Re: [EM] advocacy by means of exit polls
[EMAIL PROTECTED] writes: > It makes no sense in this case to define "wrong" as anything other > than a wrong count of how people actually voted. Therefore, the > official results of an election are just as capable of being wrong > as exit poll results. Sure, but in practice, the count that actually matters is the one that is called "official" (perhaps after a court or political contest). That is the count that third-party polls try to predict, and the one that they are usually judged against. > As for your claim that the margin of discrepancy is "closely > comparable between exit polling and phone polling," that is > such an improbable sounding claim that you are going to have > to provide some pretty convincing documentation to convince > me of it. Exit polling is widely understood as much more accurate > than phone polling. There are many widely understood things that are wrong or misleading. http://www.mysterypollster.com/main/2004/12/what_about_thos.html discusses why US presidential election national exit polls are weaker than some other exit polls. This entry discusses sources of systematic error in exit polling: http://www.mysterypollster.com/main/2004/12/what_is_the_sam.html http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/politics/july-dec04/exitpolls_11-05.html is an interview with the co-director of the NEP that mentions other sources of error in the 2004 US exit polls (search for "margins"). Perhaps most tellingly, http://www.exit-poll.net/faq.html#a15 says that the margin of error for the US national exit poll is +/- 3%, and for individual states it is +/- 4%. Most telephone polls are structured to +/- 3% error margins even within a state. For example, http://www.quinnipiac.edu/x11379.xml?ReleaseID=492 claims just over 3% error margin for each state, and considering the poll's undecided voters, the official results from the three states are within those margins. http://www.harrisinteractive.com/harris_poll/index.asp?PID=516 cites online and phone polls with error margins at or better than 3%. The phone polls in that and other Harris Interactive polls are close to the official results, but the online polls had systematic bias in John Kerry's favor. It is clear that some polls (like the German national exit polls cited by Mark Blumenthal) are superior to both the exit and phone polls done in the US, but there are also a lot of inaccurate exit polls out there -- my original post mentioned a few non-US cases. Quality differences seem much more a result of sample sizes or other processing strengths than of the poll location. Michael Pooles election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] advocacy by means of exit polls
It makes no sense in this case to define "wrong" as anything other than a wrong count of how people actually voted. Therefore, the official results of an election are just as capable of being wrong as exit poll results. As for your claim that the margin of discrepancy is "closely comparable between exit polling and phone polling," that is such an improbable sounding claim that you are going to have to provide some pretty convincing documentation to convince me of it. Exit polling is widely understood as much more accurate than phone polling. It is so reliable that in many countries where paper ballots are used, news organizations use exit polls when reporting results of elections and except in very close elections the vote counts that often come much later rarely contradict the exit poll results. But if you have good evidence to support your claim that phone polls are as accurate as exit polls, I'm certainly willing to take a look at it. -Ralph Suter << > At 03:28 PM 8/27/2006, Michael Poole wrote: >>There are well-known cases where exit polls get the margins wrong >>(e.g. Phillipines 2004) or even the results wrong (e.g. USA 2004). > > I'd hardly call USA 2004 a "well-known case" of this. As Mr. Suter > pointed out, serious controversy still exists regarding that > situation. In the absence of some kind of verification, we really > can't know for sure which occurred: error due to faulty polling, error > due to actual deviation between voter actions and voter poll answers, > or error due to vote fraud or other tabulation problems. Since you and Mr. Suter clearly share some confusion over what "wrong" meant, let me clarify it to mean any divergence from the official poll results. Whether the difference is intentional or accidental, or which counting of public preference is less representative, is absolutely irrelevant when it comes to determining what different results other methods might reach: some discrepancy exists between the collected data and the official results, and (ceteris paribus) this "margin of discrepancy" is closely comparable between exit polling and phone polling. By which I meant to point out that, to get results as useful as you are likely to ever get, you do not necessarily need to convince exit pollsters to do things your way. Phone pollsters could work as well. Michael Poole >> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] advocacy by means of exit polls
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes: > At 03:28 PM 8/27/2006, Michael Poole wrote: >>There are well-known cases where exit polls get the margins wrong >>(e.g. Phillipines 2004) or even the results wrong (e.g. USA 2004). > > I'd hardly call USA 2004 a "well-known case" of this. As Mr. Suter > pointed out, serious controversy still exists regarding that > situation. In the absence of some kind of verification, we really > can't know for sure which occurred: error due to faulty polling, error > due to actual deviation between voter actions and voter poll answers, > or error due to vote fraud or other tabulation problems. Since you and Mr. Suter clearly share some confusion over what "wrong" meant, let me clarify it to mean any divergence from the official poll results. Whether the difference is intentional or accidental, or which counting of public preference is less representative, is absolutely irrelevant when it comes to determining what different results other methods might reach: some discrepancy exists between the collected data and the official results, and (ceteris paribus) this "margin of discrepancy" is closely comparable between exit polling and phone polling. By which I meant to point out that, to get results as useful as you are likely to ever get, you do not necessarily need to convince exit pollsters to do things your way. Phone pollsters could work as well. Michael Poole election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] advocacy by means of exit polls
At 03:28 PM 8/27/2006, Michael Poole wrote: >There are well-known cases where exit polls get the margins wrong >(e.g. Phillipines 2004) or even the results wrong (e.g. USA 2004). I'd hardly call USA 2004 a "well-known case" of this. As Mr. Suter pointed out, serious controversy still exists regarding that situation. In the absence of some kind of verification, we really can't know for sure which occurred: error due to faulty polling, error due to actual deviation between voter actions and voter poll answers, or error due to vote fraud or other tabulation problems. > It >is extremely hard to correct for sampling error in exit polling, >making the overall polling accuracy comparable to certain alternatives >such as phone polls. For electoral results, both of those are >significantly more accurate than, for example, random polling in other >public places. I think that exit polling is much more likely to be accurate than phone polling, because it polls actual voters, reasonably well-verified as having voted. Sure, there are still sources of error; however, it should be possible to study the correlation between exit polls and actual election results. Serious anomalies, as in USA 2004, especially if only occurring in specific locations, could be grounds for further investigation. It has always seemed incorrect to me that the only persons having standing to force recounts are candidates. Don't the voters have a right to know what actually happened? If vote fraud happened, that the near-winner concedes does not make the fraud moot. Not only do we have a need and right to know, but if there is a sign of fraud, it should be investigated, because such fraud is generally illegal. (There are kinds of fraud that are not illegal, though perhaps they ought to be. Without charging that this actually happened, suppose a certain official, nominally a Democrat, decided to design a ballot which any expert could expect would skew the results. Nobody noticed and objected, and so this ballot was actually used and functioned as the plot intended. And thus the United States ended up with a President who not only lost the popular vote by a considerable margin, but only narrowly won the electoral vote because of the entire set of votes from Florida being awarded to that candidate due to a few-hundred vote margin, which itself was nearly certain, from later investigation, to be incorrect, and which itself depended on many little "nudges," each not specifically illegal but possibly illegal in the context of a conspiracy. Tossing alleged felons, based on records provided from other states, was not illegal, and that it just happened to eliminate, in error, far more Democratic voters than Republicans, well, that's the breaks. Get over it.) Exit polling to make an educated estimate of the effect of different voting methods is an excellent idea. It is non-binding, it would only provide information, but information that is not possible to obtain with such accuracy in any other way, I'd suggest. Would improved election methods shift outcomes? Most of us are quite certain that it would; simply allowing overvotes, by striking the line in the election code that prohibits counting them, would have moved US Presidential Florida much more toward the realization of the intention of the majority of voters. It is quite likely, I'd suggest, that the Approval Voting that would result from this simple change would shift *many* election results. This could partly be studied through analysis of actual ballots; but we can't tell from that how voters would shift their votes once they understood that overvotes would be allowed. Certainly many would. I might even consider voting for a Green! or, in some races, for that matter, a Libertarian. However, personally I'd put the effort into forging the real missing link: direct organization of the public outside of government, and, indeed, that is what I'm about. If the public were organized in the libertarian/anarchist method we call FA/DP, which is institutionally unbiased (i.e., it is libertarian, not Libertarian, direct/representative democracy, not Democratic, deliberative, not aggregative), we wouldn't have to worry about election fraud, for we would know, in advance of the election, the certain result, at least in most cases. And, as with the Orange Revolution in the Ukraine, if the oligarchs rigged the election, we simply would not accept it. If we put 10% of the effort we put into trying to manage the content of the political system into studying and reforming the *structure*, we'd find content much easier to manage. But, of course, strictly speaking, we are not advocating any change in the legal structure, only something new, something added to it: direct organization of the people, which has never before been attempted on the scale of a nation-state except through coercive or at least nondemocratic, top-down structures, which, like a
Re: [EM] democratic community, the web, implicit/explicit instant proxy
At 11:42 PM 8/27/2006, Brian Olson wrote: >I want a solution which is much like an instant proxy system. I guess this >puts me more in Abdul-Rahman Lomax's camp. The idea of setting up explicit >little affinity groups or constituencies sounds awkward and baroque to me, >and I don't think people would actually be involved enough to want to >maintain such a structure. Actually, we already have something like it. It is called society. However, the "affinity groups" are, far too often, far too informal to have the kind of impact that formal organization could accomplish. DP creates what have been called "natural caucuses," being the set of constituents of a proxy plus the proxy himself or herself. However, any mailing list going to a subset of members of an FA/DP organization is likewise a kind of caucus or affinity group. Such lists abound already, just not within an overarching DP structure that makes the discovery of consensus on a large scale possible. Small groups can find consensus relatively easily, if they value it. Most Town Meeting Town politics is the politics of consensus, because the scale is small and people do, after all, have to continue living with each other. In certain self-help groups consensus can be greatly valued, and substantial effort will be put into it. I remember one issue which started out with the group highly polarized, with a number of members reacting to a requested change with, more or less, "over my dead body." The secretary of that meeting, quite wisely, suggested that the decision be postponed to a meeting where discussion would be scheduled. And at that meeting, after thorough discussion, but before a final vote, a poll was taken. It was essentially an Approval Poll. If we'd thought of Range, we might have used it. The poll showed how the members of the group, individually, thought of the issue, after having heard the arguments. From the Poll, there was an obvious motion to make the change, and it was entered. And it passed *unanimously*. Deep polarization can disappear if people have the opportunity to work through the issues. Our present political systems, instead of providing the opportunity, all too often *encourage* the polarization, because ... well, I think most of our readers know why. It gets people fired up, and they will vote for you and work for you if you are the flag-bearer of this crusade >I should probably re-read Lomax's formal definition of Delegable Proxy >(DP) but my email isn't searchable at the moment. Based on the current >discussion it sounds like I want something a lot like that, but extended >to make it more automatic and even lower effort for a casual web community >member. DP is about as low effort as I could imagine. Indeed, one of our slogans is, "Lift a finger, change the world." But about delegable proxy as I'd define it, the topic has passed into a group project, and it never was up to me alone anyway, since there have been multiple independent inventions. The material on http://beyondpolitics.org and http://beyondpolitics.org/wiki is not the latest thinking, necessarily, the latest thinking is appearing on various lists, a newsgroup, and in private mail. Hopefully, someone will start to collect this material as well as to point to other relevant links. Searching for "delegable proxy" will pull up a lot of my writing, yes, but also that of others. There is apparently a software project or projects under discussion at the googlegroup top-politics. >http://groups.google.com/group/top-politics But I don't see delegable proxy as a software problem. DP is a method of creating a communications network, including filtering, from the bottom rather than by the more traditional central or top-down planning. Writing software to implement it is to some degree, central planning. Not wrong, per se, but I'd rather see DP groups decide what they need before determining the exact details of the rules. >The extension is to extract a fuzzy "implicit proxy" from users actions. >Instead of having to remember someone out of the myriad of possibly >bizarre user names, you go about your regular process of reading and >moderating. Many sites allow any registered user to vote for or against >any comment or user posted story. This would be recorded and if the system >determines that you're regularly positively rating some user or users they >would to some degree become your proxy. Given fuzzy, implicit >probabilistic methods, it is appropriate to give an implicit proxy only >part of their presumed constituent's vote. A non voter's vote might even >be distributed fractionally over several of their possible proxies. Certainly this is doable. We might call it "fuzzy proxy," not a bad name. Could be quite useful. But DP involves explicit choice of proxy by the client, and, as I'd suggest, explicit acceptance by the proxy. A *relationship*, a personal one, is created. The personal communication which would be exp
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and winning votes
Warren wrote: > Sorry, my last email was in error: BTR-IRV can entirely eliminate the > Smith set and elect some nonmember. I don't think it can. BTR-IRV never eliminates a candidate that pairwise beats all the other remaining candidates because such a candidate wouldn't lose the pre-elimination "runoff". So even if all but one of the Smith set had been eliminated, the last member will last until the end and win. So BTR-IRV satisfies Smith, but it does not satisfy Schwartz (at least in my current implementation, where a tied pairwise runoff eliminates each of the two candidates with equal probability). Chris Benham wrote: > As I understand it, BTR-IRV was invented by Rob Le Grand purely as a > gimmick to try to sell Condorcet to IRV supporters. I don't think he > ever seriously suggested it was good, and I don't know how anyone > else got that idea. I did originally suggest it as an IRV-like Condorcet method; I don't claim it to be clearly the best Condorcet method by any means, but I like it as a Condorcet method that seems to encourage strategy less often than some others. Also, given sincere votes, it scores higher on social utility in my simulations than the two other IRV-like Condorcet methods I include: "eliminate the candidate with the fewest first-place votes until a Condorcet candidate among the remaining candidate emerges" and "choose the Condorcet winner if one exists and the IRV winner otherwise". That said, I would not choose to have it (or any other purely ranked-ballot method) used in public elections. -- Rob LeGrand, psephologist [EMAIL PROTECTED] Citizens for Approval Voting http://www.approvalvoting.org/ __ Do You Yahoo!? Tired of spam? Yahoo! Mail has the best spam protection around http://mail.yahoo.com election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and winning votes
Warren,
There are some desirable election method properties I insist on in part
because they are so "cheap".
Two of these are Douglas Woodall's "mono-add-plump" and "mono-append".
The first says that if x wins and we add some ballots that plump (bullet
vote) for x, then x must still win.
The second says that if x wins, and then on some ballots that didn't
rank x we rank x immediately below
the previously lowest ranked (above equal-bottom) candidate; x must
still win.
Woodall demonstrates that Smith//IRV, unlike Smith,IRV fails both these
criteria.
(He calls the latter "CNTT,AV" standing for "Condorcet(Net)Top
Tier,Alternative Vote.")
>abcd 10
>bcda 6
>c 2
>dcab 5
>
>All the candidates are in the top tier, and the AV winner is a. But
>if you add two extra ballots that plump for a, or append a to the two
>c ballots, then the CNTT becomes {a,b,c}, and if you delete d from all
>the ballots before applying AV then c wins.
>
So what is a good argument "in the other direction"?
>But I guess this is an argument "for" BTR-IRV;
>
I strongly suspect that BTR-IRV also fails these criteria, and I know
that unlike Smith(Schwartz),IRV
it fails Clone Independence.
From an August 2004 message I sent to the instantrunoff-freewheeling
Yahoo group:
> CB: Standard IRV has some good properties, some of which I regard as
> essential. One of these is Independence of Clones.
> Douglas Woodall splits this into two.
> "Clone-Winner: cloning a candidate who has a positive probability of
> election should not help any other candidate."
> "Clone-Loser: cloning a candidate who has a zero probability of
> election should not change the result of the election."
> (To "clone" candidate x is to add one or more extra candidates,
> which are all ranked adjacently with x and each other by all
> the voters.)
>
> Take this example:
> 25:Brown>Jones>Davis>Smith
> 26:Davis>Smith>Brown>Jones
> 49:Jones>Smith>Brown>Davis
>
> First-preference totals: Jones49, Davis26, Brown25, Smith0.
> "LeGrand IRV"/Bottom-2 Runoffs (BTR) proceeds thus.
> Smith pairwise beats Brown, so Brown is eliminated. (Jones now has an
> unassailable 76 top-preferences).
> Davis > Smith, so Smith is eliminated. Then Jones > Davis, so Jones
> wins.
>
> Now lets clone Davis:
> 25:Brown>Jones>Davis1>Davis2>Smith
> 24:Davis1>Davis2>Smith>Brown>Jones
> 02:Davis2>Davis1>Smith>Brown>Jones
> 49:Jones>Smith>Brown>Davis2>Davis1
>
> First-preference totals: Jones49, Brown25, Davis(1) 24, Davis(2) 2,
> Smith 0.
> Davis2 > Smith, so Smith is eliminated
> Davis2 > Davis1, so Davis1 is eliminated. Top-prefernce totals are
> now: Jones49, Davis(2) 26, Brown25.
> Brown > Davis2, so Davis2 is eliminated.
> Then Brown > Jones, so Brown wins.
>
> Cloning the loser Davis changed the result, so "LeGrand IRV"/BTR
> fails Clone-Loser.
As I understand it, BTR-IRV was invented by Rob Le Grand purely as a
gimmick to try to sell Condorcet
to IRV supporters. I don't think he ever seriously suggested it was
good, and I don't know how anyone
else got that idea.
Chris Benham
Warren Smith wrote:
>I'm not sure your IRV restricted to Smith set BUT do NOT eliminate the
>non-Smith candidates, is better than the pre-elimination.
>
>Think you could make arguments either direction.
>But I guess this is an argument "for" BTR-IRV; with BTR-IRV you do
>not have to worry about that issue, since you get the same result either way.
>
>wds
>
>election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
>
>
>
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and winning votes
Warren, >BTR-IRV can entirely eliminate the Smith set >and elect some nonmember. > How can it possibly do that? Chris Benham Warren Smith wrote: >Sorry, my last email was in error: BTR-IRV can entirely eliminate the Smith >set >and elect some nonmember. > >wds > >election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info > > > election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] advocacy by means of exit polls
<< There are well-known cases where exit polls get the margins wrong (e.g. Phillipines 2004) or even the results wrong (e.g. USA 2004). It is extremely hard to correct for sampling error in exit polling, making the overall polling accuracy comparable to certain alternatives such as phone polls. For electoral results, both of those are significantly more accurate than, for example, random polling in other public places. Michael Poole >> It is far from certain that 2004 US exit polls got the results of the presidential election wrong. Many well-qualified polling experts and statisticians who have studied the polls and the official election results believe there is a strong likelihood that the exit poll results were correct and the official results were incorrect because of widespread fraud or at least unintended error. None of the efforts to explain the polling results in terms of sampling and other kinds of errors, including efforts by the people who designed and conducted the polls, have been very persuasive. Unfortunately, the kinds of post-election investigations that could have shed much needed light on this question were not done or were greatly delayed because the losing candidate, John Kerry, conceded the election less than 24 hours after the polls were closed without demanding that serious investigations be conducted and without doing any himself, despite having something like $20 million of unspent campaign contributions on hand (twice the amount spent on the exit polls themselves) that he could have used to keep his earlier promise to make sure that every vote would be counted. Reportedly, even Kerry's running mate, John Edwards, was upset with Kerry's quick concession, which also had the effect of discouraging reporters from seriously investigating the election results and the possibility of widespread fraud. Kerry's quick concession had the additional effect of enabling news organizations and pundits to dismiss people who questioned the election results as irresponsible "conspiracy theorists." It now appears that the most irresponsible people of all (except for those who may have engaged in election fraud) were Kerry and news media people and that the hypothesis that the election was stolen as a result of fraud is a very reasonable one that is supported by at least as much evidence as the theory that the exit polls were incorrect. -Ralph Suter election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] "two and a half" candidates - a way of looking at voting method development
http://rangevoting.org/TwoAndAHalf.html you perhaps will find this way of thinking useful or illuminating. Warren Smith http://RangeVoting.org election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] DH3 - error by me - should prefer BTR-IRV to Schulze beatpaths?
As Benham pointed out (basically) my claim
http://RangeVoting.org/WinningVotes.html
that "all Condorcet methods" suffer from the DH3 pathology was
not quite right. I should have said
"all Condorcet methods which handle a 3-cycle by eliminating the weakest
defeat."
This includes Schulze-beatpaths, Heitzig-river, Tideman-ranked-pairs,
least-reversal-classic-Condorcet, Simpson-Kramer-minmax, my method I call the
"maxtree" method... but not ALL Condorcet methods.
(One also can consider emthods where a vote is a rank ordering AND
an "approval threshold" but I will not do that here.)
An example of a Condorcet order-only method which is immune to DH3 is
Rob LeGrand's BTR-IRV method; another is the "IRV restricted to the Smith set"
method; another is the "plurality restricted to Smith set" method.
These are all immune in the sense that it does not make strategic sense
for the A- and B-voters to pretend D>C, because that does not work - C still
gets
elected. (They are all NOT immune in the perhaps-sillier sense that if the
voters
stupidly do it anyway, then you get the "dark horse" D winning.)
Of these three, which should we prefer?
None of the three are monotonic, all three suffer from "honest voting can hurt
you"
paradoxes, and all three can suffer from embarrassing
"winner=loser reversal paradoxes":
Plurality paradox:
2 A>B>C
2 A>C>B
3 B>C>A
7-voter scenario where
plurality-winner = BTR-IRV-winner = IRV-winner = Condorcet-winner = A =
plurality-loser
BTR-IRV paradox:
4 A>B>C
4 A>C>B
6 B>C>A
5 C>A>B
19-voter scenario where
plurality-winner = BTR-IRV-winner = IRV-winner = A = plurality-loser =
BTR-IRV-loser
IRV paradox:
9B>C>A
8A>B>C
7C>A>B
24-voter scenario where
IRV-winner = A = plurality-loser = IRV-loser = BTR-IRV-loser
Benham notes IRV enjoys (and I now note BTR-IRV also enjoys, but Plurality does
not)
the "Dominant mutual third" property:
If a more than a third of the voters rank (in any order) the members
of a subset S of candidates above all others, and all the
members of S pairwise beat all the non-members; then the
winner must come from S.
That is because the IRV (or BTR-IRV)
election will, after eliminations and vote-transfers, reduce to
a 2-man contest between an S-member and somebody else. (This is a weakened
form of the Condorcet or Smith Set property.)
Also BTR-IRV and IRV and Smith//IRV
are both clone-immune but plurality is not. These facts cause
us to demerit Smith//Plurality.
Now IRV is better than BTR-IRV in the sense it is immune to add-top failure
and enjoys "later-no-harm". However, both these IRV advantages no longer hold
if we are speaking of Smith//IRV.
So... I guess BTR-IRV and Smith//IRV both are good Condorcet methods and I
have
uncovered no basis here for preferring one over the other.
But we HAVE uncovered a good reason (DH3 immunity) to prefer either to
Schulze-beatpaths, Heitzig-river, Tideman-ranked-pairs,
least-reversal-classic-Condorcet, Simpson-Kramer-minmax, and my method I call
MaxTree.
Benham pointed out there are two ways to go with IRV restricted to the Smith
set:
either eliminate the candidates not inthe Smith set beforehand, or do not
(i.e. just use regular IRV until have eliminated all but one Smith set member X
plus some perhaps-large number of non-Smith-set members also remain, then X
wins).
I am not sure which of these two is better.
Ditto for BTR-IRV. That complicates matters.
BTR-IRV also has the advantage over Schulze-beatpaths that it does not
matter whether you hew to the margins or winning-votes philosophies - BTR-IRV
is the same in either. (With Schulze-beatpaths, you have to worry about that.)
In view of this, I should probably change CRV's recommendation
("if you insist on using a rank-order-ballot method") away from
Schulze-beatpaths
and toward BTR-IRV or Smith//IRV - probably the former since it is simplest to
describe?
Warren D Smith
http://RangeVoting.org
election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and winning votes
Sorry, my last email was in error: BTR-IRV can entirely eliminate the Smith set and elect some nonmember. wds election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and winning votes
I'm not sure your IRV restricted to Smith set BUT do NOT eliminate the non-Smith candidates, is better than the pre-elimination. Think you could make arguments either direction. But I guess this is an argument "for" BTR-IRV; with BTR-IRV you do not have to worry about that issue, since you get the same result either way. wds election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and winning votes
Warren,
Re: [EM] DH3 pathology, margins, and
winning votes
--- In [EMAIL PROTECTED],
Chris Benham <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> Warren,
> I have two main points in reply to your "DH3 pathology"
anti-Condorcet
> argument.
>
> > DH3 scenario with strategic votes by the A- and B-voters.
#voters
> > Their Vote
> > 37 C>A,B>D
> > 32 A>D>B,C
> > 31 B>D>A,C
> >
> > Then the pairwise tallies are going to be:
> >
> > Definitely A,B > D > C
> > Probably C > A,B
> >
> > In which case we (probably) have a Condorcet cycle scenario.
(It is
> > actually two 3-cycles which share the common DC arc.) The
weakest
> > defeats in these cycles are C>A,B which means, under both
every
> > Condorcet rule I know of (since I think they all are
equivalent in the
> > 3-cycle case) and Borda, that one of {A,B} is going to be the
winner.
> >
> > I verified that A wins in the 50-50 mixture case under
Tideman ranked
> > pairs , Schulze beatpaths
, and
> > basic Condorcet by using Eric Gorr's Condorcet calculator
> >
