram: kathenasorg

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Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

Jeremy Bicha:
> 
> It's not just a UI change but a translatable string change. The new
> dialog that users will have to use to mark .desktop's as trusted will
> be untranslated.
> 
> Therefore, if you want this feature, you will need to use Nautilus >=
> 3.24 which means you will need to upgrade to buster.
> 

I understand backporting is more difficult when there are user facing UI
and localisation changes. AFAIK the only new translatable string in the
patch is "Trust and _Launch". Would it be possible to include the
translations for that string with this backport patch?

Personally I don't consider this change a *feature*, it is a fix for a
serious security issue affecting Debian stable users (and Tails). The
issue is trivially exploitable against the default configuration.

Video demonstrating the issue:
https://twitter.com/bleidl/status/851969179980845056
More information and an example:
https://github.com/DonnchaC/desktop-file-social-engineering

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Jeremy Bicha]

On Thu, Sep 7, 2017 at 9:34 AM, Donncha O'Cearbhaill  wrote:
> The upstream developer has now indicated that they will not be
> backporting the fix to 3.22.x. They have a policy of not backporting
> fixes which involve UI changes in stable branches.
>
> Will Debian backport this issue themselves? I have requested a CVE which
> I hope will help other distros to coordinate their fixes.

It's not just a UI change but a translatable string change. The new
dialog that users will have to use to mark .desktop's as trusted will
be untranslated.

Therefore, if you want this feature, you will need to use Nautilus >=
3.24 which means you will need to upgrade to buster.

Thanks,
Jeremy Bicha

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

Is there anything that I can do to help get this backport patch
deployed? This issue can be exploited in the wild and I think it should
be fixed as soon as possible.

I am still waiting for a response for my CVE request.

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

The upstream developer has now indicated that they will not be
backporting the fix to 3.22.x. They have a policy of not backporting
fixes which involve UI changes in stable branches.

Will Debian backport this issue themselves? I have requested a CVE which
I hope will help other distros to coordinate their fixes.

Upstream bug: https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991

intrigeri:
> Control: tag -1 + security
> 
> Donncha O'Cearbhaill:
>> Thank you Phil for providing a backport patch. What is the next step
>> needed to get this fix released as a backport? The .desktop security
>> issue is widely know and can be exploited in the wild [1]. IMO this
>> fixed should be made available as soon as possible.
> 
> IMO the next step is to find out the answer to "Is there any plan
> upstream to backport this fix to their 3.22.x branch, and/or to
> request a CVE?": if this problem is as severe as it sounds, then it
> should be tracked as a security issue and fixed cross-distro, rather
> than patched in only the distros that are lucky enough to have users
> who care about such things.
> 

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

intrigeri:
> Control: tag -1 + security
> 
> Donncha O'Cearbhaill:
>> Thank you Phil for providing a backport patch. What is the next step
>> needed to get this fix released as a backport? The .desktop security
>> issue is widely know and can be exploited in the wild [1]. IMO this
>> fixed should be made available as soon as possible.
> 
> IMO the next step is to find out the answer to "Is there any plan
> upstream to backport this fix to their 3.22.x branch, and/or to
> request a CVE?": if this problem is as severe as it sounds, then it
> should be tracked as a security issue and fixed cross-distro, rather
> than patched in only the distros that are lucky enough to have users
> who care about such things.
> 

The upstream developer has indicated that he willing to make a 3.22.x
release if a backport patch is provided. I've sent him a link to Phil
Wyett's debdiff which I hope is acceptable.

I will also file a CVE request for this issue which should help to
coordinate the release of this fix for other distros.

Upstream bug: https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[intrigeri]

Control: tag -1 + security

Donncha O'Cearbhaill:
> Thank you Phil for providing a backport patch. What is the next step
> needed to get this fix released as a backport? The .desktop security
> issue is widely know and can be exploited in the wild [1]. IMO this
> fixed should be made available as soon as possible.

IMO the next step is to find out the answer to "Is there any plan
upstream to backport this fix to their 3.22.x branch, and/or to
request a CVE?": if this problem is as severe as it sounds, then it
should be tracked as a security issue and fixed cross-distro, rather
than patched in only the distros that are lucky enough to have users
who care about such things.

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Donncha O'Cearbhaill]

Hi,

Thank you Phil for providing a backport patch. What is the next step
needed to get this fix released as a backport? The .desktop security
issue is widely know and can be exploited in the wild [1]. IMO this
fixed should be made available as soon as possible.

Regards,
Donncha

[1] https://github.com/freedomofpress/securedrop/issues/2238



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Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Phil Wyett]

On Fri, 2017-09-01 at 21:53 +0200, intrigeri wrote:
> Hi!
> 
> Micah Lee:
> > The upstream nautilus issue [1] has already been resolved, and will be
> > released in nautilus 3.24. But since this is an important security
> > issue, I think this patch should be backported so that it's fixed in
> > older versions of Debian.
> 
> Thanks for raising this issue in Debian!
> 
> Is there any plan upstream to backport this fix to their 3.22.x
> branch, and/or to request a CVE?
> 
> Did you personally check whether it's straightforward to backport the
> fix to 3.22?
> 
> Cheers,

Hi,

Seeing this bug. I have backported from the upstream patch (hash issue with
upstream diff) for testing purposes and all looks good. If anyone wishes to
test, a debdiff is attached.

The debdiff is prepared with a 'stretch-pu' in mind.

If any edits are required, please do not hesitate to let me know.

Regards

Phil

-- 
*** If this is a mailing list, I am subscribed, no need to CC me.***

Playing the game for the games sake.

Web: https://kathenas.org

Twitter: kathenasorg

Instagram: kathenasorgdiff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-03-09 01:39:58.0 +
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/changelog	2017-09-01 23:43:51.0 +0100
@@ -1,3 +1,10 @@
+nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+
+  * Non-maintainer upload.
+  * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268).
+
+ -- Phil Wyett   Fri, 01 Sep 2017 23:43:51 +0100
+
 nautilus (3.22.3-1) unstable; urgency=medium
 
   * New upstream release.
diff -Nru nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch
--- nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	1970-01-01 01:00:00.0 +0100
+++ nautilus-3.22.3/debian/patches/desktop_file_trust.patch	2017-09-01 23:43:51.0 +0100
@@ -0,0 +1,408 @@
+From 1630f53481f445ada0a455e9979236d31a8d3bb0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Carlos Soriano 
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2017 18:47:54 +0100
+Subject: mime-actions: use file metadata for trusting desktop files
+
+Currently we only trust desktop files that have the executable bit
+set, and don't replace the displayed icon or the displayed name until
+it's trusted, which prevents for running random programs by a malicious
+desktop file.
+
+However, the executable permission is preserved if the desktop file
+comes from a compressed file.
+
+To prevent this, add a metadata::trusted metadata to the file once the
+user acknowledges the file as trusted. This adds metadata to the file,
+which cannot be added unless it has access to the computer.
+
+Also remove the SHEBANG "trusted" content we were putting inside the
+desktop file, since that doesn't add more security since it can come
+with the file itself.
+
+https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
+
+https://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=860268
+ .
+ nautilus (3.22.3-1.1) stretch; urgency=high
+ .
+   * Non-maintainer upload.
+   * Backport desktop file trust patch from upstream. (Closes: #860268)
+Author: Phil Wyett 
+---
+
+--- nautilus-3.22.3.orig/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
 nautilus-3.22.3/src/nautilus-directory-async.c
+@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
+ #include "nautilus-global-preferences.h"
+ #include "nautilus-link.h"
+ #include "nautilus-profile.h"
++#include "nautilus-metadata.h"
+ #include 
+ #include 
+ #include 
+@@ -3580,13 +3581,17 @@ is_link_trusted (NautilusFile *file,
+ {
+ GFile *location;
+ gboolean res;
++g_autofree gchar* trusted = NULL;
+ 
+ if (!is_launcher)
+ {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+ 
+-if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file))
++trusted = nautilus_file_get_metadata (file,
++  NAUTILUS_METADATA_KEY_DESKTOP_FILE_TRUSTED,
++  NULL);
++if (nautilus_file_can_execute (file) && trusted != NULL)
+ {
+ return TRUE;
+ }
+--- nautilus-3.22.3.orig/src/nautilus-file-operations.c
 nautilus-3.22.3/src/nautilus-file-operations.c
+@@ -235,10 +235,10 @@ typedef struct
+ #define COPY_FORCE _("Copy _Anyway")
+ 
+ static void
+-mark_desktop_file_trusted (CommonJob*common,
+-   GCancellable *cancellable,
+-   GFile*file,
+-   gboolean  interactive);
++mark_desktop_file_executable (CommonJob*common,
++  GCancellable *cancellable,
++  GFile*file,
++  gboolean  interactive);
+ 
+ static gboolean
+ is_all_button_text (const char *button_text)
+@@ -5290,10 +5290,10 @@ retry:
+ g_file_equal (copy_job->desktop_location, dest_dir) &&
+ is_trusted_desktop_file (src, job->cancellable))
+ {
+-mark_desktop_file_trusted (job,
+-   

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[intrigeri]

Hi!

Micah Lee:
> The upstream nautilus issue [1] has already been resolved, and will be
> released in nautilus 3.24. But since this is an important security
> issue, I think this patch should be backported so that it's fixed in
> older versions of Debian.

Thanks for raising this issue in Debian!

Is there any plan upstream to backport this fix to their 3.22.x
branch, and/or to request a CVE?

Did you personally check whether it's straightforward to backport the
fix to 3.22?

Cheers,
-- 
intrigeri

Bug#860268: .desktop files can hide malware in Nautilus

[Micah Lee]

Package: nautilus
Version: 3.22.3-1

There is a bug in Nautilus that makes it possible to disguise a
malicious script as an innocent document, like a PDF or ODT, that gets
executed when the user opens it.

The upstream nautilus issue [1] has already been resolved, and will be
released in nautilus 3.24. But since this is an important security
issue, I think this patch should be backported so that it's fixed in
older versions of Debian.

See this blog post [2] for more about how this bug allows attackers to
compromise the security-focused Debian-based distro Subgraph.

[1] https://bugzilla.gnome.org/show_bug.cgi?id=777991
[2]
https://micahflee.com/2017/04/breaking-the-security-model-of-subgraph-os/