Re: In plain English please?! Re: General resolution: Changes to the Standard Resolution Procedure

[Simon Josefsson]

Kurt Roeckx  writes:

> The solution to this problem is moving the majority check later
> in the process, so that option B would have been dropped first.
> If they did this stratigic voting in that case both options would
> have been dropped.

Interesting -- one thought: haven't voting systems been dissected and
specified in research literature for quite some time?  Isn't there one
that is already established and analyzed that we can refer to, instead
of trying to design these (quite complicated) rules for ourselves?  We
would have to find a voting system that matches Debian's intent, which
might be a challenge though.

/Simon


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Re: In plain English please?! Re: General resolution: Changes to the Standard Resolution Procedure

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Tue, Sep 01, 2015 at 09:47:47AM +0200, Simon Josefsson wrote:
> Kurt Roeckx  writes:
> 
> > The solution to this problem is moving the majority check later
> > in the process, so that option B would have been dropped first.
> > If they did this stratigic voting in that case both options would
> > have been dropped.
> 
> Interesting -- one thought: haven't voting systems been dissected and
> specified in research literature for quite some time?  Isn't there one
> that is already established and analyzed that we can refer to, instead
> of trying to design these (quite complicated) rules for ourselves?  We
> would have to find a voting system that matches Debian's intent, which
> might be a challenge though.

As far as I understand the problem is that none of them have a majority
requirement.


Kurt

Re: In plain English please?! Re: General resolution: Changes to the Standard Resolution Procedure

[Don Armstrong]

On Mon, 31 Aug 2015, Dimitri John Ledkov wrote:
> On 31 August 2015 at 08:06, Kurt Roeckx - Debian Project Secretary
>  wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > A new GR has been started to update the Standard Resolution
> > Procedure.  Details about it can be found on:
> > https://www.debian.org/vote/2015/vote_002
> >
> 
> I'm failing to understand the current situation, nor proposed changes.
> Can someone please give a plain English explanation and/or examples?
> 
> E.g. committee of size N is voting on an issue I which happens to be
> overriding developer. The votes are F for, A against, S abstentions.
> Previously this would fail, now this will pass.

If the votes were 6 for (F), 2 against (A), 0 abstensions (S) for a
resolution which required 3:1 majority, currently, such a resolution
would not pass. This changes it so that it would.

This isn't usually an issue in general votes, but is a problem on the
CTTE.

-- 
Don Armstrong  http://www.donarmstrong.com

I'm sorry about those late night emails.
I only said those things because I was too drunk
to be afraid.
  -- a softer world #579
 http://www.asofterworld.com/index.php?id=579

Re: In plain English please?! Re: General resolution: Changes to the Standard Resolution Procedure

[Russ Allbery]

Dimitri John Ledkov  writes:

> I'm failing to understand the current situation, nor proposed changes.
> Can someone please give a plain English explanation and/or examples?

> E.g. committee of size N is voting on an issue I which happens to be
> overriding developer. The votes are F for, A against, S abstentions.
> Previously this would fail, now this will pass.

In a supermajority-required TC vote involving eight TC members, currently
a supermajority of 6 can override a minority of 2, since this meets the
current 3:1 ratio.  After this change, the supermajority vote has to be
strictly greater than 3:1, so a vote of 6-2 would not pass the
supermajority requirement.

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)   

Re: In plain English please?! Re: General resolution: Changes to the Standard Resolution Procedure

[Russ Allbery]

Russ Allbery  writes:
> Dimitri John Ledkov  writes:

>> I'm failing to understand the current situation, nor proposed changes.
>> Can someone please give a plain English explanation and/or examples?

>> E.g. committee of size N is voting on an issue I which happens to be
>> overriding developer. The votes are F for, A against, S abstentions.
>> Previously this would fail, now this will pass.

> In a supermajority-required TC vote involving eight TC members, currently
> a supermajority of 6 can override a minority of 2, since this meets the
> current 3:1 ratio.  After this change, the supermajority vote has to be
> strictly greater than 3:1, so a vote of 6-2 would not pass the
> supermajority requirement.

Apologies: I wrote that exactly backwards.  This teaches me to write email
while people are trying to talk to me.  The above description is correct,
except that what I said was the new state is the current state, which this
GR is changing.

Currently, a supermajority of 6 cannot override a minority of 2.  After
this GR, that would again be possible.

-- 
Russ Allbery (r...@debian.org)   

Re: In plain English please?! Re: General resolution: Changes to the Standard Resolution Procedure

[Kurt Roeckx]

On Mon, Aug 31, 2015 at 04:49:08PM +0100, Dimitri John Ledkov wrote:
> Hello,
> 
> On 31 August 2015 at 08:06, Kurt Roeckx - Debian Project Secretary
>  wrote:
> > Hi,
> >
> > A new GR has been started to update the Standard Resolution
> > Procedure.  Details about it can be found on:
> > https://www.debian.org/vote/2015/vote_002
> >
> 
> I'm failing to understand the current situation, nor proposed changes.
> Can someone please give a plain English explanation and/or examples?
> 
> E.g. committee of size N is voting on an issue I which happens to be
> overriding developer. The votes are F for, A against, S abstentions.
> Previously this would fail, now this will pass.

One of the problems, and I consider that to be the most important
one, is about the stratigic vote that you can do.  For example,
condiser that there are 2 options (A and B) plus the default option
All options are acceptable for everybody, but 75% prefer A
and 25% prefer B.  You would except the following vote:
75%: 123
25%: 213

Option A would win as expected.

If there is a 3:1 majority requirement, you could instead vote:
75%: 123
25%: 312

As in, the 2nd group says that option A is not acceptable while in
fact it was.

This results in the option A being dropped because it does not
reach majority.  75% say A acceptable and 25% say it's not resulting
in a 3:1 majority saying it's acceptable.  The 75% just don't
reach the "strictly greater" than the 3:1 majority requirement.

In the end option B wins because of stratigic voting, while if
they were honest option A would have won.

The solution to this problem is moving the majority check later
in the process, so that option B would have been dropped first.
If they did this stratigic voting in that case both options would
have been dropped.


Kurt