[EM] DAMC meets reasonable FBC
The FBC that Ive been using is the one that requires that there be no way of improving ones outcome by voting someone over ones favorite. That strictest of FBCs is met by Approval, -1,0,1, MDDA, and MAMPO. It appears that DAMC doesnt meet that FBC. But to know that voting some particular candidate over your favorite will nearly complete a cycle that would then be completed by a defeat of your compromise, thereby preventing that defeat of your compromise from being kept--that would require pretty much complete information about how the count will turn out. After all, without that, voting some candidate over your favorite, if doing so will partially complete a cycle, so as to keep some other defeat from being kept--that could just as well hurt your compromise as help it. It would be pure guessing. And, without knowing if that will help or hurt your outcome, what youd be doing to your favorite tips the expectation-balance of that favorite burial to the negative side. So, if we judge by an FBC that requires that a voter wont improve his/her expectation by voting someone over his/her favorite, without improbably complete information, then DAMC passes that FBC. The pair-wise count methods that could have even any FBC problem are methods in which voting Compromise over Favorite can prevent a defeat of Compromise. It doesnt take improbable predictive knowledge to know that doing that can be expected to help Compromise, much more likely than hurting Compromise. The usual Condorcet versions fail that FBC, and so the super-timid voter isnt completely irrational when s/he votes Compromise over Favorite. S/he is actually helping Compromises chances some. Personally I wouldnt consider that tiny help for Compromise a justification to abandon Favorite. I hope that with Condorcet people will be motivated more by hope than by fear, and will rank sincerely, because of SFCs guarantee, even though Condorcet almost surely fails even that more reasonable FBC. Now, if DAMC meets GSFC, then it has an advantage that I value, over MDDA MAMPO--but at great cost in complexity. And it's not dominated by wv Condorcet, because it trades Condorcet's Criterion for expectation FBC. But one thing for sure: DAMC doesn't rival MDDA or MAMPO in their role, because extreme simplicity and definition-brevity is part of their advantage. As I said, DAMC is in the Condorcet complexity category. Mike Ossipoff election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] FBCs
Kevin's FBC/SF is much more concise in its meaning (though not its wording), and clearer and more useable than the expectation FBC that I named in my previous posting. Limiting it to that set of equal-ranked candidates does make it much more useable than my expectation FBC. That's probably what Chris meant. But I don't agree that FBC/SF is more technical than the FBC that I've been using, which could be called outcome SFC. Outcome SFC has a very clear, definite and unambiguous meaning language and meaning. To put it in colloquial language, for brevity, it should never be possible to improve one's outcome by voting someone over one's favorite. What makes that difficult to apply is that there could be all sorts of ways that favorite-burial might give you a better result (just as there could be all sorts of ways that it could improve your expectation). But speaking of the outcome is more concrete than speaking of expectation, and there is nothing imprecise about ordinary outcome-FBC. Well, I did have to accept some suggestions from EM members, to make its official wording unambiguous and precise. Mike Ossipoff election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 11:19 PM 3/13/2007, Michael Poole wrote: Take a voter who thinks candidate A is the best, B is bad, and C is the worst. His best estimates of normalized utility might be A=1, B=0.2, C=0. Why does he not vote his best estimate? If the ballot asks for scores based on how much a voter likes the candidates, then a vote with B=0 is insincere: the voter is not answering what the ballot asks for. Don't blame Range Voting for faulty ballot instructions! Yes, you could call such behavior insincere, that is, the voter is not responding, allegedly, sincerely (Poole has assumed that it is insincere). But what those who write about this seem to consistently overlook is that if the voter wants to vote 0 rather than 0.2 for B, the voter must have some motivation to do so! (or is simply voting randomly, which tells us nothing). Why would we claim that the voter sincerely would rate the candidate as 0.2 when the voter decides that *for whatever reason*, the candidate should get no votes! Because the voter kinda likes the candidate, perhaps personally? Present ballots don't tell voters how to vote. They simply say something like Vote for One. They do not say, Vote for the candidate you like. And quite a few voters don't vote for the candidate they like -- that is, third party supporters or those who'd prefer, really, a write-in. However, if the ballot asks for something else, it could be a sincere vote. What instructions do you think a range voting ballot should give voters? That's a good question. If it is summation Range (as distinct from average Range, which is a little trickier), it is as if the voter has 100 votes to cast (or 99 or whatever), in an Approval election, as I wrote. So, without claiming that I've considered this carefully: For each candidate, vote from 0 to 99, 0 giving the candidate no support whatever, and 99 giving full support. You may freely support as many candidates as you choose at whatever rating you choose. If you make no rating for a candidate, a rating of zero (0) will be assumed. The last part is for summation range, the instruction for average range might be If you make no rating of a candidate, your vote will not be considered in determining the overall rating of that candidate. I highly recommend that Range *start* as summation Range. But there would be no harm in a provision which allows voters to explicitly abstain, though I'm not sure there is sufficient social benefit to justify the complication. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 01:11 AM 3/14/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: But is this all about changing what we mean by the terms strategic and insincere? Is that the point? As the terms apply to Range and Approval, yes. The usage came from use with ranked systems, where the behavior of the system and implications for voters was different. Yes. I think that if you vote Approval style, you are dividing the candidates into two groups, and you are willing to support one group, fully, and not the other. It is true that this might not reflect much care, it might be simple disinterest, insufficient to go to the effort of rating candidates intermediately. Am I supposed to put extra effort into something just because I can? No. You do it if it serves you, and not otherwise. And we assume that if everyone behaves like this, the votes will generate a useful result. Serves you could include serving others, i.e., voters considering what they think others would be pleased with, if this matters to them. But in a fully sincere Range poll, I'd want voters to vote their personal preferences, and not consider the needs of compromise, but, quite for this reason, I dislike Range polls that automatically determine outcomes. They are far more useful as input to a deliberative process, or at least another poll for actual implementation (which might not be Range, it might be Condorcet compliant or at least majoritarian). election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Trees and single-winner methods
Juho wrote: Here's one more election method for you to consider Let's start from a Condorcet method (it doesn't matter much which one). Then we allow the candidates to form groups. Each group will be handled as if it was a single candidate. I reject this on the same grounds that I reject the candidate withdrawal option (in say IRV) and Asset Voting: I am only interested in single-winner methods where the result is purely determined (as far as possible) by voters voting, and not by the machinations of candidates/parties. Chris Benham election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Possible Approval Winner set/criterion (was Juho--Margins fails Plurality. WV passes.)
On Mar 14, 2007, at 8:31 , Chris Benham wrote: I'm not suggesting that PAW be explicitly made part of the rules of any method, and the PAW criterion is met by most methods including the simplest. So I don't see how it adds complexity. Ok, if the election method already meets the criterion and the criterion is not used as part of the rules, then there is no impact. The Plurality criterion is about avoiding common-sense, maybe simple-minded but nonetheless very strong and (IMO)sound complaints from a significant subset of voters: the supporters of a candidate that pairwise beats the winner: X ranked alone in top place on more ballots than Y was ranked above bottom clearly equals 'X has more support than Y', so how can you justify X losing to Y?!. I think there are different kind of elections with different kind of rationale behind selecting the winner. For example the Condorcet winner could be different than the one with best average rating. = One has to decide which needs to respect. Similarly the complaints of the voters could be based on different arguments. Some voters may complain about the number of above bottom votes (as above) but other voters might complain about the fact that the voters would like to change the winner to another candidate with a large majority. There are other other rational measures that can be used as a basis for complaints. The plurality criterion is thus just one way of tying to characterise what kind of a candidate should be elected. It is typical that in the presence of cycles some rules that look obvious when there are no cycles, but things get more complicated and intuition easily fails when the cycles are present, and one needs to violate some of the criteria. I liked the rationale you gave in support of the plurality criterion, the description of the situation after the election has been held. I think this is a good way to evaluate the methods (more natural than e.g. winner changing path based arguments) since typically we are seeking a candidate that would work well with the society and that would lead to a stable and happy state. Note that the corresponding state after the election based justification of minmax(margins) (that fails the plurality criterion) for its behaviour is that it minimises the level of interest to change the winner to some other candidate (to one other candidate at a time). I think that property can be seen as a benefit for the society and as one possible justification to violate the plurality criterion. I don't claim that this minmax(margins) style of measuring utility is ideal, but at least it makes quite a lot of sense since it clearly provides best possible protection against one type of after the election risk/complaints. I ended up again in discussing the benefits of different methods with sincere votes. But so did you :-). (I didn't yet catch if there are also some strategic issues that are closely linked to the plurality criterion.) Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] divided house problem of close vote (50%+1)
On Mar 14, 2007, at 12:15 , [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: Doubtless this won't thread correctly. Juho said Some observations. The description talks only about the yes votes. Is the assumption that the no votes mean no action will be taken? If we are talking about approving a new law then this is quite typical, but if we vote for example about whether we should send our rocket to Mars or Venus, then both sides should be treated in the same way. In the described method repeated 45% yes, 55% no results do not lead to final no (assuming super majority and new referendum levels 60%/ 40%). If we have only one rocket to send, voting first on sending the rocket to Mars, then on sending it to Venus, then to Mars etc. is not fair either. But maybe the method is not intended for this kind of elections with two similar alternatives to choose from. I get the impression the vote would go something like: Initial scores = 0 Round 1 Mars: 45% +0 = 45 (-50 = -5) Venus: 55% +0 = 55 (-50 = +5) Round 2 Mars: 45% -5 = 40 (-50 = -10) Venus: 55% +5 = 60 (-50 = +10) Round 3 Mars: 45% -10= 35 (-50 = -15) Venus: 55% +10= 65 (-50 = +15) Round 4 Mars: 45% -15= 30 (-50 = -15) Venus: 55% +15= 70 (-50 = +15) Venus wins as 2/3 Yes. You seem to assume that the Mars and Venus votes would take place more or less simultaneously. Howard Swerdfeger's xls sheet btw doesn't behave exactly the same way as the written description of the method says. It doesn't let the Mars results drop below 45%. Thanks to Howard Swerdfeger for providing the sheet. Tthat is a good method to give clear (operational) definitions to the methods. Note that it is possible that the sum of Mars and Venus votes need not be 100%. It is possible for example to have a faction that is eager to send a rocket to any planet. As a result both planets may get !50% results. In this case I don't know what happens if both planets reach the super majority limit at the same round. One could also make the rules such that there is only one Mars vs. Venus vote at each round and the decision will be made when the balance will go from 50% to some threshold % to either direction. This way the election would be a symmetric election between two similar options (not a status quo vs. change type of election as in the original version). This means that a majority can get anything past if they stick to their guns, however, it will take lots of votes (spaced say 1 day apart). It also naturally scales the time spent debating based on how controversial the decision is. Handling multiple choices could be handled with approval voting. Using multiple rounds means that the tactics for approval are easier to use. Yes. Even Condorcet could be used - just keep increasing/decreasing the elements of the comparison matrix. I think there could be also electronic election methods where results are calculated in real-time and voters may change their vote when they see what the current results are. The behaviour of a method in this situation could be also used as one criterion to evaluate the stability of the method. This kind of situations could make also the Nash equilibrium of strategic voting states more meaningful (I have earlier criticized them as not being a good measure for typical (non real-time feedback) elections). Juho For example, if you could use the following formula New Approval = 2/3 * ( Old Approval*3/4 + approval from vote ) if 50% approve of an option, it will get Round 1: 2/3*( 0 + 50) = 33% Round 2: 2/3*(25+50) = 50% Round 3: 2/3*(38+50) = 59% Round 4: 2/3*(44+50) = 63 At round N (with N - inf) Round N 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3 Round N+1 2/3*(50+50) = 66 and 2/3 I would suggest rounding upwards to the nearest percent. Ignoring rounding an option cannot get the supermajority unless it has 50%+ approval. Alternatively, rounding down could be used and the supermajority could be set to say 65% required. Raphfrk Interesting site what if anyone could modify the laws www.wikocracy.com Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry- leading spam and email virus protection. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] divided house problem of close vote (50%+1)
On Mar 14, 2007, at 16:07 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote: You are correct, It was not originally intended to choose between two similar alternatives. but I believe it could serve this purpose. You wouldn't actually send it to mars or Venus until the score reached a super majority, and then you would stop voting. I just commented in another mail that the method could be also modified so that it would make the decision in either direction if the accumulated deviation from 50% to either direction exceeds some threshold value. In this case the method should behave in a symmetric way in both directions / towards both alternative options. As for debate, Typically I would Imagine a situation where a decision making body (legislature or citizens) exists in a currently almost evenly divided state. I would further imagine that the division of this body would change over time at some rate. possibly because of debate and people changing there minds, or possibly because of the actual people in the decision making body changing (Bi-Election, full new elections, demographic change of citizens). I would guess that enough time needs to pass to typically allow 1-3% total state changes in decision making body, But that is just a guess. You need time to allow for honest debate. In a legislature this could be 1 week or 1 day with debate and backroom deals in the middle. In a referendum this could be months or years to allow for some small demographic shift, or to account for some random variation in voter opinion. One could in principle also have voting chains that go on forever. If the timing and threshold parameters are well designed it would be ok to vote once every year or every month on whether it makes sense to send a rocket somewhere. No problem if the yes decision would never come. Maybe it would be too expensive to send the rocket. Your original description included the possibility of reaching a conclusion that no additional round is needed (support below an agreed threshold, but no cumulative effect in the downwards direction (the symmetric method that I mentioned above would have similar cumulative effect in both directions)). It is possible to combine somehow also the length of the delay between elections in the equation (try again after x hours/days). Then the method would not only say if other votes are needed but it could also say something about when the next vote should be held. Maybe this would not be symmetrical. Maybe getting only 5% support would mean that new vote would be arranged earliest after some relatively long time. A concrete decision on time could be needed if there was a tendency to propose a new election with similar content right after the previous one led to a don't try again conclusion. (This is getting a bit complex = maybe recommendations and good practices and/or chairman's discretion would be enough :-).) Juho ___ All new Yahoo! Mail The new Interface is stunning in its simplicity and ease of use. - PC Magazine http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
