Re: Final draft / CVE-2011-3192

2011-08-25 Thread Dirk-Willem van Gulik
Thanks. Added to the interim draft update.

Dw.

On 25 Aug 2011, at 06:36, Steffen wrote:

 For Mitigation of Apache Range Header DoS Attack with mod_security, see
 also:
 
 http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/08/mitigation-of-apache-range-header-dos-attack.html
 
 
 - Original Message -
 From: Dirk-Willem van Gulik di...@webweaving.org
 Newsgroups: gmane.comp.apache.devel
 To: secur...@httpd.apache.org; dev@httpd.apache.org
 Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 5:34 PM
 Subject: Final draft / CVE-2011-3192
 
 
 Thanks for all the help. All fixes included. Below will go out to announce
 at the top of the hour - unless I see a veto.
 
 Dw.
 
 
 
 
 Title:CVE-2011-3192: Range header DoS vulnerability Apache HTTPD 1.3/2.x
   Apache HTTPD Security ADVISORY
 
 Date: 20110824 1600Z
 Product:  Apache HTTPD Web Server
 Versions: Apache 1.3 all versions, Apache 2 all versions
 
 Description:
 
 
 A denial of service vulnerability has been found in the way the multiple
 overlapping ranges are handled by the Apache HTTPD server:
 
  http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175
 
 An attack tool is circulating in the wild. Active use of this tools has
 been observed.
 
 The attack can be done remotely and with a modest number of requests can
 cause very significant memory and CPU usage on the server.
 
 The default Apache HTTPD installation is vulnerable.
 
 There is currently no patch/new version of Apache HTTPD which fixes this
 vulnerability. This advisory will be updated when a long term fix
 is available.
 
 A full fix is expected in the next 48 hours.
 
 Mitigation:
 
 
 However there are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until
 that time.
 
 1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.
 
Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)
 
   # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
   # CVE-2011-3192
   SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
   RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range
 
   # optional logging.
   CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range
 
Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)
 
   # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
   # CVE-2011-3192
   #
   RewriteEngine on
   RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
   RewriteRule .* - [F]
 
The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
or use things such complex http based video streaming.
 
 2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. Note that
 while
this keeps the offending Range header short - it may break other headers;
such as sizeable cookies or security fields.
 
   LimitRequestFieldSize 200
 
Note that as the attack evolves in the field you are likely to have
to further limit this and/or impose other LimitRequestFields limits.
 
See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#limitrequestfieldsize
 
 3) Use mod_headers to completely dis-allow the use of Range headers:
 
   RequestHeader unset Range
 
Note that this may break certain clients - such as those used for
e-Readers and progressive/http-streaming video.
 
 4) Deploy a Range header count module as a temporary stopgap measure:
 
  http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/mod_rangecnt.c
 
Precompiled binaries for some platforms are available at:
 
 http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/BINARIES.txt
 
 5) Apply any of the current patches under discussion - such as:
 

 http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/201108.mbox/%3ccaapsnn2po-d-c4nqt_tes2rrwizr7urefhtkpwbc1b+k1dq...@mail.gmail.com%3e
 
 Actions:
 
 
 However there are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until
 that time.
 
 1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.
 
Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)
 
   # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
   # CVE-2011-3192
   SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
   RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range
 
   # optional logging.
   CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range
 
Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)
 
   # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
   # CVE-2011-3192
   #
   RewriteEngine on
   RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
   RewriteRule .* - [F]
 
The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
or use things such complex http based video streaming.
 
 2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. Note

Final draft / CVE-2011-3192

2011-08-24 Thread Dirk-Willem van Gulik
Thanks for all the help. All fixes included. Below will go out to announce at 
the top of the hour - unless I see a veto.

Dw.




Title:CVE-2011-3192: Range header DoS vulnerability Apache HTTPD 1.3/2.x
  Apache HTTPD Security ADVISORY

Date: 20110824 1600Z
Product:  Apache HTTPD Web Server
Versions: Apache 1.3 all versions, Apache 2 all versions

Description:


A denial of service vulnerability has been found in the way the multiple 
overlapping ranges are handled by the Apache HTTPD server:

 http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175 

An attack tool is circulating in the wild. Active use of this tools has 
been observed.

The attack can be done remotely and with a modest number of requests can 
cause very significant memory and CPU usage on the server. 

The default Apache HTTPD installation is vulnerable.

There is currently no patch/new version of Apache HTTPD which fixes this 
vulnerability. This advisory will be updated when a long term fix 
is available. 

A full fix is expected in the next 48 hours. 

Mitigation:


However there are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until 
that time. 

1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
   either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.

   Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)

  # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
  # CVE-2011-3192
  SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
  RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range

  # optional logging.
  CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range

   Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)

  # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
  # CVE-2011-3192
  #
  RewriteEngine on
  RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
  RewriteRule .* - [F]

   The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
   required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
   or use things such complex http based video streaming.

2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. Note that while 
   this keeps the offending Range header short - it may break other headers; 
   such as sizeable cookies or security fields. 

  LimitRequestFieldSize 200

   Note that as the attack evolves in the field you are likely to have
   to further limit this and/or impose other LimitRequestFields limits.

   See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#limitrequestfieldsize

3) Use mod_headers to completely dis-allow the use of Range headers:

  RequestHeader unset Range 

   Note that this may break certain clients - such as those used for
   e-Readers and progressive/http-streaming video.

4) Deploy a Range header count module as a temporary stopgap measure:

 http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/mod_rangecnt.c

   Precompiled binaries for some platforms are available at:

http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/BINARIES.txt

5) Apply any of the current patches under discussion - such as:

   
http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/201108.mbox/%3ccaapsnn2po-d-c4nqt_tes2rrwizr7urefhtkpwbc1b+k1dq...@mail.gmail.com%3e

Actions:


However there are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until 
that time. 

1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
   either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.

   Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)

  # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
  # CVE-2011-3192
  SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
  RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range

  # optional logging.
  CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range

   Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)

  # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
  # CVE-2011-3192
  #
  RewriteEngine on
  RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
  RewriteRule .* - [F]

   The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
   required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
   or use things such complex http based video streaming.

2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. Note that while 
   this keeps the offending Range header short - it may break other headers; 
   such as sizeable cookies or security fields. 

  LimitRequestFieldSize 200

   Note that as the attack evolves in the field you are likely to have
   to further limit this and/or impose other LimitRequestFields limits.

   See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#limitrequestfieldsize

3) Use mod_headers to completely dis-allow the use of Range headers:

  RequestHeader unset Range 

   Note that this may break certain clients - such as those used for
   e-Readers and progressive/http-streaming video.


Re: Final draft / CVE-2011-3192

2011-08-24 Thread Eric Covener
I'm seeing Apache 2.0 doesn't accept our RequestHeader syntax due to a
defect, it misinterprets it as a value and fails startup.

If we have the opportunity to amend, I think we need to suggest the
rewrite flavor for Apache 2.0 and earlier, not just 1.3 and earlier.

Also for 1.3, is our RE safe for non-PCRE? And should we reconsider
the 5 for something more liberal?

   Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)

          # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
          # CVE-2011-3192
          SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
          RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range

          # optional logging.
          CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range

   Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)

          # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
          # CVE-2011-3192
          #
          RewriteEngine on
          RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
          RewriteRule .* - [F]


Re: Final draft / CVE-2011-3192

2011-08-24 Thread Dirk-WIllem van Gulik
That is fine - we can do another update tomorrow, say noon zulu - if we expect 
that we do not have a proper patch and/or a 2.0.65 / 2.2.20 in the day 
following.

Weird though - my 2.0.61 and 64 does seem fine. So probably very early 2.0 
series.

Dw

On 24 Aug 2011, at 20:40, Eric Covener wrote:

 I'm seeing Apache 2.0 doesn't accept our RequestHeader syntax due to a
 defect, it misinterprets it as a value and fails startup.
 
 If we have the opportunity to amend, I think we need to suggest the
 rewrite flavor for Apache 2.0 and earlier, not just 1.3 and earlier.
 
 Also for 1.3, is our RE safe for non-PCRE? And should we reconsider
 the 5 for something more liberal?
 
   Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)
 
  # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
  # CVE-2011-3192
  SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
  RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range
 
  # optional logging.
  CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range
 
   Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)
 
  # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
  # CVE-2011-3192
  #
  RewriteEngine on
  RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
  RewriteRule .* - [F]
 



Re: Final draft / CVE-2011-3192

2011-08-24 Thread Steffen
For Mitigation of Apache Range Header DoS Attack with mod_security, see 
also:


http://blog.spiderlabs.com/2011/08/mitigation-of-apache-range-header-dos-attack.html


- Original Message - 
From: Dirk-Willem van Gulik di...@webweaving.org

Newsgroups: gmane.comp.apache.devel
To: secur...@httpd.apache.org; dev@httpd.apache.org
Sent: Wednesday, August 24, 2011 5:34 PM
Subject: Final draft / CVE-2011-3192


Thanks for all the help. All fixes included. Below will go out to announce
at the top of the hour - unless I see a veto.

Dw.




Title:CVE-2011-3192: Range header DoS vulnerability Apache HTTPD 1.3/2.x
 Apache HTTPD Security ADVISORY

Date: 20110824 1600Z
Product:  Apache HTTPD Web Server
Versions: Apache 1.3 all versions, Apache 2 all versions

Description:


A denial of service vulnerability has been found in the way the multiple
overlapping ranges are handled by the Apache HTTPD server:

http://seclists.org/fulldisclosure/2011/Aug/175

An attack tool is circulating in the wild. Active use of this tools has
been observed.

The attack can be done remotely and with a modest number of requests can
cause very significant memory and CPU usage on the server.

The default Apache HTTPD installation is vulnerable.

There is currently no patch/new version of Apache HTTPD which fixes this
vulnerability. This advisory will be updated when a long term fix
is available.

A full fix is expected in the next 48 hours.

Mitigation:


However there are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until
that time.

1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
  either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.

  Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)

 # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
 # CVE-2011-3192
 SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
 RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range

 # optional logging.
 CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range

  Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)

 # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
 # CVE-2011-3192
 #
 RewriteEngine on
 RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
 RewriteRule .* - [F]

  The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
  required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
  or use things such complex http based video streaming.

2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. Note that
while
  this keeps the offending Range header short - it may break other headers;
  such as sizeable cookies or security fields.

 LimitRequestFieldSize 200

  Note that as the attack evolves in the field you are likely to have
  to further limit this and/or impose other LimitRequestFields limits.

  See: http://httpd.apache.org/docs/2.2/mod/core.html#limitrequestfieldsize

3) Use mod_headers to completely dis-allow the use of Range headers:

 RequestHeader unset Range

  Note that this may break certain clients - such as those used for
  e-Readers and progressive/http-streaming video.

4) Deploy a Range header count module as a temporary stopgap measure:

http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/mod_rangecnt.c

  Precompiled binaries for some platforms are available at:

http://people.apache.org/~dirkx/BINARIES.txt

5) Apply any of the current patches under discussion - such as:

  
http://mail-archives.apache.org/mod_mbox/httpd-dev/201108.mbox/%3ccaapsnn2po-d-c4nqt_tes2rrwizr7urefhtkpwbc1b+k1dq...@mail.gmail.com%3e

Actions:


However there are several immediate options to mitigate this issue until
that time.

1) Use SetEnvIf or mod_rewrite to detect a large number of ranges and then
  either ignore the Range: header or reject the request.

  Option 1: (Apache 2.0 and 2.2)

 # drop Range header when more than 5 ranges.
 # CVE-2011-3192
 SetEnvIf Range (,.*?){5,} bad-range=1
 RequestHeader unset Range env=bad-range

 # optional logging.
 CustomLog logs/range-CVE-2011-3192.log common env=bad-range

  Option 2: (Also for Apache 1.3)

 # Reject request when more than 5 ranges in the Range: header.
 # CVE-2011-3192
 #
 RewriteEngine on
 RewriteCond %{HTTP:range} !(^bytes=[^,]+(,[^,]+){0,4}$|^$)
 RewriteRule .* - [F]

  The number 5 is arbitrary. Several 10's should not be an issue and may be
  required for sites which for example serve PDFs to very high end eReaders
  or use things such complex http based video streaming.

2) Limit the size of the request field to a few hundred bytes. Note that
while
  this keeps the offending Range header short - it may break other headers;
  such as sizeable cookies or security fields.

 LimitRequestFieldSize 200

  Note that as the attack evolves in the field you are likely to have
  to further limit this and/or impose other