Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
On Apr 22, 2007, at 7:37 , Abd ul-Rahman Lomax wrote:
>> Some voters may trust trust the candidates, some not. Both OK. The
>> new method may be so good that it makes the candidates/
>> representatives less corrupt than before. But there is also the risk
>> that candidates will use their negotiating power (e.g. in Asset
>> voting) to gain personal benefits.
>
> Risk? I find this astonishingly naive. We are talking about
> candidates for public office, who will serve in assemblies with
> legislative power. The *status quo* is that many representatives
> already "use their negotiating power to gain personal benefits."
Are you saying that this status quo would vanish overnight when
moving to an Asset voting based system?
> What is so frequently overlooked by commentators on Asset Voting
> and Delegable Proxy is that there is *already* negotiation for the
> exercise of power, but it happens at the next state, in the
> legislature
Yes, negotiations are needed at many phases. To me the question is
how many layers there are. When compared to traditional
representative democracy, Asset voting seems to introduce one
additional layer of indirection/negotiation while direct democracy
seems to eliminate one ("direct" as opposed to "representative").
> So the question is not whether Asset will lead to the abuse of
> negotiating power, for such abuse, if it is abuse, already exists.
> The question, rather, is whether or not it will make it worse or
> better.
I think it opens one new layer of negotiation, which increases the
risks. I'm not saying though that there would not be any impact in
the opposite direction too (e.g. publicity).
> I know where my votes went, generally. If they go somewhere due to
> corrupt influence, why would I be satisfied with this?
The candidates probably will not advertise being corrupt, and will
present their whatever "interesting" viewpoints and whatever
negotiation results they were dragged into in the most positive light
they can find. This applies in all systems.
>> Some may consider it better not to
>> open doors for the temptations,
>
> If it weren't so damaging, this would be hilarious. We operate in a
> system which is thoroughly vulnerable and manipulable by special
> interests. The door is wide open *now*. With Asset, we can start to
> watch the door!
I guess this is a reference to the U.S. system. There are many
alternative paths forward. Ones where current rules are not modified
or are just improved in small scale, one could touch the rules of
funding, increasing the number of parties etc.
Juho
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Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
At 03:28 PM 4/21/2007, Juho wrote: >Some voters may think that the candidates know the political >questions better and are better up to date than the voter himself/ >herself. Some think the other way around. Both OK. The voter may be >confident in his/her opinions and finds deviations from them >uncomfortable. Another voter learns from what the candidates say and >changes his/her opinions accordingly. In my opinion the one who properly decides if a voter is competent to vote on a topic that affects him or her is the voter himself or herself. The protection against incompetent voting in a direct/democracy Delegable Proxy or Asset Voting system is that the individual voter *may* vote, but is not required to and is not asked to by the system. The default is that someone you choose votes for you. But it is entirely up to you whether or not you want to vote on your own behalf. With Asset Voting, to vote yourself you register as a candidate and simply vote for yourself. I expect that there might be some fee associated with registration, but it should be minimal, essentially enough to cover costs, and costs would be kept to a minimum. A booklet might be published listing all registered candidates in a jurisdiction, with a code to be used for actually voting. (Asset makes it practical for *many* candidates to make themselves available, because no longer are small numbers of votes wasted.) (And this is, of course, in a system where direct voting is possible, direct voting in the assembly. It might be over the internet, it might not be. Asset makes it possible for direct voting to take place, because electors under asset are public voters and it is known who is carrying their votes in the assembly, so assembly votes can be adjusted as necessary by direct votes. Basic Asset Voting does not necessarily lead to the allowance of direct voting, it merely makes it possible.) >Some voters may trust trust the candidates, some not. Both OK. The >new method may be so good that it makes the candidates/ >representatives less corrupt than before. But there is also the risk >that candidates will use their negotiating power (e.g. in Asset >voting) to gain personal benefits. Risk? I find this astonishingly naive. We are talking about candidates for public office, who will serve in assemblies with legislative power. The *status quo* is that many representatives already "use their negotiating power to gain personal benefits." Those benefits may be political -- which is not necessarily corrupt -- or personal, some of which involves corruption. What is so frequently overlooked by commentators on Asset Voting and Delegable Proxy is that there is *already* negotiation for the exercise of power, but it happens at the next state, in the legislature (as well as during campaigns, involving funding and support.) So the question is not whether Asset will lead to the abuse of negotiating power, for such abuse, if it is abuse, already exists. The question, rather, is whether or not it will make it worse or better. Remember, in Asset the votes are public. If I've voted for so-and-so, he or she may not know that I voted for him or her, but I know. And I know where my votes went, generally. If they go somewhere due to corrupt influence, why would I be satisfied with this? In Asset systems as in Delegable Proxy, the voters main focus is on the voter's link to the hierarchy, and on the path up that hierarchy. It is far, far easier to watch that path, to watch what, precisely, is being done with one's vote, not only in seating members of the assembly, but in votes subsequent to that, than it is under current systems as well as in most of the more advanced systems being proposed. There is *responsibility.* Representation is still shared, in one sense, but in another it is *personal.* I can take my vote away from the representative. (In direct voting systems, I can do so by voting. In delegable proxy systems, we usually assume that the proxy can be revoked at any time, in addition to being effectively canceled on a vote per vote basis by a direct vote cast by the client.) > Some may consider it better not to >open doors for the temptations, If it weren't so damaging, this would be hilarious. We operate in a system which is thoroughly vulnerable and manipulable by special interests. The door is wide open *now*. With Asset, we can start to watch the door! Delegable Proxy goes further, but delegable proxy, structurally, is a fractal. On the biological analogies, that's absolutely appropriate, but many people seem to have a lot of difficulty wrapping their head around it. I point out that, to the base level client, it looks extremely simple. There is a single clear path from the client to the top. That this path is cross-linked massively should not distract from that simplicity. But, still, DP would create top-level assemblies where the members have variable voting power, and some fear t
Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
Some voters may think that the candidates know the political
questions better and are better up to date than the voter himself/
herself. Some think the other way around. Both OK. The voter may be
confident in his/her opinions and finds deviations from them
uncomfortable. Another voter learns from what the candidates say and
changes his/her opinions accordingly.
Some voters may trust trust the candidates, some not. Both OK. The
new method may be so good that it makes the candidates/
representatives less corrupt than before. But there is also the risk
that candidates will use their negotiating power (e.g. in Asset
voting) to gain personal benefits. Some may consider it better not to
open doors for the temptations, since these things may well become
common practice one day, starting from one edge of the candidate
community and spreading wider later ("since everybody else seems to
do the negotiations that way too").
Different countries an societies may have different tendency and
incentives to get corrupt. And different voters (and voting method
promoters) are different as discussed above.
Juho
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Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
This is a good example to demonstrate how our experience with politics has warped and reinforced our cynicism, to the point that when a door is opened and there some blue sky out there, we don't recognize it. We think it will be the same smoke-filled room we have always known. Watch! At 05:12 PM 4/20/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote: > > (My own thinking about this is clear: I think that my favorite > > candidate is going to know the other candidates *much* better than I. > > Besides, if I have an opinion, why can't I communicate that to my > > favorite? After all, if I trust this person, presumably I would trust > > that he or she would give my opinion a fair hearing!) > >I disagree: >Imagine a classical 2D political spectrum: >http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:2d_political_spectrum.png > >with 1 voter in the middle (0,0) and 3 candidates >Candidate A is at (0, 1) >Candidate B is at (0, -1.1) >Candidate C is at (0.5, 1) > >If the voter votes for the candidate closest to them on the political >spectrum there preference would be >A > B > C > >But if A is allowed to transfer my votes he would choose the one closest >to Them IE C. What Swerdfeger is pointing to is nothing more than the obvious. The first preference of my first preference is not necessarily my second preference. You don't need math to see that! I'm not voting for a clone of myself, but for someone I trust. Two very different approaches. The first approach, standard operating procedure for most people in the present system, is to vote for someone whose position on the issues most closely matches my own. Swerdfeger *assumes* that this is optimal. I actually disagree on that very assumption. Swerdfeger also assumes that someone the voter trust will *also* follow the same process: issue match. I would much rather have someone in charge whose judgement I trust than someone who most closely matches my own opinions. Why? Well, if I were someone thoroughly conversant with all the issues, issue positions might be much more important to me. It's not that they are *un* important. But if I'm voting for a candidate because I like, for example, their positions on economic issues, and then comes an unexpected possible cause of war, I can end up being awfully unhappy that I went for an issue -- or even a complex of issues -- than for trustworthiness. Quite simply, I can't anticipate many of the issues that a representative will actually face. And that is what we are really talking about. Nobody is suggesting, here, Asset for single-winer officer elections. (If it is used for officer elections, an excellent suggestion was made on the RV list, in the last couple of days: one votes for electors, not for candidates, and the electors are disqualified from the office for that election. This would make Asset Voting, in fact, usable for single-winner.) The presumption Swerdfeger makes is that I want as my representative in, say, the state assembly to be the one who most closely matches my position on all the anticipable issues. Not only is this a problem with regard to unanticipated issues, but it is also a problem in two other major ways: (1) It assumes that I understand the issues. Do I understand the issues faced by the Assembly of our state? How much time have I put into study of those issues, compared with people who are actually charged with making the decisions? Who also have staff to help them with the process I may have opinions, and even strong opinions, but that is not the same as being adequately informed and having had the opportunity to reflect on it. I would rather choose someone who, I trust, will *understand* my concerns and will make decisions that, were I to have the opportunity, I would at least consider reasonable. (2) It makes me totally vulnerable to manipulation through standard political doubletalk and just plain lying. Swerdfeger thinks this unavoidable. But he has overlooked something, something crucial to understanding how Asset could *radically* change the face of politics. >Any way, I do not trust A as far as I can throw him! >He might be my first choice but he is still a politician. You assume. Let me suggest this if you ever see an Asset election: Don't vote for a candidate you don't trust. Period. If you trust anyone who is willing to serve, and who might have better access to good information about the uther candidates, preferably face-to-face information and understanding, then choose that person. And if there is no such person, you might first wonder a little about yourself, perhaps you are ... paranoid. Asset makes the field of possible candidates vast, unless it is combined with restrictive rules about who could be a candidate to receive votes. Which would essentially be giving us Asset with one hand and taking away its best feature with the other. Asset allows you to vote for anyone without wasting your vote. Get this. Asset allows you to vote for *anyone* wi
Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
> (My own thinking about this is clear: I think that my favorite > candidate is going to know the other candidates *much* better than I. > Besides, if I have an opinion, why can't I communicate that to my > favorite? After all, if I trust this person, presumably I would trust > that he or she would give my opinion a fair hearing!) I disagree: Imagine a classical 2D political spectrum: http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:2d_political_spectrum.png with 1 voter in the middle (0,0) and 3 candidates Candidate A is at (0, 1) Candidate B is at (0, -1.1) Candidate C is at (0.5, 1) If the voter votes for the candidate closest to them on the political spectrum there preference would be A > B > C But if A is allowed to transfer my votes he would choose the one closest to Them IE C. Any way, I do not trust A as far as I can throw him! He might be my first choice but he is still a politician. > It's quite possible to combine the methods. > > For example, it's been proposed that voters *may* on an Asset ballot, > specify ranked assignments for their votes. If they do so, the votes > will be reassigned accordingly. The Asset aspect only comes into play > when the ranks are exhausted. (I would assume that the vote reverts > to the first-preference candidate, and if there is more than one of > these, to the collection of them, divided.) > > This hybrid method is fully STV and fully Asset. The voters > themselves determine how their own vote is handled. The extra cost is > really only the extra cost of a ranked ballot, which is small. Pure > Asset is easier to count. > > In the other direction, candidates can publish lists of how they > would intend to transfer their votes. This is a method of its own, > called Candidate List, it's been discussed some, if the transfers are > automatic. If they are only a promise (as the votes of electors in > the U.S. Electoral College are only promises, though "faithless > electors" are quite rare), then it is Asset as a method, but > preserves flexibility. The promise can be broken if conditions appear > that make it advisable. I would not expect a candidate I trusted > would change the transfers unless there *was* a good reason, perhaps > some fact that surfaces that was not known when the list was published. On the subject of lists. They Must be enforced if they exist. I am generally against them as they centralize power, but to allow somebody to break an election promise with no threat of recall! that is unconscionable! *NOTE : sarcasm warning above* > Because Asset is really a deliberative method, it's tricky to use > standard election method criteria to judge it. Generally, however, it > would seem to satisfy *all* the major criteria. (We have to > amalgamate the intelligence and preferences of the voters and those > whom they trust in order to think this. A free proxy, which is what > Asset candidates become if they hold votes, it is assumed, will not > necessarily follow the first preference of those who voted for him or > her -- except for candidate list -- but may, indeed, match that > preference *if the voter were to become more fully informed.*) May is the optimal word. There is no reason why a "free proxy" as you say would follow voters preference. Even in a world where all voters and candidates have perfect information on everybody else position (see example above). As, I am slowly coming to the realization that there can be no democracy without a large amount of voter knowledge, not just on the candidates positions. But, also on the effects these policies have on the lives of the voters. I would counter your "Free proxy", with "Education reform", side tracking this thread even further by saying that the largest single holdup to the implementation of a true democracy, is the fact the majority of citizens do not fully (or even partially) understand how specific policy changes effect them. One could also say that your "Free proxy" method will breed corruption (more so then current democracies) by encouraging voters to understand less about each and every candidate. > retain the positive features of direct democracy without losing the > necessary benefits of representative democracy.) Question: Other than issues of scale. Are there any actual benefits to representative democracy? > > > > > > > election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
At 11:09 AM 4/19/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: >I think it has the same problems as PR-STV where surpluses are not >transferred. A >voter wastes the excess of his vote if he votes for someone who is elected. I'm just taking the opportunity to note the similarity between multiwinner STV and Asset Voting. With multiwinner STV the vote transfers are guided by user rankings, and in Asset Voting, by, essentially, a proxy chosen by the voter. They are really the same method, differing only in who provides the tranfer information. If you think that the voters are in a better position to judge who, among the collection of candidates, should win, than would be the candidate most trusted by each voter, then you'd prefer STV, and if you think that candidates would know the qualifications of other candidates better, then you might prefer Asset. (My own thinking about this is clear: I think that my favorite candidate is going to know the other candidates *much* better than I. Besides, if I have an opinion, why can't I communicate that to my favorite? After all, if I trust this person, presumably I would trust that he or she would give my opinion a fair hearing!) It's quite possible to combine the methods. For example, it's been proposed that voters *may* on an Asset ballot, specify ranked assignments for their votes. If they do so, the votes will be reassigned accordingly. The Asset aspect only comes into play when the ranks are exhausted. (I would assume that the vote reverts to the first-preference candidate, and if there is more than one of these, to the collection of them, divided.) This hybrid method is fully STV and fully Asset. The voters themselves determine how their own vote is handled. The extra cost is really only the extra cost of a ranked ballot, which is small. Pure Asset is easier to count. In the other direction, candidates can publish lists of how they would intend to transfer their votes. This is a method of its own, called Candidate List, it's been discussed some, if the transfers are automatic. If they are only a promise (as the votes of electors in the U.S. Electoral College are only promises, though "faithless electors" are quite rare), then it is Asset as a method, but preserves flexibility. The promise can be broken if conditions appear that make it advisable. I would not expect a candidate I trusted would change the transfers unless there *was* a good reason, perhaps some fact that surfaces that was not known when the list was published. Because Asset is really a deliberative method, it's tricky to use standard election method criteria to judge it. Generally, however, it would seem to satisfy *all* the major criteria. (We have to amalgamate the intelligence and preferences of the voters and those whom they trust in order to think this. A free proxy, which is what Asset candidates become if they hold votes, it is assumed, will not necessarily follow the first preference of those who voted for him or her -- except for candidate list -- but may, indeed, match that preference *if the voter were to become more fully informed.*) I have suggested again and again that the ideal election method is fully deliberative, and that is exactly what Asset is, and what few other methods are. The only difference between Asset and direct democracy is that there are two sets of voters, secret and public, and, generally, any voter can become a public voter. (This does create some security problems, but in "difficult situations," there are procedures which can ameliorate this, I've described them elsewhere. Bottom line, though, to the extent that this is done, to that extent there is a loss of the freedom of direct democracy. Direct democracy without proxy representation, of course, is impossible as the scale becomes sufficient, but proxy democracy is probably superior to direct democracy *if* proxy assignments are free and unconstricted, and revocable at any time; further, if there is direct voting by proxies or electors on *all* issues -- as distinct from the deliberative rights of full members of an assembly -- we retain the positive features of direct democracy without losing the necessary benefits of representative democracy.) election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [EM] election-methods Digest, Vol 34, Issue 22
RE: [EM] Tim Hull's PR method Warren Smith wds at math.temple.edu > > 1. Voters vote for up to n candidates - n being either # of open seats or > > # of candidates > > 2. Each voter has one vote equally and evenly divided among the candidates > > they voted for. > > 3. After doing the first count, eliminate the candidate with the fewest > > votes. > > 4. Recount all ballots, dividing votes equally and evenly among *remaining > > candidates only* > > 5. Repeat Steps 3 and 4 until there are only as many candidates remaining > > as there are open seats. > > 6. The remaining candidates shall be declared elected. > > > > Any comments on this method? > -- > > WDS: it seems to me this method is not PR in the sense that voters who vote > for single candidate risk having their votes wiped out, and this other > problem: > > EXAMPLE: > there are 10 Dems & 10 Repubs running for 10 seats. > The voters are 51% Dem and 49% Repub. > Each Repub voter votes for all 10 > Repubs (who thus initially each get 0.1 vote). > Each Dem voter voters 100% for just one Dem - Bill Clinton. Really > the Dem voters feel > Clinton > all other Dems > all Repubs, > but this voting scheme does not allow them to express that feeling, so they > give it all to Clinton. > > Result: 9 Dems eliminated, then 1 repub eliminated, then > the 10 winners are Clinton + 9 repubs. > > The problem here is that the Dem voters are "pickier" than the Repub voters. > A lot of PR-design-attempts run onto this kind of reef. I think it has the same problems as PR-STV where surpluses are not transferred. A voter wastes the excess of his vote if he votes for someone who is elected. > Well, actually, Hull's method *is* PR in the sense that if voters are > assumed to > vote for candidates of their "color" only, and for all of them - > then winner-counts end up proportional. > > That's nice. It's kind of a PR generalization of "approval voting." It is similar to PR-STV with equal rankings, except that only 2 ranks are allowed and there are no surplus transfers, only eliminations. (So maybe not so similar :) ). In PR-STV with equal rankings allowed, is it normal to re-calculate the fraction when a candidate is eliminated (or elected)? Raphfrk Interesting site "what if anyone could modify the laws" www.wikocracy.com Check Out the new free AIM(R) Mail -- 2 GB of storage and industry-leading spam and email virus protection. election-methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
