Re: [EM] DYN

2007-07-15 Thread Juho
These methods offer quite interesting and quite radical horse trading  
possibilities. The previous version (without the published rankings  
limitation) is so flexible that it is hard to even imagine what kind  
of trading would take place. In the version below it is possible e.g.  
that some extreme candidates would trade votes and thereby get some  
advantage over the centrist ones. It is also an option not to allow  
trading at all but just to allow the candidates to set their approval  
cutoff where they want (in line with the ranking order). One more  
option would be to allow the voters to cast ranked votes and donate  
the whole vote to one candidate that would then be allowed to put the  
approval cutoff in those votes in the most appropriate position.


Juho


On Jul 12, 2007, at 21:22 , Forest W Simmons wrote:


In further response to Juho's question about candidates making their
approval choices before versus after the partial count, here's a
compromise:

Require the candidates to publish their candidate rankings before the
election, and then (after the partial info is available to them)
require them to make approvals consistent with their rankings, so that
they can approve A without approving B only if B is not ranked  
ahead of

A on their published list.

Forest




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Re: [EM] DYN

2007-07-12 Thread Forest W Simmons
In further response to Juho's question about candidates making their 
approval choices before versus after the partial count, here's a 
compromise:

Require the candidates to publish their candidate rankings before the 
election, and then (after the partial info is available to them) 
require them to make approvals consistent with their rankings, so that 
they can approve A without approving B only if B is not ranked ahead of 
A on their published list.

Forest 




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Re: [EM] DYN

2007-07-12 Thread Forest W Simmons
True, it would be confusing to explain DYN as a form of asset voting, 
but it could be done. Here is its purest form:

Each voter gets one vote per candidate.  The voter delegates each vote 
to a candidate (the one that she wants to make responsible for   
getting a Y or N attached to that vote). 

If you want a sure Y, then delegate it to the candidate in question.

If you want a sure N, delegate it to the candidate's strongest enemy.

Each ballot is encoded as a square matrix of zeros and ones.  If the 
row i column j entry is a one, then on that ballot the Y/N decision 
regarding candidate i has been delegated to candidate j. 

After these matrices have been summed, each proxy has a multiset of 
votes (the respective columns of the sum, so interpreted).

The elements of these multisets are subject to horse trading.

When the horse trading is finished, the proxies decide the Y/N status 
of each of the votes for which they have become responsible.

The candidate with the greatest number of Y's is elected.

Check: for each candidate the sum of the Y's and N's should be the 
same, namely the total number of ballots.

Forest




Warren Smith wrote:


>see
>http://groups.yahoo.com/group/RangeVoting/message/5389
>-- 
>Warren D. Smith
>http://RangeVoting.org  <-- add your endorsement (by clicking
>"endorse" as 1st step)
>and
>math.temple.edu/~wds/homepage/works.html
>

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Re: [EM] DYN

2007-07-10 Thread Juho
Why "after"? (Is this somehow essential? Will they change their  
opinions based on the "partial results"? Are they supposed to reflect  
the general opinion more than their own opinion?)

How about announcing the content of the proxy votes already before  
the votes are counted, or maybe already before the election?

If the votes are counted "after", will each proxy know the number of  
delegated votes that other proxies have (or the number of his/her own  
delegated votes) before they cast their proxy votes?

Juho


On Jul 10, 2007, at 2:21 , Forest W Simmons wrote:

> Delegable Yes/No:
>
> Each voter has a Yes/No vote to cast for each candidate.  The voters
> can delegate some of these votes to candidates (including write-ins),
> if they so desire.  The candidates cast the delegated votes after the
> rest of the votes have already been counted.
>
> Thus the voters that have strong feelings about certain candidates can
> vote for or against them, and delegate their remaining votes to their
> proxies, who will then have some firm partial results to inform their
> strategies.
>
> Forest
>
>
> 
> election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for  
> list info





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[EM] DYN

2007-07-09 Thread Forest W Simmons
Delegable Yes/No:

Each voter has a Yes/No vote to cast for each candidate.  The voters 
can delegate some of these votes to candidates (including write-ins), 
if they so desire.  The candidates cast the delegated votes after the 
rest of the votes have already been counted.

Thus the voters that have strong feelings about certain candidates can 
vote for or against them, and delegate their remaining votes to their 
proxies, who will then have some firm partial results to inform their 
strategies.

Forest

 

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