Re: More SHA-1 certs

2016-02-04 Thread Erwann Abalea
Le dimanche 31 janvier 2016 18:47:53 UTC+1, Peter Bowen a écrit :
> Sub-CA under SHECA (which has applied to be in the Mozilla program)
> https://crt.sh/?id=12367776=cablint

Wow. Each certificate has its own CRL. And this CRL is not properly partitioned 
(missing IDP extension).
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Re: CA Community in Salesforce

2016-02-04 Thread Kathleen Wilson
I have updated a couple wiki pages in regards to the CA Community in 
Salesforce...


+ Added an 'After Inclusion' section to the page about how to apply for 
inclusion:

https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:How_to_apply#After_Inclusion

+ Added steps 15 and 16 to the Process Overview:
https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA#Process_Overview

I will appreciate thoughtful and constructive feedback on these changes.

Thanks,
Kathleen


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Re: CA Community in Salesforce

2016-02-04 Thread Kathleen Wilson
I believe I have issued a CA Community Salesforce license to the Primary 
Point of Contact (POC) of each currently-included CA.


https://wiki.mozilla.org/CA:SalesforceCommunity

Please send me email if any of you are a Primary POC for a 
currently-included CA, and you have not received your CA Community 
Salesforce license. Also, please be sure to login to the CA Community in 
Salesforce and let me know if you have an problems or questions about it.


Thanks,
Kathleen


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Re: SHA1 certs issued this year chaining to included roots

2016-02-04 Thread dave.ta...@rsa.com
Hello-

Regarding:

> - https://crt.sh/?id=12501254=cablint -- RSA Security 2048 V3 via
> RSA Corporate CA v2 via RSA Corporate Server CA v2

All certificates issued with SHA-1 post 1 January 2016 have been revoked and 
replaced with SHA-2 compliant Certificates as of  4 Feb 2016.  
The configuration of the CA was amended to only issue SHA-2 certificates going 
forward. 
The issuing CA was a deprecated CA that was effectively retired in Q1 of 2015. 
As a result, it was not included in our SHA-2 conversion efforts. 
Due to a fielded application that had embedded explicit trust only to this CA, 
when the certificates came up for renewal,  they were issued in error. As soon 
as the error was brought to our attention, the certificates were revoked and 
replaced with SHA-2 certificates. 
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Re: ComSign Root Renewal Request

2016-02-04 Thread Jesus F
Dear Mozilla community,

Reviewing the BR audit report of Comsign Ltd I have a few doubts regarding the 
audits accepted by Mozilla and may someone can help me.

The BR audit was conducted according to the WebTrust forCertification 
Authorites - SSL Baseline Requirements Audit Criteria version 1.1 and it's a 
point-of-time (as of April 26, 2015).
Although this audit criteria is accepted according to the Mozilla CA 
Certificate Inclusion Policy 2.2, the BR audit version 1.1 was superseded by 
Webtrust SSL Baseline with Network Security version 2.0 (effective for audit 
periods starting on or after July 1, 2014).

Webtrust audit criteria states that "The point-in-time readiness assessment 
shall be completed no earlier than twelve (12) months prior to issuing 
Publicly-Trusted Certificates and shall be followed by a complete audit under 
such scheme within ninety (90) days of issuing the first Publicly-Trusted 
Certificate. (See SSL Baseline Requirements Section 17.4)". Should Mozilla 
expect a complete audit 90 days after the point-in-time BR audit report or 
after the first certificate (I don't know when was issued)?

In addition and regarding the OCSP Responder certificate with Serial Number: 
0e:2b:cd:a4:aa:4f:8f:80:da:16:94:4e:ba:33:35:33, the validity is 3 years. 
According the RFC 6960 "A CA may specify that an OCSP client can trust a 
responder for the lifetime of the responder's certificate.  The CA does so by 
including the extension id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck.  This SHOULD be a non-critical 
extension. The value of the extension SHALL be NULL. CAs issuing such a 
certificate should realize that a compromise of the responder's key is as 
serious as the compromise of a CA key used to sign CRLs, at least for the 
validity period of this certificate.  CAs may choose to issue this type of 
certificate with a very short lifetime and renew it frequently." Which is the 
maximum acceptable lifetime for this type of certificates that contains the 
id-pkix-ocsp-nocheck extension?

PS: Now I cannot test the OCSP due a server error "Code=503,Reason=Service 
Unavailable"

Best
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Firefox is printing SHA1 warning several times - but which servers use SHA-1?

2016-02-04 Thread Denny Bartelt
When including ads on a website Firefox is printing a SHA-1 warning several 
times:

(30) "This site makes use of a SHA-1 Certificate; it's recommended you use 
certificates with signature algorithms that use hash functions stronger than 
SHA-1."

Is there a way to print which servers are using SHA-1 Certificates without 
recheck each of them manually? Is there a verbose mode for that message which 
prints the server name?

thanks, denny
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Re: Firefox is printing SHA1 warning several times - but which servers use SHA-1?

2016-02-04 Thread Richard Barnes
Hey Denny: Good idea.  Unfortunately, there's not a way to turn it on right
now; we would need to add code.

Mark: Could we, say, add the host name to the string?  ("The server at
$DOMAIN makes use of...")  The method producing the warning is on
nsHTTPChannel, so it seems like the host name should be there.

https://dxr.mozilla.org/mozilla-central/source/netwerk/protocol/http/nsHttpChannel.cpp#1384


-- Forwarded message --
From: Denny Bartelt 
Date: Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 4:13 AM
Subject: Firefox is printing SHA1 warning several times - but which servers
use SHA-1?
To: mozilla-dev-security-pol...@lists.mozilla.org


When including ads on a website Firefox is printing a SHA-1 warning several
times:

(30) "This site makes use of a SHA-1 Certificate; it's recommended you use
certificates with signature algorithms that use hash functions stronger
than SHA-1."

Is there a way to print which servers are using SHA-1 Certificates without
recheck each of them manually? Is there a verbose mode for that message
which prints the server name?

thanks, denny
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Re: Firefox is printing SHA1 warning several times - but which servers use SHA-1?

2016-02-04 Thread Mark Goodwin
Where are you viewing these? If you use the web console in the developer
tools, the server is displayed alongside the warning.

On Thu, Feb 4, 2016 at 9:13 AM, Denny Bartelt <
d.bart...@netzathleten-media.de> wrote:

> When including ads on a website Firefox is printing a SHA-1 warning
> several times:
>
> (30) "This site makes use of a SHA-1 Certificate; it's recommended you use
> certificates with signature algorithms that use hash functions stronger
> than SHA-1."
>
> Is there a way to print which servers are using SHA-1 Certificates without
> recheck each of them manually? Is there a verbose mode for that message
> which prints the server name?
>
> thanks, denny
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