Re: Importance of browser security (was: On Mozilla-* updates)
Greetings, Am Dienstag, 2. August 2005 10:57 schrieb Ben Bucksch: > Stefano Salvi wrote: > > I prefer to have no X on the server and administer it from command > > line or Web interfaces (command line is better). > > Let's say > >1. You use Mozilla from sarge >2. Somebody cracks you through known holes in that old Mozilla, > either a mass exploit or an enemy of you specifically targetting > you. Which is probably the easiest way to attack you, through all > firewalls. So much for browser/email security. >3. He controls your desktop >4. He downloads all your local mail and photos/images, including your > confidental company mail, private mail and nude photos of your > girlfriend. He posts it on the Internet, your company's billboard, > and your supermarket's billboard. Eh - no. Linux allows you to start two different XServers on two different screens (or on the same) with two different user-id's on two virtually or physically seperated Systems. As you can see, only fools make this mistake. >5. He also installs a keyboard sniffer and downloads your private SSH > keys. Rubbish - if seperated correctly. >6. He logs into all servers and other computers that you have access > to. Including those desktops of your friends, which you remote > administrate or use the password that they use for your server. > And the attacker goes on from there. So much for desktop/server > security. You are describing the general results of trojan attacks - but to be honest - if it's getting personal, there are other ways to comprise machines. I've done some test: Who on my instant messaging list will execute a signed Java-Applet without asking me for further information. No one asked my what this applet was doing. Everyone got his c:\test.txt saying "This was foolish" (Or /home/usr/C:\test.txt). Verify yourself. But in order to make this a server issue, you have to be foolish. Keep smiling yanosz -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Re: Importance of browser security
Ben Bucksch wrote: Stefano Salvi wrote: I prefer to have no X on the server and administer it from command line or Web interfaces (command line is better). Let's say 1. You use Mozilla from sarge ... CUT ... Description of an exploit That's what's at stake here. I don't care, if a Mozilla security update breaks some badly written extensions. And if it breaks Galeon's print function, so be it, you can still use Mozilla in this rare case. But there's *no* recovery from a bad breakin. I completly agree with you. My point was: - server software needs strict security and less functionality; a long release cycle is welcome; it is preferred to stick to some releases of the software. - desktop software needs good security, but also new features; you prefer to get the latest release of a software. My choice is to stick on woody (I'll rebulid now with Sarge, now) for the server and use Sid on the desktop, upgrading it regularly. I think this gives me strong security on the server and good security AND features on the desktop. The difference is that I didn't install an old browser on the server and keep the browser updated constantly on the desktop. Using this policy, from time to time my desktop has some problems (I'm using unstable). I would be very happy if there was a "stable branch" that keeps software updated AND tracks security. Stefano -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]
Importance of browser security (was: On Mozilla-* updates)
Stefano Salvi wrote: I prefer to have no X on the server and administer it from command line or Web interfaces (command line is better). Let's say 1. You use Mozilla from sarge 2. Somebody cracks you through known holes in that old Mozilla, either a mass exploit or an enemy of you specifically targetting you. Which is probably the easiest way to attack you, through all firewalls. So much for browser/email security. 3. He controls your desktop 4. He downloads all your local mail and photos/images, including your confidental company mail, private mail and nude photos of your girlfriend. He posts it on the Internet, your company's billboard, and your supermarket's billboard. 5. He also installs a keyboard sniffer and downloads your private SSH keys. 6. He logs into all servers and other computers that you have access to. Including those desktops of your friends, which you remote administrate or use the password that they use for your server. And the attacker goes on from there. So much for desktop/server security. 7. One of your friends did things which are strictly legal, but your boss didn't like it at all, and fired him. Another one happened to be a dissident and gets in jail or maybe shot. So much for efficiency (this has nothing to do with efficiency). 8. Because all this costs some time, the attacker needs to live, too. He drafts your bank accounts and those of your friends as a fair compensation. The Half Life 2 source code got indeed stolen via desktop compromitation, too. But all that is insignificant in comparison to your dead friend. That's what's at stake here. I don't care, if a Mozilla security update breaks some badly written extensions. And if it breaks Galeon's print function, so be it, you can still use Mozilla in this rare case. But there's *no* recovery from a bad breakin. -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to [EMAIL PROTECTED] with a subject of "unsubscribe". Trouble? Contact [EMAIL PROTECTED]