Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 08:32 PM 4/24/2007, Tim Hull wrote:
>I know the Condorcet winner is preferred to every other candidate - 
>however, I'm in particular assuming ballots like this:
>
>48% - 10 D 2 PW 0 R
>47% - 10 R 2 PW 0 D
>5% - 10 PW 5 D 0 R
>
>(the numbers being the sincere range rating for the candidate)
>Under Condorcet, PW would win despite the fact that he or she is 
>barely liked by anyone.
>Under range and IRV, D would win.  I know that Condorcet and IRV 
>don't use ratings, but you need to take into account
>the fact that #2 is not always a strong #2 or is some eccentric joke 
>candidate.

I'm just noting that to understand what is really going on with an 
election, you need Range or Range-like information about preference 
strength. Range is simply the only method on the table that directly 
considers preference strength!



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Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 06:41 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
>The reason why I talked about learning is that Range is often
>described so that the first impression voters will get is that they
>"should" put their sincere ratings on the ballot (and they would not
>be aware of how to vote with full strength).

what ballot instructions have you read that so instructed voters?


> > First of all, we think that it will be common knowledge that if you
> > don't vote the extremes for at least one candidate on either side,
> > you are casting a weak vote.
>
>In most cases any use of intermediate values makes the vote weaker
>than it could be.

That is correct. You vote the extremes where you have a strong 
preference, you vote in the middle when you don't. And this also 
happens to be necessary where you face opposing risks. Range *never* 
requires you to vote "strategically" in the sense of reversing preferences.


> > Nobody is recommending that truly weak votes be cast. (But some
> > people may want to cast them anyway, and they should be able to.
> > Consider it a partial abstention, and many people abstain from this
> > or that race now.)
>
>That's ok. Weak votes and abstention can be options for the voters.

But they are not options in ranked systems.


> > If A was the favorite, why in the world would the voter vote A=5 in
> > the first place?
>
>The voter didn't find him/her "excellent" but just "reasonably good".

Hey, I'd be happy with that! I wish! Instead, we get "truly awful."

We get a "uniter not a divider," who, it turns out, means by "unite," 
"you all do it my way or you are a traitor."

>With fully sincere (utility based) ratings maybe no candidate gets
>the max or min score.

That's correct if we are talking about pure utility. Indeed, there is 
no max or min score. But Range really asks voters to rate candidates 
*relative* to each other, with Best being max rating and Worst being 
min. It really should be explained that way.

We have sometimes suggested that Range Votes be normalized. That is, 
if a voter voted, in Range (0-10), 0, 3, 5, this would be normalized 
to 0, 6, 10. But I think it better to keep it simple.

A ballot could actually say, instead of numbers, Best, Good, 
Acceptable, Not-Acceptable, Worst. Range 5.

Basically, those who object to Range on the basis that voters will be 
confused and mistakenly vote weak votes are assuming idiotic or at 
least inadequate ballot instructions.

This is not to be confused with "weak" votes, meaning intermediate 
votes, which are another matter. These are votes where the voter has 
no strong preference, or, for a more sophisticated voter, is 
balancing opposing considerations: "I'd like to see A defeat B, and B 
to defeat C. Range requires voters to weigh the relative merits, the 
preference strengths of these pairs. If the first consideration is 
more important than the second, then the rating of B will move closer 
to that of C, and if the second is more important, then the rating of 
B will move up toward A."

There is really no alternative to this that makes sense. Either 
preference strength matters or it doesn't! If it matters, then it 
*must* follow that a weak preference will be expressed in a weak vote.

> > What is continually asserted here is that voters with weak
> > preferences will somehow decide to vote strategically.
>
>I assumed that voters with strong wish to win, or those that
>(strongly) want to counter the ones that vote with full power, would
>vote with full power ("strategically").

Yes. However, voting strongly *requires* you to vote weakly. Haven't 
you noticed that?

What is a strong vote? Well, bullet voting is strong, it's been 
presented that way in this thread. Okay, three candidates, and you 
vote A=10, B=0, C=0. Strong vote?

Actually this is a maximally *weak* vote in the B/C pairwise 
election. If you care seriously about that pair and you want to vote 
strongly regarding it, favoring B, you must vote A=10, B=10, C=0. But 
then you have cast a maximally weak vote in the A/B pairwise election.

If there are voters who are bullet voting for B, and I don't like B, 
I can vote zero for B. This *maximally* counters those allegedly 
strong votes. But suppose there is another candidate C, far worse 
than B. By trying to cancel out those nasty bullet voters, I force 
myself to abstain from the B/C pairwise election.

You can go around and around with this. Bottom line, the claim that 
voters will over time gravitate to Approval style voting is based on 
a total misunderstanding of how Range works. It might happen, it 
might not, but it certainly isn't clear that it will, yet Range 
critics often present the matter as if it were obvious that it must 
happen, voters would be "idiots" to not vote that way.

 From my point of view, how to vote Range is pretty simple: rate your 
favorite max, rate the worst candidate min, and then arrange the 
others into two categories: acceptable and not acceptable. Range, if 
it is a single-stage implementa

Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 03:56 PM 4/24/2007, Juho wrote:
>On Apr 24, 2007, at 1:51 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
> > 4) The ultimate form of democracy is one that
> >  * maximizes voter knowledge of issues
> >  * seeks to Involve the voters at every stage of decision making
> > process   (direction, Discussion/deliberation, Vote)
>
>Agreed. These are some very key principles that make a democratic
>system work well.

Actually, while this is a common opinion, it is utterly impossible on 
a large scale. It doesn't even work that way in fairly small direct 
democracies.

To me, the key element in democracy is consent. Ideally, informed 
consent, but that isn't always possible.

Think about it. I'm tired of repeating this stuff over and over, 
besides, it's late and I have jury duty tomorrow. Somebody else can 
explain it, if necessary.



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Re: [EM] Asset Voting vs STV

[Abd ul-Rahman Lomax]

At 08:33 PM 4/24/2007, Jonathan Lundell wrote:
>On Apr 20, 2007, at 7:41 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>
>>I'm just taking the opportunity to note the similarity between
>>multiwinner STV and Asset Voting. With multiwinner STV the vote
>>transfers are guided by user rankings, and in Asset Voting, by,
>>essentially, a proxy chosen by the voter. They are really the same
>>method, differing only in who provides the tranfer information.
>
>If I understand Asset Voting (and I may not), there's more to it than
>that. An important aspect of STV (without which is loses later-no- 
>help/harm, a critically important property, to my mind) is that, in
>any given round, only the current top choice on each ballot is
>considered.

Well, that's a *little* more. I was noting similarity, not identity! 
With Asset Voting, the transfer information is provided by a proxy. 
(We often assume that this person is a candidate, but not 
necessarily. Indeed, with single-winner Asset there are some reasons 
why we might prohibit candidates from serving as proxies. But that's 
another story. I've assumed total freedom both in registration as 
candidates and in choosing what candidate(s) to name.)

With STV, the vote transfers are determined by a ranked list, so that 
the top name is used unless that candidate is eliminated, then the 
next name, etc. The voter provides the transfer information, which is 
used specifically and rigidly. It's the rigidity that is the problem. 
As I've noted, the problem is not generally serious with multiwinner 
STV, it seems, but it *is* a limitation and affects the ability of 
STV to maximize voter freedom in choosing representatives.

>One could, of course, allow a voter to fill out a truncated STV
>ballot by indicating somehow that the remainder of the ballot should
>follow an ordering specified by some third party (it could be my
>favorite candidate, or my party, or any other appropriately
>registered preference ordering). Such a variation would preserve
>later-no-help/harm, but allow the voter to defer to the judgement of
>a third party.

This kind of hybridization is often possible with methods. For 
example, it is generally considered that Range Voting does not 
satisfy the Majority Criterion. However, if we add a top-two runoff, 
where the Range winner and the Condorcet winner, if there is any that 
differs from the Range winner, face each other in a choose-one 
election, the combination satisfies the Majority Criterion. That is, 
if the majority has a preference, and maintains that preference in 
the face of a differing Range winner, the majority cannot fail to 
prevail. This, actually, I personally prefer to Range alone. But if 
we must have a single step under all conditions -- a serious 
limitation in my view, and a foolish one -- then I refer Range. It 
will almost always choose a Condorcet winner.

(Asset is kind of a trick, it is not an "election method" as it is 
sometimes defined: deterministic, using a single poll as the only 
input. It is, rather, a hybrid itself, between a simple 
meet-the-quota-and-you-are-elected method and a deliberative, 
negotiated process.)




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[EM] Asset Voting vs STV

[Jonathan Lundell]

On Apr 20, 2007, at 7:41 AM, Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> I'm just taking the opportunity to note the similarity between
> multiwinner STV and Asset Voting. With multiwinner STV the vote
> transfers are guided by user rankings, and in Asset Voting, by,
> essentially, a proxy chosen by the voter. They are really the same
> method, differing only in who provides the tranfer information.

If I understand Asset Voting (and I may not), there's more to it than  
that. An important aspect of STV (without which is loses later-no- 
help/harm, a critically important property, to my mind) is that, in  
any given round, only the current top choice on each ballot is  
considered.

One could, of course, allow a voter to fill out a truncated STV  
ballot by indicating somehow that the remainder of the ballot should  
follow an ordering specified by some third party (it could be my  
favorite candidate, or my party, or any other appropriately  
registered preference ordering). Such a variation would preserve  
later-no-help/harm, but allow the voter to defer to the judgement of  
a third party.

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Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Tim Hull]

I know the Condorcet winner is preferred to every other candidate - however,
I'm in particular assuming ballots like this:

48% - 10 D 2 PW 0 R
47% - 10 R 2 PW 0 D
5% - 10 PW 5 D 0 R

(the numbers being the sincere range rating for the candidate)
Under Condorcet, PW would win despite the fact that he or she is barely
liked by anyone.
Under range and IRV, D would win.  I know that Condorcet and IRV don't use
ratings, but you need to take into account
the fact that #2 is not always a strong #2 or is some eccentric joke
candidate.  For instance, imagine a similar election in the UK with Labour,
the Conservatives, and the Official Monster Raving Loony Party (assume no
Liberal Democrat ran)...  Would an OMRLP MP really be a quality result?  It
may be entertaining, though...

On 4/24/07, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


On Apr 25, 2007, at 0:40 , Tim Hull wrote:

The partyless method is seen as a plus - our current parties as somewhat
diverse in their composition, and people generally don't like the "vote
counts for candidate and party" when you can have wildly diverging
ideologies on the same ticket.  It also encourages party discipline and
"voting in bloc" at the Assembly level, something no one likes the idea
of...

As far as Condorcet for single-winner, it's yet another complex
explanation and has the issue of failing "later-no-harm", which I feel would
cause massive amounts of strategic and bullet voting, no matter how low the
real risk of LNH failure.


That's called "uneducated and mistaken voters" ;-). The cases where there
would be some real reason to vote that way are extremely rare. Note that
also IRV is not free of strategic voting related problems. I don't think
Condorcet performs poorly here. (Negative propaganda can be made though on
any method.)

  It also can elect centrists with very weak support along the lines of my
"pro wrestler" example (assuming that he'd get a 2 or 1 our of 10 in Range).


Note that a Condorcet winner, even if coming from a small party, is a
candidate that majority of voters would prefer in comparison to any other
candidate. I'd say that is strong support, although the number of first
place rankings in the ballots may not be as high as with some other
candidates.

Juho

  Also, dominance by two major parties would be a significant improvement
over the status quo - as of now we have dominance by *1* major party.



On 4/24/07, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
>
> On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:26 , Tim Hull wrote:
>
> > In this case, the only *tested* method which is fully candidate
> > based (i.e. no party lists, open or closed)  - and does not use
> > anything other than votes cast for candidates to determine winners
> > - is STV.
>
> (There are also other interesting methods like http://
> en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_approval_voting and http://
> en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPO-STV. STV is however more established and
> closer to real life, so I don't recommend any more complex or
> experimental systems to be promoted in your case.)
>
> (I have also written about MultiGroup that is a method that could,
> despite of seeing candidates as members of various groupings, be
> fully based on individual candidate decisions on what kind of
> groupings/ideologies the want to promote and benefit of ( i.e. not
> "party lists" but "candidate lists of groups he/she likes"). This one
> is also experimental, so not for you.)
>
> >   In the case of voting, it seems like a good idea for the method
> > of voting to be consistent for everyone.  Hence, it only seems
> > logical to use IRV.  Doing anything else would only make the
> > explanation of how voting works twice as long, and make said effort
> > more likely to fail.
>
> (You didn't say if you want the method to be consisted to the voters
> or also to the ones who will decide what method will be taken into
> use. If it is enough to provide a consistent voting experience to the
> votes, any ranked ballot based method would do. But I guess you refer
> also to the latter case.)
>
> > Until these is a good, *proven* single-winner/multi-winner
> > combination that works well, I don't see this type of situation
> > changing.
>
> (Does the "combination" mean combination of multi-seat and single-
> seat "districts" (within a multi-winner election) or combination of
> "government" and "chairman" elections? I guess the latter is the
> case. Also other combinations would work technically, but maybe would
> be more difficult to explain to the decision makers (= not work well).)
>
> >   In my push to implement a better voting system than our truncated
> > Borda/FPTP combo, I see IRV and STV as the best chance to actually
> > make a change.  I don't see myself trying to push two separate and
> > complicated systems (one alone is hard enough), or trying to sell a
> > system that has not been widely used anywhere.
>
> Ok, you know best what is possible and what not. Note however that
> with IRV you'll choose a direction where the major parties will be
> f

Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Juho]

On Apr 25, 2007, at 0:40 , Tim Hull wrote:

The partyless method is seen as a plus - our current parties as  
somewhat diverse in their composition, and people generally don't  
like the "vote counts for candidate and party" when you can have  
wildly diverging ideologies on the same ticket.  It also encourages  
party discipline and "voting in bloc" at the Assembly level,  
something no one likes the idea of...


As far as Condorcet for single-winner, it's yet another complex  
explanation and has the issue of failing "later-no-harm", which I  
feel would cause massive amounts of strategic and bullet voting, no  
matter how low the real risk of LNH failure.


That's called "uneducated and mistaken voters" ;-). The cases where  
there would be some real reason to vote that way are extremely rare.  
Note that also IRV is not free of strategic voting related problems.  
I don't think Condorcet performs poorly here. (Negative propaganda  
can be made though on any method.)


  It also can elect centrists with very weak support along the  
lines of my "pro wrestler" example (assuming that he'd get a 2 or 1  
our of 10 in Range).


Note that a Condorcet winner, even if coming from a small party, is a  
candidate that majority of voters would prefer in comparison to any  
other candidate. I'd say that is strong support, although the number  
of first place rankings in the ballots may not be as high as with  
some other candidates.


Juho

  Also, dominance by two major parties would be a significant  
improvement over the status quo - as of now we have dominance by  
*1* major party.




On 4/24/07, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:
On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:26 , Tim Hull wrote:

> In this case, the only *tested* method which is fully candidate
> based (i.e. no party lists, open or closed)  - and does not use
> anything other than votes cast for candidates to determine winners
> - is STV.

(There are also other interesting methods like http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_approval_voting and http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPO-STV. STV is however more established and
closer to real life, so I don't recommend any more complex or
experimental systems to be promoted in your case.)

(I have also written about MultiGroup that is a method that could,
despite of seeing candidates as members of various groupings, be
fully based on individual candidate decisions on what kind of
groupings/ideologies the want to promote and benefit of ( i.e. not
"party lists" but "candidate lists of groups he/she likes"). This one
is also experimental, so not for you.)

>   In the case of voting, it seems like a good idea for the method
> of voting to be consistent for everyone.  Hence, it only seems
> logical to use IRV.  Doing anything else would only make the
> explanation of how voting works twice as long, and make said effort
> more likely to fail.

(You didn't say if you want the method to be consisted to the voters
or also to the ones who will decide what method will be taken into
use. If it is enough to provide a consistent voting experience to the
votes, any ranked ballot based method would do. But I guess you refer
also to the latter case.)

> Until these is a good, *proven* single-winner/multi-winner
> combination that works well, I don't see this type of situation
> changing.

(Does the "combination" mean combination of multi-seat and single-
seat "districts" (within a multi-winner election) or combination of
"government" and "chairman" elections? I guess the latter is the
case. Also other combinations would work technically, but maybe would
be more difficult to explain to the decision makers (= not work  
well).)


>   In my push to implement a better voting system than our truncated
> Borda/FPTP combo, I see IRV and STV as the best chance to actually
> make a change.  I don't see myself trying to push two separate and
> complicated systems (one alone is hard enough), or trying to sell a
> system that has not been widely used anywhere.

Ok, you know best what is possible and what not. Note however that
with IRV you'll choose a direction where the major parties will be
favoured (centrist compromise candidates from smaller parties
probably won't be elected). Maybe that is ok in the environment in
question.

> In short - I would say that the lack of any good, tested multi-
> winner system with a better-than-IRV single-winner version is part
> of why IRV is so popular...

(I guess this you mean that this is the reason "why IRV is so
popular" to you in your current case (not in general).)

My summary of the STV-IRV combination is that
- IRV favours big parties (Condorcet would not, and also it would be
ranked ballot based)
- explaining STV and IRV to the decision makers at one go is a bonus
- you have decided to use a partyless method, which is ok, but I'm
still wondering if the existing major groupings will agree with this
- STV-IRV would surely be a significant improvement to your current
voting practices

Juho





__

Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Juho]

On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:48 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

> At 06:37 PM 4/23/2007, Juho wrote:
>> Another explanation to the emergence of Approval style strategic
>> voting is that an individual voter might learn that, in a case where
>> there are only two candidates that have chances of winning the
>> election, voting A=9, B=0 instead of A=5, B=4 makes his/her vote 9
>> times stronger.

> A voter "might learn this?" Why didn't the voter know this from the  
> start. *Of course* voting the extremes is a strong vote. The  
> question is why you'd cast a strong vote if your preferences are  
> weak. Why? Because you want to "win"?

Many voters want that.

The reason why I talked about learning is that Range is often  
described so that the first impression voters will get is that they  
"should" put their sincere ratings on the ballot (and they would not  
be aware of how to vote with full strength).

> First of all, we think that it will be common knowledge that if you  
> don't vote the extremes for at least one candidate on either side,  
> you are casting a weak vote.

In most cases any use of intermediate values makes the vote weaker  
than it could be.

> Nobody is recommending that truly weak votes be cast. (But some  
> people may want to cast them anyway, and they should be able to.  
> Consider it a partial abstention, and many people abstain from this  
> or that race now.)

That's ok. Weak votes and abstention can be options for the voters.

> If A was the favorite, why in the world would the voter vote A=5 in  
> the first place?

The voter didn't find him/her "excellent" but just "reasonably good".  
With fully sincere (utility based) ratings maybe no candidate gets  
the max or min score.

> What is continually asserted here is that voters with weak  
> preferences will somehow decide to vote strategically.

I assumed that voters with strong wish to win, or those that  
(strongly) want to counter the ones that vote with full power, would  
vote with full power ("strategically"). This behaviour may make also  
the originally "weak preference" more radical. Voters that  
intentionally want to cast a weak vote (and that are ok with others  
using strong votes) would not be affected.

> Look, if there is an election, and I sincerely rank A as 9 and B as  
> 8 (and other candidates lower than that, let's say zero) and B  
> wins, I'm happy! That's an excellent outcome! The danger comes in  
> quite the opposite direction from what Juho proposes. Suppose I  
> rate B as 8 and C wins, with B being the runner-up. Close runner- 
> up. I might regret rating B at 8.

I believe this voting pattern os in line with the Approval style  
strategic voting that I discussed.

> If you vote Approval style, you fail to express your true  
> appreciation of the candidates, and this can backfire.

Yes, but typically/statistically Approval strategy improves the outcome.

> It is just as reasonable to consider that Range elections will move  
> *away* from Approval-style as that they will move toward it.

A simple example of this would be nice.

> I expect that they will start out, actually, as close to Approval  
> for many voters. Smith thinks differently, and I really don't know  
> which of us is right. He's got reasons to think his way. We might  
> both be right. I.e., many voters, maybe most, will vote Approval  
> style, and it will be bullet voting. But there will be quite a few,  
> from the start, who do something different.

I think much depends on the media and other discussions before the  
elections.

> I say that we are not going to really know until we see real  
> elections using Range. The alleged devolution to Approval is not a  
> serious harm. It would only mean that some ballot space and a  
> counting effort had been wasted.

Yes, Range could be roughly as good as Approval (with some wasted  
effort, and ability to cast weak votes). The biggest hiccups might  
come in the form of people realizing that their vote was weak  
although they didn't understand that when they voted, or if some  
candidate won as a result of efficient use of strategic voting.

>> Rating the least preferred candidate at 0 reduces the probability of
>> that candidate getting elected (and doesn't carry any risks with it).
>
> But from the conditions of the problem, there was no risk of that.  
> No, I don't buy it. (By the way, none of us involved with Range  
> would recommend giving the "least preferred candidate" any other  
> vote than the minimum. I assumed that PW was being given a 1  
> because voters somewhat liked him, there were *worse* candidates  
> involved.

There were no worse candidates involved. The voter liked PW somewhat.  
But since PW was the least liked candidate and the voter wanted to  
avoid electing him, giving him 0 was a perfect solution. (I thus used  
sincere utility based ratings instead of normalized ones.)

(If the probability of PW getting elected is strictly 0%, then any  
rating would be e

Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Tim Hull]

The partyless method is seen as a plus - our current parties as somewhat
diverse in their composition, and people generally don't like the "vote
counts for candidate and party" when you can have wildly diverging
ideologies on the same ticket.  It also encourages party discipline and
"voting in bloc" at the Assembly level, something no one likes the idea
of...

As far as Condorcet for single-winner, it's yet another complex explanation
and has the issue of failing "later-no-harm", which I feel would cause
massive amounts of strategic and bullet voting, no matter how low the real
risk of LNH failure.  It also can elect centrists with very weak support
along the lines of my "pro wrestler" example (assuming that he'd get a 2 or
1 our of 10 in Range).  Also, dominance by two major parties would be a
significant improvement over the status quo - as of now we have dominance by
*1* major party.



On 4/24/07, Juho <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> wrote:


On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:26 , Tim Hull wrote:

> In this case, the only *tested* method which is fully candidate
> based (i.e. no party lists, open or closed)  - and does not use
> anything other than votes cast for candidates to determine winners
> - is STV.

(There are also other interesting methods like http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_approval_voting and http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPO-STV. STV is however more established and
closer to real life, so I don't recommend any more complex or
experimental systems to be promoted in your case.)

(I have also written about MultiGroup that is a method that could,
despite of seeing candidates as members of various groupings, be
fully based on individual candidate decisions on what kind of
groupings/ideologies the want to promote and benefit of (i.e. not
"party lists" but "candidate lists of groups he/she likes"). This one
is also experimental, so not for you.)

>   In the case of voting, it seems like a good idea for the method
> of voting to be consistent for everyone.  Hence, it only seems
> logical to use IRV.  Doing anything else would only make the
> explanation of how voting works twice as long, and make said effort
> more likely to fail.

(You didn't say if you want the method to be consisted to the voters
or also to the ones who will decide what method will be taken into
use. If it is enough to provide a consistent voting experience to the
votes, any ranked ballot based method would do. But I guess you refer
also to the latter case.)

> Until these is a good, *proven* single-winner/multi-winner
> combination that works well, I don't see this type of situation
> changing.

(Does the "combination" mean combination of multi-seat and single-
seat "districts" (within a multi-winner election) or combination of
"government" and "chairman" elections? I guess the latter is the
case. Also other combinations would work technically, but maybe would
be more difficult to explain to the decision makers (= not work well).)

>   In my push to implement a better voting system than our truncated
> Borda/FPTP combo, I see IRV and STV as the best chance to actually
> make a change.  I don't see myself trying to push two separate and
> complicated systems (one alone is hard enough), or trying to sell a
> system that has not been widely used anywhere.

Ok, you know best what is possible and what not. Note however that
with IRV you'll choose a direction where the major parties will be
favoured (centrist compromise candidates from smaller parties
probably won't be elected). Maybe that is ok in the environment in
question.

> In short - I would say that the lack of any good, tested multi-
> winner system with a better-than-IRV single-winner version is part
> of why IRV is so popular...

(I guess this you mean that this is the reason "why IRV is so
popular" to you in your current case (not in general).)

My summary of the STV-IRV combination is that
- IRV favours big parties (Condorcet would not, and also it would be
ranked ballot based)
- explaining STV and IRV to the decision makers at one go is a bonus
- you have decided to use a partyless method, which is ok, but I'm
still wondering if the existing major groupings will agree with this
- STV-IRV would surely be a significant improvement to your current
voting practices

Juho





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Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Juho]

On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:26 , Tim Hull wrote:

> In this case, the only *tested* method which is fully candidate  
> based (i.e. no party lists, open or closed)  - and does not use  
> anything other than votes cast for candidates to determine winners   
> - is STV.

(There are also other interesting methods like http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_approval_voting and http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/CPO-STV. STV is however more established and  
closer to real life, so I don't recommend any more complex or  
experimental systems to be promoted in your case.)

(I have also written about MultiGroup that is a method that could,  
despite of seeing candidates as members of various groupings, be  
fully based on individual candidate decisions on what kind of  
groupings/ideologies the want to promote and benefit of (i.e. not  
"party lists" but "candidate lists of groups he/she likes"). This one  
is also experimental, so not for you.)

>   In the case of voting, it seems like a good idea for the method  
> of voting to be consistent for everyone.  Hence, it only seems  
> logical to use IRV.  Doing anything else would only make the  
> explanation of how voting works twice as long, and make said effort  
> more likely to fail.

(You didn't say if you want the method to be consisted to the voters  
or also to the ones who will decide what method will be taken into  
use. If it is enough to provide a consistent voting experience to the  
votes, any ranked ballot based method would do. But I guess you refer  
also to the latter case.)

> Until these is a good, *proven* single-winner/multi-winner  
> combination that works well, I don't see this type of situation  
> changing.

(Does the "combination" mean combination of multi-seat and single- 
seat "districts" (within a multi-winner election) or combination of   
"government" and "chairman" elections? I guess the latter is the  
case. Also other combinations would work technically, but maybe would  
be more difficult to explain to the decision makers (= not work well).)

>   In my push to implement a better voting system than our truncated  
> Borda/FPTP combo, I see IRV and STV as the best chance to actually  
> make a change.  I don't see myself trying to push two separate and  
> complicated systems (one alone is hard enough), or trying to sell a  
> system that has not been widely used anywhere.

Ok, you know best what is possible and what not. Note however that  
with IRV you'll choose a direction where the major parties will be  
favoured (centrist compromise candidates from smaller parties  
probably won't be elected). Maybe that is ok in the environment in  
question.

> In short - I would say that the lack of any good, tested multi- 
> winner system with a better-than-IRV single-winner version is part  
> of why IRV is so popular...

(I guess this you mean that this is the reason "why IRV is so  
popular" to you in your current case (not in general).)

My summary of the STV-IRV combination is that
- IRV favours big parties (Condorcet would not, and also it would be  
ranked ballot based)
- explaining STV and IRV to the decision makers at one go is a bonus
- you have decided to use a partyless method, which is ok, but I'm  
still wondering if the existing major groupings will agree with this
- STV-IRV would surely be a significant improvement to your current  
voting practices

Juho





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Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Juho]

Good description.

In addition to this of course also the topics to be decided have an  
impact. Voting on issues that have major impact on the individual  
voter's life easily make him/her vote in a way that guarantees an  
acceptable outcome. Polls, entertainment, favourite colours and other  
small things don't "force" voters to push their viewpoints through.

Juho


On Apr 24, 2007, at 6:01 , Michael Poole wrote:

> Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes:
>
>> At 05:53 PM 4/23/2007, Juho wrote:
>>> Political elections are typically competitive. Polls are typically
>>> less competitive. Voting on which family size Pizza (of several good
>>> ones) to buy for the family today may well be a quite non- 
>>> competitive
>>> election.
>>
>> That's true. And one might ask why. Certainly it's understandable in
>> a family. But it is also understandable in any functional
>> neighborhood or community organization. Why does this
>> "non-competitiveness" break down, and under what conditions?
>
> It generally breaks down when a voter no longer has a strong enough
> personal connection to a large enough fraction of the others involved.
> That threshold varies from person to person, and probably from time to
> time and from subject to subject.
>
> The same kind of breakdown happens in many online interactions: it is
> easy for a person to be extremely rude to someone whom he has never
> met, especially if the audience does not contain many people whose
> opinions of him are important to him.
>
> A similar breakdown is well-documented in mob behavior, where the
> actions of an individual may be quite different when he is anonymous
> than when he is known or memorable to the victims of his behavior.
>
> There will always be some people whose behavior is consistently
> honest, repulsive, or whatever else, but a large majority of people
> are swayed by peer pressure -- even the potential or imaginary kinds.
>
> Michael Poole





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Re: [EM] PR in student government

[Juho]

Some short observations:
- It looked to me that the original proposal was planned for single- 
seat districts. Maybe the party level outcome would be decided fist  
and only then the individual approval votes within that party.
- Small parties could now also win the seat.
- There are also multi-winner Approval based methods (e.g. http:// 
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Proportional_approval_voting).

Juho


On Apr 24, 2007, at 1:50 , Gervase Lam wrote:

>> Date: Tue, 17 Apr 2007 14:28:56 -0400
>> From: Howard Swerdfeger
>> Subject: Re: [EM] PR in student government
>
>> Voting Instructions:
>> 1. You only have ONE vote.
>> 2. Place an X in the box NEXT to your candidate of choice.
>> 3. Your vote counts both for your candidate and your party.
>>
>> Party AParty B   Party C  Independent
>> 
>> [ ]Candidate1  [ ]Candidate1 [ ]Candidate1 [ ]Candidate1
>> [ ]Candidate2  [ ]Candidate2 [X]Candidate2
>> [ ]Candidate3  [ ]Candidate3 [ ]Candidate3
>> ---
>>
>>
>> Seats would be allocated proportionally by party.
>> But the member of the party that gets each seat would be  
>> determined by
>> the number of votes the received.
>
> One slight variation to this is to use Approval voting for both the
> voting of the party and candidate.  That is, a voter can approve as  
> many
> parties as the voter wishes and as many candidates as wished.
>
> Alternatively, the Approval and Plurality voting could be mixed (i.e.
> Plurality voting for parties and Approval voting for the candidates or
> vice versa).
>
> Also (for either Plurality or Approval) one could allow voting of
> candidates on lists that a voter did not vote for.  But may be
> disallowing this would be better.
>
> This type of thing was discussed on this list before:
>
>  electorama.com/2004-March/012455.html>
>  electorama.com/2004-March/012503.html>
>
> Thanks,
> Gervase.
>
>
> 
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
> list info



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Re: [EM] Student government - what voting system to recommend?

[Juho]

On Apr 24, 2007, at 1:51 , Howard Swerdfeger wrote:
> a) I guess I was thinking of "Non-competitive" as one where the  
> winner is obvious long before the contest is held (boxing: Me vs  
> Mike Tyson). and "competitive" as one where the winner is not known  
> until the last possible moment (Running: Me Vs. You!).

This use of the word correlates with the way I used it (but may also  
differ in many cases).

> b) accepting your definition for the purpose of this thread.

Ok, my use of the term is not a stable definition in the area of  
election methods, so also different terminology may be used.

> 4) The ultimate form of democracy is one that
>  * maximizes voter knowledge of issues
>  * seeks to Involve the voters at every stage of decision making  
> process   (direction, Discussion/deliberation, Vote)

Agreed. These are some very key principles that make a democratic  
system work well.

>  * generates a laws and directions for society that is  
> representative of the beliefs of all well knowledgeable voters.

Yes, assuming that we try to make all voters "knowledgeable" (as in  
the first bullet) and don't deny the less knowledgeable ones the  
right and recommendation to vote as well.

> Many people in the last election who voted Conservative did not  
> really want the conservative in power. They mainly wanted the  
> ruling Liberals out of Power. and the only party with enough  
> support to do that was the Conservatives.
>
> Same goes for the one before that election. Many people "Plugged  
> there nose" and voted Liberal because they were afraid of the  
> "hidden agenda"  from the "Religious Right" in the Conservative Party.

This sounds like the "one dimensional" (binary) spectrum of  
alternatives of a two-party system is not sufficient for the voters  
in this case. Multiple parties and/or ability to provide opinions in  
more than one dimension (traditionally often the left-right axis)  
would probably reduce the "nose plugging effect".

Juho


P.S. One more comment on the older mails. The number of voters has an  
effect in the sense that the higher the number of voters is the more  
probable it is that one voter doesn't feel that he/she can trust all  
the other voters to be his/her friends but will vote against him/her  
(in a competitive way). This may increase the probability that this  
voter decides to vote strategically (since probably others do so  
too). In small groups people may thus trust that all members of it  
know the needs to all others and will take them into account in a  
fair way. In big groups others may be seen as "strangers that one  
needs to defend against".





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