Re: [Ach] Proposal to Remove legacy TLS Ciphersuits Offered by Firefox

2014-01-05 Thread Kurt Roeckx
On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 12:19:10AM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote:
 
  3DES isn't broken.
 Triple DES provides about 112bit security (We've a section on the topic in 
 the Paper in the Keylenghts section). All ciphers that we
 recomend are at least at 128bit security.

The document doesn't seem to say that it's trying to reach a 128
bit security level over the whole chain.  It seems to be happy
with 2048 bit RSA keys.  They also provide 112 bit security.

If you really want to go for 128 bit, you need to have the RSA
keys of at least something in the order of 3072 bit.  If 2048
is fine, 3DES is fine.


Kurt

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Re: [Ach] Proposal to Remove legacy TLS Ciphersuits Offered by Firefox

2014-01-05 Thread ianG

On 5/01/14 18:27 PM, Kurt Roeckx wrote:

On Fri, Jan 03, 2014 at 12:19:10AM +0100, Aaron Zauner wrote:



3DES isn't broken.

Triple DES provides about 112bit security (We've a section on the topic in the 
Paper in the Keylenghts section). All ciphers that we
recomend are at least at 128bit security.


The document doesn't seem to say that it's trying to reach a 128
bit security level over the whole chain.  It seems to be happy
with 2048 bit RSA keys.  They also provide 112 bit security.



As others have mentioned, these aren't quite comparable.  3DES has an 8 
byte block, which gives its own problems.  AES is a stronger more modern 
algorithm.


Key length isn't an exact proxy for security.

Also, the setting of the RSA key is more driven by software capabilities 
and CA's capabilities  compliances with mountains of documents than 
anything else.  Rather chalk  cheese, you can't just wind up the RSA 
key size by setting a param in config, more's the pity.


iang



If you really want to go for 128 bit, you need to have the RSA
keys of at least something in the order of 3072 bit.  If 2048
is fine, 3DES is fine.


Kurt

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Re: [Ach] Proposal to Remove legacy TLS Ciphersuits Offered by Firefox

2014-01-05 Thread cloos
Julien Vehent jul...@linuxwall.info writes:

 I would argue that our documents target server configurations, where
 AES-NI is now a standard.

It is not.  Many sites run on virtuals, often using kvm.  And most kvm
sites provide a QEMU Virtual CPU which only supports sse2.

And even without kvm, there is still a /lot/ of pre-aes-ni hardware in use.

-JimC
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