Re: Shadow vss PAM

1996-08-22 Thread Patrick Weemeeuw

   Date: Wed, 21 Aug 96 11:59 PDT
   From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Perens)
   Cc: debian-devel@lists.debian.org (Debian Development)

   Patrick Weemeeuw writes:
I would propose to go for shadow for 1.2.
In the mean time, I will try to make a few applications PAM-aware,
to wet my feet and to gain some insight about how simple or complex
things are. After all, it's not a  black or white thing, but we can
PAMify application by application.

   Good decision. If I understand you correctly, we can set PAM to
   authenticate via shadow password only and deploy it in a piece-wise
   fashion. Then, once we have it deployed fully, we can start to introduce
   additional methods of validation.

   Thanks

   Bruce

Even better yet: as soon as any application has been adapted to PAM it
can use all available PAM modules immediately (as configured by the
system administrator per application), independently of the status of
other authentication clients.  I also hope that the support for shadow
passwords is compatible with the current shadow package: that would
avoid most transition problems.

Patrick.




Re: Shadow vss PAM

1996-08-21 Thread Patrick Weemeeuw

   Date: Tue, 20 Aug 96 08:19 PDT
   From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] (Bruce Perens)
   Reply-To: Bruce Perens [EMAIL PROTECTED]

   From: Patrick Weemeeuw [EMAIL PROTECTED]
The big question is: is PAM ready for integration in the distribution?

   I agree that it sounds like a better way to do the job. I think the
   interested parties should decide together if they are able to deploy
   it reasonably _soon_. I have started work on the installation floppies
   for 1.2, we are about to change the source format and convert a lot of
   packages, we have architecture changes to merge in, etc., so you probably
   have a month but not much more.

   Thanks

   Bruce

Well, I do have some areas of concern, both pro and against
introducing PAM now.

Introducing PAM is certainly not a free lunch: it needs some changes
to rather many components of the distribution [including probably
changes to some unexpected ones such as e.g. init for session
logging--this is still in discussion on the mailing list].  This is
certainly easier to do with a more centralised control as in the
RedHat distribution, than in our distributed development model.  In
this light, a month is on the short side, and it might be easier to
wait and see how RedHat solves the hasles.  On the other hand, we do
not need complete PAM support in 1.2, but might well start with a few
PAMified applications.  However, I think that a commitment of Debian
to PAM in the long term, is important.

My second concern is that introducing the shadow support now might
make a later introduction of PAM more difficult.  Technically,
conversion from a unix password authentication scheme to PAM is
simpler than from unix + shadow to PAM (this might or might not be a
big issue, depending maybe on how compatible the PAM shadow module is
with the Debian shadow package).

Thinking things over again, and considering that the shadow support
for Debian is almost finished (as far as I know, only xdm and a few
small utilities such as vipw have to be adapted for shadow support), I
would propose to go for shadow for 1.2.  In the mean time, I will try
to make a few applications PAM-aware, to wet my feet and to gain some
insight about how simple or complex things are.  After all, it's not a
black or white thing, but we can PAMify application by application.

Patrick




Bug#4120: rdist ssh

1996-08-12 Thread Patrick Weemeeuw
Package: netstd
Version: 2.06-1

Currently the netstd package contains rdist version 6.1.
Could this please be upgraded to version 6.1.1 or 6.1.2,
so that it works with ssh?

Thanks.

--

From the ssh FAQ:

4.4 Can I use rdist with ssh?

Stock rdist 6.1.0 does not work together with ssh, due to bugs in it. The 
6.1.1 versions of rdist and
later versions are believed to work.

If you use rdist, don't forget to compile the path to ssh into it. 
Alternatively, you may specify the -P
option so rdist uses ssh, and not rsh.

If you use password authentication with rdist 6.1.2, you will need to apply 
the following patch to
rdist to make it work: 

--- src/rshrcmd.c.orig  Tue Jun 11 16:51:21 1996
+++ src/rshrcmd.c   Tue Jun 11 16:52:05 1996
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@
/* child. we use sp[1] to be stdin/stdout, and close
   sp[0]. */
(void) close(sp[0]);
-   if (dup2(sp[1], 0)  0 || dup2(0,1)  0 || dup2(0, 2)  0) {
+   if (dup2(sp[1], 0)  0 || dup2(0,1)  0) {
error(dup2 failed: %s., SYSERR);
_exit(255);
}




Bug#4070: snmpd: hrStorageSize fix

1996-08-08 Thread Patrick Weemeeuw
Package: snmp
Version: 2.1.2l4-1

The following patch fixes the problem of integer wrap around that
occurs for =2Gb disks (i.e. sbuf.f_blocks * sbuf.f_bsize  2^31).
This is accomplished by computing the intermediate values in floating
point.

Patrick.
--
--- snmp-2.1.2l4/agent/snmp_vars.c  Sun Aug 20 23:02:21 1995
+++ snmp-2.1.2l4.patched/agent/snmp_vars.c  Wed Aug  7 13:17:24 1996
@@ -3514,11 +3525,11 @@
break;
  case HRSTORAGESIZE:
long_return = idx  2 ? hr_getstor (idx, HRSTORAGESIZE, 1024) :
-   (sbuf.f_blocks * sbuf.f_bsize) / 1024;
+ (long)(((float)sbuf.f_blocks * (float)sbuf.f_bsize) / 1024.0 + 0.5
);
break;
  case HRSTORAGEUSED:
long_return = idx  2 ? hr_getstor (idx, HRSTORAGEUSED, 1024) :
- ((sbuf.f_blocks-sbuf.f_bfree) * sbuf.f_bsize) / 1024;
+ (long)(((float)(sbuf.f_blocks-sbuf.f_bfree) * sbuf.f_bsize) / 1024
.0 + 0.5);
break;
  case HRSTORAGEALLOCFAILURES:
long_return = 0;/* XXX: dummy */




PAM libraries (libpam) uploaded

1996-08-04 Thread Patrick Weemeeuw

I have uploaded the initial release of libpam to chiark.  There is
also a copy available on
ftp://ftp.kulnet.kuleuven.ac.be/pub/people/patrick/debian.

The libpam package contains the PAM libraries (PAM = Pluggable
Authentication Modules [http://gluon.physics.ucla.edu/~morgan/pam
http://www.redhat.com/pam]).

The current libraries have an experimental nature: the main logic is
OK, but only a limited set of underlying authentication modules is
available for the moment (other modules are under development).
However, the libraries are stable enough to start making application
programs (authentication clients) PAM aware.

I am releasing this package now, because I think that it's now the
time to consider making applications PAM aware: development is
currently accellerating, and RedHat is PAM-ifying some authentication
clients for their next release.  As a consequence we can use the same
or similar diffs for most of our applications.

If you would PAM-ify your application, please join the Linux-PAM
mailing list ([EMAIL PROTECTED]).

-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-

Date: 04 Aug 96 06:53 UT
Format: 1.6
Distribution: unstable
Urgency: Low
Maintainer: Patrick Weemeeuw [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Source: libpam
Version: 0.50-1
Binary:  libpam
Architecture:  i386 source
Description: 
 libpam: Pluggable Authentication Modules -- Libraries
Changes: initial release
Files:
 977e5542dd94866ba6030457035f6017  265966  -   libpam_0.50-1.tar.gz
 1cebc86544ded0b5d67cdd2abbb10a40  107224  -   libpam_0.50-1.diff.gz
 8cee7a269c830e413b207b1a43ef4978  224980  misc  extra  libpam_0.50-1_i386.deb

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Towards support for S/Key

1995-12-07 Thread Patrick Weemeeuw
A common source of security problems is often that each service uses
its own protocol and code for authentication (ftpd, telnetd, rlogind,
login, popd, ...).  Besides the inconsistent user interface, this also
introduces many oportunities for security holes.  This holds in
particular for public domain software, for which there is no
centralised code management.

As we are integrating all these packages into one high quality
distribution, I think that this point is worth our attention.
Separating authentication code into one library, would offer the
following benefits:
- consistent interface for all utilities
- more security (at least if the library itself is also properly
  protected)
- it becomes much more easy to plug in alternative authentication
  methods, e.g. S/Key.
BTW: a similar thing has been done with the readline library (I'm not
sure about this, but at least I have noticed that ftp has command line
editing).

On the other hand, I don't think that this modularity is easily
achieved, as it interferes with many packages.  Perhaps more
debian-knowledgeable people can add their comments?
--
Patrick Weemeeuw, network manager
K.U.Leuven, KULeuvenNet, currently at the Dept. of Computer Science
Celestijnenlaan 200 A, B-3001 Leuven, Belgium
Tel: +32 16 327635 Fax: +32 16 327996
E-mail: [EMAIL PROTECTED]
PGP key: ftp://ftp.kulnet.kuleuven.ac.be/pub/people/patrick/pgpkey.asc