Re: [DNSOP] [dnsdir] Dnsdir early review of draft-ietf-dnsop-qdcount-is-one-01

2024-01-17 Thread Jim Reid



> On 17 Jan 2024, at 20:42, Matt Brown via Datatracker via dnsdir 
>  wrote:
> 
> Reviewer: Matt Brown
> Review result: Ready
> 
> I have been selected as the DNS Directorate reviewer for this draft.

> The draft itself is clear and understandable. Both the language and the
> substance of the proposal make sense to me.
> 
> Given this previous discussion and clarity of proposal I see no blockers or
> issues for the ADs to consider and recommend this draft is ready to be
> progressed further.

Excellent! Many thanks for your review Matt.

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[DNSOP] Dnsdir early review of draft-ietf-dnsop-qdcount-is-one-01

2024-01-17 Thread Matt Brown via Datatracker
Reviewer: Matt Brown
Review result: Ready

I have been selected as the DNS Directorate reviewer for this draft. The DNS
Directorate seeks to review all DNS or DNS-related drafts as they pass through
IETF last call and IESG review, and sometimes on special request. The purpose
of the review is to provide assistance to the ADs. For more information about
the DNS Directorate, please see https://wiki.ietf.org/en/group/dnsdir

This draft proposes addition of normative language updating RFC1035 to specify
that QDCOUNT must not be > 1 for OPCODE=0 (QUERY) DNS requests. The intent is
to eliminate present ambiguity in the specification where QDCOUNT is not
required to be <= 1, but (as described by section A.1 and A.5 of the draft) in
practical terms given the meaning of other fields (AA) and the surrounding
language in RFC1035 it is undefined how such a question should or even could be
interpreted and usefully responded to.

The proposal has been discussed in the dnsop group and previous meetings and my
observation of the discussion is that there is both broad agreement that
QDCOUNT > 1 is not used in practice and at least some supporting evidence
presented that it is not observed in the wild either.

The draft itself is clear and understandable. Both the language and the
substance of the proposal make sense to me.

Given this previous discussion and clarity of proposal I see no blockers or
issues for the ADs to consider and recommend this draft is ready to be
progressed further.


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Re: [DNSOP] Resolver behaviour in the presence of unrequested answer records

2024-01-17 Thread Paul Wouters
On Jan 17, 2024, at 05:15, Bellebaum, Thomas 
 wrote:
> 
> 1. Caching of unrequested RRs would actually be fine, if they are
> properly signed. At worst, a resolver would cache irrelevant records.

This is not entirely true.  By tailoring someone’s cache you might be able to 
track them. There is definitely a privacy aspect here.

> 2. It is the usage of irrelevant records by the application which is
> causing the problem. You could reproduce this problem without any
> caches involved.

They could become relevant later on when they are already in the cache ? Eg the 
google.con example ? The user later on browses google.com. This is not an 
application using “irrelevant records”

Paul
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Re: [DNSOP] Poll to select DNSOP Interim meeting last week January

2024-01-17 Thread Benno Overeinder

Dear DNSOP WG,

I closed the doodle poll to select a suitable day and time.  The 
selected day and time is *January 30, 2024, 17:00-18:00 UTC*.


I will schedule the interim in the datatracker and more information 
about the interim meeting will appear on the mailing list.



Best regards,

-- Benno


On 12/01/2024 13:34, Benno Overeinder wrote:

Dear DNSOP WG,

The authors and contributors of the DELEG document have made good 
progress since the IETF 118 meeting, where they initially presented 
their ideas.  During the IETF 118 DNSOP meeting, Petr Spacek shared the 
outcomes of the two-day Hackathon session and introduced the initial 
concepts related to DELEG.


For presentation slides, please refer to: 
https://datatracker.ietf.org/meeting/118/materials/slides-118-dnsop-hackaton-118-deleg-rr-proposal-00.


The chairs have engaged with the document's authors and contributors, 
and it appears that the end of January is an opportune time to share the 
progress, current status, and future plans to the DNSOP WG participants. 
  In early February, some of the contributors will meet in person to 
address various issues, and feedback from the DNSOP WG prior to this 
gathering would be highly beneficial.  This timeframe also allows for 
ongoing work on a number of topics that can be presented at the IETF 119 
meeting in March 2024.


To coordinate the interim meeting, we have created a doodle to determine 
a suitable day and time.  Kindly complete the doodle before Tuesday, 
January 16 (end of business day):


* https://doodle.com/meeting/participate/id/b2G7kMJd

The authors and contributors are actively working on drafts available in 
the following GitHub repository: https://github.com/fl1ger/deleg.



Best regards,

Suzanne, Tim and Benno

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--
Benno J. Overeinder
NLnet Labs
https://www.nlnetlabs.nl/

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Re: [DNSOP] Resolver behaviour in the presence of unrequested answer records

2024-01-17 Thread Bellebaum, Thomas
> That's cache poisoning.  Search for "Eugene Kashpureff" to learn all
> about it.

There is a relation in the sense that checking RRs for relevance to the
query is mentioned as a partial defense against cache poisoning in RFC
3833, section 2.3.

Note however some differences:

1. Caching of unrequested RRs would actually be fine, if they are
properly signed. At worst, a resolver would cache irrelevant records.

2. It is the usage of irrelevant records by the application which is
causing the problem. You could reproduce this problem without any
caches involved.

The confusion seems to arise in RFC 1034, section 5.3.3, which states:

> a. if the response answers the question or contains a name
>error, cache the data as well as returning it back to
>the client.

But what exactly "the data" is (or, going with RFC 3833, how
"relevance" is determined), does not seem to be specified anywhere, at
least not in rigorous algorithmical form.

Best regards,

- Thomas


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