Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking

2009-01-13 Thread Thomas Liske
Hi,

you might have a look at apt-dater[1] (part of unstable [2]). It is uses
SSH to retrieve package informations from client hosts using public key
authentification and uses sudo to call apt-get/sudo. It is a ncurses
based CLI, but it has a report function to retrieve distri name 
version, kernel version (and check if a reboot is required), package
versions etc. as a XML file - so you could do anything with the result.

This work very well for us to keep around 100 hosts up to date.

[1] http://apt-dater.sf.net/
[2] http://packages.debian.org/apt-dater


Cheers,
Thomas


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Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking [REDUX]

2009-01-10 Thread R. W. Rodolico
http://debianhelpdesk.com/sysinfo.tgz
md5sum 0704c3016a64817f1d2dcee7af3b3fa1

This is not production ready. It is currently in production, but only on
my clients sites, and I fix things as they pop up. As I say in the
README, we're working on a major rewrite that should make it much more
usable to others (one of the goals).

Feel free to contact me with any questions and/or comments. I take
constructive criticism very, very well, and would really like it if
anyone could use this at all.

I will likely not have the new version production ready for a couple of
months. Paying gigs keep getting in the way.

Rod

R. W. Rodolico wrote:
 Give me a couple of days to find a version that is not totally unstable.
 I'll tar it up, get some brief explanation, and post the URL here. Right
 now, the best 1.x stuff is wrapped up in a .deb. I have 2.0b in testing
 (on a few machines), but it is showing some bugs. I don't trust my svn
 install (haven't tested to see if I set it up correctly).
 
 I did not make myself clear. The UI to view the summaries and reports is
 written in PHP. The engines (the client side data gatherer and the
 server side parser) are all perl. I don't think I've ever written a
 command line PHP script yet.
 
 The big difference between v1 and v2 is that I've gone to xml for the
 report from the client to the server, and the UI is being broken up into
 modules so people can add/remove more easily (should have done that from
 the beginning).
 
 In most cases, I do not consider e-mail to be unreliable. However, there
 are some cases where e-mail is less than optimum. So, I plan to allow
 https and ftp in the future.
 
 Rod
 
 Holger Levsen wrote:
 Hi Sheldon,

 this sounds like an interesting project, please keep us posted!

 On Mittwoch, 7. Januar 2009, Sheldon Hearn wrote:
 On Wednesday 07 January 2009 00:24:09 R. W. Rodolico wrote:
 I have a package that we have been working on for a while that might
 be a good starting point.

 This is gpl'd, and I would be happy to supply the .deb, the source
 tree or svn access if you would like to look at it.
 Suppressing my knee-jerk reaction to PHP, it sounds like you're quite
 far down the track with this one. :-)
 sitesummary, as in http://packages.qa.debian.org/s/sitesummary.html might 
 also 
 be interested for you to look at. and it's perl, not php.


 On a site note, I dont consider mail to be too unreliable here. First, it's 
 actually pretty reliable. Second, just resend the mail the next day / time 
 slot.

 regards,
  Holger
 
 


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Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking [REDUX]

2009-01-07 Thread Holger Levsen
Hi Sheldon,

this sounds like an interesting project, please keep us posted!

On Mittwoch, 7. Januar 2009, Sheldon Hearn wrote:
 On Wednesday 07 January 2009 00:24:09 R. W. Rodolico wrote:
  I have a package that we have been working on for a while that might
  be a good starting point.
 
  This is gpl'd, and I would be happy to supply the .deb, the source
  tree or svn access if you would like to look at it.

 Suppressing my knee-jerk reaction to PHP, it sounds like you're quite
 far down the track with this one. :-)

sitesummary, as in http://packages.qa.debian.org/s/sitesummary.html might also 
be interested for you to look at. and it's perl, not php.


On a site note, I dont consider mail to be too unreliable here. First, it's 
actually pretty reliable. Second, just resend the mail the next day / time 
slot.

regards,
Holger


signature.asc
Description: This is a digitally signed message part.


Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking [REDUX]

2009-01-07 Thread R. W. Rodolico
Give me a couple of days to find a version that is not totally unstable.
I'll tar it up, get some brief explanation, and post the URL here. Right
now, the best 1.x stuff is wrapped up in a .deb. I have 2.0b in testing
(on a few machines), but it is showing some bugs. I don't trust my svn
install (haven't tested to see if I set it up correctly).

I did not make myself clear. The UI to view the summaries and reports is
written in PHP. The engines (the client side data gatherer and the
server side parser) are all perl. I don't think I've ever written a
command line PHP script yet.

The big difference between v1 and v2 is that I've gone to xml for the
report from the client to the server, and the UI is being broken up into
modules so people can add/remove more easily (should have done that from
the beginning).

In most cases, I do not consider e-mail to be unreliable. However, there
are some cases where e-mail is less than optimum. So, I plan to allow
https and ftp in the future.

Rod

Holger Levsen wrote:
 Hi Sheldon,
 
 this sounds like an interesting project, please keep us posted!
 
 On Mittwoch, 7. Januar 2009, Sheldon Hearn wrote:
 On Wednesday 07 January 2009 00:24:09 R. W. Rodolico wrote:
 I have a package that we have been working on for a while that might
 be a good starting point.

 This is gpl'd, and I would be happy to supply the .deb, the source
 tree or svn access if you would like to look at it.
 Suppressing my knee-jerk reaction to PHP, it sounds like you're quite
 far down the track with this one. :-)
 
 sitesummary, as in http://packages.qa.debian.org/s/sitesummary.html might 
 also 
 be interested for you to look at. and it's perl, not php.
 
 
 On a site note, I dont consider mail to be too unreliable here. First, it's 
 actually pretty reliable. Second, just resend the mail the next day / time 
 slot.
 
 regards,
   Holger


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Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking

2009-01-06 Thread Sheldon Hearn
-BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
Hash: SHA1


Hi folks,

I work for an hosting provider, and am looking at how to improve 
visibility into vulnerability exposure.

We have over 800 Debian hosts that we manage fore customers, and will 
have over 1,000 by the end of this quarter.

A major problem we face is that our change distribution mechanism is 
poor.  We're working on that problem, but in the meantime, I'm looking 
at ways to assert that we are / are not vulnerable to specific issues 
disclosed by the Debian project.  I realize that this isn't the whole 
game, but it's an huge part of it.

First prize is a web application that we can draw reports from (or will 
push reports to us or whatever), that knows what security issues have 
been identified and addressed by the Debian project, what versions of 
packages are installed on all servers, and therefore which packages on 
which servers should have been upgraded but have not yet been.

Yup, basically the output of debsecan --only-fixed --suite etch.  But 
I'd prefer not to use email as the transport mechanism (unreliable), 
and I'd have to write an aggregator for all those mails, because 
working through mail from over a thousand servers is error prone.

So I imagine a solution involving:

* a web service to which servers can basically post their dpkg status,
* a feed consumer for DSAs,
* a vulnerability resolver that matches these two data sources,
* reports to provide a view into the persisted resolver results.

I spent a lot of time hunting for such a thing, and haven't found one 
I'm happy with.  I'm not keen on using Nessus for this, for a few 
reasons:

* I don't think it's an hosted application with persisted results
  (i.e. you have to initiate a full network-wide test every time
   you want a report).
* The Tenable sales people are useless.
* I don't think their feeds are worth the money.

OpenVAS would address the last two, but I can't recommend it in 
production on Debian Etch or Lenny yet, and there's still the matter 
that it's not an hosted application with persisted results.

So I'm hoping for one of:

* Someone points me to an existing app, I bow my head in shame, admit I 
have no Google Fu, and avoid reinventing the wheel.

* Someone points out how wrong I am about Nessus and suggests how I 
might re-educate myself (hint: I _have_ actually installed and played 
with it).

* I go ahead and implement the solution proposed above.  I'm confident 
that my employer would be keen on release under a DFSG-compatible 
license (probably MIT, since I'd be using Ruby).

I have a handle on every aspect of the solution except for one: the feed 
consumer for DSAs.

I've reverse-engineered debsecan, and mostly have my head around the 
security tracker's suite feeds.  I'm talking about the feeds available 
at URLs like:

http://secure-testing.debian.net/debian-secure-testing/project/debsecan/release/1/etch

I just need some clarity:

* I'd have to consume feeds for multiple suites, (because we use 
backports and volatile), and would have to do some version munging to 
deal with things like ~bpo in versions.  I could get package suites 
with something like apt-show-versions. Am I on the right track here?

* I get what the etch, lenny, sid suites are for.  What's in the GENERIC 
feed?

* There are fields in the feeds that debsecan calls unstable_version 
and other_versions. As I read the code, a package is vulnerable if:

  pkg_version  unstable_version
  pkg_version == any of other_versions

  This seems unlikely to me, and I suspect I've misread the code.  Can 
someone clarify?

Again, to be clear, I realize that we need to work towards update policy 
and mechanisms that guarantee that security updates are applied 
automatically and in a timely manner.  We're working on that, but it's 
going to take us time.  And even once we're done, we'll still want a 
vulnerability tracker for some time thereafter, until we're confident 
that things are running smoothly.

So any suggestions on how to implement scalable Debian vulnerability 
tracking in the interrim would be greatly appreciated.

Thanks,
Sheldon.
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Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking

2009-01-06 Thread Michael Tautschnig
 
 Hi folks,
 
 I work for an hosting provider, and am looking at how to improve 
 visibility into vulnerability exposure.
 
 We have over 800 Debian hosts that we manage fore customers, and will 
 have over 1,000 by the end of this quarter.
 
 A major problem we face is that our change distribution mechanism is 
 poor.  We're working on that problem, but in the meantime, I'm looking 
 at ways to assert that we are / are not vulnerable to specific issues 
 disclosed by the Debian project.  I realize that this isn't the whole 
 game, but it's an huge part of it.
 
 First prize is a web application that we can draw reports from (or will 
 push reports to us or whatever), that knows what security issues have 
 been identified and addressed by the Debian project, what versions of 
 packages are installed on all servers, and therefore which packages on 
 which servers should have been upgraded but have not yet been.
 
 Yup, basically the output of debsecan --only-fixed --suite etch.  But 
 I'd prefer not to use email as the transport mechanism (unreliable), 
 and I'd have to write an aggregator for all those mails, because 
 working through mail from over a thousand servers is error prone.


[...]

This is definitely not a complete solution to your problem, but it might help
you along the way:

- Run apt-get update + apt-show-versions on each host (daily, hourly, whatever
  you like)
- If you don't like email for aggregation, a central syslog may be an option.
  Pipe the output of apt-show-versions through logger and filter and aggregate
  the logs on your server.

We don't have hundreds of servers, but this scheme works fairly well around
here, using a very simply daily cron job and logwatch as the aggregator.

HTH,
Michael







pgpb2jmR3RIjQ.pgp
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Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking

2009-01-06 Thread R. W. Rodolico
I have a package that we have been working on for a while that might be
a good starting point. It tracks information about several machines,
storing them in a central repository. There is a client piece installed
on each machine which runs on a cron job, and currently e-mails the
results to one or more centralized servers. I wrote it with the idea in
mind that other transport agencies could be used, however.

The server piece is a php app w/MySQL backend that allows reporting,
including ad-hoc reports. The other functions such as maintenance
tracking would probably not be of interest to you, but those are just
modules that can be disabled (in the new version we're working on). The
UI is primitive and ugly.

Again, the package is pretty primitive, but has been tested on a dozen
Debian servers and two Fedora servers over the past year. It has one
report that would be of interest to you that retrieves the current
version of a package installed on all (or some) machines.

This is gpl'd, and I would be happy to supply the .deb, the source tree
or svn access if you would like to look at it.

You can see some very, very outdated documentation at
http://wiki.linuxservertech.com/index.php/Sysinfo. That documentation is
 is about one major version behind, and the links are to the older
version. I'm making some big changes right now.

Rodo (at this domain to email directly)



Michael Tautschnig wrote:
 Hi folks,

 I work for an hosting provider, and am looking at how to improve 
 visibility into vulnerability exposure.

 We have over 800 Debian hosts that we manage fore customers, and will 
 have over 1,000 by the end of this quarter.

 A major problem we face is that our change distribution mechanism is 
 poor.  We're working on that problem, but in the meantime, I'm looking 
 at ways to assert that we are / are not vulnerable to specific issues 
 disclosed by the Debian project.  I realize that this isn't the whole 
 game, but it's an huge part of it.

 First prize is a web application that we can draw reports from (or will 
 push reports to us or whatever), that knows what security issues have 
 been identified and addressed by the Debian project, what versions of 
 packages are installed on all servers, and therefore which packages on 
 which servers should have been upgraded but have not yet been.

 Yup, basically the output of debsecan --only-fixed --suite etch.  But 
 I'd prefer not to use email as the transport mechanism (unreliable), 
 and I'd have to write an aggregator for all those mails, because 
 working through mail from over a thousand servers is error prone.

 
 [...]
 
 This is definitely not a complete solution to your problem, but it might help
 you along the way:
 
 - Run apt-get update + apt-show-versions on each host (daily, hourly, whatever
   you like)
 - If you don't like email for aggregation, a central syslog may be an option.
   Pipe the output of apt-show-versions through logger and filter and aggregate
   the logs on your server.
 
 We don't have hundreds of servers, but this scheme works fairly well around
 here, using a very simply daily cron job and logwatch as the aggregator.
 
 HTH,
 Michael
 
 
 
 
 


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Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking

2009-01-06 Thread Moritz Muehlenhoff
In gmane.linux.debian.devel.security, you wrote:
 -BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-
 Hash: SHA1

 Hi folks,

 I work for an hosting provider, and am looking at how to improve 
 visibility into vulnerability exposure.

 We have over 800 Debian hosts that we manage fore customers, and will 
 have over 1,000 by the end of this quarter.

 A major problem we face is that our change distribution mechanism is 
 poor.  We're working on that problem, but in the meantime, I'm looking 
 at ways to assert that we are / are not vulnerable to specific issues 
 disclosed by the Debian project.  I realize that this isn't the whole 
 game, but it's an huge part of it.

 First prize is a web application that we can draw reports from (or will 
 push reports to us or whatever), that knows what security issues have 
 been identified and addressed by the Debian project, what versions of 
 packages are installed on all servers, and therefore which packages on 
 which servers should have been upgraded but have not yet been.

 Yup, basically the output of debsecan --only-fixed --suite etch.  But 
 I'd prefer not to use email as the transport mechanism (unreliable), 
 and I'd have to write an aggregator for all those mails, because 
 working through mail from over a thousand servers is error prone.

 So I imagine a solution involving:

 * a web service to which servers can basically post their dpkg status,
 * a feed consumer for DSAs,
 * a vulnerability resolver that matches these two data sources,
 * reports to provide a view into the persisted resolver results.

 I spent a lot of time hunting for such a thing, and haven't found one 
 I'm happy with.  I'm not keen on using Nessus for this, for a few 
 reasons:

 * I don't think it's an hosted application with persisted results
   (i.e. you have to initiate a full network-wide test every time
you want a report).
 * The Tenable sales people are useless.
 * I don't think their feeds are worth the money.

 OpenVAS would address the last two, but I can't recommend it in 
 production on Debian Etch or Lenny yet, and there's still the matter 
 that it's not an hosted application with persisted results.

 So I'm hoping for one of:

 * Someone points me to an existing app, I bow my head in shame, admit I 
 have no Google Fu, and avoid reinventing the wheel.

 * Someone points out how wrong I am about Nessus and suggests how I 
 might re-educate myself (hint: I _have_ actually installed and played 
 with it).

 * I go ahead and implement the solution proposed above.  I'm confident 
 that my employer would be keen on release under a DFSG-compatible 
 license (probably MIT, since I'd be using Ruby).

 I have a handle on every aspect of the solution except for one: the feed 
 consumer for DSAs.

 I've reverse-engineered debsecan, and mostly have my head around the 
 security tracker's suite feeds.  I'm talking about the feeds available 
 at URLs like:

 http://secure-testing.debian.net/debian-secure-testing/project/debsecan/release/1/etch

 I just need some clarity:

 * I'd have to consume feeds for multiple suites, (because we use 
 backports and volatile), and would have to do some version munging to 
 deal with things like ~bpo in versions.  I could get package suites 
 with something like apt-show-versions. Am I on the right track here?

[..]

 So any suggestions on how to implement scalable Debian vulnerability 
 tracking in the interrim would be greatly appreciated.

Hi Sheldon,
that sounds like an interesting project. Thanks for the intent to
share and to provide your possible solution it to the public!

For an environment the size of yours I'd recommend to implement a Nagios
plugin, which checks the local state of installed applications against
the data from the Debian Security Tracker, which is also used for debsecan.
The Security Tracker URL is http://security-tracker.debian.net/tracker/ 

The whole data is available in SVN under svn://svn.debian.org/secure-testing/
(don't let you be fooled by the name, it also applies for stable and
backports.org, the repository name is due to historic reasons).

All the data is below data/, the code to parse the data is below
lib/python/ and bin/. The existing scripts should provide an easy
base to build upon.

Beware that there might a some false positives, all data in debsecan
and the Debian Security Tracker is initially flagged as vulnerable
for stable-security unless it's properly validated or fixed, so it
can happen that a package is marked as vulnerable for Etch, which
is actually safe. We have an extensive HOWTO on how the Debian Security
Tracker works:
http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/secure-testing/doc/narrative_introduction?op=filerev=0sc=0
 

If you want to amend/correct data, please send mail to
debian-security-trac...@lists.debian.org. (This is also the mailing
list for followup questions on the Tracker or the code)
There are also people available on the OFTC IRC network on #debian-security
who should be able to help you out.

BTW

Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking

2009-01-06 Thread Jonas Andradas
 are for.  What's in the GENERIC
 feed?

 * There are fields in the feeds that debsecan calls unstable_version
 and other_versions. As I read the code, a package is vulnerable if:

  pkg_version  unstable_version
  pkg_version == any of other_versions

  This seems unlikely to me, and I suspect I've misread the code.  Can
 someone clarify?

 Again, to be clear, I realize that we need to work towards update policy
 and mechanisms that guarantee that security updates are applied
 automatically and in a timely manner.  We're working on that, but it's
 going to take us time.  And even once we're done, we'll still want a
 vulnerability tracker for some time thereafter, until we're confident
 that things are running smoothly.

 So any suggestions on how to implement scalable Debian vulnerability
 tracking in the interrim would be greatly appreciated.

 Thanks,
 Sheldon.
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Best Regards,

-- 
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Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking

2009-01-06 Thread Luis Mondesi
Is there anything wrong with using cfengine for this? [1]

I'd just have a very simple layout for cfengine files and a
cf.packages.$distro [2] file for each distro we support. Then have
cfengine maintain a list of known packages that needs to be on each.
Reporting can be easily done from a module (cfengine module). And this
can be written in whatever language you want.

I've been successfully using cfengine to manage large datacenters for
a long time.
The learning curve is a bit steep at first, but you will be up and
running in a few hours.

Hope this helps.

Regards,

Notes:
1. http://www.cfengine.org/docs/cfengine-Reference.html
2. http://www.cfengine.org/docs/cfengine-Reference.html#packages

-- 
)(-
Luis Mondesi
Maestro Debiano

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Re: Scalable Debian vulnerability tracking [REDUX]

2009-01-06 Thread Sheldon Hearn
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On Tuesday 06 January 2009 23:28:29 Erik Harrison wrote:
 actually, if you do find something that does this, dont publish
 anything. start a company.

No thanks.  Just got out of that game and am thoroughly enjoying being 
an employee in an organisation that recognizes the value of open source 
and encourages contribution. :-)

On Wednesday 07 January 2009 06:39:53 Luis Mondesi wrote:
 Is there anything wrong with using cfengine for this?

Nothing wrong with that.  In fact, we'll be using Puppet instead.  But 
yes, it would certainly be better to just keep up to date with updates 
in a near-fully automated fashion.

But we won't be done with that this quarter, and for some time after 
we're done, we'll still want to monitor that we're getting it right.

On Wednesday 07 January 2009 02:44:46 Jonas Andradas wrote:
 If you can modify the mail system of each host, you could create an
 exim4 router and transport that will accept mail for a local user
 (lets call it SecMonitor) which would pipe the output of debsecan
 to a script (be it shell, perl, python or anything you choose).

Interesting.  I hadn't considered letting debsecan do the work but 
obviating SMTP as the transport protocol.

I'll have a think about whether I like the idea of leaving the work of 
the vulnerability resolver up to the client hosts.  It opens the door 
for decentralized local policy configuration, which is good and 
bad. :-)

On Wednesday 07 January 2009 00:24:09 R. W. Rodolico wrote:
 I have a package that we have been working on for a while that might
 be a good starting point.

 This is gpl'd, and I would be happy to supply the .deb, the source
 tree or svn access if you would like to look at it.

Suppressing my knee-jerk reaction to PHP, it sounds like you're quite 
far down the track with this one. :-)

I'd love to see what you've got, and from the sound of it, at least one 
other person on this list would like to see it too.  SVN access would 
be first prize, but a source tarball might be easier for you to arrange 
if you elect to disclose a URL here.

On Wednesday 07 January 2009 01:45:36 Moritz Muehlenhoff wrote:
 We have an extensive HOWTO on how the Debian Security
 Tracker works:
 http://svn.debian.org/wsvn/secure-testing/doc/narrative_introduction?
op=filerev=0sc=0

This is gold, thank you.  Is there also an explanation of the file 
format of the debsecan feeds, though?  By debsecan feeds, I mean the 
libz-compressed files such as

http://secure-testing.debian.net/debian-secure-testing/project/debsecan/release/1/etch

In particular, I'm still unclear on how to interpret the 
unstable_version and other_versions fields.

Thanks,
Sheldon.
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