By and large I'd say that Matt's no's should instead be yes's. If we adopt the 
standpoint that releasing a domain is equivalent to saying "I no longer use 
that name" then a revocation is equivalent to adding "...and anyone who does 
use that name must surely be an imposter."

In other words, we should give relying parties every opportunity to determine 
legitimate-or-fraud to the greatest extent possible. Granted the real world is 
not quite so simple but I think that's (part of?) the spirit of what we're here 
to do.


  Original Message  
From: Matt Palmer via dev-security-policy
Sent: Wednesday, February 22, 2017 10:32 PM
To: dev-security-policy@lists.mozilla.org
Reply To: Matt Palmer
Subject: Re: Let's Encrypt appears to issue a certificate for a domain that 
doesn't exist

On Wed, Feb 22, 2017 at 10:00:45PM -0500, George Macon via dev-security-policy 
wrote:
> On 2/22/17 7:30 PM, Gervase Markham wrote:
> > On Hacker News, Josh Aas writes:
> > Update: Squarespace has confirmed that they did register the domain and
> > then released it after getting a certificate from us."
> 
> In this case, should Squarespace have requested that the certificate be
> revoked before releasing the domain?

No.

> Is there a way to automatically detect that the domain was released? (I
> suspect the answer to this question is "not easily".)

There have been feeds provided in the past (they may still exist, but I
haven't needed to look for them for some years) for registered domains, I
don't know if something exists for expiration, but it certainly seems like
it, given the speed with which squatters appear able to pick up expired
domains.

> Would it make sense to prohibit certificate issuance during the grace
> period?

No.

- Matt

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