Bug#303300: marked as done (file permissions modification race (CAN-2005-0953))

2005-06-12 Thread Debian Bug Tracking System
Your message dated Sun, 12 Jun 2005 16:53:37 +1000
with message-id <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
and subject line Bug#303300: and woody?
has caused the attached Bug report to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what I am
talking about this indicates a serious mail system misconfiguration
somewhere.  Please contact me immediately.)

Debian bug tracking system administrator
(administrator, Debian Bugs database)

--
Received: (at submit) by bugs.debian.org; 5 Apr 2005 21:56:10 +
>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Tue Apr 05 14:56:10 2005
Return-path: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Received: from kitenet.net [64.62.161.42] (postfix)
by spohr.debian.org with esmtp (Exim 3.35 1 (Debian))
id 1DIw1q-0004Mg-00; Tue, 05 Apr 2005 14:56:10 -0700
Received: from dragon.kitenet.net (unknown [66.168.94.177])
(using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
(Client CN "Joey Hess", Issuer "Joey Hess" (verified OK))
by kitenet.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id B672E18006
for <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Tue,  5 Apr 2005 21:56:08 + (GMT)
Received: by dragon.kitenet.net (Postfix, from userid 1000)
id 762166E28F; Tue,  5 Apr 2005 17:59:06 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2005 17:59:05 -0400
From: Joey Hess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Debian Bug Tracking System <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: file permissions modification race (CAN-2005-0953)
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1;
protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5"
Content-Disposition: inline
X-Reportbug-Version: 3.9
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.8i
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.60-bugs.debian.org_2005_01_02 
(1.212-2003-09-23-exp) on spohr.debian.org
X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-8.0 required=4.0 tests=BAYES_00,HAS_PACKAGE 
autolearn=no version=2.60-bugs.debian.org_2005_01_02
X-Spam-Level: 


--FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Package: bzip2
Version: 1.0.2-5
Severity: normal
Tags: security

According to
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=3Dbugtraq&m=3D111229375217633&w=3D2:

  If a malicious local user has write access to a directory in which a
  target user is using bzip2 to extract or compress a file to then a
  TOCTOU bug can be exploited to change the permission of any file
  belonging to that user.

  On decompressing bzip2 copies the permissions from the compressed
  bzip2 file to the
  uncompressed file. However there is a gap between the uncompressed
  file being written (and it's file handler being close) and the
  permissions of the file being changed.

  During this gap a malicious user can remove the decompressed file and
  replace it with a hard-link to another file belonging to the user.
  bzip2 will then change the permissions on the  hard-linked file to be
  the same as that of the bzip2 file.

This is a low impact security hole as it requires a local user to
exploit a race, and bzip2 must be run in a directory that the attacker
can write to (and +t directories probably don't work), and all you
can do is change a file permissions.=20

If you fix this hole, please refer to CAN-2005-0953 in your changelog.

-- System Information:
Debian Release: 3.1
  APT prefers unstable
  APT policy: (500, 'unstable')
Architecture: i386 (i686)
Kernel: Linux 2.4.27
Locale: LANG=3Den_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=3Den_US.UTF-8 (charmap=3DUTF-8)

Versions of packages bzip2 depends on:
ii  libbz2-1.0  1.0.2-5  high-quality block-sorting fil=
e co
ii  libc6   2.3.2.ds1-20 GNU C Library: Shared librarie=
s an

-- no debconf information

--=20
see shy jo

--FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
Content-Description: Digital signature
Content-Disposition: inline

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFCUwopd8HHehbQuO8RAhnfAJ4g7Eg/vVwNZ5QglR3Hj0pjCLv2EwCgoHNl
n+iQxlNnoMWQaieV69NZ9UU=
=/2Yv
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

--FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5--

---
Received: (at 303300-done) by bugs.debian.org; 12 Jun 2005 06:53:40 +
>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Sat Jun 11 23:53:40 2005
Return-path: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Received: from cpe-138-217-160-143.vic.bigpond.net.au (nukak.apana.org.au) 
[138.217.160.143] 
by spohr.debian.org with esmtp (Exim 3.35 1 (Debian))
id 1DhMLj-0001Vz-00; Sat, 11 Jun 2005 23:53:39 -0700
Received: by nukak.apana.org.au (Postfix, from userid 1000)
id 58E7F68428F; Sun, 12 Jun 2005 16:53:37 +1000 (EST)
Date: Sun, 12 Jun 2005 16:53:37 +1000
From: Anibal Monsalve Salazar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]

Bug#303300: marked as done (file permissions modification race (CAN-2005-0953))

2005-05-04 Thread Debian Bug Tracking System
Your message dated Wed, 04 May 2005 04:02:37 -0400
with message-id <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
and subject line Bug#303300: fixed in bzip2 1.0.2-6
has caused the attached Bug report to be marked as done.

This means that you claim that the problem has been dealt with.
If this is not the case it is now your responsibility to reopen the
Bug report if necessary, and/or fix the problem forthwith.

(NB: If you are a system administrator and have no idea what I am
talking about this indicates a serious mail system misconfiguration
somewhere.  Please contact me immediately.)

Debian bug tracking system administrator
(administrator, Debian Bugs database)

--
Received: (at submit) by bugs.debian.org; 5 Apr 2005 21:56:10 +
>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Tue Apr 05 14:56:10 2005
Return-path: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Received: from kitenet.net [64.62.161.42] (postfix)
by spohr.debian.org with esmtp (Exim 3.35 1 (Debian))
id 1DIw1q-0004Mg-00; Tue, 05 Apr 2005 14:56:10 -0700
Received: from dragon.kitenet.net (unknown [66.168.94.177])
(using TLSv1 with cipher DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA (256/256 bits))
(Client CN "Joey Hess", Issuer "Joey Hess" (verified OK))
by kitenet.net (Postfix) with ESMTP id B672E18006
for <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>; Tue,  5 Apr 2005 21:56:08 + (GMT)
Received: by dragon.kitenet.net (Postfix, from userid 1000)
id 762166E28F; Tue,  5 Apr 2005 17:59:06 -0400 (EDT)
Date: Tue, 5 Apr 2005 17:59:05 -0400
From: Joey Hess <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: Debian Bug Tracking System <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Subject: file permissions modification race (CAN-2005-0953)
Message-ID: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Mime-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: multipart/signed; micalg=pgp-sha1;
protocol="application/pgp-signature"; boundary="FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5"
Content-Disposition: inline
X-Reportbug-Version: 3.9
User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.8i
Delivered-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
X-Spam-Checker-Version: SpamAssassin 2.60-bugs.debian.org_2005_01_02 
(1.212-2003-09-23-exp) on spohr.debian.org
X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-8.0 required=4.0 tests=BAYES_00,HAS_PACKAGE 
autolearn=no version=2.60-bugs.debian.org_2005_01_02
X-Spam-Level: 


--FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable

Package: bzip2
Version: 1.0.2-5
Severity: normal
Tags: security

According to
http://marc.theaimsgroup.com/?l=3Dbugtraq&m=3D111229375217633&w=3D2:

  If a malicious local user has write access to a directory in which a
  target user is using bzip2 to extract or compress a file to then a
  TOCTOU bug can be exploited to change the permission of any file
  belonging to that user.

  On decompressing bzip2 copies the permissions from the compressed
  bzip2 file to the
  uncompressed file. However there is a gap between the uncompressed
  file being written (and it's file handler being close) and the
  permissions of the file being changed.

  During this gap a malicious user can remove the decompressed file and
  replace it with a hard-link to another file belonging to the user.
  bzip2 will then change the permissions on the  hard-linked file to be
  the same as that of the bzip2 file.

This is a low impact security hole as it requires a local user to
exploit a race, and bzip2 must be run in a directory that the attacker
can write to (and +t directories probably don't work), and all you
can do is change a file permissions.=20

If you fix this hole, please refer to CAN-2005-0953 in your changelog.

-- System Information:
Debian Release: 3.1
  APT prefers unstable
  APT policy: (500, 'unstable')
Architecture: i386 (i686)
Kernel: Linux 2.4.27
Locale: LANG=3Den_US.UTF-8, LC_CTYPE=3Den_US.UTF-8 (charmap=3DUTF-8)

Versions of packages bzip2 depends on:
ii  libbz2-1.0  1.0.2-5  high-quality block-sorting fil=
e co
ii  libc6   2.3.2.ds1-20 GNU C Library: Shared librarie=
s an

-- no debconf information

--=20
see shy jo

--FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature; name="signature.asc"
Content-Description: Digital signature
Content-Disposition: inline

-BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-
Version: GnuPG v1.4.0 (GNU/Linux)

iD8DBQFCUwopd8HHehbQuO8RAhnfAJ4g7Eg/vVwNZ5QglR3Hj0pjCLv2EwCgoHNl
n+iQxlNnoMWQaieV69NZ9UU=
=/2Yv
-END PGP SIGNATURE-

--FL5UXtIhxfXey3p5--

---
Received: (at 303300-close) by bugs.debian.org; 4 May 2005 08:12:37 +
>From [EMAIL PROTECTED] Wed May 04 01:12:37 2005
Return-path: <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
Received: from newraff.debian.org [208.185.25.31] (mail)
by spohr.debian.org with esmtp (Exim 3.35 1 (Debian))
id 1DTEzl-0001ul-00; Wed, 04 May 2005 01:12:37 -0700
Received: from katie by newraff.debian.org with local (Exim 3.35 1 (Debian))
id 1DTEq5-0005N6-00; Wed, 04 May 2005 04:02:37 -0400
From: Anibal Monsalve Salazar <[EMAIL PROTECTED]>
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
X-Katie: $Revision: 1.55 $
Subject: Bug#303300: