Re: [EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 01:11 AM 3/14/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: >But is this all about changing what we mean by the terms "strategic" >and "insincere"? Is that the point? As the terms apply to Range and Approval, yes. The usage came from use with ranked systems, where the behavior of the system and implications for voters was different. > > Yes. I think that if you vote Approval style, you are dividing the > > candidates into two groups, and you are willing to support one group, > > fully, and not the other. It is true that this might not reflect much > > care, it might be simple disinterest, insufficient to go to the > > effort of rating candidates intermediately. > >Am I supposed to put extra effort into something just because I can? No. You do it if it serves you, and not otherwise. And we assume that if everyone behaves like this, the votes will generate a useful result. "Serves you" could include serving others, i.e., voters considering what they think others would be pleased with, if this matters to them. But in a "fully sincere" Range poll, I'd want voters to vote their personal preferences, and not consider the needs of compromise, but, quite for this reason, I dislike Range polls that automatically determine outcomes. They are far more useful as input to a deliberative process, or at least another poll for actual implementation (which might not be Range, it might be Condorcet compliant or at least majoritarian). election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
Hi, --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > >I don't really mind if you want to define strategic voting out of > >existence. I don't think it sheds light on anything, though. > > Just because you can't see that light doesn't mean it doesn't exist. > > I have not defined strategic voting out of existence. Range, quite > simply, does not encourage true strategic voting. Reverse rank order > in order to gain a better outcome, *that* is strategic, insincere voting. But is this all about changing what we mean by the terms "strategic" and "insincere"? Is that the point? > >I mean, it's trivial for me to imagine myself in a Range election with > >a variety of personal ratings for many candidates. Since I personally > >don't vote with enough uncertainty to want to undermine my own voting > >power (going to the polls is enough of an inconvenience), I would vote > >approval-style. And here you're basically saying you have enough > >confidence in me, some random voter, to trust that I must truly care > >deeply about this separation of the candidates into two sets. > > Yes. I think that if you vote Approval style, you are dividing the > candidates into two groups, and you are willing to support one group, > fully, and not the other. It is true that this might not reflect much > care, it might be simple disinterest, insufficient to go to the > effort of rating candidates intermediately. Am I supposed to put extra effort into something just because I can? Kevin Venzke ___ Découvrez une nouvelle façon d'obtenir des réponses à toutes vos questions ! Profitez des connaissances, des opinions et des expériences des internautes sur Yahoo! Questions/Réponses http://fr.answers.yahoo.com election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 12:44 PM 3/11/2007, Matthew Welland wrote: >Based on what I know now I would settle on Range Voting. However for a while >I was dead set on approval voting and before that I was advocating IRV. Is >Range Voting "satisficient" or are its flaws or limitations serious enough >that there are many scenarios where it will fail to meet a satisficity >ratio of greater than one? Mr Welland, if he has not done so, should consider joining the Range Voting mailing list, which actually discusses election methods in general, but also implementation strategy and related election topics, such as voting machines, gerrymandering, etc. A rather broad consensus has appeared among election methods activists that the best first step is Approval. First of all, it is terminally simple. Implementing Approval is simply a matter of striking out a few lines of the election code, those which cause overvoted ballots to be discarded. I have never seen a good argument for tossing these ballots, and I've seen quite a bit of mischief done by discarding them. In any case, this reform has a crackerjack slogan: Just Count All the Votes! And, of course, it solves the first-order spoiler effect quite well, without complicating voting for the large majority of voters who will continue to vote as they had been voting prior to the reform. Ballots stay essentially the same, instructions might change a little. Counting methods and equipment do not change (discarding overvotes can't be hard-wired or built-in except as an option, because all equipment must be able to handle multiple-winner elections). Sometimes when Approval is presented as some shiny new method, "Vote for every candidate you Approve," it gets a bad reaction. All that is necessary, though, is to stop discarding ballots! Once Approval is in place, further reforms will, I think, become more popular, and it is an open question as to whether reform will move toward Condorcet or Range methods. As I suggested in another post, it is possible to combine the two by risking a top-two runoff (between a Range and Condorcet winner). However, once it becomes possible for voters to equally rate or rank candidates, voters may correctly see an IRV method that requires ranking as a loss of one kind of voting power in order to gain another. And that is not necessary, nor is it necessary to risk the center-squeeze effect of IRV. If one is going to have a fully-ranked ballot, why not have a fully-rated ballot? I.e., a Range ballot. If one wants to use a Range ballot to find a Condorcet winner, no problem. But rankings without ratings causes quite a bit of important information to be lost, specifically preference strength information. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 01:38 PM 3/11/2007, Juho wrote: >On Mar 11, 2007, at 18:44 , Matthew Welland wrote: >My current choice > > would be > > range voting. It is simple (only slightly harder to expain than > > approval) > > and it seems to do a good job at leaving voters satisfied. > >It offers some really nice properties with sincere votes. It however >has the potential to lead to disasters if used in a mixed way so that >some voter groups mark their sincere preferences while some others >mark strategically only largest and smallest values. This charge regarding range is a bit misleading. Range is a voting method which allows voters to vote all the way from bullet style, to approval style, to full Range. And every large Range election in the real world, I'm quite sure, will be "mixed." So the "potential to lead to disasters" charge is a serious one, if true. I see no evidence that it is more true of Range than of any other election method generally discussed here. Warren Smith has done extensive simulations of Range under "sincere" and "strategic" voting mixtures of voters, and indications are that Range performs well. Warren's work is in progress, he does not pretend that it is fully conclusive. But it's better, basically, than anything else we have. My own observation on the alleged dichotomy between "sincere preferences" and "strategically only largest and smallest values" is that all of these can be sincere, and, assuming that the voters have some basic understanding of the system, all are likely to be sincere. Range never encourages a "fully insincere" rating of a candidate; such a rating is one which has the effect of reversing expressed preference order over sincere preference order. (But it is possible that some voters might do this, for one reason or another. It is not strategically mandated by the system, but suppose that a voter likes a candidate but does not wish to express approval of the candidate's party. So this voter might downrate the candidate, while not downrating other candidates who would otherwise get lesser ratings. This, however, only means that a voter can treat a candidate *for whatever reason* as less worthy.) So if the voter maintains preference order, within what is expressed (that is, preference information may be unexpressed in Range if the voter votes equal ratings), then we can call the voting sincere. I used to think that I understood what "strategic" voting in Range was, i.e., say I prefer A>B>C. And, say, I would rate them 1, 0.5, and 0 respectively. Ah, but I really want A to win. So I rate B, not at 0.5, but at 0. Seemed simple, I was "exaggerating." But wait! If I vote this way, it must be that I prefer A to B with more strength than I prefer B to C. So the conditions of the problem are contradictory. I assumed that the preference strength was equal, and thus the ratings would be equally spaced. But then I essentially assumed that they were *not* equal, because by downrating B to zero I was equating B and C, risking victory by C, my least favorite. Essentially, my conclusion has been that Range voters will vote sincerely and the only problem has been that we assume that voting extremes is insincere. We do understand, readily, that voting zero for a candidate is not equating that candidate with Genghis Khan. It means, instead, that of this field of candidates, this candidate is rated among the lowest grouping of candidates, these are all candidates to whom I do not want to contribute any votes. But we need to understand that, in addition to normalization, which moves the votes to the extremes, for at least one candidate, there is what I've called magnification, where the preference range expressed is decreased. It's like turning up the gain on a DC amplifier, with sufficient gain the output will peg the meter at max or min. Useful information is still provided. I began to realize this with arguments over the relationship between Range and the Majority Criterion. Range allows a majority to elect its preference, *if* the majority cares sufficiently. If a majority bullet votes, the majority preference will be elected. When it is alleged that Range does not satisfy the Majority Criterion, what is meant that if a majority votes for its preference (we assume at max rating), but some of that majority also elevates above min rating some other candidate, there is a "risk" that this other candidate will win. This is alleged as a problem with Range. It is not, because the majority has *permitted* this outcome. In any case, if a majority in a Range election prefers a candidate, and considers the election of this candidate over all others to be of sufficient importance, it cannot fail to prevail. It is only if the majority -- at least some of it -- is willing to permit another outcome by elevating candidates other than first preference, that the winner may not be the first preference of a majority. And we have shown by many exampl
[EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
On Sun, 11 Mar 2007 09:44:32 -0700 Matthew Welland wrote: > I can't follow every thread but I'm starting to think that the search for > some perfect voting method is asymptotically approaching some sort of > limit. > > That doesn't mean that the pursuit isn't useful but there is an academic > path and a pragmatic path. I want to know what to advocate in various > forums and what to implement on my own web site. My current choice would be > range voting. It is simple (only slightly harder to expain than approval) > and it seems to do a good job at leaving voters satisfied. It is hard to > imagine that more than 50% of the voters would be dissatisfied with the > results of a range vote. > > I see several important qualities to consider: > > 1. How hard is the system to describe to others and to implement. > 2. Will the ratio of people satisfied to dissatisifed with the results > be greater than 1. A "satisficity(*) ratio" if you will. > 3. Voting effort. How much effort does it take to express your vote? > > Voting system Complexity Satisficity(*)Voting Effort > -- --- --- > Pluratlity simple terrible low > Approval simple ok to goodlow > Condorcet complex good? medium > Range simple good medium > ... Actually I disagree, especially as to "complex" for Condorcet. Until you get involved in cycles it is NOT complex. While the method BETTER be prepared for more than two candidates competing for leading, this should not happen often - and the possibility need not concern voters deciding how to vote. There BETTER be ONE method for all races for, as a voter, I have neither time nor interest in studying multiple sets of rules. It BETTER give me reasonable control for reasonable effort, though my desires vary from race to race. Thus: Plurality - the implemented method BETTER not demand more effort than Plurality would require for the majority of races for which Plurality would be satisfactory. Approval or Condorcet would do, provided there is no nonsense about forbidding truncation. Approval - this, occasionally, is better than Plurality - making it acceptable as a cheap temporary advance. Condorcet - proper implementation is simple to me for I can vote as for Plurality or Approval when desired, but can do full ranking of 2 or more candidates when desired. While I cannot prove need for more than about 3 ranks, I defy implementation proposals claiming need to limit to that few ranks - 9 is a believable limit if more than that would complicate implementation. IRV - much like Condorcet, but has difficulty accepting Approval voting, cannot provide the information offered by Condorcet arrays, and, occasionally, can be expected to award the win to a candidate Condorcet would recognize the voters rated as a lemon. Range? I leave it to a Range backer to argue for this. I see rating as more complex than ranking, and less able to give the control that ranking does (though it can claim detailed variation in backing when desired). Write-ins - not a method, but an ability that BETTER give as good control as would be expected from Plurality (some discussions of Range offer either MORE or LESS control than Plurality offers). -- [EMAIL PROTECTED]people.clarityconnect.com/webpages3/davek Dave Ketchum 108 Halstead Ave, Owego, NY 13827-1708 607-687-5026 Do to no one what you would not want done to you. If you want peace, work for justice. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
On Mar 11, 2007, at 18:44 , Matthew Welland wrote: > I can't follow every thread but I'm starting to think that the > search for > some perfect voting method is asymptotically approaching some sort of > limit. Theoretically that may be the truth. In practice I see many experts with often quite different opinions on where the asymptote is about to lead us :-). Note also that there may be also different targets on what kind of utility the method tries to maximize. Seeking for a compromise candidate with wide support may be a good target in most elections but one could also have different goals like minimizing number of really disappointed voters or giving a chance also to candidates that are not widely supported (e.g. random ballot). Allowing the majority to decide vs. seeking for best average utility is also another decision on what kind of utility to seek. And of course in some environments strategic voting is a bigger threat than in others and one needs to pick the voting method accordingly. There are however some good general purpose methods that work well in most typical elections. > > That doesn't mean that the pursuit isn't useful but there is an > academic > path and a pragmatic path. Yes, this list discusses both theoretical questions and pragmatic questions. Both are of course good topics to cover. It would be good to be clear when one claims something about the theoretical properties and when about the practical properties. > I want to know what to advocate in various > forums and what to implement on my own web site. My current choice > would be > range voting. It is simple (only slightly harder to expain than > approval) > and it seems to do a good job at leaving voters satisfied. It offers some really nice properties with sincere votes. It however has the potential to lead to disasters if used in a mixed way so that some voter groups mark their sincere preferences while some others mark strategically only largest and smallest values. Juho Laatu > It is hard to > imagine that more than 50% of the voters would be dissatisfied with > the > results of a range vote. > > I see several important qualities to consider: > > 1. How hard is the system to describe to others and to implement. > 2. Will the ratio of people satisfied to dissatisifed with the results > be greater than 1. A "satisficity(*) ratio" if you will. > 3. Voting effort. How much effort does it take to express your vote? > > Voting system Complexity Satisficity(*)Voting Effort > -- --- --- > > Pluratlity simple terrible low > Approval simple ok to goodlow > Condorcet complex good? medium > Range simple good medium > > > > Based on what I know now I would settle on Range Voting. However > for a while > I was dead set on approval voting and before that I was advocating > IRV. Is > Range Voting "satisficient" or are its flaws or limitations serious > enough > that there are many scenarios where it will fail to meet a satisficity > ratio of greater than one? > > (*) My definition is "degree to which it satisfies" which may > differ from > definitions found out on the web :-) and yes, I know I should be using > Bayesian Regret but a) don't really understand it and b) I like > the sound > of satisficity. > > Matt > -- > http://www.kiatoa.com, a self-governing site where *you* can be the > boss! > You make and choose the stories and the classifieds are always free. > Also, many "best of" polls. Come join in the ballot stuffing! > > election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for > list info ___ Inbox full of spam? Get leading spam protection and 1GB storage with All New Yahoo! Mail. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/nowyoucan.html election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
I can't follow every thread but I'm starting to think that the search for some perfect voting method is asymptotically approaching some sort of limit. That doesn't mean that the pursuit isn't useful but there is an academic path and a pragmatic path. I want to know what to advocate in various forums and what to implement on my own web site. My current choice would be range voting. It is simple (only slightly harder to expain than approval) and it seems to do a good job at leaving voters satisfied. It is hard to imagine that more than 50% of the voters would be dissatisfied with the results of a range vote. I see several important qualities to consider: 1. How hard is the system to describe to others and to implement. 2. Will the ratio of people satisfied to dissatisifed with the results be greater than 1. A "satisficity(*) ratio" if you will. 3. Voting effort. How much effort does it take to express your vote? Voting system Complexity Satisficity(*)Voting Effort -- --- --- Pluratlity simple terrible low Approval simple ok to goodlow Condorcet complex good? medium Range simple good medium Based on what I know now I would settle on Range Voting. However for a while I was dead set on approval voting and before that I was advocating IRV. Is Range Voting "satisficient" or are its flaws or limitations serious enough that there are many scenarios where it will fail to meet a satisficity ratio of greater than one? (*) My definition is "degree to which it satisfies" which may differ from definitions found out on the web :-) and yes, I know I should be using Bayesian Regret but a) don't really understand it and b) I like the sound of satisficity. Matt -- http://www.kiatoa.com, a self-governing site where *you* can be the boss! You make and choose the stories and the classifieds are always free. Also, many "best of" polls. Come join in the ballot stuffing! election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
