Re: [EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 11:19 PM 3/13/2007, Michael Poole wrote: >Take a voter who thinks candidate A is the best, B is bad, and C is >the worst. His best estimates of normalized utility might be A=1, >B=0.2, C=0. Why does he not vote his best estimate? >If the ballot asks for scores based on how much a voter likes the >candidates, then a vote with B=0 is insincere: the voter is not >answering what the ballot asks for. Don't blame Range Voting for faulty ballot instructions! Yes, you could call such behavior "insincere," that is, the voter is not responding, allegedly, sincerely (Poole has assumed that it is insincere). But what those who write about this seem to consistently overlook is that if the voter wants to vote 0 rather than 0.2 for B, the voter must have some motivation to do so! (or is simply voting randomly, which tells us nothing). Why would we claim that the voter "sincerely" would rate the candidate as 0.2 when the voter decides that *for whatever reason*, the candidate should get no votes! Because the voter kinda likes the candidate, perhaps personally? Present ballots don't tell voters how to vote. They simply say something like "Vote for One." They do not say, "Vote for the candidate you like." And quite a few voters don't vote for the candidate they like -- that is, third party supporters or those who'd prefer, really, a write-in. > However, if the ballot asks for >something else, it could be a sincere vote. What instructions do you >think a range voting ballot should give voters? That's a good question. If it is summation Range (as distinct from average Range, which is a little trickier), it is as if the voter has 100 votes to cast (or 99 or whatever), in an Approval election, as I wrote. So, without claiming that I've considered this carefully: For each candidate, vote from 0 to 99, 0 giving the candidate no support whatever, and 99 giving full support. You may freely support as many candidates as you choose at whatever rating you choose. If you make no rating for a candidate, a rating of zero (0) will be assumed. The last part is for summation range, the instruction for average range might be "If you make no rating of a candidate, your vote will not be considered in determining the overall rating of that candidate." I highly recommend that Range *start* as summation Range. But there would be no harm in a provision which allows voters to explicitly abstain, though I'm not sure there is sufficient social benefit to justify the complication. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
Abd ul-Rahman Lomax writes: > At 05:56 PM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: >> > The problem is that we have this idea of >> > exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate? >> > *Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration. >> >>You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint, I must have >>genuinely needed the money. > > This conversation is bankrupt. > > Yes, if I rob a bank, at gunpoint or otherwise, I obviously have > sufficient motivation to take the very substantial risks involved. > What's the point? Take a voter who thinks candidate A is the best, B is bad, and C is the worst. His best estimates of normalized utility might be A=1, B=0.2, C=0. If the ballot asks for scores based on how much a voter likes the candidates, then a vote with B=0 is insincere: the voter is not answering what the ballot asks for. However, if the ballot asks for something else, it could be a sincere vote. What instructions do you think a range voting ballot should give voters? Michael Poole election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 05:56 PM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: > > The problem is that we have this idea of > > exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate? > > *Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration. > >You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint, I must have >genuinely needed the money. This conversation is bankrupt. Yes, if I rob a bank, at gunpoint or otherwise, I obviously have sufficient motivation to take the very substantial risks involved. What's the point? (That the robber "genuinely needs the money' -- it would be more accurate, perhaps, to say that he sincerely believes he needs it -- is, in fact, proven by the fact of the robbery, to a reasonable expectation. And thus Range votes can be assumed to be sincere. Just as someone might rob a bank on a lark, perhaps in some deranged condition, a Range Vote may have nothing to do with the opinions the voter actually holds. But we will normally assume that it does. >I don't really mind if you want to define strategic voting out of >existence. I don't think it sheds light on anything, though. Just because you can't see that light doesn't mean it doesn't exist. I have not defined strategic voting out of existence. Range, quite simply, does not encourage true strategic voting. Reverse rank order in order to gain a better outcome, *that* is strategic, insincere voting. Range allows voters to express preference strength *as they define it*. I can vote pure Approval in Range; what I'm saying if I do is that I wish to support the candidacy of these candidates and I do not wish to support the candidacy of those. I say that we have become confused with utility analysis. In the end, voters will use the system to advance their own purposes -- which might include the welfare of society as a whole as a purpose, and it might not. We use utility analysis to help determine the effect of election methods on society, but that is not necessarily how voters will look at the method. However, if an election method is being used to make an economic choice, it would be quite sensible to vote according to the estimated financial effect of each option. And this analysis, for overall benefit, could quite sensibly use simple summation. If we were talking "absolute Range" where true, non-normalized expectations could be used, summation would indeed be fully appropriate. But, to me, Range looks like a method where I can support one set of candidates, fully, provide no support whatever for another set, and provide intermediate support for intermediate candidates. It is as if I am 100 voters, not one, voting 100 times in an Approval election. (And it is interesting to look at the Majority Criterion from this point of view but I won't go there now.) >I mean, it's trivial for me to imagine myself in a Range election with >a variety of personal ratings for many candidates. Since I personally >don't vote with enough uncertainty to want to undermine my own voting >power (going to the polls is enough of an inconvenience), I would vote >approval-style. And here you're basically saying you have enough >confidence in me, some random voter, to trust that I must truly care >deeply about this separation of the candidates into two sets. Yes. I think that if you vote Approval style, you are dividing the candidates into two groups, and you are willing to support one group, fully, and not the other. It is true that this might not reflect much care, it might be simple disinterest, insufficient to go to the effort of rating candidates intermediately. I'm utterly unoffended that you might vote this way. You might, under present conditions, use standard Approval "strategy." That is, vote for your favorite of the top two, and then for any candidates you equally approve or more approve. That this is called "strategy" points out the problem. It is not insincere. Range allows voters *freedom* to vote intermediate votes. It does not require them to do so. If few take advantage of it, it may be argued that the system is too complicated, and that the range should be reduced. I'd approach it from the other direction: I'd start with Approval, which is terminally simple, and then add intermediate ratings, starting with one (probably the intuitively appealing range of -1, 0, +1). If enough voters want more resolution, we can go on up. What I've become opposed to, even though I often think of ways to do it, is setting up a system that allows the expression of a preference with no rating difference. In the end, I'm thinking of Range, overall, as a system that maximizes voter satisfaction (another way of looking at utility analysis). Many of us look at elections from the point of view of how partisan voters will behave. But there are large numbers of voters who are not particularly partisan. They, obviously, vote Democratic in one election and Republican in another. Among others, these are voters who will use intermediate ratings, and
[EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
Hi, --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > > Seemed simple, I was "exaggerating." > > > > > > But wait! If I vote this way, it must be that I prefer A to B with > > > more strength than I prefer B to C. So the conditions of the problem > > > are contradictory. > > What I'm saying is that "I really want A to win" > is a sincere preference that is expressed by > bullet voting for A, and zero-rating B. If I > don't care so much, but I prefer A over all > others, I can rate A at max and B at some > intermediate rating. It all depends on how much I care. > > The problem is that we have this idea of > exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate? > *Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration. You can similarly say that if I rob a bank at gunpoint, I must have genuinely needed the money. I don't really mind if you want to define strategic voting out of existence. I don't think it sheds light on anything, though. I mean, it's trivial for me to imagine myself in a Range election with a variety of personal ratings for many candidates. Since I personally don't vote with enough uncertainty to want to undermine my own voting power (going to the polls is enough of an inconvenience), I would vote approval-style. And here you're basically saying you have enough confidence in me, some random voter, to trust that I must truly care deeply about this separation of the candidates into two sets. Kevin Venzke ___ Découvrez une nouvelle façon d'obtenir des réponses à toutes vos questions ! Profitez des connaissances, des opinions et des expériences des internautes sur Yahoo! Questions/Réponses http://fr.answers.yahoo.com election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
At 03:03 AM 3/13/2007, Kevin Venzke wrote: >Hi, > >--- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > > I used to think that I understood what "strategic" voting in Range > > was, i.e., say I prefer A>B>C. And, say, I would rate them 1, 0.5, > > and 0 respectively. Ah, but I really want A to win. So I rate B, not > > at 0.5, but at 0. > >I guess this example shows you didn't understand it. "I really want A to >win" isn't a strategic consideration. It's a statement of sincere >preference that clearly contradicts what you had just said about the >sincere preferences. And I guess this means you didn't understand what I was saying. I was exposing that very contradiction. And I went on to explain: > > Seemed simple, I was "exaggerating." > > > > But wait! If I vote this way, it must be that I prefer A to B with > > more strength than I prefer B to C. So the conditions of the problem > > are contradictory. What I'm saying is that "I really want A to win" is a sincere preference that is expressed by bullet voting for A, and zero-rating B. If I don't care so much, but I prefer A over all others, I can rate A at max and B at some intermediate rating. It all depends on how much I care. The problem is that we have this idea of exaggeration. But why would one exaggerate? *Because they care.* In other words, it is not an exaggeration. > I assumed that the preference strength was equal, > > and thus the ratings would be equally spaced. But then I essentially > > assumed that they were *not* equal, because by downrating B to zero I > > was equating B and C, risking victory by C, my least favorite. > >This example is unfortunate since with candidates with an average >utility of .5, and no information on any candidates' viability, it doesn't >matter strategically how you rate a candidate worth .5. I think that we get confused by utility consideration. Range Voting is a voting method that voters will use to maximize their expected outcome from the election. Utilities are slippery things. We think of utilities, first, in a vacuum, to come up with supposedly "sincere" ratings. But, in fact, choices are made in contexts. It is completely artificial to separate them out. That Adolf Hitler enters the contest and seems to have a chance of winning will quite likely alter our "sincere" ratings. And these new ratings are equally sincere. Range uses *relative* utility, that is, the utility of candidates relative to the others, and in the existing social context. >Let's say B is only worth .4. Now strategically you should exaggerate >and rate B 0. That's because on a single puny vote, it's inefficient to >try to save some voting power to help B beat C when the same power could >be helping A beat B for a greater improvement. > >You could also need to rate B as 0 if you do not believe that your last >choice C has a good chance of winning. This is because spending your >voting power to help B beat C is relatively pointless if C isn't going >to win. Again, you have one puny vote; it's different if yours is the only >ballot. > >Kevin Venzke > > > > > > >___ >Découvrez une nouvelle façon d'obtenir des réponses à toutes vos questions ! >Profitez des connaissances, des opinions et des >expériences des internautes sur Yahoo! Questions/Réponses >http://fr.answers.yahoo.com > >election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
[EM] RE : Re: Are proposed methods asymptotically aproaching some limit of utility?
Hi, --- Abd ul-Rahman Lomax <[EMAIL PROTECTED]> a écrit : > I used to think that I understood what "strategic" voting in Range > was, i.e., say I prefer A>B>C. And, say, I would rate them 1, 0.5, > and 0 respectively. Ah, but I really want A to win. So I rate B, not > at 0.5, but at 0. I guess this example shows you didn't understand it. "I really want A to win" isn't a strategic consideration. It's a statement of sincere preference that clearly contradicts what you had just said about the sincere preferences. > Seemed simple, I was "exaggerating." > > But wait! If I vote this way, it must be that I prefer A to B with > more strength than I prefer B to C. So the conditions of the problem > are contradictory. I assumed that the preference strength was equal, > and thus the ratings would be equally spaced. But then I essentially > assumed that they were *not* equal, because by downrating B to zero I > was equating B and C, risking victory by C, my least favorite. This example is unfortunate since with candidates with an average utility of .5, and no information on any candidates' viability, it doesn't matter strategically how you rate a candidate worth .5. Let's say B is only worth .4. Now strategically you should exaggerate and rate B 0. That's because on a single puny vote, it's inefficient to try to save some voting power to help B beat C when the same power could be helping A beat B for a greater improvement. You could also need to rate B as 0 if you do not believe that your last choice C has a good chance of winning. This is because spending your voting power to help B beat C is relatively pointless if C isn't going to win. Again, you have one puny vote; it's different if yours is the only ballot. Kevin Venzke ___ Découvrez une nouvelle façon d'obtenir des réponses à toutes vos questions ! Profitez des connaissances, des opinions et des expériences des internautes sur Yahoo! Questions/Réponses http://fr.answers.yahoo.com election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
