Re: [dmarc-ietf] Non-solution for DMARC disruption of normal email use while still offering its normal protection

2014-05-30 Thread Tim Draegen
On May 29, 2014, at 3:05 AM, John R Levine jo...@taugh.com wrote:
 Really, that makes no difference.  I don't want Yahoo or anyone else to pay 
 us to screw up our mail software to work around them -- I want them to spend 
 their money to fix things so we don't have to.

Yes, I get it, I guess in my own jaded way I don't think there is any amount of 
money that Yahoo and AOL can spend that will fix things (because email isn't 
owned by Yahoo or AOL).  BUT, if Yahoo or AOL is willing to experiment, let 
that experiment be me!

I replied to Doug earlier (not yet in archive), and hashed out my own thinking 
around how much domain owners can do vs. how to address 
legitimate-but-unauthorizable email.

TLDR summary: addressing legitimate-but-unauthorizable mail is my answer to 
Scott Kitterman's question: How do we define the scope of work for this list?.


 
 Yahoo, in their own blog, estimates there are 30,000 mail systems that they 
 have damaged by their DMARC actions.  I would be surprised if there were more 
 than a few hundred mail systems acting on DMARC policies, although some of 
 those are very, very large. Is it that hard to understand why someone might 
 think it was unreasonable to demand that the 30,000 make changes of no 
 benefit to themselves, rather than the few hundred fix their buggy fussp?

I don't think there is/was a way for Yahoo to fix the estimated few hundred 
mail systems acting on DMARC policies, especially since most are not controlled 
by Yahoo.  Maybe they could have published a list of 30,000 mail systems that 
are white-listed, but wouldn't that just be a publication of 30,000 holes to 
exploit?

The absolute most work I could imagine Yahoo and AOL having done would have 
been to analyze and publish a series of articles/guidance on how impacted email 
can be fixed, complete with accessible patches to all known mailing systems.  
THEN, give the entire internet enough time to apply said patches.  This is my 
unicorn.

For the next 10 years, I'm going to attempt to recreate this unicorn.

 
 The 30K estimate is probably low, since there are likely many small mail 
 systems they aren't aware of but that they are damaging. For example, 
 yesterday a middle school teacher who found my old Dummmies web site wrote to 
 me out of the blue to say that his web form that lets students and parents 
 send mail to him stopped working for AOL and Yahoo addresses, which just 
 disappear.  It took about two seconds to figure out what was wrong when he 
 told me that his script sends mail to his Gmail account.  I told him what was 
 wrong, and he did a hack that sticks in a fake From: address, so the mail 
 gets through but now his script works worse since he can't write back without 
 extra effort.  If he hadn't written to me, he'd probably never have figured 
 out what was wrong.  These are real people who are really hurt by the two 
 providers' actions.

In a similar vein, there are a fair number of businesses that do stuff like 
encapsulate their customer mail with bling (fancy headers, pictures, footers w/ 
disclaimers... stationary), and they're having to figure out how to maintain 
their service when sending on behalf of clients with Yahoo and AOL addresses.  

What is missing is how am I supposed to do this right?  I'm not being glib, 
there's a real vacuum due to email being what it is, and it's a vacuum that I 
personally don't think corporations can/should fill.

-= Tim

 
 Regards,
 John Levine, jo...@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
 Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail.
 
 PS: Here endeth the rant.

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Non-solution for DMARC disruption of normal email use while still offering its normal protection

2014-05-30 Thread John R Levine

TLDR summary: addressing legitimate-but-unauthorizable mail is my answer to Scott 
Kitterman's question: How do we define the scope of work for this list?.


Yup.

Yes, I get it, I guess in my own jaded way I don't think there is any 
amount of money that Yahoo and AOL can spend that will fix things 
(because email isn't owned by Yahoo or AOL).  BUT, if Yahoo or AOL is 
willing to experiment, let that experiment be me! ...


Sounds good.

I don't think there is/was a way for Yahoo to fix the estimated few 
hundred mail systems acting on DMARC policies, especially since most are 
not controlled by Yahoo.  Maybe they could have published a list of 
30,000 mail systems that are white-listed, but wouldn't that just be a 
publication of 30,000 holes to exploit?


Um, wait. Are we doing experiments or not?

In answer to your second question, well, no.  There's no reason to think 
that can't be described by DMARC is related to insecure.  A lot of 
them, like the WSJ and the schoolteacher who wrote to me, don't even have 
inbound MTAs to attack.


Regards,
John Levine, jo...@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail.

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Re: [dmarc-ietf] Non-solution for DMARC disruption of normal email use while still offering its normal protection

2014-05-29 Thread John R Levine
Hello John, what you're missing -- and its easy to miss -- is that Yahoo 
has an outstanding offer to help developers (this means $!) fix things.


Really, that makes no difference.  I don't want Yahoo or anyone else to 
pay us to screw up our mail software to work around them -- I want them to 
spend their money to fix things so we don't have to.


Yahoo, in their own blog, estimates there are 30,000 mail systems that 
they have damaged by their DMARC actions.  I would be surprised if there 
were more than a few hundred mail systems acting on DMARC policies, 
although some of those are very, very large.  Is it that hard to 
understand why someone might think it was unreasonable to demand that the 
30,000 make changes of no benefit to themselves, rather than the few 
hundred fix their buggy fussp?


The 30K estimate is probably low, since there are likely many small mail 
systems they aren't aware of but that they are damaging.  For example, 
yesterday a middle school teacher who found my old Dummmies web site wrote 
to me out of the blue to say that his web form that lets students and 
parents send mail to him stopped working for AOL and Yahoo addresses, 
which just disappear.  It took about two seconds to figure out what was 
wrong when he told me that his script sends mail to his Gmail account.  I 
told him what was wrong, and he did a hack that sticks in a fake From: 
address, so the mail gets through but now his script works worse since he 
can't write back without extra effort.  If he hadn't written to me, he'd 
probably never have figured out what was wrong.  These are real people who 
are really hurt by the two providers' actions.


Regards,
John Levine, jo...@taugh.com, Taughannock Networks, Trumansburg NY
Please consider the environment before reading this e-mail.

PS: Here endeth the rant.

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