[EM] Voting chaos
Oops: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6622963.stm Review under way on voting chaos: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6623287.stm Election group criticises ballots: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6628657.stm All this even after a how to vote publicity campaign on TV! Thanks, Gervase. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Voting chaos
Too many more stories like this and I'll have to write up my own software and go into business selling election counting systems. Brian Olson http://bolson.org/ On Thu, 10 May 2007, Gervase Lam wrote: Oops: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6622963.stm Review under way on voting chaos: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6623287.stm Election group criticises ballots: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/scotland/6628657.stm All this even after a how to vote publicity campaign on TV! Thanks, Gervase. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Does this method already have a name?
Forest W Simmons wrote: Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs. Forest, I gather from your description of the method that the voters don't/can't give explicit approval cutoffs that allow them to rank among unapproved candidates. I say this because in the algorithm these cuttoffs are moved about with their 'original position' having no effect. Is that right? If so, it seems to me that they way you define the ballots somewhat mixes up the concepts of input and algorithm and maybe even strategy. The candidate with Maximum Minimal Reactionary Approval wins. A candidate's reactionary approval relative to another candidate is the approval she would get if the approval cutoff were moved adjacent to (but not past) the other candidate's position in the ballot order on every ballot. Am I correct in taking it that (a) sometimes the approval cutoff is moved so that some ballots 'approve' none of the candidates, and (b) the cutoff is never moved to a position where it distinguishes between candidates given the same rank? Chris Benham Forest W Simmons wrote: Ballots are ordinal with approval cutoffs. The candidate with Maximum Minimal Reactionary Approval wins. A candidate's reactionary approval relative to another candidate is the approval she would get if the approval cutoff were moved adjacent to (but not past) the other candidate's position in the ballot order on every ballot. So each candidate's score is her minimum reactionary approval relative to the other candidates. The candidate with the highest score wins. It turns out that when rankings are complete this method is equivalent to the common versions of MinMax. It doesn't get tripped up on Kevin's standard example against pure MMPO: 49 A 1 A=B 1 B=C 49 C Does it satisfy the FBC? Forest election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
