Here's one basic example on how tree based Condorcet methods might work in practice.
Sincere preferences: 40: A 35: B>C 25: C>B B would win (Condorcet winner). Strategic votes: 40: A 35: B>C 25: C>A (strategic) C would win. When looking at the sincere preferences we see that B and C are clones. All B supporters think that C is the second best candidate. All C supporters think that B is the second best candidate. They look like coming from the same party or same bigger grouping (e.g. right wing). It seems that it would be natural for the B and C "parties" to form an alliance. Together they will get 60% of all votes. All B and C supporters think that the alliance is ok since it will be made with the second best "party". All of them think that A should not win. If B and C form an alliance (tree branch) the candidate tree will look like (A (B C)). At the top level the election will be a race between the (B C) branch and candidate A. Branch (B C) will win 60-40 (even if C supporters would use the now useless strategy). Within that branch B has more support than C (even if C supporters would use the now useless strategy), so B wins. Forming the alliance stripped away the possibility of C supporters burying B. Even if C supporters were planning to do so they maybe would agree to form the alliance if asked (otherwise their plans could become obvious, and B could e.g. seek for a deal with A). The end result is very fair from the sincere preferences perspective. The alliance was quite natural. And it led to elimination of a risk of strategic voting. So, at least in some cases tree based Condorcet methods seem to bring happiness to the world :-). Juho ___________________________________________________________ Copy addresses and emails from any email account to Yahoo! Mail - quick, easy and free. http://uk.docs.yahoo.com/trueswitch2.html ---- election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info