Re: Security problem in PHP3+Postgres with Potato?

2002-03-25 Thread Benoît Sibaud
> > What's the normal way to make a security bug report?
> apt-get install bug

The 'bug' package is for "normal" bugs. [EMAIL PROTECTED] seems to be
the good place to report security problems. Sorry for my previous post.

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Security problem in PHP3+Postgres with Potato?

2002-03-25 Thread Benoît Sibaud
Hi,

I think I found a security problem in PHP3+postgres+apache shipped with
Potato.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the following code should support any $var.
If you uncomment the client_encoding line, I'm able to execute any
request I want with the good $var.

%<--
  $conn = pg_connect("dbname=" . BASE_DOC . " port=" . BASE_PORT
   . " user=" . BASE_USER);
  $var="X";
  //pg_exec($conn, "SET client_encoding = 'LATIN1'");
  $requete = "SELECT col FROM tab WHERE col='" . addslashes($var) . "'";
  echo $requete;
  $query = pg_exec($conn, $requete);
%<--

Tested on Debian GNU/Linux Potato i386, with
apache 1.3.9-14
php3   3.0.18-0
php3-pgsql 3.0.18-0
postgresql 6.5.3-27

What's the normal way to make a security bug report?

-- 
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Re: Security problem in PHP3+Postgres with Potato?

2002-03-25 Thread Benoît Sibaud

> > What's the normal way to make a security bug report?
> apt-get install bug

The 'bug' package is for "normal" bugs. [EMAIL PROTECTED] seems to be
the good place to report security problems. Sorry for my previous post.

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom


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Security problem in PHP3+Postgres with Potato?

2002-03-25 Thread Benoît Sibaud

Hi,

I think I found a security problem in PHP3+postgres+apache shipped with
Potato.

Correct me if I'm wrong, but the following code should support any $var.
If you uncomment the client_encoding line, I'm able to execute any
request I want with the good $var.

%<--
  $conn = pg_connect("dbname=" . BASE_DOC . " port=" . BASE_PORT
   . " user=" . BASE_USER);
  $var="X";
  //pg_exec($conn, "SET client_encoding = 'LATIN1'");
  $requete = "SELECT col FROM tab WHERE col='" . addslashes($var) . "'";
  echo $requete;
  $query = pg_exec($conn, $requete);
%<--

Tested on Debian GNU/Linux Potato i386, with
apache 1.3.9-14
php3   3.0.18-0
php3-pgsql 3.0.18-0
postgresql 6.5.3-27

What's the normal way to make a security bug report?

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom


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Re: syslog messages

2002-02-21 Thread Benoît Sibaud
> I have checked this and i am running the recommended version
> nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1, also i don't see any obvious signs of access. Dose
> this mean i don't need to worry about it or is there something else i
> should be doing ?
There is a bug in nfs-common_0.1.9.1 in Potato ( #111990  Hi,

http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=111990&archive=yes&repeatmerged=yes
)
This bug is NOT related to your problem (nor any security problem,
except putting garbage in logcheck mails), but you may be interested.

dists/potato/main/binary-sparc/net/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.deb
dists/potato/main/binary-sparc/net/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.deb
dists/potato/main/binary-i386/net/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.deb
dists/potato/main/binary-i386/net/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_i386.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_sparc.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_i386.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_sparc.deb

You should use nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.potato1 to avoid this problem.
Can somebody explain me why the replacement 0.1.9.1-1 ->
0.1.9.1-1.potato1 is not automatically done be apt ?
My /etc/apt/source.list is:
deb ftp://LOCAL_MIRROR/pub/debian stable main contrib non-free
deb ftp://LOCAL_MIRROR/pub/debian-non-US stable/non-US main contrib
non-free
deb ftp://LOCAL_MIRROR/pub/debian-security stable/updates main contrib
non-free
(LOCAL_MIRROR is one of our boxes mirroring ftp.fr.debian.org and
security.debian.org, just for our own needs).

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom



Re: syslog messages

2002-02-20 Thread Benoît Sibaud

> I have checked this and i am running the recommended version
> nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1, also i don't see any obvious signs of access. Dose
> this mean i don't need to worry about it or is there something else i
> should be doing ?
There is a bug in nfs-common_0.1.9.1 in Potato ( #111990  Hi,

http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=111990&archive=yes&repeatmerged=yes
)
This bug is NOT related to your problem (nor any security problem,
except putting garbage in logcheck mails), but you may be interested.

dists/potato/main/binary-sparc/net/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.deb
dists/potato/main/binary-sparc/net/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.deb
dists/potato/main/binary-i386/net/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.deb
dists/potato/main/binary-i386/net/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_i386.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_sparc.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_i386.deb
pool/main/n/nfs-utils/nfs-kernel-server_0.1.9.1-1.potato1_sparc.deb

You should use nfs-common_0.1.9.1-1.potato1 to avoid this problem.
Can somebody explain me why the replacement 0.1.9.1-1 ->
0.1.9.1-1.potato1 is not automatically done be apt ?
My /etc/apt/source.list is:
deb ftp://LOCAL_MIRROR/pub/debian stable main contrib non-free
deb ftp://LOCAL_MIRROR/pub/debian-non-US stable/non-US main contrib
non-free
deb ftp://LOCAL_MIRROR/pub/debian-security stable/updates main contrib
non-free
(LOCAL_MIRROR is one of our boxes mirroring ftp.fr.debian.org and
security.debian.org, just for our own needs).

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom


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Re: More security for screensavers

2002-01-09 Thread Benoît Sibaud
Hi,

> It's there in Sid already (maybe Woody too -- haven't checked).  If
In Woody too.

> Does anyone know if xscreensaver-demo on Potato have an option like
> that?
No it hasn't.

Disabling the feature on each box would be easier at install, but I
respect the maintainer choice. Working in a R&D center, I think it's a
security problem, but it's true it isn't for "classic" users.

The bug report has been closed by the maintainer.

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom



Re: More security for screensavers

2002-01-09 Thread Benoît Sibaud

Hi,

> It's there in Sid already (maybe Woody too -- haven't checked).  If
In Woody too.

> Does anyone know if xscreensaver-demo on Potato have an option like
> that?
No it hasn't.

Disabling the feature on each box would be easier at install, but I
respect the maintainer choice. Working in a R&D center, I think it's a
security problem, but it's true it isn't for "classic" users.

The bug report has been closed by the maintainer.

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom


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Re: More security for screensavers

2002-01-08 Thread Benoît Sibaud
Ted Cabeen wrote:
> Good call.  The default should probably be set to off.  A debconf questio=
> n of "low" priority would probably also be a good thing.

I opened the #128169 bug report (
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=128169 )
"For security reasons, xscreensaver shouldn't be allowed to grab desktop
images by default (which is currently the case).
Screensavers like Jigsaw or Spotlight can allow bad guys to see what
you're doing, even if you lock your screen.

Discussed on debian-security, thread beginning here:
http://lists.debian.org/debian-security/2002/debian-security-200201/msg00014.html

For now, the xscreensaver maintainer disagrees.
"I disagree. It is NOT a security issue, it has been discussed the last
3 times it was brought up, and it's easy enough to change if it bothers
you. Neither your bug or the discussion you pointed to adds anything to
the debate that's been carried on several times before."

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom



Re: More security for screensavers

2002-01-08 Thread Benoît Sibaud

Ted Cabeen wrote:
> Good call.  The default should probably be set to off.  A debconf questio=
> n of "low" priority would probably also be a good thing.

I opened the #128169 bug report (
http://bugs.debian.org/cgi-bin/bugreport.cgi?bug=128169 )
"For security reasons, xscreensaver shouldn't be allowed to grab desktop
images by default (which is currently the case).
Screensavers like Jigsaw or Spotlight can allow bad guys to see what
you're doing, even if you lock your screen.

Discussed on debian-security, thread beginning here:
http://lists.debian.org/debian-security/2002/debian-security-200201/msg00014.html

For now, the xscreensaver maintainer disagrees.
"I disagree. It is NOT a security issue, it has been discussed the last
3 times it was brought up, and it's easy enough to change if it bothers
you. Neither your bug or the discussion you pointed to adds anything to
the debate that's been carried on several times before."

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom


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Re: More security for screensavers

2002-01-03 Thread Benoît Sibaud
Hi,

> Xscreensaver has options that let you prevent screensavers from grabbing =
> 
> desktop images.  If you run xscreensaver-demo, it's in the options tab.  =
> 
> =46rom my brief look, none of the xlockmore modes grab the screen.

It's correct, but that grabbing desktop images is enable by default and
I've never seen a Debconf question about it during installation (I badly
wrote my previous post and forgot to precise "at installation level").
Perhaps it should be disabled by default (probably unuseful to add a
question for this small point).

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom



Re: More security for screensavers

2002-01-03 Thread Benoît Sibaud

Hi,

> Xscreensaver has options that let you prevent screensavers from grabbing =
> 
> desktop images.  If you run xscreensaver-demo, it's in the options tab.  =
> 
> =46rom my brief look, none of the xlockmore modes grab the screen.

It's correct, but that grabbing desktop images is enable by default and
I've never seen a Debconf question about it during installation (I badly
wrote my previous post and forgot to precise "at installation level").
Perhaps it should be disabled by default (probably unuseful to add a
question for this small point).

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom


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More security for screensavers

2002-01-02 Thread Benoît Sibaud
Hi,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I didn't see any "security level
configuration" for both xscreensaver or xlockmore. What I mean is a way
to choose something like a class of screensavers, like 'secure' or 'fun'
or both: all screensavers save the screen, but they don't all protect
privacy; some screensavers (like Spotlight or Jigsaw for example) don't
fully hide the desktop; some others like Bomb (which really disconnect
the user at the end of the countdown) are 'dangerous' in a corporate
environment.

I suppose I should write a bugreport but I wanted to know security team
opinion before.

Oh, last point: happy new year, best wishes, long life to Debian

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D engineer - France Telecom



More security for screensavers

2002-01-02 Thread Benoît Sibaud

Hi,

Correct me if I'm wrong, but I didn't see any "security level
configuration" for both xscreensaver or xlockmore. What I mean is a way
to choose something like a class of screensavers, like 'secure' or 'fun'
or both: all screensavers save the screen, but they don't all protect
privacy; some screensavers (like Spotlight or Jigsaw for example) don't
fully hide the desktop; some others like Bomb (which really disconnect
the user at the end of the countdown) are 'dangerous' in a corporate
environment.

I suppose I should write a bugreport but I wanted to know security team
opinion before.

Oh, last point: happy new year, best wishes, long life to Debian

-- 
Benoît Sibaud
R&D engineer - France Telecom


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Re: ssh and root

2001-12-12 Thread Benoît Sibaud
Hi,

> BTW: I would prefer to keep the main cvs repository local and copy
> (rsync ?) it to the foreign sever, if that's possible.  Or would this
> confuse cvs on the other server?  Would I have direct write access to
> 'my' files in the (foreign) repository or only over cvs?  Hints welcome.
(I only know about SF) I don't think you can rsync the SF CVS. You can
import your files in, but you don't have a full control on your files:
you can't remove directories from your CVS tree, and you can't change
file permissions on your files (be careful if you commit script or
executable). For both, you'll have to submit a request to SF team. And
you don't have ssh access to SF CVS servers AFAIK (only to users
server).

-- 
Benoît Sibaud



Re: ssh and root

2001-12-12 Thread Benoît Sibaud

Hi,

> BTW: I would prefer to keep the main cvs repository local and copy
> (rsync ?) it to the foreign sever, if that's possible.  Or would this
> confuse cvs on the other server?  Would I have direct write access to
> 'my' files in the (foreign) repository or only over cvs?  Hints welcome.
(I only know about SF) I don't think you can rsync the SF CVS. You can
import your files in, but you don't have a full control on your files:
you can't remove directories from your CVS tree, and you can't change
file permissions on your files (be careful if you commit script or
executable). For both, you'll have to submit a request to SF team. And
you don't have ssh access to SF CVS servers AFAIK (only to users
server).

-- 
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Re: Compiling HostSentry

2001-06-26 Thread Benoît Sibaud
Hi,

> printf("offset of username:
Wrong copy paste. I don't know how to complete it.

Linux X 2.2.19 #1 Wed May 16 07:41:58 EST 2001 i686 unknown
size of utmp struct: 384
size of ut_type: 2
size of pid_t: 4
offset of tty name: 6
size of tty name: 32

Linux Y 2.2.19 #1 Mon Apr 2 13:29:46 EDT 2001 sparc unknown
size of utmp struct: 384
size of ut_type: 2
size of pid_t: 4
offset of tty name: 6
size of tty name: 32

--
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom



Re: Compiling HostSentry

2001-06-26 Thread Benoît Sibaud

Hi,

> printf("offset of username:
Wrong copy paste. I don't know how to complete it.

Linux X 2.2.19 #1 Wed May 16 07:41:58 EST 2001 i686 unknown
size of utmp struct: 384
size of ut_type: 2
size of pid_t: 4
offset of tty name: 6
size of tty name: 32

Linux Y 2.2.19 #1 Mon Apr 2 13:29:46 EDT 2001 sparc unknown
size of utmp struct: 384
size of ut_type: 2
size of pid_t: 4
offset of tty name: 6
size of tty name: 32

--
Benoît Sibaud
R&D Engineer - France Telecom


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