Bug#919226: hardening

2019-01-15 Thread Yves-Alexis Perez
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[adding the ITP bug on CC]

On Mon, 2019-01-14 at 10:24 -0800, Matt Taggart wrote:
> Hi,
> 
> I just found out about your hardening-runtime package, it's great!
> 
> A while back I created a package with similar intent named lockdown.
> 
> https://gitlab.com/taggart/lockdown

Nice, I didn't know about it, thanks for the pointer.
> 
> (although now there is a linux lockdown https://lwn.net/Articles/750761/
> so I might rename it).

Indeed.
> 
> I've been meaning to get back to working on it, I have some other ideas
> about locking out some old networking protocols and other junk.
> 
> Take a look and tell me what you think, maybe it's interesting to merge
> them? (or at the very least I will add a dependency to pull yours in).

I have to admit I'm not sure I like the whole initscript thing, and prefer the
configuration file approach. Regarding the current features:

kernel.kexec_load_disabled=1 and kernel.unprivileged_bpf_disabled=1 are in
hardening-runtime

kernel.modules_disabled is not. Starting with Buster unsigned modules won't
load by default so part of the feature (not loading random kernel modules even
if you have CAP_SYS_ADMIN) will be enabled. For the rest (not loading signed
modules for vulnerable stuff, for example), I think it would make more sense
to load the required module in the initramfs and set the setting there.

This could be done by a special initramfs hook and adding all the whitelisted
modules in /etc/initramfs-tools/modules but it has to be done manually.

All in all:

- - I don't think it really make sense to have both lockdown and hardening-
runtime (it doesn't hurt that much but still it's duplicate work)
- - hardening-runtime supports more stuff (sysctl settings and kernel command
line) than lockdown at the moment

I think it would make more sense to migrate the modules_disabled part to
hardening-runtime and I would happily welcome co-maintainership on this if
you're interested. Obviously that's my opinion and I can understand if you're
reluctant on that :)

Regards,
- -- 
Yves-Alexis
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Bug#919226: hardening

2019-01-26 Thread Yves-Alexis Perez
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On Tue, 2019-01-15 at 10:26 +0100, Yves-Alexis Perez wrote:
> I think it would make more sense to migrate the modules_disabled part to
> hardening-runtime and I would happily welcome co-maintainership on this if
> you're interested. Obviously that's my opinion and I can understand if you're
> reluctant on that :)

Hi,

In case you missed, I've uploaded hardening-runtime and it just migrated to
testing.

Regards,
- -- 
Yves-Alexis
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