Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

2023-06-10 Thread Richard Clayton
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In message <7f854d28-d3b5-fd00-4613-b8baa1217...@tana.it>, Alessandro
Vesely  writes

>What I find nonsensical is to eliminate SPF in order to save DNS queries,

at $DAYJOB$ (a large mailbox provider) SPF queries are limited to 15 ...
since the prescribed limit of 10 was determined to cause too many SPF
passes not to be found...

> given 
>that we replaced local PSL lookups with a series of queries.  We cannot do 
>that 
>and pretend that SPF is too expensive.

the change here is not, I believe, 15 ... or even 10  (I think, counting
quickly on my fingers, it's +3 -- and for the vast majority of cases +0)

- -- 
richard   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] PSD flag vs Version bump

2023-06-10 Thread Richard Clayton
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In message <20230610210457.b4c22e924...@ary.qy>, John Levine
 writes

>We have two of the largest mail operators in the world saying that if
>they can't tell which org domain scheme domain expects, they won't
>implement the tree walk. We have to do something or we are wasting our
>time.

Clarity is everything ... reducing system complexity matters as well.

Removing the need to consult a (reasonably) current version of the PSL
matters a great deal, because even when operating at the scale that you
can have engineers (and further systems) monitoring for when this does
not happen is complexity that one would wish to dispose of.

ie the new tree walk is an improvement and not just because of the new
features it provides.

Domain owners can learn when the new treewalk is being used by
consulting aggregate reports...  domains that wish to use the features
the new treewalk provides may, in the fullness of time, start reaching
out to the recalcitrant.

For example, if you are gov.uk and running a special DNS system to make
the old approach provide some safety, you may want to turn that system
off, but you can only do that once mailbox provides have changed over.

Meantime the mailbox providers want to know if they are behind the curve
in using the new tree walk... tracking the DMARC records they fetch (or
looking at surveys by people who fetch and count them) will tell them if
domain owners know that things have changed.

Personally (and I am not writing on behalf of $DAYJOB$) I think that
signal "I know things have changed and am setting things up accordingly"
is most clearly sent by bumping the version number, rather than relying
on other more subtle syntax changes.

viz: the version number bump is a clear signal that domain owners know
what is going on (and is really easy to explain to them).

That signal tells mailbox providers which tree walk (and any other
changes) to use and when it is clear that we're into the long tail of
domain owners who have not heard the messaging then is the time to say
"well the new tree walk makes no difference" and delete the old code,
stop fetching the PSL and decommission the monitoring... the final step
is to ignore version 1 records completely (and signal that in aggregate
reports)...

I foresee almost no enthusiasm for running two systems in parallel in
perpetuity. Running the simpler __system__ is clearly better all round
but I do think that the fact that there are changes should be signalled
very clearly rather than deduced ... it will make the messaging to the
masses rather than the cognoscenti so much simpler.

- -- 
richard   Richard Clayton

Those who would give up essential Liberty, to purchase a little temporary 
Safety, deserve neither Liberty nor Safety. Benjamin Franklin 11 Nov 1755

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] PSD flag vs Version bump

2023-06-10 Thread Scott Kitterman



On June 10, 2023 9:04:57 PM UTC, John Levine  wrote:
>It appears that Scott Kitterman   said:
>>
>>What's the incentive that any existing DMARC users (senders or receivers) 
>>would have to invest additional resources in another email
>>authentication protocol?
>
>We have two of the largest mail operators in the world saying that if
>they can't tell which org domain scheme domain expects, they won't
>implement the tree walk. We have to do something or we are wasting our
>time.
>
>So how about this: in the tree walk, you look for DMARC records that
>have an explicit psd=y/n/u tag. If you find at least one record with a
>tag, you use the new scheme. If you find no records with a tag, you
>fall back to the old scheme. I think this will let people do
>everything they can do with the current tree walk, while being
>backward compatible. If you want a domain to be an org domain you put
>psd=n, if you want the tree walk to skip it and keep looking, you put
>psd=u, and if it's one of the 0.001% of domains that actually is a
>PSD, you put psd=y.
>
>We already added DiscoveryType to the aggregate report schema so we
>are OK there.

Generally, I think it's fine, but specifically, I think we need to be careful 
about the language.

Using PSL is 7489DMARC.  Using tree walk is DMARCbis.  I don't think we want to 
include all the PSL stuff in the bis document, so I think we need to avoid 
talking about it.

We can update the tag description and include a statement that the presence of 
the tag is an indication that the record has been evaluated as being compatible 
with DMARCbis (which is I think what they actually want).

At the rate we're going on the description of overall interoperability status 
of DMARC, I think there's plenty of time to work out the details.

Scott K

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] PSD flag vs Version bump

2023-06-10 Thread John R Levine

Why not say "SHOULD use tree walk", and then document, as explanation
for "SHOULD" instead of "MUST", non-normative reasons why you might
not?


I don't think that will fly with the VLMPs.  The mandatory PSD seems 
relatively easy to implement, just add it to the template you use for 
everything.


R's,
John


On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 5:05 PM John Levine  wrote:


It appears that Scott Kitterman   said:


What's the incentive that any existing DMARC users (senders or receivers) would 
have to invest additional resources in another email
authentication protocol?


We have two of the largest mail operators in the world saying that if
they can't tell which org domain scheme domain expects, they won't
implement the tree walk. We have to do something or we are wasting our
time.

So how about this: in the tree walk, you look for DMARC records that
have an explicit psd=y/n/u tag. If you find at least one record with a
tag, you use the new scheme. If you find no records with a tag, you
fall back to the old scheme. I think this will let people do
everything they can do with the current tree walk, while being
backward compatible. If you want a domain to be an org domain you put
psd=n, if you want the tree walk to skip it and keep looking, you put
psd=u, and if it's one of the 0.001% of domains that actually is a
PSD, you put psd=y.

We already added DiscoveryType to the aggregate report schema so we
are OK there.

R's,
John

PS: Whether we say people SHOULD NOT use SPF is a separate issue.


Regards,
John Levine, jo...@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail. https://jl.ly

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] PSD flag vs Version bump

2023-06-10 Thread Barry Leiba
Hm...

Why not say "SHOULD use tree walk", and then document, as explanation
for "SHOULD" instead of "MUST", non-normative reasons why you might
not?

Waddyathink?

Barry


On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 5:05 PM John Levine  wrote:
>
> It appears that Scott Kitterman   said:
> >
> >What's the incentive that any existing DMARC users (senders or receivers) 
> >would have to invest additional resources in another email
> >authentication protocol?
>
> We have two of the largest mail operators in the world saying that if
> they can't tell which org domain scheme domain expects, they won't
> implement the tree walk. We have to do something or we are wasting our
> time.
>
> So how about this: in the tree walk, you look for DMARC records that
> have an explicit psd=y/n/u tag. If you find at least one record with a
> tag, you use the new scheme. If you find no records with a tag, you
> fall back to the old scheme. I think this will let people do
> everything they can do with the current tree walk, while being
> backward compatible. If you want a domain to be an org domain you put
> psd=n, if you want the tree walk to skip it and keep looking, you put
> psd=u, and if it's one of the 0.001% of domains that actually is a
> PSD, you put psd=y.
>
> We already added DiscoveryType to the aggregate report schema so we
> are OK there.
>
> R's,
> John
>
> PS: Whether we say people SHOULD NOT use SPF is a separate issue.
>
>
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Re: [dmarc-ietf] PSD flag vs Version bump

2023-06-10 Thread John Levine
It appears that Scott Kitterman   said:
>
>What's the incentive that any existing DMARC users (senders or receivers) 
>would have to invest additional resources in another email
>authentication protocol?

We have two of the largest mail operators in the world saying that if
they can't tell which org domain scheme domain expects, they won't
implement the tree walk. We have to do something or we are wasting our
time.

So how about this: in the tree walk, you look for DMARC records that
have an explicit psd=y/n/u tag. If you find at least one record with a
tag, you use the new scheme. If you find no records with a tag, you
fall back to the old scheme. I think this will let people do
everything they can do with the current tree walk, while being
backward compatible. If you want a domain to be an org domain you put
psd=n, if you want the tree walk to skip it and keep looking, you put
psd=u, and if it's one of the 0.001% of domains that actually is a
PSD, you put psd=y.

We already added DiscoveryType to the aggregate report schema so we
are OK there.

R's,
John

PS: Whether we say people SHOULD NOT use SPF is a separate issue.


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Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

2023-06-10 Thread Jesse Thompson
On Sat, Jun 10, 2023, at 12:50 AM, Barry Leiba wrote:
> Are there working group participants who can do this sort of
> evaluation, not just giving numbers but also analyzing why DKIM
> failures happened when they should not have?

As primarily an outbound ESP, we don't have access to relevant inbound logs, 
nor DMARC reports for customer domains, so our awareness of this issue is 
dependent on being told.

That said, at MAAWG we were made aware of an edge case which is resulting in 
DKIM failures. Presumably, unknown bugs like this are inflating the numbers to 
support the "pro keeping SPF in DMARC" argument.

I typically advise customers that DKIM (CNAMEs with managed rotation) is 
enough. But that's speaking as a sender that supports DKIM. I suppose that some 
senders still aren't willing to implement DKIM today.

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Version bump: was DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

2023-06-10 Thread Scott Kitterman
To the extent we might need it so far, I think the psd= tag is that flag.

Scott K

On June 10, 2023 7:34:59 PM UTC, Tim Wicinski  wrote:
>I'd rather add an option to flag some behavior rather than do a version
>bump.
>
>Have to agree with Scott that version bumps take forever.
>(I had a network engineer recently tell me that DNS packets *MUST* be no
>larger than 512 bytes - and EDNS0 was 1999?)
>
>tim
>
>On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:03 PM Scott Kitterman 
>wrote:
>
>>
>>
>> On June 8, 2023 12:58:51 PM UTC, Tobias Herkula > 401und1...@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
>> ...
>> >
>> >However, such a fundamental shift in the protocol's architecture warrants
>> a clear signifier. I suggest we upgrade our DMARC version string from the
>> current state to 'DMARC2.' This upgrade would not only denote the change of
>> SPF removal, but also the switch from the Public Suffix List (PSL) to the
>> Tree-Walk algorithm.
>> >
>> >By moving towards DMARC2, we not only update our standard to better
>> reflect our present requirements, but we also make a clear commitment to
>> the ongoing evolution and improvement of the protocol.
>>
>>
>> There's been a fair amount of discussion of the drop SPF part of this
>> proposal, but I think less about the question of version bumps.  I'm going
>> back to the top of the thread to focus on that.
>>
>> I don't think there's much precedent for version bumps being successful in
>> any reasonable time frame.  How long did it take to transition from SMTP to
>> ESMTP?  Is it done yet?  Absent IPv4 address exhaustion, how many more
>> decades would it have taken for IPv6 deployment to take off?  SSL/TLS is
>> the best example I can think of, but even that, where there are very strong
>> security and privacy incentives, has been too slow and very painful.  We
>> have nothing like that level incentive for people to support an
>> incompatible break between non-IETF DMARC and IETF DMARC.
>>
>> Technically, it's a new protocol.  There's no technical difference between
>> saying records now have to start with v=DMARC2 and they have to start with
>> v=NOTDMARC.  It's a decision to abandon all existing deployments and start
>> over.
>>
>> What's the incentive that any existing DMARC users (senders or receivers)
>> would have to invest additional resources in another email authentication
>> protocol?  My expectation is that if the IETF decides to bump the version,
>> very little deployment of the IETF variant.  "The IETF says this one is
>> better" doesn't move budgets in any meaningful way.
>>
>> My suggestion is that if we determine that a change requires a version
>> bump, out response should be to not make that change instead.
>>
>> For clarity, I don't think the tree walk should drive a version bump (and
>> we already went over that, let's resist the temptation to do it again), but
>> if it did, then I would rather stay with the PSL.
>>
>> Please, no version bumps.
>>
>> Scott K
>>
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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Version bump: was DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

2023-06-10 Thread Tim Wicinski
I'd rather add an option to flag some behavior rather than do a version
bump.

Have to agree with Scott that version bumps take forever.
(I had a network engineer recently tell me that DNS packets *MUST* be no
larger than 512 bytes - and EDNS0 was 1999?)

tim

On Sat, Jun 10, 2023 at 3:03 PM Scott Kitterman 
wrote:

>
>
> On June 8, 2023 12:58:51 PM UTC, Tobias Herkula  401und1...@dmarc.ietf.org> wrote:
> ...
> >
> >However, such a fundamental shift in the protocol's architecture warrants
> a clear signifier. I suggest we upgrade our DMARC version string from the
> current state to 'DMARC2.' This upgrade would not only denote the change of
> SPF removal, but also the switch from the Public Suffix List (PSL) to the
> Tree-Walk algorithm.
> >
> >By moving towards DMARC2, we not only update our standard to better
> reflect our present requirements, but we also make a clear commitment to
> the ongoing evolution and improvement of the protocol.
>
>
> There's been a fair amount of discussion of the drop SPF part of this
> proposal, but I think less about the question of version bumps.  I'm going
> back to the top of the thread to focus on that.
>
> I don't think there's much precedent for version bumps being successful in
> any reasonable time frame.  How long did it take to transition from SMTP to
> ESMTP?  Is it done yet?  Absent IPv4 address exhaustion, how many more
> decades would it have taken for IPv6 deployment to take off?  SSL/TLS is
> the best example I can think of, but even that, where there are very strong
> security and privacy incentives, has been too slow and very painful.  We
> have nothing like that level incentive for people to support an
> incompatible break between non-IETF DMARC and IETF DMARC.
>
> Technically, it's a new protocol.  There's no technical difference between
> saying records now have to start with v=DMARC2 and they have to start with
> v=NOTDMARC.  It's a decision to abandon all existing deployments and start
> over.
>
> What's the incentive that any existing DMARC users (senders or receivers)
> would have to invest additional resources in another email authentication
> protocol?  My expectation is that if the IETF decides to bump the version,
> very little deployment of the IETF variant.  "The IETF says this one is
> better" doesn't move budgets in any meaningful way.
>
> My suggestion is that if we determine that a change requires a version
> bump, out response should be to not make that change instead.
>
> For clarity, I don't think the tree walk should drive a version bump (and
> we already went over that, let's resist the temptation to do it again), but
> if it did, then I would rather stay with the PSL.
>
> Please, no version bumps.
>
> Scott K
>
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[dmarc-ietf] Version bump: was DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

2023-06-10 Thread Scott Kitterman



On June 8, 2023 12:58:51 PM UTC, Tobias Herkula 
 wrote:
... 
>
>However, such a fundamental shift in the protocol's architecture warrants a 
>clear signifier. I suggest we upgrade our DMARC version string from the 
>current state to 'DMARC2.' This upgrade would not only denote the change of 
>SPF removal, but also the switch from the Public Suffix List (PSL) to the 
>Tree-Walk algorithm.
>
>By moving towards DMARC2, we not only update our standard to better reflect 
>our present requirements, but we also make a clear commitment to the ongoing 
>evolution and improvement of the protocol.


There's been a fair amount of discussion of the drop SPF part of this proposal, 
but I think less about the question of version bumps.  I'm going back to the 
top of the thread to focus on that.

I don't think there's much precedent for version bumps being successful in any 
reasonable time frame.  How long did it take to transition from SMTP to ESMTP?  
Is it done yet?  Absent IPv4 address exhaustion, how many more decades would it 
have taken for IPv6 deployment to take off?  SSL/TLS is the best example I can 
think of, but even that, where there are very strong security and privacy 
incentives, has been too slow and very painful.  We have nothing like that 
level incentive for people to support an incompatible break between non-IETF 
DMARC and IETF DMARC.

Technically, it's a new protocol.  There's no technical difference between 
saying records now have to start with v=DMARC2 and they have to start with 
v=NOTDMARC.  It's a decision to abandon all existing deployments and start over.

What's the incentive that any existing DMARC users (senders or receivers) would 
have to invest additional resources in another email authentication protocol?  
My expectation is that if the IETF decides to bump the version, very little 
deployment of the IETF variant.  "The IETF says this one is better" doesn't 
move budgets in any meaningful way.

My suggestion is that if we determine that a change requires a version bump, 
out response should be to not make that change instead.

For clarity, I don't think the tree walk should drive a version bump (and we 
already went over that, let's resist the temptation to do it again), but if it 
did, then I would rather stay with the PSL.

Please, no version bumps.

Scott K

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Errors in the tree walk, was version bump to DMARC2

2023-06-10 Thread Alessandro Vesely

On Sat 10/Jun/2023 01:26:18 +0200 Emil Gustafsson wrote:


Without a version change for the tree-walk, I think we (Google) would need to 
support both approaches (the old one plus the tree-walk) and based on what we 
see - make a best guess which version we should use.



I haven't coded the tree walk yet, but I'm thinking to do the same.


Having two explicit versions still means we have two implementations, but at 
least we don't have to guess which one to use whenever there would be ambiguity 
with a single version.



Why two versions?  Tree walk can be supported while still checking it against 
the PSL in the same version of the verifier.  One point, for example is the 
lack of psd=y tags in the critical domains.


In this respect, I propose to report the most striking configuration errors in 
DMARC aggregate reports.  In fact, RFCs 6651 and 6652 have seen very little 
adoption; ruf= a little bit more, but still much less than DMARC aggregate reports.


Errors like missing psd=, invalid SPF record, invalid or missing DKIM record, 
and similar could be added in the report header, e.g. after , 
in case relevant errors are seen.  Maybe that could improve settings...



Best
Ale
--





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Re: [dmarc-ietf] DMARC2 & SPF Dependency Removal

2023-06-10 Thread Alessandro Vesely

On Fri 09/Jun/2023 17:33:16 +0200 Scott Kitterman wrote:

You may not think that last half of a percent is important (my recollection is
that it varied a bit between 0.2% and 0.8%), but I think it exists and is
important.



I only keep one month worth of DKIM and SPF results, and got 0.52% on it right 
now, featuring large an small companies.  Surely they must be misconfigured...


Two names are twitter.com and gnupg.org.  The latter cannot be said to be 
crypto-ignorant.



Best
Ale
--





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