Re: Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
Le Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 05:38:09PM +0100, Stefano Zacchiroli a écrit : I don't like the underlying intuition that this entails, namely that the GR proposer is somehow different from the other people which contribute to the ballot preparation (e.g. seconders and proposers of the initial and subsequent amendments). Hi Stefano, the core of my idea is that somebody should feel responsible for the success of a GR. Votes are big investments; in our countries they cost a lot of money and in Debian the cost a lot of energy that is not spent on development. Being able to control the contents of the GR gives the possiblity to really influence on the outcome, but since NOTA is always an option, I think that a misuse of such a responsibility would lead to failure and the vote of a competing GR, and not in an artificial advantage. Cheers, -- Charles -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-vote-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: http://lists.debian.org/20100401164045.gc19...@kunpuu.plessy.org
Re: Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 09:24:45AM +0900, Charles Plessy wrote:
After the very painful GR about “Lenny and resolving DFSG violations”,
discussions started about our voting system, and the fact that it does not
accomodate well with mixture of supermajority and regular options. Also,
disagreements whether an option needs the supermajority often starts bitter
debates.
Do you think it is a problem that you would like to solve as a DPL?
I don't plan to work on that if elected DPL. I agree that that GR was
painful, but it has been so for a mixture of factors, including some
honest mistakes acknowledged by the past secretary which contributed to
his decision of resigning from the position (unfortunately for
everybody, a bit too bitterly).
During the discussions that started after the GR, I suggested that the GR
proposer should have more control about the options put to the vote. In
particular, it would be useful if he can refuse an option that would
disequilibrate the voting system. That would make him responsible for the
success of the GR: discarding a popular option is taking the risk that the
I don't like the underlying intuition that this entails, namely that the
GR proposer is somehow different from the other people which
contribute to the ballot preparation (e.g. seconders and proposers of
the initial and subsequent amendments). With the current way of
preparing ballots, all such contributors are equal. In fact, such
equality is also reflected by the fact that some people also second
amendments they won't vote for. This is quite nice as it highlights the
principle that GRs are a way to take decisions---used when everything
else fail---rather than an instrument to win in a specific battle.
(I'm not claiming you see GRs that way, I'm just explaining my bad
feeling about this idea.)
The only participant in a GR preparation which is more equal than
others is the secretary, which is already ultimately responsible for the
form that the various ballot entries take. Being the secretary means
having the trust of the project in how the constitution is interpreted
and ballots are prepared, that is IMO enough of a guarantee that shit
will not happen in ballot preparations (in that respect, the Lenny GR
only shows that we are all humans and that we can make mistakes).
For the supermajority, I think that it should be used only when
modifying directly foundation documents.
I fear this quite a bit. Going that way might open the flank to tricks
like leaving untouched the foundation documents, but actually subverting
them completely via some external procedure which is incompatible with
the *spirit* of those documents. (Yes, this is being a bit paranoid, but
constitutional rules, in any constitution, have some degree of paranoia
in order to be as much future-proof as possible.)
For instance, I believe that even if your GR proposal on copyright
(point (2)) does not affect the foundation *documents*, it is evident
from the related threads that more than a few DDs think it is in
contradiction with our foundation *principles*. I think we should have
the ability to interpret the constitution and declare 3:1 requirements
accordingly. I also think we should trust the project secretary in
judging that.
As a compensation, we may let the Secretary declare a GR
‘unconstitutional’ and refuse to let it be applied. This would remove
a lot of meta-discussion in GRs that already produce many emails. In
contrary with our current sytem, constitutionality of an option would
only be decided after it gets the Condorcet majority.
I find this quite pointless. In Debian, as we are all volunteers, we
should always consider that decision making processes drain time away
from other, generally more pleasant, hacking activities. Now, it is
absolutely fair to go through them when there is something important at
stake. Nevertheless, having a full GR from start to end, with the risk
that only at the end it will be declared unconstitutional, is
something that smells of huge time wasting.
Cheers.
--
Stefano Zacchiroli -o- PhD in Computer Science \ PostDoc @ Univ. Paris 7
z...@{upsilon.cc,pps.jussieu.fr,debian.org} -- http://upsilon.cc/zack/
Dietro un grande uomo c'è ..| . |. Et ne m'en veux pas si je te tutoie
sempre uno zaino ...| ..: | Je dis tu à tous ceux que j'aime
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Re: Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
On Thu Mar 25 17:38, Stefano Zacchiroli wrote: I don't like the underlying intuition that this entails, namely that the GR proposer is somehow different from the other people which contribute to the ballot preparation (e.g. seconders and proposers of the initial and subsequent amendments). With the current way of preparing ballots, all such contributors are equal. In fact, such equality is also reflected by the fact that some people also second amendments they won't vote for. This is quite nice as it highlights the principle that GRs are a way to take decisions---used when everything else fail---rather than an instrument to win in a specific battle. (I'm not claiming you see GRs that way, I'm just explaining my bad feeling about this idea.) That not withstanding, there is still a legitimate point here. What happens when an amendment is proposed which has different majority requirements to the others? What happens when the secretary and the proposer disagree about the majority requirements? Matt -- Matthew Johnson signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 05:16:33PM +, Matthew Johnson wrote: That not withstanding, there is still a legitimate point here. What happens when an amendment is proposed which has different majority requirements to the others? What happens when the secretary and the proposer disagree about the majority requirements? This has happened before. The secretary adjudicates any disputes about interpretation of the constitution. I would suggest that in future, it doesn't get this far by a proposer asking the secretary for their probable view *first* if they're proposing anything which may require a supermajority. Or anyone could simply ask the secretary for advice about any GR, and I'm sure they'd receive a comment about phrasing/legitamacy/quorate etc. Neil -- weasel dpkg: shut up dpkg No, I won't, and you can't make me. :P weasel hah. _I_ can -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-vote-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: http://lists.debian.org/20100325183727.gt28...@halon.org.uk
Re: Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
On Thu Mar 25 18:37, Neil McGovern wrote: On Thu, Mar 25, 2010 at 05:16:33PM +, Matthew Johnson wrote: That not withstanding, there is still a legitimate point here. What happens when an amendment is proposed which has different majority requirements to the others? What happens when the secretary and the proposer disagree about the majority requirements? This has happened before. The secretary adjudicates any disputes about interpretation of the constitution. I would suggest that in future, it doesn't get this far by a proposer asking the secretary for their probable view *first* if they're proposing anything which may require a supermajority. Or anyone could simply ask the secretary for advice about any GR, and I'm sure they'd receive a comment about phrasing/legitamacy/quorate etc. Indeed, however, where there is a clear disagreement it would be nice to have a policy of whether we a. don't run the vote until everyone agrees and is happy, b. don't run a vote with mixed majority options, c. run whatever vote is proposed with whatever majority options the secretary thinks is correct (which is I believe the current situation which lead to the arguments mentioned in the OP) d. all / none of the above. Matt -- Matthew Johnson signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Re: Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
On Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 9:24 PM, Charles Plessy ple...@debian.org wrote: After the very painful GR about “Lenny and resolving DFSG violations”, discussions started about our voting system, and the fact that it does not accomodate well with mixture of supermajority and regular options. Also, disagreements whether an option needs the supermajority often starts bitter debates. Do you think it is a problem that you would like to solve as a DPL? Not at all. I think this is the kind of problem that should be solved either by consensus or by a GR. I don't think it would do any good to solve it as DPL. For the supermajority, I think that it should be used only when modifying directly foundation documents. As a compensation, we may let the Secretary declare a GR ‘unconstitutional’ and refuse to let it be applied. This would remove a lot of meta-discussion in GRs that already produce many emails. In contrary with our current sytem, constitutionality of an option would only be decided after it gets the Condorcet majority. I don't think this makes any sense. It'd mean that we would be voting for something only to have it invalidated after it's voted. It would lead to a lot of flamewars, and probably to the resignation of the acting secretary. I think the best scenario is that the secretary states why a certain option would require supermajority, and then the proposer can a) re-formulate the option so that it doesn't require supermajority, b) present it as a separate ballot, c) accept to have mixed options in the ballot. I think that if what's going on is clear for everybody, it's easier to reach some common ground, to find an option that suits the interests of the proposer without requiring supermajority. Having to wait until the end of the election process to hear what the secretary thinks would only mean lost time and a lot of frustration. This said, I have not mentionned supermajority issues in my platform, since I think that the main points I propose would keep me busy enough if I am elected. I would be pleased however if somebody would self-appoint and lead this debate, if there is the impression that it is needed. I would definitely not lead it myself, and I would rather we spent our time in more productive activities. -- Besos, Marga -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-vote-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: http://lists.debian.org/e8bbf0361003241304l6ecfa2e5r5704abb38b470...@mail.gmail.com
Re: Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
On Wed, Mar 24, 2010 at 09:24:45AM +0900, Charles Plessy wrote: Le Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:03:32PM -0700, Russ Allbery a écrit : For whatever it's worth, I believe the second option changes the foundation documents and would require a 3:1 majority. The person who's canonical on that is the Secretary. Dear Russ, Stefano, Wouter and Margarita. I would like to take the opportunity of Russ's comment to ask to the other candidates their opinions about the supermajority votes. After the very painful GR about “Lenny and resolving DFSG violations”, discussions started about our voting system, and the fact that it does not accomodate well with mixture of supermajority and regular options. I'm not quite convinced that was the case; as I remember what happened then, these discussions were more about whether some options would have needed a supermajority to begin with. Also, disagreements whether an option needs the supermajority often starts bitter debates. Do you think it is a problem that you would like to solve as a DPL? I believe this problem has been solved already. During the vote you refer to, it became rather apparent that the then-current secretary, Manoj Srivastava, had a different opinion on when a vote would require a supermajority than did many developers in the project. As a direct result of that, the secretary decided to resign from his post. We have had some discussion, and I believe the general consensus on what needs to happen is now much clearer, and also shared by the current secretary. If the current secretary feels that there are still some areas in which things could be made clearer, we can have a GR to clarify the constitution. However, I don't think that is necessary. During the discussions that started after the GR, I suggested that the GR proposer should have more control about the options put to the vote. In particular, it would be useful if he can refuse an option that would disequilibrate the voting system. That would make him responsible for the success of the GR: discarding a popular option is taking the risk that the whole GR is refused and the option is accepted as a separate GR, which is the kind of public failure that I expect that people will avoid. I'm not quite sure that's a very good idea, but perhaps it could work. For the supermajority, I think that it should be used only when modifying directly foundation documents. I agree, and I feel this is the current consensus within the project. [...] -- The biometric identification system at the gates of the CIA headquarters works because there's a guard with a large gun making sure no one is trying to fool the system. http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2009/01/biometrics.html signature.asc Description: Digital signature
Question for the other candidates: supermajority.
Le Tue, Mar 23, 2010 at 12:03:32PM -0700, Russ Allbery a écrit : For whatever it's worth, I believe the second option changes the foundation documents and would require a 3:1 majority. The person who's canonical on that is the Secretary. Dear Russ, Stefano, Wouter and Margarita. I would like to take the opportunity of Russ's comment to ask to the other candidates their opinions about the supermajority votes. After the very painful GR about “Lenny and resolving DFSG violations”, discussions started about our voting system, and the fact that it does not accomodate well with mixture of supermajority and regular options. Also, disagreements whether an option needs the supermajority often starts bitter debates. Do you think it is a problem that you would like to solve as a DPL? During the discussions that started after the GR, I suggested that the GR proposer should have more control about the options put to the vote. In particular, it would be useful if he can refuse an option that would disequilibrate the voting system. That would make him responsible for the success of the GR: discarding a popular option is taking the risk that the whole GR is refused and the option is accepted as a separate GR, which is the kind of public failure that I expect that people will avoid. For the supermajority, I think that it should be used only when modifying directly foundation documents. As a compensation, we may let the Secretary declare a GR ‘unconstitutional’ and refuse to let it be applied. This would remove a lot of meta-discussion in GRs that already produce many emails. In contrary with our current sytem, constitutionality of an option would only be decided after it gets the Condorcet majority. I do not think that it would create more problems than the current system, where the results of the vote can be analysed afterwards to show, if it is the case, that an option did not pass the supermajority but would be the choice of a simple majority of the developers. This is a crisis situation in general, whatever the vote system is. This said, I have not mentionned supermajority issues in my platform, since I think that the main points I propose would keep me busy enough if I am elected. I would be pleased however if somebody would self-appoint and lead this debate, if there is the impression that it is needed. Have a nice day, -- Charles Plessy, Tsurumi, Kanagawa, Japan -- To UNSUBSCRIBE, email to debian-vote-requ...@lists.debian.org with a subject of unsubscribe. Trouble? Contact listmas...@lists.debian.org Archive: http://lists.debian.org/20100324002445.gb5...@kunpuu.plessy.org
