[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2022-01-21 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #22 from Santi Jumpla  ---
FUN88 ทางเข้าเล่น 2022 สล็อต SLOT หวย เกมส์ กีฬา สมัครฟัน88 วันนี้ 
รับโบนัสเครดิตฟรี 150% 

References:
https://sites.google.com/view/fun88asia1/

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2016-05-23 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

Mark Thomas  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 Status|NEW |RESOLVED
 Resolution|--- |FIXED

--- Comment #21 from Mark Thomas  ---
Tomcat 9.0.x and 8.5.x no longer set the Server header by default.
Setting the server attribute on a Connector still replaces any value specified
by the web application.
A new attribute serverRemoveAppProvidedValues allows any application specified
value to be removed.

This change will be included in:
- 9.0.0.M7 onwards
- 8.5.3 onwards

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2016-04-07 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #20 from Phillip Webb  ---
FWIW we're still getting quite a bit of interest in this on the Spring Boot
issue tracker. It seems like a fair number would like the ability to not send
the header.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2016-03-07 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #19 from Anthony J. Biacco  ---
Sorry, i don't REBUILD the jar, i just leave
org/apache/catalina/util/ServerInfo.properties there after modded as suggested
in the Valves section of
https://tomcat.apache.org/tomcat-8.0-doc/security-howto.html

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2016-03-07 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #18 from Anthony J. Biacco  ---
I usually just modify server.* org/apache/catalina/util/ServerInfo.properties
and rebuild catalina.jar.
Not exactly ideal, but fairly trivial for me at least to mask the info.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2016-03-07 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

Michael Osipov <1983-01...@gmx.net> changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 CC||1983-01...@gmx.net

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-31 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #17 from Greg Turnquist  ---
I tend to lean towards security experts (like OWASP) that indicate it's
preferable to reduce information leakage, rather than simply asserting there is
no real world risk here.

The rest of the industry has headed towards reducing information leakage (see
Jetty, Undertow, etc.) While "everyone else is doing it" isn't an argument,
observing an industry migration that is backed up by cited security experts IS
an argument in favor of such a change.

On a personal note, it's interesting that we're not concerned about 27 bytes
because it's nothing, but some ARE concerned about the cycles spent to generate
those 27 bytes. I don't think resource consumption is the focal point of this
request, being premature optimization. I would favor upholding RFCs behind
servlets as well as HTTP headers alongside industry-driven security
recommendations, and save optimization only for AFTER that has been met.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-22 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #16 from Christopher Schultz  ---
(In reply to Mark Thomas from comment #9)
> I remain unconvinced that there are any real world security benefits to be
> gained by removing the security header.

Agreed.

> The bandwidth argument carries slightly more weight but we are only talking
> 27 bytes per response and most responses will dwarf that by at least several
> orders of magnitude. Add HTTP/2 to the mix and those 27 bytes will quickly
> shrink.

While the bytes shrink, the CPU still gets wasted to shrink them.

An even better argument *for* a configurable parameter might be HTTP spec.
Section 15.1.2 of RFC 2616 pretty much says flat-out that servers SHOULD make
the Server header a configurable option. But, RFC 7231 says nothing similar so
I'd call it a draw from a spec perspective.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #15 from Mark Thomas  ---
Ignoring the reasoning isn't a red herring. It is part of deciding what the
best solution is. "Because someone wants it" is not, on its own, sufficient
justification.

The patch looks like a good start if we wanted to go that way. It needs some
docs.

However, I'm still leaning towards removing all server header handling from
Tomcat. That gives users - including boot - maximum flexibility. They can
add/remove the header as desired via the Servlet API. We can remove the server
option completely in 9.0.x. In 8.0.x and earlier I think we'd need to set the
header if the option is set to retain backwards compatibility. Essentially that
changes Tomcat's default behaviour from sending the header to not sending it.

In the (unlikely) case of an app setting the header that the system
administrator wants to remove, the sys admin would need to add a filter that
removed the header.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #14 from Phillip Webb  ---
I've been mulling this issue over a little bit more and I think that the
arguments about whether removing the header offers any real world security or
bandwidth benefits are a bit of a red herring. There's clearly some difference
of opinion here, but regardless of why you'd want to remove the header, it
still stands that it's currently not possible.

If we put the argument of why to one side, and just focus on answering the
question "How do I remove the server header?", what are the options? Is the
suggested patch a sensible approach? Is there some other way to do it (a custom
Http11Protocol implementation? some way to post-process headers?).

I'm happy to try and rework the patch as required, or try to find a less
invasive way to solve the problem. My ultimate goal is to just prove the
request Spring Boot feature without needing to add a "but not on Tomcat"
caveat.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #13 from Phillip Webb  ---
Created attachment 33364
  --> https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/attachment.cgi?id=33364&action=edit
Suggested patch

Something like this. (not including tests yet as not sure where to add them)

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #12 from Phillip Webb  ---
For more information about what's driving this request see
https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-boot/issues/4730. We've specifically
looking for feature parity across all embedded servlet containers that we
support (Tomcat, Jetty, Undertow).

I think the least invasive option is to add a flag to disable the server
header. This would be similar to Jetty's
`HttpConfiguration.setSendServerVersion`, not effect any existing users and
provide a quick way to opt-out of the header.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #11 from Phillip Webb  ---
Removing all server header processing code will break back compatibility.
Specifically, this recently added Spring Boot feature [1] will stop working
since it relies on the `server` attribute being picked up.

[1] https://github.com/spring-projects/spring-boot/issues/4461

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

Phillip Webb  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

 CC||pw...@pivotal.io

--- Comment #10 from Phillip Webb  ---
Thanks! Sorry, I should have checked that.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #9 from Mark Thomas  ---
I remain unconvinced that there are any real world security benefits to be
gained by removing the security header.

The bandwidth argument carries slightly more weight but we are only talking 27
bytes per response and most responses will dwarf that by at least several
orders of magnitude. Add HTTP/2 to the mix and those 27 bytes will quickly
shrink.

If we do anything at all, I am leaning towards completely removing all Server
header processing (all ~15 lines of code of it) and let applications add it if
they wish. Users wanting to provide useful server version information via
configuration can enable the X-Powered-By header.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #8 from Remy Maucherat  ---
"2) if a Server header was set by a web application, we should remove it": I
see no reason to do that.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #7 from Phillip Webb  ---
Thanks! Sorry, I should have checked that.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #6 from Mark Thomas  ---
Read BUILDING.txt for details on the minimum Ant version required.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-18 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #5 from Phillip Webb  ---
I'm trying to create a patch for this but I don't seem to be able to build
8.0.x from trunk.

Running `ant test` gives me:

test-bio:

BUILD FAILED
/Users/pwebb/projects/tomcat/trunk/build.xml:1374: The following error occurred
while executing this line:
/Users/pwebb/projects/tomcat/trunk/build.xml:1431: junit doesn't support the
"threads" attribute


Any ideas?

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-17 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #4 from Konstantin Kolinko  ---
1. The place to patch is 
org.apache.coyote.http11.Http11Processor.prepareResponse()

If this feature is enabled, then it means that
1) if none Server header is set by a web application, we should skip adding the
default one
2) if a Server header was set by a web application, we should remove it

2. A possible value to trigger this feature could be setting an empty string,
but that value is already used as a synonym for no value (null),
by Http11Processor.setServer() setter method.


3. For reference, the Server header is defined for HTTP/1.1 by RFC 7231
ch.7.4.2.

https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc7231#section-7.4.2

A server "MAY" generate it. There is no obligation to actually generate it.
Skipping the Server header saves several bytes of bandwidth.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-17 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #3 from Rob Winch  ---
Thank you for the responses.

> It is also worth noting that because many system admins fake the server 
> header, most attackers try scanning for all known vulnerabilities anyway.

Some hackers may target specific applications. If that is the approach they are
taking, they are likely to try all exploits against the victim. As already
mentioned, exposing information will likely help them prioritize the exploits
to find something more quickly which will increase the likely hood that they go
undetected.

Hackers don't always target a specific victim. Another method of attack is to
have a known set of vulnerabilities and actively searching for victims.
Exposing any unnecessary information makes it easier for the attacker to find
victims in an automated way.



> In short, hiding the server header is a waste of time (even for instances 
> running insecure versions) that would be better spend upgrading insecure 
> instances to secure versions.

This isn't always possible. For example, there may be a 0-day exploit that has
no patched version or was just released & users have not had the opportunity to
update. Hackers are going to easily be able to find victims if the Server
header is exposed.



> Indeed, this provides absolutely no value :)

> In short, hiding the server header is a waste of time (even for instances
> running insecure versions) that would be better spend upgrading insecure
> instances to secure versions.

These seem like pretty bold claims. I'd be very interested in seeing some
citations.

I can provide countless credible citations that recommend removing the Server
header. I have provided a few additional examples below.

= OWASP

I provided this citation on the original report. However, since OWASP is such
an important part of web application security, I felt like this should be
emphasized.

OWASP states that "Information Leakage" is a class of vulnerability [1]. It is
described as:

Revealing system data or debugging information helps an adversary learn
about the system and form a plan of attack. An information leak occurs
when system data or debugging information leaves the program through an
output stream or logging function.

>From my perspective, the Server header is revealing unnecessary information.
This means it fits the OWASP description of "Information Leakage" and should be
removed.

= Troy Hunt (Microsoft MVP for Developer Security, etc)

I an excellent article by Troy Hunt (Microsoft MVP for Developer Security, etc)
on why you should remove unnecessary HTTP headers from the response [2]. Some
highlights of the article include:

* Why removing headers is not "security through obscurity"
* A concrete example of how exposing headers can help find victims of 0-day
exploits
* Additional citations on why headers that leak information should be removed

= RFC-2616 "15.1.2 Transfer of Sensitive Information"

The IETF recommends that server implementations SHOULD make the Server header a
configurable option [3].

   Revealing the specific software version of the server might allow the
   server machine to become more vulnerable to attacks against software
   that is known to contain security holes. Implementors SHOULD make the
   Server header field a configurable option.




[1] https://www.owasp.org/index.php/Information_Leakage
[2] http://www.troyhunt.com/2012/02/shhh-dont-let-your-response-headers.html
[3] http://www.rfc-base.org/txt/rfc-2616.txt

Regards,
Rob Winch

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-17 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

--- Comment #2 from Mark Thomas  ---
I don't see any significant information leakage here, even if the exact Tomcat
version is provided.

Assume you have a Tomcat instance running 8.0.30 (no known vulnerabilities as I
type this). How does it make that instance less secure (easier to attack) if
the attacker knows that it is a Tomcat 8.0.30 instance vs. now knowing what
server it is?

The best answer I can come up with is that the attacker doesn't have to waste
time trying out known vulnerabilities for other servers or earlier Tomcat
versions but that doesn't make the Tomcat instance any easier to attack. It
might mean that the attacker gets spotted and blocked while they test various
known vulnerabilities but internet facing servers get hit with so many scans
that unless an attacker generates so many requests it starts to have a DoS
effect the scans are simply ignored. Automating blocking is only used for the
worst offenders because NAT and proxies means blocking every 'attack' shuts out
large numbers of legitimate users which is actually much worse than just
ignoring the scan.

It is also worth noting that because many system admins fake the server header,
most attackers try scanning for all known vulnerabilities anyway.

Now consider a Tomcat instance running 8.0.0 vulnerable to CVE-2014-0050 (DoS).
Hiding the server header doesn't make the Tomcat instance any less vulnerable
to the DoS. It may take an attacker slightly longer to find vulnerability, but
- given my comments above - they are going to find it anyway.

In short, hiding the server header is a waste of time (even for instances
running insecure versions) that would be better spend upgrading insecure
instances to secure versions.

I'd be more than happy to reconsider my position and implement this feature if
a valid case is made for how hiding the server header increases the actual
security of an instance.

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[Bug 58750] Provide way to disable Server header completely

2015-12-17 Thread bugzilla
https://bz.apache.org/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=58750

Remy Maucherat  changed:

   What|Removed |Added

   Severity|normal  |enhancement

--- Comment #1 from Remy Maucherat  ---
Indeed, this provides absolutely no value :)

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