Re: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Alexander Konovalenko
On Sun, Apr 6, 2008, Bernd Eckenfels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you wrote:
>  > I trust the archive maintainers and have a secure way to get a copy of
>  > their public key. I don't trust individual developers and cannot have
>  > all of their keys securely distributed to me.
>
>  Yes, you would have to sign the packages with your own key after verifying
>  the release file.

If you are talking about automating the verification process, that
wouldn't quite work. The system that downloads the packages might have
been compromised. The files that I would sign on that system might
have been already modified at the time when I sign them.

So I don't see how signing the packages with my own key could help
here. Am I missing something?


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Re: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Bernd Eckenfels
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you wrote:
> I trust the archive maintainers and have a secure way to get a copy of
> their public key. I don't trust individual developers and cannot have
> all of their keys securely distributed to me.

Yes, you would have to sign the packages with your own key after verifying
the release file.

Gruss
Bernd


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Re: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Alexander Konovalenko
On Sun, Apr 6, 2008, Bernd Eckenfels <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
>  It should be possible to verify the package on install time. (Especially
>  when not using apt-get).
>
>  Not sure if debsig-verify can work in that environment.

debsig-verify is not applicable in my case. It implements a different
checking scheme from apt-secure with a different chain of trust.
debsig-verify can check the signature of the individual who prepared a
package, while apt-secure verifies the signature of archive
maintainers which applies to all packages. debsig-verify cannot verify
the archive maintainers' signature (Release.gpg).

I trust the archive maintainers and have a secure way to get a copy of
their public key. I don't trust individual developers and cannot have
all of their keys securely distributed to me.

As far as I know, debsig-verify is not currently in use neither by
Debian nor by Ubuntu, and many packages lack a signature. Securing
Debian Manual (section 7.4.5) even says that signatures from
developers are stripped when the packages enter the archive because
the preferred method of verification is secure apt.

  -- Alexander


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TR: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Julien Stuby
That seems the best way. The seconde step will be to use an another OS that the 
first to reduce even more attack surface from readed disk.

 -- Julien

-Message d'origine-
De : Alexander Konovalenko [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Envoyé : samedi, 5. avril 2008 22:33
À : debian-security@lists.debian.org
Cc : Julien Stuby
Objet : Re: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

On Sun, Apr 6, 2008, Julien Stuby <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
>  If some packages are localy modified, This suggests that your local system 
> is already compromised.
>  :¬

Of course. I will be verifying the integrity of my .deb files from
another, more trusted system (a LiveCD or a hardened host that have
never been connected to any network, etc.). So the compromise of my
system won't prevent me from checking the package integrity securely.

The second system is not immune. It might have a vulnerability in its
filesystem layer or in the code that processes the Release and
Packages files, and a local IDS might not be able to detect the
exploitation of such a vulnerability. But that is acceptable because
the attack surface of the trusted system is much reduced compared to
that of the first system.

  -- Alexander



Re: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Bernd Eckenfels
In article <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> you wrote:
> If some packages are localy modified, This suggests that your local system
> is already compromised.

Not if you use a NFS mounted shared cache.

It should be possible to verify the package on install time. (Especially
when not using apt-get).

Not sure if debsig-verify can work in that environment.

Gruss
Bernd


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Re: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Alexander Konovalenko
On Sun, Apr 6, 2008, Julien Stuby <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
> Hi,
>
>  If some packages are localy modified, This suggests that your local system 
> is already compromised.
>  :¬

Of course. I will be verifying the integrity of my .deb files from
another, more trusted system (a LiveCD or a hardened host that have
never been connected to any network, etc.). So the compromise of my
system won't prevent me from checking the package integrity securely.

The second system is not immune. It might have a vulnerability in its
filesystem layer or in the code that processes the Release and
Packages files, and a local IDS might not be able to detect the
exploitation of such a vulnerability. But that is acceptable because
the attack surface of the trusted system is much reduced compared to
that of the first system.

  -- Alexander


RE: TR: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Julien Stuby

Hotmail live connector bug again ...
> Hi,> > If some packages are localy modified, This suggests that your local 
> system is already compromised.> :¬ > > De : Alexander Konovalenko 
> [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] > Envoyé : samedi, 5. avril 2008 06:11> À : 
> debian-security@lists.debian.org> Objet : How to verify package integrity 
> after they have been downloaded?> > I would like to verify that some .deb 
> files I downloaded a while ago> (using apt) haven't been tampered with. 
> (Actually, I'll be doing this> kind of thing more than once.) I have the 
> appropriate Release,> Release.gpg and Packages files.> > As the apt-secure(8) 
> manual page states, apt verifies the integrity of> the .deb packages when it 
> downloads them. But it doesn't do so when> installing from cache. To make 
> sure, I manually modified a .deb file> in /var/cache/apt/archives/ and 
> installed that package with apt-get.> The modified package was installed 
> without any warnings.> > (I'm working on Ubuntu 7.10 but I think there's no 
> difference here> between Debian and Ubuntu. Please correct me if I'm wrong.)> 
> > I can verify the signature of the Release file and check the hash-sum> of 
> the Packages file by hand. But there are a lot of .deb files to> verify. I 
> could write a script that would parse the Packages file and> extract the 
> checksums so that its output could be fed to the> {md5,sha1,sha256}sum -c 
> commands. But it would take considerable> effort to make the script robust 
> enough so that it doesn't break on> new or malicious Packages files.> > Is 
> there a simpler way to verify the integrity of .deb packages that> were 
> downloaded with apt?> > > -- > To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED]> 
> with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]> > 

TR: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Julien Stuby


-Message d'origine-
De : Julien Stuby [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Envoyé : samedi, 5. avril 2008 21:19
À : 'debian-security@lists.debian.org'
Objet : RE: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

Hi,

If some packages are localy modified, This suggests that your local system is 
already compromised.
:¬ 

De : Alexander Konovalenko [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Envoyé : samedi, 5. avril 2008 06:11
À : debian-security@lists.debian.org
Objet : How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

I would like to verify that some .deb files I downloaded a while ago
(using apt) haven't been tampered with. (Actually, I'll be doing this
kind of thing more than once.) I have the appropriate Release,
Release.gpg and Packages files.

As the apt-secure(8) manual page states, apt verifies the integrity of
the .deb packages when it downloads them. But it doesn't do so when
installing from cache. To make sure, I manually modified a .deb file
in /var/cache/apt/archives/ and installed that package with apt-get.
The modified package was installed without any warnings.

(I'm working on Ubuntu 7.10 but I think there's no difference here
between Debian and Ubuntu. Please correct me if I'm wrong.)

I can verify the signature of the Release file and check the hash-sum
of the Packages file by hand. But there are a lot of .deb files to
verify. I could write a script that would parse the Packages file and
extract the checksums so that its output could be fed to the
{md5,sha1,sha256}sum -c commands. But it would take considerable
effort to make the script robust enough so that it doesn't break on
new or malicious Packages files.

Is there a simpler way to verify the integrity of .deb packages that
were downloaded with apt?


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RE: How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

2008-04-05 Thread Julien Stuby
Hi,

If some packages are localy modified, This suggests that your local system is 
already compromised.
:¬ 

De : Alexander Konovalenko [mailto:[EMAIL PROTECTED] 
Envoyé : samedi, 5. avril 2008 06:11
À : debian-security@lists.debian.org
Objet : How to verify package integrity after they have been downloaded?

I would like to verify that some .deb files I downloaded a while ago
(using apt) haven't been tampered with. (Actually, I'll be doing this
kind of thing more than once.) I have the appropriate Release,
Release.gpg and Packages files.

As the apt-secure(8) manual page states, apt verifies the integrity of
the .deb packages when it downloads them. But it doesn't do so when
installing from cache. To make sure, I manually modified a .deb file
in /var/cache/apt/archives/ and installed that package with apt-get.
The modified package was installed without any warnings.

(I'm working on Ubuntu 7.10 but I think there's no difference here
between Debian and Ubuntu. Please correct me if I'm wrong.)

I can verify the signature of the Release file and check the hash-sum
of the Packages file by hand. But there are a lot of .deb files to
verify. I could write a script that would parse the Packages file and
extract the checksums so that its output could be fed to the
{md5,sha1,sha256}sum -c commands. But it would take considerable
effort to make the script robust enough so that it doesn't break on
new or malicious Packages files.

Is there a simpler way to verify the integrity of .deb packages that
were downloaded with apt?


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