Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Wed, 27 Oct 2010, Jordon Bedwell wrote:
> On 10/27/2010 04:05 PM, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> > On Mon, 25 Oct 2010, Michael Loftis wrote:
> >> checks prior to this indicate a soft success.  If you remove
> >> authentication from your system, its expected that any attempt to
> >> access will pass, barring and specific denial.
> > 
> > If I remove authentication from my system, I expect it to tell me to get
> > lost, as that is the _only_ safe failure scenario.  Recovery is supposed to
> > be done through single-user mode and sulogin in that case (if you don't have
> > a root window already open somewhere, that is).
> > 
> > This fail-unsafe behaviour looks like it is a "feature" of the default
> > config being shipped in /etc/pam.d/common-*.  I wonder what is the
> > justification behind that decision...

Hmm, looking at it very carefully, it is not.  common-auth defines pam_deny
as "requisite", and pam_permit as "required".  This will *always* fail to
autenticate, i.e. it IS failing safe (to a locked state).

So, no, it is not a misfeature of the config being shipped.

Now, if you manage to mess with that pam_deny, then, all hell breaks lose
because the existence of that pam_permit disables libpam's internal
fail-safe.  We would be better off without that pam_permit line at all, if
it is not important for some non-cosmetic reason (which it might well be! I
am wondering what the reason is, however).

But just commenting the pam_unix line should not be able to open the system
wide open.

> Wait, let me get this right.  You have a *server running*, you then
> *remove authentication* on said server and then you *expect* the system

Remove authentication:
You explicitly configure pam to remove authentication.  That means adding a
"sufficient pam_permit.so" at the right place, which is not something a typo
should cause.

Break authentication:
A typo.

Fail unsafe: system is now wide open.  Security breaches are possible.

Fail safe: system is now locked down for new autentications, already
autenticated sessions keep working (and can be used to repair the system,
for example).  Special procedures can be used to restore normal operation in
the worst case.  No security breach happens because of the failure.

So, yes, it is supposed to fail to locked down state, and the more resilient
it is into failing to locked state when misconfigured (instead of opening
the system to unauthorized access), the better.

-- 
  "One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Jim P
On Wed, Oct 27, 2010 at 19:16, Jordon Bedwell  wrote:
> On 10/27/2010 05:19 PM, Jim P wrote:
>> Please move this thread to debian-u...@.  EOM
>
> I find it ironic you top post and don't trim while asking people to move
> something to Debian-User.

That was posted from a mobile device.   This isn't.  It's a fact of
modern life, as much as we dislike it.

> This guy has what /he/ thinks is a /security
> issue/.  According to Debian this list is: Discussions about /security
> issues/, including cryptographic issues, that are of interest to all
> parts of the Debian community.

But it's already been proven to NOT be a security issue.  It's a user
of Debian issue.

-Jim P.


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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Jordon Bedwell
On 10/27/2010 05:19 PM, Jim P wrote:
> Please move this thread to debian-u...@.  EOM

I find it ironic you top post and don't trim while asking people to move
something to Debian-User.  This guy has what /he/ thinks is a /security
issue/.  According to Debian this list is: Discussions about /security
issues/, including cryptographic issues, that are of interest to all
parts of the Debian community.


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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Jim P
Please move this thread to debian-u...@.  EOM

-Jim P.
On Oct 27, 2010 6:16 PM, "Jordon Bedwell"  wrote:
> On 10/27/2010 04:05 PM, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
>> On Mon, 25 Oct 2010, Michael Loftis wrote:
>>> checks prior to this indicate a soft success. If you remove
>>> authentication from your system, its expected that any attempt to
>>> access will pass, barring and specific denial.
>>
>> If I remove authentication from my system, I expect it to tell me to get
>> lost, as that is the _only_ safe failure scenario. Recovery is supposed
to
>> be done through single-user mode and sulogin in that case (if you don't
have
>> a root window already open somewhere, that is).
>>
>> This fail-unsafe behaviour looks like it is a "feature" of the default
>> config being shipped in /etc/pam.d/common-*. I wonder what is the
>> justification behind that decision...
>
> Wait, let me get this right. You have a *server running*, you then
> *remove authentication* on said server and then you *expect* the system
> to tell everybody to go away? So if that is the case, why would you be
> running the server in the first place? An ironic situation... I like
> the idea of blaming the system for an administrators lack of competency
> when it comes to systems security.
>
>
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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Jordon Bedwell
On 10/27/2010 04:05 PM, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Oct 2010, Michael Loftis wrote:
>> checks prior to this indicate a soft success.  If you remove
>> authentication from your system, its expected that any attempt to
>> access will pass, barring and specific denial.
> 
> If I remove authentication from my system, I expect it to tell me to get
> lost, as that is the _only_ safe failure scenario.  Recovery is supposed to
> be done through single-user mode and sulogin in that case (if you don't have
> a root window already open somewhere, that is).
> 
> This fail-unsafe behaviour looks like it is a "feature" of the default
> config being shipped in /etc/pam.d/common-*.  I wonder what is the
> justification behind that decision...

Wait, let me get this right.  You have a *server running*, you then
*remove authentication* on said server and then you *expect* the system
to tell everybody to go away?  So if that is the case, why would you be
running the server in the first place?  An ironic situation...  I like
the idea of blaming the system for an administrators lack of competency
when it comes to systems security.


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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Mark van Walraven
On Wed, Oct 27, 2010 at 05:22:26PM -0400, Brad Tilley wrote:
> I felt the same way. I understand that I removed authentication by
> accidentally commenting out that line, but I thought that would cause
> authentication to fail. Obviously, authentication is not succeeding,
> it's just that authentication is not happening at all and you can type
> anything and get a shell on the remote system (provided you know a user
> name). In short, that behavior surprised me.

I disagree: if authentication was removed from a system (regardless of
whether by accident or not), I would expect the result to be a system
with no authentication.  Not a system in which authentication had become
impossible.

Perhaps a comment above the line, warning that removing that line removes
the requirement of authentication?

Regards,

Mark.


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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Luis M
Don't want to sound flame bait but...

This is just a typical pebkac problem. As an admin you are always able to 
remove authentication from a system no matter how "safe" the failsafe is. 

How about: don't experiment with stuff that you don't fully understand?

The original post was about doing something that totally breaks the security of 
the system. If you move this function elsewhere, he might have changed that too!

PAM is well documented and used everywhere.

--
A bug magnet

On Oct 27, 2010, at 17:05, Henrique de Moraes Holschuh  wrote:

> On Mon, 25 Oct 2010, Michael Loftis wrote:
>> checks prior to this indicate a soft success.  If you remove
>> authentication from your system, its expected that any attempt to
>> access will pass, barring and specific denial.
> 
> If I remove authentication from my system, I expect it to tell me to get
> lost, as that is the _only_ safe failure scenario.  Recovery is supposed to
> be done through single-user mode and sulogin in that case (if you don't have
> a root window already open somewhere, that is).
> 
> This fail-unsafe behaviour looks like it is a "feature" of the default
> config being shipped in /etc/pam.d/common-*.  I wonder what is the
> justification behind that decision...
> 
> -- 
>  "One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
>  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
>  where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
>  Henrique Holschuh
> 
> 
> -- 
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> 


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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Brad Tilley
Henrique de Moraes Holschuh wrote:
> On Mon, 25 Oct 2010, Michael Loftis wrote:
>> checks prior to this indicate a soft success.  If you remove
>> authentication from your system, its expected that any attempt to
>> access will pass, barring and specific denial.
> 
> If I remove authentication from my system, I expect it to tell me to get
> lost, as that is the _only_ safe failure scenario.  Recovery is supposed to
> be done through single-user mode and sulogin in that case (if you don't have
> a root window already open somewhere, that is).

I felt the same way. I understand that I removed authentication by
accidentally commenting out that line, but I thought that would cause
authentication to fail. Obviously, authentication is not succeeding,
it's just that authentication is not happening at all and you can type
anything and get a shell on the remote system (provided you know a user
name). In short, that behavior surprised me.

I expected an authentication failure, but got a shell instead.

Brad

> This fail-unsafe behaviour looks like it is a "feature" of the default
> config being shipped in /etc/pam.d/common-*.  I wonder what is the
> justification behind that decision...



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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-27 Thread Henrique de Moraes Holschuh
On Mon, 25 Oct 2010, Michael Loftis wrote:
> checks prior to this indicate a soft success.  If you remove
> authentication from your system, its expected that any attempt to
> access will pass, barring and specific denial.

If I remove authentication from my system, I expect it to tell me to get
lost, as that is the _only_ safe failure scenario.  Recovery is supposed to
be done through single-user mode and sulogin in that case (if you don't have
a root window already open somewhere, that is).

This fail-unsafe behaviour looks like it is a "feature" of the default
config being shipped in /etc/pam.d/common-*.  I wonder what is the
justification behind that decision...

-- 
  "One disk to rule them all, One disk to find them. One disk to bring
  them all and in the darkness grind them. In the Land of Redmond
  where the shadows lie." -- The Silicon Valley Tarot
  Henrique Holschuh


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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-25 Thread Michael Loftis
Depends on your full stack, but yes, this is the PAM behavior as checks 
prior to this indicate a soft success.  If you remove authentication from 
your system, its expected that any attempt to access will pass, barring and 
specific denial.


--On Monday, October 25, 2010 17:16 -0400 Brad Tilley  
wrote:



While experimenting with PCI DSS on a default Debian Linux system, I
found that when I comment out this line:

authrequiredpam_unix.so nullok_secure

in /etc/pam.d/common-auth, any account may ssh into the box by typing
anything as the password. Is this the desired behavior? I would think
that it would fail by default.



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Re: Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-25 Thread Noah Meyerhans
On Mon, Oct 25, 2010 at 05:16:51PM -0400, Brad Tilley wrote:
> While experimenting with PCI DSS on a default Debian Linux system, I
> found that when I comment out this line:
> 
> authrequiredpam_unix.so nullok_secure
> 
> in /etc/pam.d/common-auth, any account may ssh into the box by typing
> anything as the password. Is this the desired behavior? I would think
> that it would fail by default.

If no authentication modules are 'required', then no authentication is
required.  Makes sense to me.

noah



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Any Account Logs In With Any Password

2010-10-25 Thread Brad Tilley
While experimenting with PCI DSS on a default Debian Linux system, I
found that when I comment out this line:

authrequiredpam_unix.so nullok_secure

in /etc/pam.d/common-auth, any account may ssh into the box by typing
anything as the password. Is this the desired behavior? I would think
that it would fail by default.



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