Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Dear Abd ul-Rahman, I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions; What exactly is majority consent? In my understanding consent means *all* voters share some opinion... what do you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority? It is not democratic whenever some group can impose its will on the others (in the sense of making their preferred outcome certain). No matter whether that group is a majority or a minority. From this it follows that a method which is always deterministic cannot possibly be democratic. Question: if the majority explicitly consents to this for a specific election, does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion? If the system would have allowed the majority to decide otherwise, the *system* is majoritarian. I'm not sure at all what a just share of power is. Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually begin. What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain sufficient information to determine justice. Yes it does. I gave a reasoning why I consider C the more just solution because everyone prefers it to the democratic benchmark. Again, without defining justice, but relying upon common understanding of it, we can easily construct scenarios that fully explain the ratings as sincere, but which have quite different implications regarding justice. In the challenge election, to repeat, we have 55: A 100, B 0, C 80 45: A 0, B 100, C 80 It was assumed that the ratings were sincere, though that was not defined. I gave at least two interpretations of this, so it was defined. I prefer the preferences over lotteries interpretation. Now, it's obvious that C is what we would ordinarily understand as the best winner. But a majority will disagree, and thus the challenge. I don't recall the exact wording, but is there a method which, if adopted, would cause C to win, even if the A and B voters are selfish, and we might assume, the A voters know that they are in the majority? The answer given was Borda with equal ranking prohibited. Now, when I first read this, I did not properly understand it. I should repeat what I did before, only correctly. Let me be explicit about how this could elect C. I will modify the way Borda count from how it is usually stated to make it equivalent to a Range 2 election (CR 3). Sincere votes. 55: ACB 45: BCA Counts: A, B, C 55: 2 0 1 45: 0 2 1 totals: A 110, B 90, C 100. This does not elect C. However the B voters, if they understand the situation, can vote 45: CBA or counts A, B, C: 45: 0 1 2 totals: A 110, B 45, C 145. C wins, so it appears a quite desirable strategy for the B voters, as we would understand the sincere ratings. Is there a counter-strategy? What if the A voters reverse their second and third preferences? 55: 2 1 0 With the strategic votes from the other side the totals are A 110, B 100, C 90; they defeat the compromise attempted by the B voters. However, the gain is relatively small, it would seem (but there is an assumption that a gain of 20 in rating is small. Not necessarily.) and with the original sincere Borda votes from the B voters, this counterstrategy would give us totals A 110, B 135, C 90. So, somewhat off the topic, but interesting nevertheless, the B voters, being not only selfish, but clever, mount a secret campaign to get all the B voters to vote the strategy. However, they also arrange to leak this information to the A voters, and, *supersecretly*, they are not going to do that, they are going to vote sincerely. If the A voters fall for it and vote strategically, to defeat the nefarious stratagem of the B voters, and the B voters then simply vote sincerely, B prevails, which is a disaster for the A voters and a total victory for the B voters. The A voters are *probably* better off simply voting sincerely. And that was Jobst's point. I don't think that was my point. In order to get a stable situation, i.e. a group strategy equilibrium, all voters should order reverse to make sure the other faction cannot reverse the outcome to their advantage. So the A voters are better off voting CAB. For this reason, I consider Borda a possible but not a good solution to the problem. Juho's suggestion to use weights like 1.4, 1, and 0 improves this since with them C is already elected with sincere ballots. Explicitly, Jobst stated that the ratings given were not utilities, and that he doesn't believe in utilities as having any meaning. Again, this is not true. I only stated that I don't believe in *measurable* utilities or, most importantly, even in *commensurable * ones. That does not mean I regard the term utility as meaningless. When someone prefers some A to some B, I think we can
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
Dear Abd ul-Rahman, the ratings that Jobst fed us as a distraction. You're doing it again -- please stop it. That was not an insult. It made the challenge more interesting. I'm sorry that you thought it critical. I don't think it was insulting. You just repeatedly attribute opinions or intentions to me which are not mine. I explained several times how the ratings are meant to have more meaning than just rankings. I also don't think you were critical here, but I certainly invite you to be it! The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages, since I really have trouble to read that much! Yours, Jobst Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
Seems there's something seriously broken with copy/paste on AIM mail. From: Jobst Heitzig [EMAIL PROTECTED] Democratic decision systems avoid the necessity of fighting to prove strength by assuming strength from numbers and making the necessary accomodations. In my opinion democracy in its basic meaning is not just a tool to reproduce the result of a violent process without the violent process. Taking that analogy further. If there was a civil war between a 55/45 split of the popluation, there would be lots of damage to both sides. The 'nuclear option' doesn't quite simulate that. However, it does impose some cost on the majority, without preventing them from doing whatever they want. Another proposal I had was that the majority should be allowed to pass bills without a supermajority, but the minority had the authority to delay them. This prevents the minority rule effect, while still giving the minority some power. For example, A proposal to pass a bill (or maybe just to bring it to a vote) can be passed by - 1 count with 2/3 support - 2 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 62.5% support in both counts - 3 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 57.5% support in all counts - 4 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with 52.5% support in all counts - 5 counts spaced at least 1 month apart with majority support in all counts This allows a 1/3 minority to delay any bill by 1 month a 37.5% minority to delay any bill by 2 months a 42.5% minority to delay any bill by 3 months a 47.5% minority to delay any bill by 4 months From the war analogy, a strong minority could delay the majority implementing its proposals immediately, even if they ultimately lost. The next question is what would be acceptable to get the above rule implemented in the first place. A referendum to modify the constitution with 50%+1 support ? I'm not sure at all what a just share of power is. Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually begin. In Northern Ireland, they have a power sharing executive. Each member of the assembly declares as a member of a party. Cabinet positions are then allocated using the d'Hondt method. The party leader can assign anyone from the assembly to the cabinet position. This somewhat discriminates against smaller parties as the largest parties always gets to pick first. Assuming that the seats aren't all roughly equal, the best one or 2 will be assigned before a small party gets a chance. Also, there has been some strategic moves from one party to another after the election. I would probably have implemented it using Jan's tree structure. Groups of parties can form a super-party (and maybe some party members could form a sub-party). The seats are assigned to the group using d'Hondt and then between the parties in the group. The parties in NI would probably split into groups, unionist, nationalist and neither. Strategic party changes have been used to shift total cabinet seats between unionist and nationalist. Nope. Depends on situation. In my example, 49% have no power at all. That everyone has 1 vote does not mean everyone has the same power. It is only a formal equality. It is actually equal, one vote is perfectally replacable by another. The problem exists outside the individual voter. The problem is caused when you have a majority that is block voting. This is kinda like a monopoly in the free market. The standard benefits break down. Logrolling means that in Congress, there is a certain amount of vote trading which means that the result is closer to utility optimal. However, they don't always (ever?) actually look at what they are giving up in exchange for votes later on. Also, in a non-2 party system, there is often more than one potential coalition. This leads to negotiation between the parties and again that should lead to all opinions being considered. Ofc, in practice, only certain coalition permutations are possible. This can lead to some parties not having much power. However, if a coalition was to form that was seriously a problem, the party members could break ranks and give their support to the least bad option so that the worst doesn't happen. This is a safety valve that doesn't really occur. Alternatively, they could go for something like Germany's current grand coalition. Also, even in parties with a strong tradition of cohesion, if the party leadership was to agree to something unacceptable, they could break ranks. Finally, even if none of the above applies, you don't want to alienate potential future coalition partners to much. And in pure democratic process, there are only two groups, and no decision is made unless one outnumbers the others. I.e., if the Yes faction outnumbers, the No faction, the motion prevails; otherwise, it fails. What you call a pure democratic process is just what
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions
At 12:23 AM 8/30/2007, Paul Kislanko wrote: If I understand the meaning of the original example correctly, the answer is Asset voting. Give every voter 100 points. By the conditions given, both the A and B voters think C is 80% as good as their true favorite, so give 5/9 of their points to their favorite and 4/9 to C. A's total is 55 x 5/9 = 275/9 B's total is 45 x 5/9 = 225/9 C's total is 55 x 4/9 + 45 x 4/9 = 100 x 4/9 = 400/9 so C wins. Mr. Kislanko misunderstood the conditions of the problem. One of the conditions was that the voters were selfish. What is to stop tha A voters from giving all their points to A? Range handles the problem quite well if voters vote sincerely. But the A voters, voting sincerely, are voting against their own interests. That's the problem. If they are selfish, they will simply elect A. I dislike, by the way, describing voters as selfish if they vote in their own interest. That's the default, they *should* vote in their own interest. What I ended up suggesting was that the problem is resolved if the voters negotiate. It's possible to set up transfers of value (money?) such that the utilities are equalized, and that the benefit of selecting C is thus distributed such that the A voters do *not* lose by voting for C. If they vote for A, they get A but no compensation. If they vote for C, they get C plus compensation. If the utilities were accurate -- Juho claimed that they were *not* utilities, but that then makes the problem incomprehensible in real terms -- then overall satisfication is probably optimized by the choice of C with compensation to the A voters, coming from the C voters. Certainly the reverse is possible, that is, the A voters could pay the C voters compensation to elect A, but it would have to be much higher compensation! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there're only 2 factions
At 04:18 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: Dear Abd ul-Rahman, I am most concerned about majority *consent.* Jobst is ignoring the fact that I'm suggesting majority *consent* for decisions; What exactly is majority consent? In my understanding consent means *all* voters share some opinion... No. That's consensus. Consent is individual acceptance of a result, majority consent refers to consent by a majority. what do you call it when a minority imposes its will on a majority? It is not democratic whenever some group can impose its will on the others (in the sense of making their preferred outcome certain). No matter whether that group is a majority or a minority. From this it follows that a method which is always deterministic cannot possibly be democratic. This is a serious error. It treats democracy as an absolute, when, in fact, it is relative. We have complete democracy, with respect to some decision, when everyone consents. And we have no democracy if nobody consents. A situation is more democratic when not when a majority consent. This is the point where we can start to term the result democratic. But its not fully democratic unless everyone consents. Question: if the majority explicitly consents to this for a specific election, does the election method satisfy the Majority Criterion? If the system would have allowed the majority to decide otherwise, the *system* is majoritarian. No, that was not the question, which was quite specific. It's a bit rude not to answer the question! I did not ask if the system was majoritarian, and that is not clearly defined. I'm not sure at all what a just share of power is. Me neither. But no power at all is definitely not a just share of power. By posting on this topic I hope a discussion on this will eventually begin. What I pointed out here was that the ratings given did not contain sufficient information to determine justice. Yes it does. I gave a reasoning why I consider C the more just solution because everyone prefers it to the democratic benchmark. But your democratic benchmark, apparently, requires consensus. Yet you would, it appears, impose the result of C even if the A voters don't consent. The word justice does not refer to any democratic benchmark. Democracy and justice are not synonyms. Again, without defining justice, but relying upon common understanding of it, we can easily construct scenarios that fully explain the ratings as sincere, but which have quite different implications regarding justice. In the challenge election, to repeat, we have 55: A 100, B 0, C 80 45: A 0, B 100, C 80 It was assumed that the ratings were sincere, though that was not defined. I gave at least two interpretations of this, so it was defined. I prefer the preferences over lotteries interpretation. That's correct, a definition was given. My apologies. However, the central point is that these are relative ratings, not absolute ones. They are not commensurable, so aggregating them in this form is vulnerable to imbalances that can represent injustice. We'd see this if we were to implement an auction that created a transfer of value such that true utilities become known (Which would you prefer, a payment of +/-$X or the victory of A?). If you are poor, you might prefer the money and then live with the inconvenience of, say, increased travel. That's fair! But you probably would not, even if poor, shift your vote significantly for $5. Explicitly, Jobst stated that the ratings given were not utilities, and that he doesn't believe in utilities as having any meaning. Again, this is not true. I only stated that I don't believe in *measurable* utilities or, most importantly, even in *commensurable * ones. That does not mean I regard the term utility as meaningless. When someone prefers some A to some B, I think we can interpret this as A having more utility for her than B. But this more need not be representable by real numbers. Real utilities can be discovered by various means, and so made commensurable. It's not difficult to think of schemes for this, but it does not have to be part of the election method itself. Rather, it can be something that the public engages in voluntarily. Using it, we could make Plurality elections quite fair! And fully democratic. If you can get the large majority of people to agree, and you should be able to do this through appropriate negotiation -- in general, not always -- then these people will simply vote in their own interest and in agreement and you will get more complete democracy Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Elect the Compromise
At 04:23 AM 8/30/2007, Jobst Heitzig wrote: The only thing I wish is that you try to be post shorter messages, since I really have trouble to read that much! Sorry, don't have time! Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions
At 08:19 AM 8/30/2007, [EMAIL PROTECTED] wrote: That isn't how asset voting works. You assign your vote to the elector that you most trust. The elector can then assign the vote to any candidate after negotitation. Actually, what Paul wrote about was the original Asset proposal. I proposed Fractional Approval Asset Voting (which might normally mean that voters would vote for one, but they are *allowed* to vote for more than one), to make the ballot practical and simple. In FAAV, if you vote for N, the vote is divided fractionally, as 1/N, to each candidate you vote for. But the original proposal allowed votes to be real numbers in the range of 0 to 1, with the restriction that they sum to one. If that is what we wanted, we would probably normalize the ballots, to avoid problems with math errors. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
Re: [Election-Methods] Challenge: Elect the compromise when there'reonly 2 factions
At 09:48 AM 8/30/2007, Howard Swerdfeger wrote: In personal economics a diversified portfolio helps reduce risk, I see no reason why in fractional asset should not follow the same logic. by diversifying the people or groups you give your votes to you reduce risk of your vote being corrupted. Well, whether or not it reduces risk depends on the effort you can put into watching how your vote works. There are two versions of the adage: Don't put all your eggs in one basket, and Put all your eggs in one basket and watch that basket like a hawk! If you have eggs in many baskets, you may not be able to watch them. FAAV allows you to make the choice, while the ballot remains very simple. I'd probably vote for one, though, because I think know who, quite precisely, represents me, and I can talk to this person. Now, with secret ballot, I could vote for five and then talk to one, it still works. But then I really only know how one fraction of my vote is working Someone who is relatively uninformed about all the possible candidates -- which is pretty braod in Asset, we assume that something very similar to write-in is allowed -- might indeed decide to spread the vote out among a number of candidates, not being sure about whom to trust. But, generally, in my view, the best strategy in asset is to pick the single candidate you most trust. If this is based on knowledge, it's safer than spreading it around. That a candidate is getting a *lot* of votes, though, is a mark against him in Asset! It does make him a target for possible corruption. So that, too, is a factor. Asset turns traditional politics on its head. Voting for one person is quite practical in Asset, you can even simply vote for yourself, in which case you become a public elector and can participate in the direct democracy of electors. Election-Methods mailing list - see http://electorama.com/em for list info
