Re: [EM] danger of coercion (Re: First U.S. Scientific Election Audit...)

2007-05-15 Thread Abd ul-Rahman Lomax
At 03:22 PM 5/14/2007, Juho wrote:
  And, something seems to be forgotten here. Elections are about
  aggregating votes. Rarely do a few votes matter.

Well, this matters at least to the individuals (and the mentality may
escalate to wider circles too).

That's true. However, if there is a coercion problem that is 
spreading like this, it is a problem that surely will come to public 
attention and additional security can be put in place. It is fairly 
simple, for example, to prohibit all extraneous marks or signals on 
ballots. Write-ins can be handled with a separate procedure. Note 
that there is no way to avoid write-in coercion that is aimed at the 
write-in vote. Write my name in or I breaka you face! But very, 
very difficult for such coercion to actually elect this write-in candidate.

This is the point. Coercion, bad. But eliminating all possibility of 
a coercer knowing that the victim has complied is impossible. And 
keeping ballots private is not particularly effective.

What I'm saying is that (1) election coercion should be prosecuted 
and treated as a serious crime, as, indeed, should election fraud. It 
could be argued that election fraud is treason, because it is a 
betrayal of the sovereign, which in a democracy is the people, 
lawfully expressing their decisions through elections.

It is not a minor crime.

Why is it treated as such? Well, unfortunately, if election fraud 
attains its goal, the mechanisms of law enforcement are under the 
control of those who benefited from it. Only an awakened public can 
deal with a problem like this. Depending on the government to do it 
without serious general public support (to the point of a demand) is, 
quite simply, naive to the max.

Election coercion is not, from the point of view of the victim, the 
most serious form of coercion, by far. For one thing, it is fairly 
easy to comply, and the cost is low. So for a truly powerless victim, 
the danger can be avoided. *Of course* we don't want voters to be put 
in that position, but ballot imaging does not actually increase the 
risk seriously. Remember, in order to have any effect on attempts to 
coerce voting, the ballot must be distinguished in some way. This, 
all by itself, will leave traces that something unusual is happening, 
and the authorities -- if there is a public demanding it -- can 
actively investigate, not wait for a victim brave enough to come forward.

If the ballots are imaged, the public will know that they are being 
marked! If not, how will they know?

Discarding marked ballots is dangerous because it creates a ready 
method for those bent on election fraud to invalidate ballots. It can 
be done in a practically undetectable manner. Glue a piece of pencil 
lead to the tip of a finger. Pick up the ballot in a certain way, it 
is marked. Pick it up in any other way, not.

But if someone is marking ballots in this way, in numbers sufficient 
to affect elections, it will show on the images. Or there will be, if 
rules are in place to specially handle marked ballots, a large number 
of such ballots where images are not available. In any case the 
public will be able to tell something is amiss, if routine ballots are imaged.

The ballots should not be discarded. They should be counted under 
tighter rules about who can see them. They should be segregated for 
rapid special access if needed for audit.

My point is that the problem can be addressed far more effectively 
than by routinely keeping ballots out of public view. Remember, a 
coercer, under present law, can already arrange to view ballots 
directly. So how does routinely keeping them secret protect against coercion.

The protection is in the privacy of the voting booth and in measures 
intended to prevent connecting the ballot with the voter. This can 
only be defeated, generally, with the collusion of the voter, which 
is why the arguments about groups afraid to express their opinion 
because it would be unpopular is totally off the mark. Such people 
are not in any way put at risk by ballot imaging.

An example of impact to bigger groups: Females are a majority out of
which considerable part could feel the pressure of their husbands.

Some husbands might claim that their wives are a bigger risk

I've never heard of a husband demanding that a wife vote in a certain 
way. I'm sure it has happened, all kinds of crazy things happen, but 
abusive husbands are usually concerned about more immediate and 
personal things than elections. How *dare* you disturb my beer bottle 
collection!

People with abusive spouses have a lot more to worry about than 
election coercion. Amongst all the serious problems, this one would 
hardly make a dent.

  I think that standing the whole system on its head to avoid a very
  theoretical and unlikely scenario is nuts.

I think privacy in elections is a long standing healthy principle. No
need to make radical changes. And if need arises, one can seek
balance between different needs.

Privacy in 

Re: [EM] danger of coercion (Re: First U.S. Scientific Election Audit...)

2007-05-15 Thread Juho
On May 15, 2007, at 18:11 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:

 eliminating all possibility of a coercer knowing that the victim  
 has complied is impossible.

I think some very basic methods eliminate the possibility of coercion  
quite well (e.g. ballots with only few options, no write-ins, marked  
ballots rejected, voting only manually, at places well controlled by  
representatives of multiple interest groups, only one person allowed  
in the voting booth and at the ballot box at one time, and many  
enough voters per voting location).

 Discarding marked ballots is dangerous because it creates a ready  
 method for those bent on election fraud to invalidate ballots.

In my previous mail I recommended representatives of all political  
groupings to be present when the votes are counted. If there are  
fraudsters with full uncontrolled access to the ballots they could do  
many tricks like replace some ballots with new ones.

 a coercer, under present law, can already arrange to view ballots  
 directly.

I guess this refers to the U.S law. This of course (in addition to  
providing some openness) introduces also some privacy and coercion  
related problems.

Juho







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