Re: Restated Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
* Sam Hartman , 2015-09-04, 14:28: - GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS - Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1. Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a off-by-one error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly greater than the supermajority ratio. In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that is no longer possible. This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent of the Constitution, and is unhelpful. For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical Committee) in progress at the time the change is made. Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows: Index: doc/constitution.wml === --- doc/constitution.wml(revision 10982) +++ doc/constitution.wml(working copy) @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ An option A defeats the default option D by a majority - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A). + ratio N, if V(A,D) is greater or equal to N * V(D,A) and V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A). If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering. The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is undesirable. Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment: - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0. - GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS - Seconded. -- Jakub Wilk signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: Restated Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 05:34:44PM +0200, Wouter Verhelst wrote: > However, as I've said in <20150903164145.gb23...@grep.be>, I think the > better fix is to update 6.1.4 as follows: > > -4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 majority) > +4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 2:1 majority) > > This way, the off-by-one change that was introduced with CSSD is > reverted *for the TC*, while the supermajority definition isn't. Only after I sent this mail did I notice that there's actually a second reference to the 3:1 number in the paragraph below. Not very relevant since this isn't a formal amendment, but if it turns into one, that would need to be changed as well... -- It is easy to love a country that is famous for chocolate and beer -- Barack Obama, speaking in Brussels, Belgium, 2014-03-26 signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: Restated Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
Hi Sam, On Fri, Sep 04, 2015 at 02:28:20PM +, Sam Hartman wrote: >- GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS - > > >Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix > >Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical >Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1. > >Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a >off-by-one error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met >only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly >greater than the supermajority ratio. > >In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a >developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single >dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two >dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that >is no longer possible. > >This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent >of the Constitution, and is unhelpful. > >For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any >votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical >Committee) in progress at the time the change is made. > >Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows: > > Index: doc/constitution.wml > === > --- doc/constitution.wml (revision 10982) > +++ doc/constitution.wml (working copy) > @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ > > >An option A defeats the default option D by a majority > - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A). > + ratio N, if V(A,D) is greater or equal to N * V(D,A) and > V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A). > > >If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority > ratio > > > > > > >Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering. > >The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. >This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is >undesirable. > >Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment: > > - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0. > > >- GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS - I second this amendment. However, as I've said in <20150903164145.gb23...@grep.be>, I think the better fix is to update 6.1.4 as follows: -4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 3:1 majority) +4. Overrule a Developer (requires a 2:1 majority) This way, the off-by-one change that was introduced with CSSD is reverted *for the TC*, while the supermajority definition isn't. I say "change", because I don't buy the argument that it's a "bug"; I think the removal of the "X + one" requirement would be a bug. However, I do accept that requiring 3 + 1 votes in favour per opposing vote is problematic for the TC, so I do agree that reducing the required number of votes is desirable. The above does that. To clarify, I've always interpreted a "majority" to mean "One vote more than X over Y". This definition is easily proven correct when one considers a simple majority: to get a simple majority, strictly more than 50% of the vote is required (otherwise you don't have a majority, you have an equilibrium). While the constitution doesn't specifically refer to 1:1 simple majorities (it doesn't need to, since a result that doesn't manage to reach simple majority wouldn't be the condorcet winner), I think it would be inconsistent and wrong for us to change the constitution in this manner. If that argument manages to convince you, I would appreciate it if you could update your proposal in that manner. Having said that, I don't feel strongly enough about it to make this a formal amendment; while I think the change would be undesirable for regular GRs, I doubt it would make much difference in practice, so I'm not going to pursue this unless someone pokes me. Regards, -- It is easy to love a country that is famous for chocolate and beer -- Barack Obama, speaking in Brussels, Belgium, 2014-03-26 signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
Fixed, I hope; thanks.
Re: Restated Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
Restated to fix comments received. For formality, to the extent that I am able, I withdraw my previous amendment. As I discussed, in Andreas's resolution, I think that the strategic voting fix introduces more problems than it serves. INstead, I propose that we don't fix that, but trust ourselves to propose ballot options that are statement-of-the-day-like ballot options not requiring a super-majority when doing so is wise. I think that doing so is generally a good idea when you have a super-majority option and its opposite on the same ballot--when there is substantial contraversy about whether to move in the direction of the super-majority option or some other option on the same ballot. I have chosen to retain the preference for the default option in the TC. If four members of the TC really cannot live with an option, we're better off with more discussion or taking it to a GR. Even in the Init system discussion, which I think is the most controversial decision to come before the TC, several of the TC members who preferred options that did not win explained what changes would need to be made for them to consider options similar to the one that won to be acceptable (ranked above FD). As it happened, four TC members didn't think no decision was better than the decision we got: if four members had ranked the winning option below FD, the chair would not have had the opportunity to use his casting vote. We also have some strong evidence from emails where some TC members explained their balloting decisions including what they ranked above FD that the tactical voting people were afraid of didn't happen. We're actually quite good at deciding whether another round of painful discussion is worth the cost or not, and when people we've appointed to make these decision decide that it is, I'd rather not second guess them. Specifically, I formally propose to replace the GR text with: - GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS - Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1. Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a off-by-one error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly greater than the supermajority ratio. In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that is no longer possible. This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent of the Constitution, and is unhelpful. For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical Committee) in progress at the time the change is made. Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows: Index: doc/constitution.wml === --- doc/constitution.wml(revision 10982) +++ doc/constitution.wml(working copy) @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ An option A defeats the default option D by a majority - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A). + ratio N, if V(A,D) is greater or equal to N * V(D,A) and V(A,D) is strictly greater than V(D,A). If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering. The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is undesirable. Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment: - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0. - GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS - pgpUpgzfDuSSS.pgp Description: PGP signature
Re: Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
On Fri, 4 Sep 2015, Sam Hartman wrote: --- doc/constitution.wml(revision 10982) +++ doc/constitution.wml(working copy) @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ An option A defeats the default option D by a majority - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A). + ratio N, if V(A,D) is greater than N * V(D,A) and v(A,D) is strictly greater than v(D,A). If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio Should that be "greater than or equal to", and should those latter be capital Vs? -- Edward Allcutt
Re: Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
* Sam Hartman , 2015-09-04, 12:03: Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a fencepost error. Please say "off-by-one" rather than "fencepost". See this sub-thread for rationale: https://lists.debian.org/20150831082617.gs9...@sym.noone.org if V(A,D) is greater than N * V(D,A) For me, "greater" and "strictly greater" means the same thing. I think you wanted to say "greater or equal" here. and v(A,D) is strictly greater than v(D,A). Here both "v" should be uppercase. -- Jakub Wilk
Amendment: We Choose Wording of the Day
As I discussed, in Andreas's resolution, I think that the strategic voting fix introduces more problems than it serves. INstead, I propose that we don't fix that, but trust ourselves to propose ballot options that are statement-of-the-day-like ballot options not requiring a super-majority when doing so is wise. I think that doing so is generally a good idea when you have a super-majority option and its opposite on the same ballot--when there is substantial contraversy about whether to move in the direction of the super-majority option or some other option on the same ballot. I have chosen to retain the preference for the default option in the TC. If four members of the TC really cannot live with an option, we're better off with more discussion or taking it to a GR. Even in the Init system discussion, which I think is the most controversial decision to come before the TC, several of the TC members who preferred options that did not win explained what changes would need to be made for them to consider options similar to the one that won to be acceptable (ranked above FD). As it happened, four TC members didn't think no decision was better than the decision we got: if four members had ranked the winning option below FD, the chair would not have had the opportunity to use his casting vote. We also have some strong evidence from emails where some TC members explained their balloting decisions including what they ranked above FD that the tactical voting people were afraid of didn't happen. We're actually quite good at deciding whether another round of painful discussion is worth the cost or not, and when people we've appointed to make these decision decide that it is, I'd rather not second guess them. Specifically, I formally propose to replace the GR text with: - GENERAL RESOLUTION STARTS - Constitutional Amendment: TC Supermajority Fix Prior to the Clone Proof SSD GR in June 2003, the Technical Committee could overrule a Developer with a supermajority of 3:1. Unfortunately, the definition of supermajorities in the SSD GR has a fencepost error. In the new text a supermajority requirement is met only if the ratio of votes in favour to votes against is strictly greater than the supermajority ratio. In the context of the Technical Committee voting to overrule a developer that means that it takes 4 votes to overcome a single dissenter. And with a maximum committee size of 8, previously two dissenters could be outvoted by all 6 remaining members; now that is no longer possible. This change was unintentional, was contrary to the original intent of the Constitution, and is unhelpful. For the avoidance of any doubt, this change does not affect any votes (whether General Resolutions or votes in the Technical Committee) in progress at the time the change is made. Therefore, amend the Debian Constitution as follows: Index: doc/constitution.wml === --- doc/constitution.wml(revision 10982) +++ doc/constitution.wml(working copy) @@ -913,7 +913,7 @@ An option A defeats the default option D by a majority - ratio N, if V(A,D) is strictly greater than N * V(D,A). + ratio N, if V(A,D) is greater than N * V(D,A) and v(A,D) is strictly greater than v(D,A). If a supermajority of S:1 is required for A, its majority ratio Constitutional Amendment: Fix duplicate section numbering. The current Debian Constitution has two sections numbered A.1. This does not currently give rise to any ambiguity but it is undesirable. Fix this with the following semantically neutral amendment: - Renumber the first section A.1 to A.0. - GENERAL RESOLUTION ENDS - pgpBrum4Qz7ha.pgp Description: PGP signature
