Re: [EM] maybe a new variant of Condorcet
peter barath wrote (18/04/2007): I call a subset of candidates a quasi-clone set, if: 1. they don't make up the whole set of candidates 2. for every candidate out of the set they are in the same winning relation with (all beat / all tie / all lose) (You can ask why to make the subsets at all, but I think this Rubicon is already crossed with the Smith-set, which is a special kind of quasi-clone sets.) This is similar to Forest Simmons' beat clone sets he uses in his Dec. 2004 sprucing up process idea. http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014325.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014326.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014328.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014330.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014331.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014354.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2004-December/014337.html Chris Benham Markus Schulze wrote: Dear Peter Barath, your proposal is very similar to Mike Ossipoff's subcycle rule. Please read: http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1996-June/000494.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1996-June/000532.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1996-July/000572.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1997-September/001532.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/1998-June/001721.html http://lists.electorama.com/pipermail/election-methods-electorama.com/2005-February/014707.html Markus Schulze election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] PR in student government
On Apr 17, 2007, at 21:28 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote: Again, I recommend a Regional Open List System. It would be my second choice (behind STV) in therms of results given the requirements you mentioned. But it would be my first choice if one was to give more weight to simplicity of counting and simplicity for the voter. I agree. For me the three very basic (vanilla flavour) multi-winner methods are: - STV = if one wants to avoid parties; expressive votes; computer based calculation for fractional votes - open lists = if parties and/or groups are used; simple manual calculation - single member districts = does not provide full PR; clear links between representatives and citizens of the region There are many mixes and variants of these but I think these three basic methods already pretty well stretch the space. Ballot Would look something like this --- Voting Instructions: 1. You only have ONE vote. 2. Place an X in the box NEXT to your candidate of choice. 3. Your vote counts both for your candidate and your party. Party A Party B Party C Independent [ ]Candidate1 [ ]Candidate1 [ ]Candidate1 [ ]Candidate1 [ ]Candidate2 [ ]Candidate2 [X]Candidate2 [ ]Candidate3 [ ]Candidate3 [ ]Candidate3 --- One very simple alternative is to just write the number of one's favourite candidate in a blank ballot paper. The numbers of the candidates are advertised elsewhere. Seats would be allocated proportionally by party. But the member of the party that gets each seat would be determined by the number of votes the received. This basic version works reasonably well. The candidate election process within parties (plurality like) could however be improved (if wanted) (e.g. by making the group structure more detailed). Juho ___ All New Yahoo! Mail Tired of [EMAIL PROTECTED]@! come-ons? Let our SpamGuard protect you. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Tim Hull's PR method
1. Voters vote for up to n candidates - n being either # of open seats or # of candidates 2. Each voter has one vote equally and evenly divided among the candidates they voted for. 3. After doing the first count, eliminate the candidate with the fewest votes. 4. Recount all ballots, dividing votes equally and evenly among *remaining candidates only* 5. Repeat Steps 3 and 4 until there are only as many candidates remaining as there are open seats. 6. The remaining candidates shall be declared elected. Any comments on this method? -- WDS: it seems to me this method is not PR in the sense that voters who vote for single candidate risk having their votes wiped out, and this other problem: EXAMPLE: there are 10 Dems 10 Repubs running for 10 seats. The voters are 51% Dem and 49% Repub. Each Repub voter votes for all 10 Repubs (who thus initially each get 0.1 vote). Each Dem voter voters 100% for just one Dem - Bill Clinton. Really the Dem voters feel Clinton all other Dems all Repubs, but this voting scheme does not allow them to express that feeling, so they give it all to Clinton. Result: 9 Dems eliminated, then 1 repub eliminated, then the 10 winners are Clinton + 9 repubs. The problem here is that the Dem voters are pickier than the Repub voters. A lot of PR-design-attempts run onto this kind of reef. Warren D Smith http://rangevoting.org election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Tim Hull's PR method[2]
Well, actually, Hull's method *is* PR in the sense that if voters are assumed to vote for candidates of their color only, and for all of them - then winner-counts end up proportional. That's nice. It's kind of a PR generalization of approval voting. Warren D. Smith http://rangevoting.org election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Cumulative Voting with Elimination - idea for simple PR system...
At 03:37 PM 4/17/2007, Tim Hull wrote: In my research of voting systems, PR, etc, I've been trying to come up with the most simple candidate-based PR system that I can possibly devise that uses votes for candidates and no other factors to determine the winners ( i.e. open list and asset voting don't count for this purpose). This is a restriction which is guaranteed to reduce the fairness and flexibility of the system. Asset, in particular, is actually a deliberative process. It *does* use the votes alone to determine the winners. But the votes get distributed intelligently, by trusted agents. It's amazingly hard to get this very simple idea across: we already know how to hybridize direct and representative democracy, how to make it fully fair, it's been done for centuries. In business. Why we never think of doing it in politics is beyond me. Sure, you might argue that business is about property and politics is about ... what? ... but one would think that, at least, the analogous practices would be *considered* before being rejected. They aren't rejected. They aren't even considered. Asset Voting is essentially proxy voting. Proxy voting is used in business because people with power and choices *insist* on it. That is, such people want to be able to name proxies. A proxy is a *chosen* personal representative, as distinct from an elected collective representative. I think the reason it's difficult is history. Business *started* with individual rights, personal control of property, and then means needed to be developed for many people to make decisions cooperatively, *without* coercion. Coercion doesn't work when an investor can sell his or her shares and put their money elsewhere! But governments started (or at least became, long ago) as centralized systems of authority, and representatives, where they existed at all, were agents of the sovereign, assigned to a jurisdiction by the sovereign. And then came the idea of electing them, so that they represented the people. In this, representatives were assigned and considered to represent districts. Not people. In a districted legislature, a representative supposedly represents all the people in their district, whether they love him or hate him, and whether he is fair to those who don't like him or not. As long as he represents the majority, his position is stable, and too bad about the minority. They do not get a voice. Period. Now, STV-PR does move away from this toward something more like personal representation. But Asset does it directly. It *is* personal representation. Delegable Proxy does this without the restrictions imposed by a peer assembly, so Asset Voting can be considered a more traditional form of Delegable Proxy. Asset Voting, by creating an elector class, makes it possible for something quite close to direct democracy to exist even with secret ballot. (To do this, it really becomes Delegable Proxy with a standardized distribution of votes so that the default voting power of each seat is the same, but when an elector directly casts votes, the elector's votes assigned to that seat reduce the voting power of the seat for that poll.) I'm not suggesting that the direct democracy potential of Asset Voting be used, at least not at first. It should be understood that simply using Asset to elect traditional members of an assembly, a group would be pioneering a new and quite exciting political reform. Asset Voting makes putting together an assembly a *cooperative* effort, quite distinct from it being a *competitive* one. Candidates who get enough votes are simply seated with no more fuss, but what is interesting with Asset is what happens with excess and other unassigned votes. Those who hold these assets *cooperate* to put together seats. (A few very popular candidates may be able to essentially appoint a seat or more, besides their own, but they still would generally have excess votes to distribute, less than a quota.) So, my question to Mr. Hull is this: Why would you prefer a deterministic, purely aggregative system, which must produce results with no further human input, over a deliberative one, which encourages and, indeed, requires voluntary cooperation? Aggregative methods are inherently inferior, as far as anything that has ever been proposed. Such methods are used, not because they are superior to deliberative methods, but because they have been considered more practical, due to the need for secret ballot. It's been thought that secret ballot requires a pure aggregative method. However, what has been overlooked, generally, is that, in the end, the representative is going to exercise what would otherwise be the votes of those represented, were it a direct democracy. Direct democracy is considered impractical because of the problems raised in deliberation in large groups. This, again, is based on an assumption that direct democracy requires the full right of
