Re: [EM] Hamilton vs Webster (Sainte-Lague)

2006-12-14 Thread Juho
Yes, this one works. But there are still some interesting peculiarities.

Example:

We have three sates with population A:5, B:3 and C:3 (millions I guess).

Seats will be allocated in the following order: A, B*, C, A, B*, A,  
C,...
- Three first seats go to the three states either based on the at  
least one seat per state rule or by starting the algorithm from  
zero seats
- I used * to indicate where B wins the seat by lottery (instead of C)

The strange thing is that the fifth seat goes to B by lottery but C  
will not get the next seat although it was already entitled (tie) to  
the previous seat (and B and C are identical states in the sense that  
they have exactly the same population).

Divisor methods like SL/Webster provide ordering of the candidates/ 
seats by default and they may be nicer to use in places where such  
ordering is needed. I however tend to think that the Alabama paradox  
is not a sufficient reason to abandon use of LR/Hamilton in seat  
allocation to the states. LR/Hamilton does the allocation in a  
perfectly rational way that can be considered to be ideal (at least  
from one point of view). LR/Hamilton (Alabama paradox) may look bad  
to the audience if presented so, but it is another question if it is  
bad or if it looks bad to mathematicians.

Juho Laatu


On Dec 14, 2006, at 6:16 , Dan Bishop wrote:

 MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
 ...
 Are there other reasons
 why LR/Hamilton is not favoured?

 I reply:

 That's reason enough. Two kinds of nonmonotonicity: Population
 nonmonotonicity and House-size nonmonotonicitly. Your state can  
 lose a seat
 because of a population change favoring your state with respect to  
 the
 others, or because of an increase in the House's total number of  
 seats.

 There's a pretty simple modification to LR/Hamilton that would  
 eliminate
 the Alabama Paradox.  Give seats one at a time (except at the  
 beginning,
 when each state is assigned one seat), such that the nth seat goes to
 the state for which the quantity
 (state's proportion of population) * n - (state's seats so far)
 is the greatest.
 
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[EM] Hamilton vs Webster (Sainte-Lague)

2006-12-06 Thread MIKE OSSIPOFF

You wrote:

I understand that LR/Hamilton may lead to the Alabama paradox and
people may dislike LR/Hamilton because of this. But I think LR/
Hamilton is quite proportional and unbiased.

I reply:

Hamilton is unbiased, as is Webster. But though Hamilton doesn't 
systematically deviate from proportionality so as to favor large or small 
states, it sporadically and randomly deviates from proportionality, in an 
unbiased way.

You continued:

Are there other reasons
why LR/Hamilton is not favoured?

I reply:

That's reason enough. Two kinds of nonmonotonicity: Population 
nonmonotonicity and House-size nonmonotonicitly. Your state can lose a seat 
because of a population change favoring your state with respect to the 
others, or because of an increase in the House's total number of seats.

You continued:

SL/Webster is close to LR/Hamilton

I reply:

Close in the sense of being unbiased.

You continued:

and avoids the Alabama paradox, but LR/Hamilton might still be
considered more exact in providing proportionality.

I reply:

Why? Hamilton's nonmonotonicity paradoxes are instances of 
unproportionality. And, as I said, Webster, and only Webster has the 
transfer property that I described. For example, given a Hamilton seat 
allocation, it could well be, due to Hamilton's random caprice, that if we 
take a seat from one state, and give it to another state, that seat transfer 
could reduce the factor by which those two states' votes per seat differ. 
Showing that the Hamilton allocation was suboptimal and need of improvement.

Milke Ossipoff

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Re: [EM] Hamilton vs Webster (Sainte-Lague)

2006-12-06 Thread Juho
On Dec 7, 2006, at 3:50 , MIKE OSSIPOFF wrote:
 You continued:

 and avoids the Alabama paradox, but LR/Hamilton might still be
 considered more exact in providing proportionality.

 I reply:

 Why? Hamilton's nonmonotonicity paradoxes are instances of
 unproportionality. And, as I said, Webster, and only Webster has the
 transfer property that I described. For example, given a Hamilton seat
 allocation, it could well be, due to Hamilton's random caprice,  
 that if we
 take a seat from one state, and give it to another state, that seat  
 transfer
 could reduce the factor by which those two states' votes per seat  
 differ.
 Showing that the Hamilton allocation was suboptimal and need of  
 improvement.

Joseph Malkevitch pointed out the Balinski-Young Theorem in another  
mail. That's what I was actually looking for. I don't think this is  
too dramatic since we are only talking about rounding errors. But if  
voters can influence the outcome, then this is more serious. In the  
Alabama case I think LR/Hamilton is quite harmless since people sure  
do not move or give birth to children in the assumption that it might  
change the political balance (especially since you don't know if  
other people are moving too). But if someone is able to influence the  
outcome of the census (after knowing the results of the other  
states), then there is space for doing tricks. My assumption is that  
in most cases LR/Hamilton works ok and people should in a way be  
happy with the paradox since that gives them the fairest possible  
result. In practice SL/Webster is close enough (and monotonic), so I  
find it ok as well (the difference is anyway only at rounding error  
level here). And SL/Webster would be a good choice if there is a risk  
of foul play.

Btw, in the case that one intentionally wants to favour large parties  
I find methods like d'Hondt/Jefferson better than setting a hard  
limit (e.g. 5%) that parties must reach to get their first candidate  
through.

Juho Laatu



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