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2005-10-27 Thread Benjamin Maerte




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2005-10-12 Thread Benjamin Maerte

Florian Weimer a écrit :


* Michael Koch:

 


This is a big field which needs even bigger investigation. The free
runtimes can load them but signed jars are still not supported (or was
this fixed lately...). Your best action would be to just test it with
kaffe or gcj or whatever and report any bugs you find.
   



In the meantime, it occurred to me that the certified key (including
the private key) would have to be included in the source package,
otherwise the package would fail to build from source.

While I see nothing in Sun's form that requires us to keep the private
key secret, publishing it still not be such a good idea.


 




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2005-10-12 Thread Benjamin Maerte

Michael Koch a écrit :


On Tue, Oct 04, 2005 at 04:01:03PM -0400, Charles Fry wrote:
 


In order to be trusted, the security provider must be signed with a
key that was certified by the JCE Code Signing Certification
Authority (see Step 5 of the document above).
   


So why can't we ship trusted root certificates for a Debian Code
Signing Certification Authority, or trust everything which is present
in the file system?
 


Your first proposition sounds reasonable at first glance, though I would
like some feedback from others who are more familiar with the free JVMs
that ship with Java.

   


I have the strong suspicion that this certificate just asserts that
you have signed the CSR form and promised to comply with U.S. export
regulations, and nothing else.  Maybe this was the result of a deal
between BXA/BIS and Sun which permitted Sun to export their
implementation.  We don't need to follow such a procedure because
Debian has different means to comply with the regulations, and we do
not distribute Sun's implementation, AFAIK.
 


Though we don't distribute Sun's implementation, java-package provides a
straightforward way to insall Sun's installation on a Debian machine.
Further, due to what appears to be a Classpath bug, no free JVM that we
do ship is able to pass all of the BouncyCastle regression tests (which
is why BouncyCastle is currently in contrib).

Does anyone from debian-java know how the free JVMs deal with security
providers?
   



This is a big field which needs even bigger investigation. The free
runtimes can load them but signed jars are still not supported (or was
this fixed lately...). Your best action would be to just test it with
kaffe or gcj or whatever and report any bugs you find.


Cheers,
Michael
 




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2005-10-11 Thread Benjamin Maerte




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2005-10-06 Thread Benjamin Maerte

Craig Schneider a écrit :


Hi Guys

Is there software available that can log the contents of IP_CONTRACK in
proc to a webpage similar to IPCOP with port numbers, source and
destination IP addresses?

Thanks
Craig

 




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2005-09-30 Thread Benjamin Maerte

Vincent Caron a écrit :


On Fri, 2005-09-30 at 08:49 +0200, Martin Schulze wrote:
 


-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1

- --
Debian Security Advisory DSA 829-1 [EMAIL PROTECTED]
http://www.debian.org/security/ Martin Schulze
September 30, 2005  http://www.debian.org/security/faq
- --

Package: mysql
Vulnerability  : buffer overflow
Problem type   : remote
Debian-specific: no
CVE ID : CAN-2005-2558
BugTraq ID : 14509

A stack-based buffer overflow in the init_syms function of MySQL, a
popular database, has been discovered that allows remote authenticated
users who can create user-defined functions to execute arbitrary code
via a long function_name field.  The ability to create user-defined
functions is not typically granted to untrusted users.

The following vulnerability matrix shows which version of MySQL in
which distribution has this problem fixed:

woody  sarge  sid
mysql 3.23.49-8.14   n/a   n/a
mysql-dfsgn/a  4.0.24-10sarge14.0.24-10sarge1
mysql-dfsg-4.1n/a  4.1.11a-4sarge24.1.14-2
mysql-dfsg-5.0n/an/a5.0.11beta-3
   



 That's not one of our package, I've checked.



 




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