Re: Where are others "SHA256 " cipher suits in Firefox 27?
>On the server side, we are working to support better TLS. Thanks for the information. Please also have a look at AMO, it doesn't even support TLS 1.2 and Forward Secrecy: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=addons.mozilla.org -- View this message in context: http://mozilla.6506.n7.nabble.com/Where-are-others-SHA256-cipher-suits-in-Firefox-27-tp306678p311571.html Sent from the Mozilla - Cryptography mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
Re: Where are others "SHA256 " cipher suits in Firefox 27?
Another reason to enable DHE_RSA_AES_*_GCM: Mozilla's new account system only supports RSA and DHE_RSA ciphers: https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=accounts.firefox.com Same goes for mozilla.org and bugzilla. -- View this message in context: http://mozilla.6506.n7.nabble.com/Where-are-others-SHA256-cipher-suits-in-Firefox-27-tp306678p311535.html Sent from the Mozilla - Cryptography mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
Re: Where are others "SHA256 " cipher suits in Firefox 27?
>Lucky13 is a timing attack on MAC-then-Encrypt, which CBC uses. >This attack can be fixed, but it's harder to get this right than >it should be. >Maybe you're refering to the BEAST attack instead of Lucky 13, >which TLS 1.1 fixed and can be worked around in older versions >by splitting? >Anyway, I see no need for adding support for ciphers that do not >support forward secrecy. Yes, because CBC is vulnerable to Lucky13, using GCM will not be vulnerable, thus GCM support is important. So if some sites support GCM but not Forward Secrecy, making TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 available in Firefox, they will at least be safe from Lucky13. But on the other hand I agree with you that supporting new ciphers without Forward Secrecy is undesirable. >Please name a few of those sites that have > 1024 DH keys. I went looking for some more, but the apparently the only sites that have > 1024 DH keys are a few small sites usually concerning privacy and/or security. >But I can understand that some people might prefer DHE instead of >ECDHE. And I've actually requested that this cipher would be >enabled too. Ah nice. I am not sure who is in charge of this decision, but I've searched for a while and found quite a few sites that support AES-GCM but not the ECDHE versions. The list includes VPN providers, a 3rd party payment provider, a 3rd party system that educational institutions use which handles student information and some more. So a lot of private and/or confidential information. I hope that this can convince the need for TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_*_GCM_SHA* https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=openssl.org&s=185.9.166.106 https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=community.openvpn.net https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=payment.buckaroo.nl https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=hartvoorinternetvrijheid.nl https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=system.im https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=ivpn.net https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=mullvad.net https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=fronter.summacollege.nl https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=proxy.sh https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=unipackworldwide.com https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=www.security.nl&s=213.156.0.246 https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=verified.de https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=apache-da.com https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=tuifly.com https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=techzone.ergon.ch https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=https-ict.nl https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=filezilla-project.org https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=socialsecurity.be https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=daisy.ubuntu.com&s=91.189.95.55 https://www.ssllabs.com/ssltest/analyze.html?d=www.box.com&s=74.112.185.70 >I understand that RSA is expected to get broken in the next 10 years >and we need alternatives. ECDSA is currently the only other >standardised method for using in TLS that we should consider using >as far as I know. I would also like to point out that EC isn't >exactly new, it's just seeing more wide deployment now. >So I'm actually concerned that in the long run all of RSA, DHE and >ECC will be broken and that we don't really have alternatives. >But we have to go with what we currently know. Hopefully alternatives will emerge in the near future. -- View this message in context: http://mozilla.6506.n7.nabble.com/Where-are-others-SHA256-cipher-suits-in-Firefox-27-tp306678p306864.html Sent from the Mozilla - Cryptography mailing list archive at Nabble.com. -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
Where are others "SHA256 " cipher suits in Firefox 27?
Regarding the other variants of AES-GCM -TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 There are some sites support AES-GCM that use only ciphers with RSA key exchange. I think it would be best not to support new standards that don't provide Forward Secrecy, but on the other hand, if this cipher is enabled then users browsing to those sites will at least have something better than RSA with AES-CBC. If I'm correct, AES-GCM is not vulnerable to some of the newer TLS attacks, in particular Lucky13. Even when used together with TLS 1.2, AES-CBC is vulnerable to Lucky13. -TLS_DHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 I'm aware that a lot of sites only use 1024 bit DH, but with the patent issues regarding ECC, there are still enough sites who don't support ECDHE. If this cipher is enabled, users can benefit both from protection against Lucky13 and Forward Secrecy. Also there are enough sites out there that do have 2048 or even 4096 bit DH key exchange. For sites that have both ECDHE and DHE ciphers enabled, ECDHE variants are usually the preferred anyway and if the server has no preference, they are also preferred by NSS. I also think that diversity should be maintained in case a vulnerability in some standard or protocol is discovered. Just like supporting ChaCha20_Poly1305 and AES with other modes like CCM to avoid the same disaster as with the BEAST attack, where AES-CBC was the only really secure protocol, found vulnerable and then having tons of sites switch back to the insecure RC4. Just in case ECC is being discovered vulnerable, there should be an alternative key exchange method that does not use EC cryptography. The only widely used are RSA and DHE, and DHE supports Forward Secrecy and is the better alternative IMO. Bruce Schneier believes ECC is relatively easier to break for the NSA. Whether or not you find his advice important, the fact is that ECC is relatively new and there should at least be one older and proven method as well. As discussed before, ECC cryptography has better performance, but if webmasters prefer performance then they put DHE ciphers lower in the order or disable them completely. IMO, the weighing whether to prefer performance or security is the choice of siteowners and webmasters. By supporting only variants you or someone else prefers, you're limiting their choice. -- dev-tech-crypto mailing list dev-tech-crypto@lists.mozilla.org https://lists.mozilla.org/listinfo/dev-tech-crypto
