Re: [SECURITY] [DSA-134-2] Unknown OpenSSH remote vulnerability

2002-06-25 Thread kruskal
Mark Janssen <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

> On Tue, 2002-06-25 at 15:57, Kruskal wrote:
> > Has anyone applied this update yet?  I did so on a potato box, enabled
> > priv separation in the sshd config file and restarted sshd.  I saw
> > that a user called sshd was created.  However, when I ssh'ed in, I
> > didn't see any processes owned by sshd.  In fact, the ssh daemon
> > process was still owned by root.
> 
> I noticed this as well.. and decided to roll my own version, and include
> a patch for setproctitle support, this to aide debugging.
> 
> It in fact does work, but the 'sshd' process from the 'sshd' user only
> exists before login.

Looks like this is the way it happens under potato as well.  Looking
into it, I see the initial sshd sitting idle created by root.  Then
when I initially connect, but before I am authenticated, a child
process owned by sshd is created.  ps fauwx looks like:

root  8159  1.0  0.6  2544 1228 ?S09:20   0:00 /usr/sbin/sshd
root  8162  1.1  0.8  4380 1596 ?S09:21   0:00  \_ 
/usr/sbin/sshd
sshd  8163  5.5  0.7  3964 1472 ?S09:21   0:00  \_ 
/usr/sbin/sshd

Then when I give the password, that sshd owned process goes away, leaving:

root  8159  0.5  0.6  2544 1228 ?S09:20   0:00 /usr/sbin/sshd
root  8162  0.2  0.8  5620 1680 ?S09:21   0:00  \_ 
/usr/sbin/sshd
user  8166  0.3  0.9  5632 1752 ?S09:21   0:00  \_ 
/usr/sbin/sshd
user  8167  1.0  0.6  2016 1240 pts/0S09:21   0:00  \_ -bash

So it looks to me like priv sep is working on potato.  At this point,
is it safe to open up a public server?

-- 
--Kruskal


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Re: [SECURITY] [DSA-134-2] Unknown OpenSSH remote vulnerability

2002-06-25 Thread Kruskal
Wichert Akkerman <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> writes:

> 
> Debian Security Advisory DSA-134-2   [EMAIL PROTECTED]
> http://www.debian.org/security/ Wichert Akkerman
> June 25, 2002
> 
> 
> 
> Package: ssh
> Problem type   : remote exploit
> Debian-specific: no

Has anyone applied this update yet?  I did so on a potato box, enabled
priv separation in the sshd config file and restarted sshd.  I saw
that a user called sshd was created.  However, when I ssh'ed in, I
didn't see any processes owned by sshd.  In fact, the ssh daemon
process was still owned by root.

Anybody have any thoughts on this?  Does priv sep work in potato?

-- 
--Kruskal


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